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The Institutional Relations and Relationships of the United 
Kingdom Final Court of Appeal; an empirical analysis of the UK’s 
top courts 2007-2011 
Jaclyn Paterson 
Abstract 
This thesis conducts a systematic, empirical examination of each of the judgments that arose in the 
UK final court of appeal in the sessions 2007-2011, covering the transitional period between the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. The aim 
of the thesis was to establish whether the institutional independence of the court, following the 
enactment of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, resulted in a more powerful court within the UK 
constitution. The relative power of the court was gauged by empirically reviewing each of the court’s 
legal and political institutional relationships, together with the administrative efficiency of the court, 
across the transitional period. The study concludes with an assessment of whether the Supreme 
Court appeared to be a more powerful and assertive institution than its predecessor. The conclusion 
also draws upon the significant effects that the influence of the European Convention of Human 
Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights appeared to have on the 
court’s institutional relationships and administrative efficiency in the time period. 
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Chapter 1; Introduction 
 
The 1st October 2009 was one of the most significant dates in the UK’s modern constitutional 
history. It brought apparent legal, theoretical as well as visual changes to the constitution and 
seemingly went against the UK’s constitutional heritage of evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
change. The commanding words of s23 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (‘CRA’), which had 
forewarned that ‘there is to be a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom’, were brought into force.1 
The Lords of Appeal in Ordinary who had sat in the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords 
(‘Appellate Committee’) immediately before the commencement of Part 3 of the CRA 2005 became 
the new Justices of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (‘Supreme Court’)2 and the jurisdiction 
of the Appellate Committee, alongside the devolution issue jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council (‘JCPC’), was transferred to the new court.3  
Visually, the Supreme Court instantly benefitted from being housed in a distinct building separate 
from Parliament. The neo-gothic architectural building of the former Middlesex Guildhall on 
Parliament Square was to be the home of the new Supreme Court. The choice of Parliament Square 
as the setting for the new court was fitting, being at the heart of the UK’s modern day political, legal 
and constitutional machinery.  The prestigious location of the court conveyed to the outside world 
the central role that the court was to play within the UK’s legal and political constitution.4   
The new court was a blank canvas from which to carve a new reputation and that reputation had to 
be established across each of the court’s institutional relationships. This thesis explores the nature 
of the final appeal court’s political and legal institutional relationships in the years 2007-2011, 
covering the transition from the Appellate Committee to the Supreme Court, by empirically 
measuring changes that occurred in those relationships during that time period. The empirical study 
asks a series of questions, each designed to comment on a specific aspect of an institutional 
relationship, across 246 judgments that arose in the time period.  
The thesis begins with a thematic review of institutional relations and relationships. The section that 
follows explores the relative dynamism of the constitution and the extent to which it sets the 
framework for institutional relationships and state institutional power. This leads to the theoretical 
                                                             
1
CRA 2005 (Commencement No. 11) Order 2009 
2
s24 CRA 2005 
3
s40 and sch 9 CRA 2005 
4JAG Griffiths,‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42(1) MLR 1, 17. See also D Nicol, ‘Law and Politics after the 
Human Rights Act’ [2006] PL 722 
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background to the project, which focuses on the constitutional principles underpinning the UK 
constitution that have the capacity to accommodate fluctuating judicial power, to realign 
institutional relationships and provide the judiciary with a more prominent constitutional role.  
Finally, the introductory chapter provides a review of the political and legal reasons for creating the 
Supreme Court and the extent to which a change in role for the court was envisaged as part of the 
constitutional changes enacted by the CRA. 
The introduction will then move on to look at the influence that constitutional theory had on the 
design of empirical database and structure of the thesis. Empirical studies of Appellate Committee 
are relatively scarce in the UK, however they provide the foundations for the current study and 
demonstrate the complexity but immense utility of empirical work. The empirical studies, the 
relevant constitutional theoretical literature and extra-judicial opinion are best appreciated when 
set in the context of the current study and will therefore be referred to throughout the thesis. 
Thematic Review; Institutional Relations and Relationships  
 
The central theme linking the chapters of this thesis is the institutional relationships of the Supreme 
Court. The legal, social and political positioning of the Supreme Court is not fixed and is instead 
relative to the character of the institutional relationship examined. This is termed ‘relative power’ in 
the thesis.  Relative power appreciates that the power dynamics between the final appeal court and 
each of the institutions reviewed together with the influence which one institution has over the 
other will differ, depending on where that institution is placed either legally or politically within the 
constitution.  The power of an institution may change at different points in time or as a result of an 
external event.5  For each relationship there is a notional axis of power and the relative power of the 
Supreme Court will depend upon which of these relations or underlying relationships is viewed. The 
data generated from the variables, for both the Appellate Committee and Supreme Court, will form 
the basis of this assessment. The data will record where the power balance appears to lie in any 
given relationship over the study period and whether there was any perceptible change in these 
relations from the two years preceding the 1st October 2009 to the two years thereafter. 
In measuring change, it should be remembered that the two final appeal courts under review are not 
discrete institutions. The Supreme Court is the successor of the Appellate Committee and the JCPC 
and as such, carries forth many of the characteristics of the Appellate Committee. The CRA appeared 
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to create a new court, borne from statute and specific constitutional design, however the Supreme 
Court has a legal pedigree dating back over one hundred years to the enactment of the Appellate 
Jurisdiction Act 1876.  Blom-Cooper and Drewry felt that the institutional relationships ‘between the 
House of Lords and other legal, political and administrative institutions’ were part of the ‘flesh’ of 
the Appellate Committee.6 The Supreme Court had to develop its institutional relations from the 
point that they were left by the Appellate Committee. Indeed, the linkage between the Appellate 
Committee and the Supreme Court is emphasised by the fact that many of the Law Lords became 
the first Justices of the Supreme Court, informing its founding practices and steering its initial 
course.  Any attempt to empirically measure the changes in these relationships had to acknowledge 
and be sensitive to the heritage and personnel of the Supreme Court and the part they played in 
shaping institutional relationships going forward. 
Constitutional Dynamism and Institutional Relationships 
 
State institutions each have a role to play in creating, enforcing or revising the legal order. The 
constitution, within a democracy, must recognise the non-static nature of state power and account 
for how that power is balanced between the institutions and how it is legitimately demarcated and 
controlled.7 An accurate assessment of institutional power permits those institutions to be held to 
account for their actions and their authority legitimately maintained.8 The constitution and the 
theory underpinning it are therefore continually developing.  
The most enduring constitutional power in the UK remains that of a sovereign Parliament.  
According to Dicey’s orthodox theory, Parliament has the power to make or unmake any law 
whatsoever and thus has the legal, constitutional and theoretical power to override any law, 
convention or constitutional principle, including the parallel imperative of the rule of law.9 However, 
in recent times this Diceyan concept of sovereign power has been challenged by increasing judicial 
power.10 This power has been arrogated to the judges either through the common law11 or through 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
5This was acknowledged by the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution. It felt that the 
‘character’ of relations between the judiciary, the executive and the legislature had ‘… changed significantly’ as 
a result of ‘changes in governance’ and ‘wider societal change.’ House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution, Relations between the Executive, the Judiciary and Parliament (HL 151), July 2007, para 1 
6L Blom-Cooper and G Drewry, Final Appeal: A Study of the House of Lords in its Judicial Capacity (Clarendon 
Press, 1972), p100 
7
Laws, ‘Law and Democracy’ [1995] PL 72, 81 
8
See A Le Sueur, ‘Developing Mechanisms for judicial accountability in the UK’ (2004) 24(1/2) LS 73 for a 
review of the conceptual difficulties in holding the judiciary to account 
9 AV Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (Macmillan & Co, 1885) 
10See obiter speeches made in Jackson v HM Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 [102] (per Lord Steyn), [107] 
(per Lord Hope) and [159] (per Lady Hale) 
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a rise in judicial review of state action.12  The rise in judicial power is also partly owing to the 
contemporary understanding of the fundamental nature of the common law’s inherent rights and 
values,13 and the ‘resurgence’14 of these rights following the incorporation of the Convention via the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA’).15 The post-1997 statutory constitutional reforms, not only 
accelerated the pace of constitutional change in the UK,16 they reinvigorated common law values by 
providing a level of legislative and thus democratic sanction to rights based ideals. 
The creation of the Supreme Court altered the constitutional paradigm between the three branches 
of state once more,17 with the CRA providing the necessary infrastructure for a more independent 
state institution. Commentators18 and judges19 alike questioned whether the investment of 
considerable legal, political and economic capital in the creation of the court merited something 
bolder than merely recycling the jurisdiction and personnel of the Appellate Committee. Speculation 
centred on whether the Justices would take a more dominant constitutional role.20  Lord Hope felt 
that the Supreme Court name combined with the structural separation from Parliament provided 
the court with ‘an added authority’ and although there did not appear to be any change in the 
‘relationship’ with the other branches of state, he appreciated that, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
11See for instance the gradual judicial erosion of the doctrine of implied repeal in R v Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No2) [1991] 1 AC 603, Thoburn v Sunderland Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) 
[62-63] (per Laws LJ) and more recently the obiter remarks of Lord Mance and Neuberger in R (on the 
application of HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3 [207] 
12See Lord Carnworth’s written evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Constitutional Reform Bill, 
Session 2003-2004 where he noted the ‘rapid development’ of judicial review of government decisions in the 
last three decades as well as the increase in HRA decisions that attract ‘more direct controversy, political or 
moral’. <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldcref/125/125we10.htm>accessed 25 
February 2016 
13R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 (per Lord Hoffmann)  
14See S Stephenson, ‘The Supreme Court’s renewed interest in autochthonous constitutionalism’ [2015] PL 
394, 395, as evidenced in four recent Supreme Court decisions; R (on the application of HS2 Action Alliance) 
Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3; R (on the application of Osborn) v Parole Board [2013] 
UKSC 61; Kennedy v Information Commissioner [2014] UKSC 20 and A v BBC [2014] UKSC 25 
15See Lord Justice-General Rodger’s comments in HM Advocate v Montgomery [2000] JC 111 ,117, cited with 
approval by Lord Reed in Osborn, n14 [63] 
16See V Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2009) and A King, The British Constitution 
(OUP, 2007), p2-3 and p351 
17House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (HL 151),n5, para 16. K Malleson’s evidence 
nevertheless suggests that the nature of that change may be less about going on the offensive and instead 
about allowing the judiciary to ‘… have a more structured and active role in defending themselves from 
criticism and ensuring the proper resources and support for the courts are in place.’ See para 18 
18
Masterman described the proposals as ‘conservative’ in terms of jurisdiction; R Masterman, ‘A Supreme 
Court for the United Kingdom: two steps forward, but one step back on judicial independence’ [2004] PL 48 
19
Baroness Hale, ‘A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom?’ (2004) 24(1/2) LS 36, 41-42. Lord Hope, ‘The 
creation of a Supreme Court was it worth it?’(Barnard Inn’s Reading, 24 June 2010) 
<www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/jun/24/uk-supreme-court> accessed 22 August 2010 
20J Webber, ‘Supreme Courts, independence and democratic agency’ (2004) 24(1/2) LS 55 
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under our system the law- public law in particular- is never settled.  The boundaries 
between what can and cannot be done are constantly being tested on all sides.21  
A BBC Radio 4 programme revealed that key judicial figures, some of whom would play a role in the 
new court, were unsure of the full ramifications of the change.22 Lord Phillips and Lord Bingham 
were the most measured in their comments. Lord Phillips did not envisage a fundamental change in 
judicial power or assertiveness however he conceded that he could not ‘predict quite how we are 
going to function in the new world.’ Lord Bingham also dismissed any ideas of the Justices having a 
‘rush of blood to the head’ or ‘throwing their weight around’.  Lord Neuberger led the way for a 
more reformist perspective on the power of the court. He felt there was a risk of ‘judges arrogating 
to themselves greater power than they have at the moment.’ He suggested that the newly found 
institutional independence of the court ‘could’ be the catalyst to engender a more assertive court 
with the executive arm being the most likely to feel the full force of this. Lord Falconer, the then 
Lord Chancellor, agreed, predicting that both judicial review and individual rights would be the likely 
conduits for an emboldened court.  Lord Collins also felt that the Supreme Court ‘might evolve into a 
different type of body, perhaps not as pivotal as the US Supreme Court but playing a much more 
central role in the legal system … ’.  
Alan Paterson looked at ‘role’ as part of his 1970s study examining the processes behind decision-
making in the Appellate Committee. He found that the concept of ‘role’ was not one dimensional. 
Instead, the final appeal court’s decision-making was to be regarded as a social process influenced 
by the court’s perceived role in relation to various reference groups.23  
A person’s role is what is expected of him in the particular social position in which he 
occupies’ or ‘the cluster of normative expectations which exist at any given time as to the 
behaviour and attributes required of a person who holds a particular status or position.24 
Paterson made clear that ‘expectation’ is two dimensional in that it derives from both the role-
holder and the ‘reference groups’ to which that role-holder has regard when making a decision.25 For 
‘expectations’ to have any meaningful impact on the ‘role’ of the court they presumably have to be 
‘legitimate expectations’, to borrow a phrase from administrative law and must not venture too far 
beyond what is within the court’s capacity to achieve.  Provided these expectations are legitimate 
and the court is able to substantially fulfil them, the court’s ‘social’ role should flourish.  
                                                             
21Lord Hope, ’The creation of a Supreme Court’, n19 
22J Rosenburg, ‘Top Dogs’, BBC Radio 4 programme broadcast on 8 September 2009 
23A Paterson, The Law Lords (Macmillan Press, 1982) p7  
24Paterson, The Law Lords, n23, p3 
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Paterson accepted the possibility that the social role of the court could change.  
Role…has a dynamic aspect in that a role and performance are, to a greater or lesser degree, 
open to ‘negotiation’ between the incumbent and his audience.26 
The final appeal court’s changing role must be measured in each of the three main institutional 
groups that have a relationship with the court; UK State Institutions (Chapter 4), UK Lower Courts 
(Chapter 5) and European Courts (Chapter 6). The Supreme Court also has a non-institutional 
relationship with the wider public.  The latter is more difficult to measure and will not be specifically 
examined in this thesis.27 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is more aware of the need to inform the 
public of its role, than the Appellate Committee was, and is actively using public lectures and 
televised broadcasts to educate the wider public on nature of the court.28 A strong reputation will 
only be earned on the back of a successful execution of the court’s expected role in each 
institutional relationship. Reputation is therefore linked to role and the remit of that role will 
depend on the dynamics of the particular institutional relationship.  
This thesis takes an objective view to measuring change in institutional relationships in the time 
period, however in structuring the thesis and presenting the results the study was guided by what 
could be perceived as ‘good’ institutional relations.  A strong institutional relationship includes such 
positive characteristics as institutional efficiency, clear institutional communication, stability in the 
law, institutional respect and where necessary deference, alongside a degree of flexibility to 
accommodate both institutional and constitutional change.  Thus institutional relationships are 
complex and have to strike an appropriate balance between several competing objectives. Each 
institutional relationship will vary in its ability to accommodate a paradigm shift in the role of the 
court, depending on the constitution’s ability to accept and legitimise any change in the power 
dynamics of that relationship.  
Constitutional Theory and the fluctuations of Judicial Power 
The Rule of Law  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
25Paterson, The Law Lords, n23, p3 
26
Paterson, The Law Lords,n23, p3 
27The House of Lords Select Committee acknowledged the need for research into the public’s perception of the 
judiciary which goes beyond perceptions based on the media and whether judges are trusted to carry out their 
role. HL 151, n5, paras 141 and 144 (citing the evidence of Professor Dame Hazel Genn) 
28Lord Phillips has specifically acknowledged the use of these two mediums to explain the role of the court to 
the public. See ‘Judicial Independence & Accountability: A View from the Supreme Court’, (UCL Constitution 
Unit Lecture, 8 February 2011), p20. http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_110208.pdf> accessed 25 
February 2016 
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The judicial commitment to the values inherent in the rule of law is often used to legitimise judicial 
power. The rule of law is a constitutional principle that escapes a universally accepted definition, 
with some believing that it includes substantive values29 and others merely formalistic qualities.30  
This conceptual uncertainty leaves it open to possible abuse by state institutions31 however s1 of the 
CRA recognises the enduring nature of the principle and endorses the values it enshrines for the 
constitution by placing it on a statutory footing.32 The complexity involved in attempting to define 
the principle was avoided by maintaining the ‘existing’ constitutional principle.33 Statutory 
‘recognition’ is not the same as statutory ‘creation’ and the rule of law remains a constitutional 
principle rather than a creature of statute. A constitutional principle runs deeper than the surface of 
a statute and may not be removed by Parliament using either implied or express repeal.34 This 
immunity from Parliamentary repeal provides the rule of law with a more solid constitutional base to 
found judicial power than that afforded to judges under statute; ‘constitutional’35 or otherwise.   
The inherent potential of the rule of law in the UK constitution was demonstrated in Jackson v HM 
Attorney General36 where it was suggested obiter dictum that the rule of law, as safeguarded by the 
judiciary, acts as a limiting force on an otherwise sovereign Parliament. Lord Steyn recognised that 
‘the supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of our constitution’, but that it may no 
longer be regarded as the absolute principle under a new definition of ‘constitutionalism’ in the UK. 
In this sense, ‘the classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, 
pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the modern United Kingdom.’37  
Lord Hope agreed that ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute’ and ‘step by 
step, gradually but surely, the English principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament 
which Dicey derived from Coke and Blackstone is being qualified.’38  Lord Hope went on to identify 
the rule of law, as enforced by the courts, as the ‘ultimate controlling’ factor on which the UK 
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One of the main advocates of a substantive concept is TRS Allan. See TRS Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The 
Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (OUP, 1993); Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule 
of Law (OUP, 2001) 
30See Jowell, ‘The Rule of Law and its underlying Values’ in Jowell and Oliver (eds) The Changing Constitution 
(OUP, 2007) 
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See JAG Griffiths, ‘The Political Constitution’, n4, 15 
32s1 states that ‘This Act does not adversely affect— (a) the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law, 
or (b) the Lord Chancellor's existing constitutional role in relation to that principle.’ 
33Lord Bingham attributed the difficulties in creating a statutory definition to the inability to be ‘succinct’ and 
‘accurate’ in how one describes the rule of law. See Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ (2007) 66 CLJ 67, 68 
34
See obiter comments of Lords Mance and Neuberger in R (HS2), n14 [207]. Dworkin famously distinguished 
principles from rules as a set of moral standards that are an integral part of the law and assist judges in their 
decision-making. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977) 
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Thoburn v Sunderland City Council (per Laws LJ), n11 
36Jackson, n10 
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constitution is based.39 Lady Hale also revealed the lengths that the courts would go to in order to 
uphold the rule of law in that ‘the courts will treat with particular suspicion (and might even reject) 
any attempt to subvert the rule of law … ’.40   
The transition to the Supreme Court did little to quell Lord Hope’s belief in the rule of law as the 
fundamental principle of our constitution, referring to it in Axa, as the ‘guiding principle’.41 The 
issues therein went ‘to the root of the relationship between the democratically elected legislatures 
and the judiciary’ as well as considering ‘the part which the rule of law … has to play in setting the 
boundaries of this relationship.’42 The Supreme Court found that Acts of the Scottish Parliament 
were subject to common law judicial review under the guiding principle of the rule of law43 or when 
fundamental rights are breached.44 The case was significant in demonstrating the power of the rule 
of law to authorise a form of review, falling short of full judicial review, of a legislative body that was 
elected on a democratic mandate and which possessed ‘plenary’45 powers within its competencies. 
That said, the obiter remarks made in Jackson remain untested given that the Scottish Parliament is 
not a sovereign legislature and is subject to statutory review by the Supreme Court.46   
The Steyn-Hope-Hale axis of thought in Jackson is by no means representative,47 nevertheless the 
obiter comments hint that some members of the senior judiciary regard the rule of law, under 
judicial guardianship, to be the dominant principle in the modern UK constitution.  To date, the 
Jackson remarks remain the strongest statements of Parliamentary Sovereignty’s subservience to 
the rule of law.48  Parliamentary Sovereignty appears to have lost its Diceyan immunity to external 
limitation in the modern constitution, in particular from the rule of law.49 This view has also gained 
traction in academic scholarship with Allan believing that ‘it is the rule of law that is truly absolute, 
constituting the basis of the legal order within which legislative sovereignty must be located and 
                                                             
39Jackson, n10 [107] 
40Jackson, n10 [159] 
41AXA General Insurance Limited v The Lord Advocate (Scotland) [2011] UKSC 46 [51] 
42AXA, n41 [42] (per Lord Hope) 
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 See Lord Neuberger ‘Who are the Masters Now?’ (Lord Alexander of Weedon Lecture, 6 April 2011) 
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defined.’50 Furthermore, McGarry considers Parliamentary Sovereignty as more akin to a Dworkian 
principle than a rule and that statutory law can be weighed against competing principles by 
assessing the import of each and the level of infringement.51  Professor Hart was the closest of the 
legal philosophers to recognising that law was above parliamentary power. Hart theorised that a 
higher order of law existed in the UK which he termed the ‘rule of recognition’ and that this principle 
of legality constrained what Parliament could do.52 The Jackson obiter remarks appear to alter Hart’s 
doctrine from the fundamental nature of the rule of recognition to the fundamental nature of the 
rule of law which limits an otherwise sovereign Parliament.   
The idea that the rule of law constitutes a higher order law corresponds with Lord Woolf’s extra 
judicial commentary. He believed that ‘as both Parliament and the courts derive their authority from 
the rule of law so both are subject to it and cannot act in manner which involves its repudiation.’53 
Woolf’s constitutional philosophy strips Parliament of a defining feature of its sovereign power, that 
of being positioned above the law. Indeed this was one of the dual concepts of sovereignty 
professed by Hart,54 alongside the ‘habit of obedience’ of the subjects of the state. In a post-Jackson 
world, Parliament only definitively possesses the latter. A modern ‘hypothesis’ of 
‘constitutionalism’55 may have to account for a weakening in command of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
over the constitution and recognise that it, as well as the courts, are limited by standards imposed 
on it by the rule of law.  The judges are therefore custodians of what may be regarded as the 
superior ‘limiting’ constitutional principle in the UK.  
The rule of law’s character as a limiting rather than an empowering constitutional principle restricts 
its ability to replace Parliamentary Sovereignty as the dominant principle in the constitution. The 
courts command the ‘habitual obedience’ of UK citizens and state institutions to the common law, 
developed over the course of successive judgments in a Hartian sense,  however Parliament still has 
the power to legislate to avoid the effects of a judgment.56 Furthermore, from a Diceyan perspective 
the court cannot ‘make’ or ‘unmake’ any law. The judicial role is reactive as opposed to active with 
little power to direct law reform through controlling the court’s caseload.57 This narrow remit for law 
reform is compounded by the judges avoiding making generic and widespread pronouncements on 
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TRS Allan, Constitutional Justice; A liberal theory of the Rule of Law, n29, p201 
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J McGarry, ‘The Principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (2012) 32(4) LS 577 
52HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP, 1961) 
53H Woolf, ‘Droit public- English Style’ [1995] PL 57, 68 
54Hart, The Concept of Law, n52 p49-50 
55See Jackson (per Lord Steyn), n10 [102] 
56See Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 
57Exceptionally, the declaration of incompatibility under s4 HRA or breaches of the Convention have instigated 
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the area of law before them, instead containing their review to the specific arguments raised by 
counsel and tested in the courtroom.58  The untrammelled potential for legislation to be reviewed, 
tested,  ‘controlled’59 and even ‘rejected’60 by the judges acting under a ‘different hypothesis of 
constitutionalism’61 in a post-Jackson world needs to be treated with caution. It gives the impression 
that the rule of law possesses equal or even superior strength to the longstanding doctrine of the 
Sovereignty of Parliament. The fallacy of this view has been raised by certain commentators,62 
believing it respectively to misrepresent the jurisprudential basis of the Westminster model,63 to 
empower the legal opinion of the judiciary without any democratic sanction or accountability64 and 
to assume the strength of the rule of law when it has in fact weakened in the face of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty as a result of increased national security and strict counterterrorism measures.65  
Knight provides a different view of the sovereign power of courts, which is achieved not through 
curtailing and restricting Parliament’s sovereign power under the mandate of an alternative 
legitimate constitutional principle but rather by sharing sovereign power with Parliament. Knight 
aligns two existing academic arguments for split sovereignty and contextualises them within the 
realities of the UK constitution.66 The first is Sir Stephen Sedley’s extra-judicial support for dual 
sovereignty; legally the Crown is present in the courts, politically the Crown is present in Parliament 
and the executive is answerable to both.67 The second is Rees’ functional distinction between legal 
and coercive sovereignty, although Knight attributes ‘coercive’ sovereign power to the courts rather 
than the armed forces or the police, as Rees suggests.68 Knight merges Rees’ and Sedley’s concepts 
of dual sovereignty by viewing sovereignty in a functional manner and arguing that UK pragmatism 
results in the courts and Parliament having both coercive and legal sovereignty; the difference lying 
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in the sovereignty that is exercised customarily and the sovereignty that is the exception.69 This, he 
believes, is a ‘more plausible’ theoretical conception of state power in the UK which reflects our 
pragmatic constitutional heritage founded upon realism and only a partial subscription to the 
separation of powers.70  Knight is not alone in his belief of the divisibility of sovereignty. Allan 
approves of Lord Bridge’s observations in X Ltd v Morgan Grampian (Publishers) Ltd71 where he 
recognised that the rule of law divides sovereignty between the Queen in Parliament and the Queen 
in the courts; one ‘making the law’, the other ‘interpreting and applying the law.’72 Allan goes on to 
argue that, 
the idea of absolute legislative power is ultimately plausible only on the assumption that 
enactments can (or should) be ‘literally’ applied, without interpretation abstracted from the 
controlling influence of transcendent constitutional values.73  
The dual sovereignty perspective is not without its critics74 but remains useful on two levels.  Firstly, 
it provides an alternate way of viewing judicial power before the CRA, without necessarily 
subscribing to the view that the courts are enforcers of a fundamental concept of law to which the 
sovereign legislature must also be subject.   Secondly, it demonstrates the utility in taking a realist 
approach to examining the institutional paradigm within the UK constitution. Theory must be 
anchored in the realities of how the institutions in the UK actually share power. This thesis 
subscribes to the realist approach to constitutional research by providing systematic empirical data 
to ground the more speculative theory on whether the final appeal court is becoming a more 
powerful institution.  
This section has demonstrated that the rule of law is a fundamental if not the fundamental principle 
in the UK constitution. It is clear that the judiciary has already acquired significant constitutional 
power through being custodians and defenders of the rule of law. The dual sovereignty writings take 
this further and collectively believe that in enforcing and interpreting the legal will of the Crown, the 
judiciary share sovereignty. Even more recently the ‘power’ and ‘status’ acquired by the Supreme 
Court has led to commentators suggesting that the court should be recognised in exceptional 
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constitutional cases as ‘co-equal to Parliament in the resolution of constitutional disputes.’75 The 
authority for this was again premised upon the rule of law, as a ‘democratic conception’ in the 
modern constitution that ‘conceives and legitimates the constitutional role of the Supreme Court as 
a counter-majoritarian institution.’76 
It is clear that the fundamental nature of the rule of law provides a clear judicial mandate to check 
state institutional power, which is achieved through the judicial review of public decision-making to 
ensure the legality of those decisions.77   Judicial power in this field can be gauged by avenues of 
review open to the court as well as the breadth of the grounds for review.  In countries with a 
written constitution, constitutional review is permitted, or inferred, under the authority of the 
constitution. In the UK, the judiciary has established powers of review under the common law. The 
next section will examine the growth in judicial power as a result of the expansion of common law 
judicial review before examining powers of review under the HRA.  
Judicial Review 
 
Judicial review is concerned with the legality of an administrative decision; a legitimate public 
decision must be taken in accordance with the law, as enacted by Parliament. Judicial review is 
closely related to the rule of law in that the former gives effect to the latter.78  The decision must 
follow a due process and be procedurally fair. Judicial review in public decision-making entered its 
developmental phase in the 1950s and 1960s79 following the leading decision of Associated 
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn.80 Lord Greene MR, in Wednesbury, was clear on 
where the boundaries of the judicial review lay.  A court could not substitute its own decision for 
that of the public body. Instead, it is merely concerned that the public body has taken into account 
all of the factors that it is required to take into account, either expressly or by implication, by the 
primary statute conferring the discretion.81  
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Judicial review has developed since the 1950s and expanded upon traditional Wednesbury grounds.  
This expansion is partly owing to the scale of modern day government,82 and partly owing to the 
judicial acceptance of a wider platform of review.83 Foremost amongst the innovations has been the 
adaption of the Wednesbury test where decisions affect the rights of an individual, to allow for a 
more heightened form of scrutiny.84  Subsequently, the HRA provided the legislative sanction to 
move beyond traditional heads of judicial review to proportionality review where the rights of an 
individual were concerned.  This was evident in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
p Daly85 which is accepted by commentators as having adopted a proportionality-based test of 
substantive review where human rights are involved.86  Lord Steyn, in Daly, clearly set out the 
differences that proportionality-based review would encompass. For a start, the ‘intensity of review 
is somewhat greater under the proportionality approach’.87 He explained that,  
the doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the balance which 
the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or 
reasonable decisions.  
He confirmed that this ‘may go further than the traditional grounds of review inasmuch as it may 
require attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations.’ He 
also noted that, 
the intensity of the review … is guaranteed by the twin requirements that the limitation of 
the right was necessary in a democratic society, in the sense of meeting a pressing social 
need, and the question whether the interference was really proportionate to the legitimate 
aim being pursued.88  
The significance of the proportionality principle being adopted by the judges is its capacity to expand 
the platform of substantive review and take the judges closer to reviewing the merits of a decision. 
Wednesbury was criticised as symbolic of the post-war unwillingness for the judiciary to review cases 
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on substantive grounds in all but the most extreme instances of public behaviour89 and as 
encouraging only ‘pragmatic intervention’ from the judiciary.90 Poole notes that the proportionality 
principle is currently unlimited in the way that the Wednesbury reasonableness test inherently was 
and secondly, it moves the focus of the court from the ‘reasonableness’ to the ‘proportionality’ of 
the decision affecting the rights of an individual. What is reasonable may not be proportionate.91  
Lester and Jowell, however, feel that the principle of proportionality acts as a greater safeguard 
against surreptitious political decision-making by the judges. In their opinion, adoption of the 
proportionality standard is actually a clearer articulation92 of the legal principle that governs judicial 
review, namely that public officials must not exceed the limits of the powers conferred on them, and 
moves away from the vagaries of Wednesbury, which can serve to obscure judicial economic and 
social agendas.93  Poole, on the other hand, believes that proportionality has the capacity to be 
equally as vague as Wednesbury unreasonableness, however concedes that it is more transparent 
and ‘at least encourages judges to show their workings out’.94 
Whereas some commentators view proportionality review as part and parcel of UK administrative 
law and clearly envisage its further expansion, others do not feel that it is a permissible development 
in the common law. In the former camp, Poole has commented that ‘the normative assumptions 
that underpin proportionality’ based review are not containable within the rights realm and instead 
‘have the capacity to spill over into other areas of judicial review where rights are not necessarily 
directly in play.’95 In the latter camp sits Sir Philip Sales, who recently reviewed the current state of 
administrative law with a view to establishing whether the Wednesbury based principle of rationality 
should be replaced by the principle of ‘proportionality’.96 He was clear that this had not already 
occurred and that, unlike rationality, Parliament had not accepted the constitutional check that 
proportionality represents.97  Sales felt that the incorporation of proportionality-based review would 
alter the institutional power balance in the UK98 through creating stronger powers of review for the 
courts that narrow the breadth of discretion enjoyed by public bodies.99  
                                                             
89Poole, ‘The reformation of English Administrative law’, n86, 143 
90Lester and Jowell, ‘Beyond Wednesbury: substantive principles of administrative law’ [1987] PL 368, 368 
91Poole, ‘The reformation of English Administrative law’, n86, 146-147 
92This was reiterated by Lord Steyn in Daly, n85 [27] 
93
A Lester and J Jowell, ‘Beyond Wednesbury: substantive principles of administrative law’ [1987] PL 368, 381  
94
T Poole’s views in ‘Tilting at windmills? Truth and illusion in “The Political Constitution”’ (2007) 70(2) MLR 
250, 268 
95
Poole, ‘The reformation of English Administrative law’, n86, 147 
96
 Sir Philip Sales, ‘Rationality, Proportionality and the development of the law’ (2013) 129 LQR 223 
97
Sales, ‘Rationality, Proportionality and the development of the law’, n96, 230 
98
Sales, ‘Rationality, Proportionality and the development of the law’, n96, 225 
99Sales, ‘Rationality, Proportionality and the development of the law’, n96, 226 
52 
 
The principle of proportionality has the capacity to grant more power to the judges as it involves a 
balancing of rights as well as a consideration of legitimate expectations and therefore subjects a 
public decision inherently to a more anxious degree of scrutiny than pure rationality. As Poole 
explains, the courts are more likely to come closer to the merits of the public authority’s decision 
and as a consequence narrow that authority’s discretion to act. This narrowing of discretion can also 
occur in the context of ‘… cases which involve questions of acute political controversy.’100  
Proportionality would undoubtedly act as a greater check on executive action and, as proffered by 
Lester and Jowell, could still be democratically acceptable through a clearer articulation of the legal 
principle of review. A move towards a proportionality principle of review would heighten the legal 
checks on the executive and shift the paradigm of power in the court’s relationship with the 
executive. 
Human Rights and Common Law Rights 
 
The UK constitution enjoys capacity to uphold fundamental rights, either by virtue of the HRA or 
through the rights recognised in the common law. Upholding specific rights was not traditionally a 
task for the court and, as outlined below, the mechanics of the HRA have provided the judiciary with 
a new method of statutory review to ensure that rights are protected across all branches of state.  At 
the same time, the protection of common law rights has also come back to the fore as the Supreme 
Court has recently indicated that common law rights, reinforced by the Convention, is the primary 
method of protection of individual rights in the UK.101 This primacy of common law constitutionalism 
combined with its perceived democratic legitimacy, as outlined by Laws LJ below, could provide 
another avenue for a legitimate increase in judicial power within the constitution. 
Common Law Rights 
 
The common law is both created and enforced by the judiciary and enjoys a deep rooted 
constitutional pedigree. It is a product of progressive ‘judgment and opinion’ that is continually 
evolving and has been recognised as having institutional features that support a degree of judicial 
creativity.102  The common law is generally regarded as secondary to statute law and can be 
overruled by express statutory language. Some common law theorists, however, would position the 
common law more fundamentally in the UK constitution and believe that common law values shape 
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and define sovereign power.  Laws LJ believes ‘sovereignty is a common law construct’ and that ‘the 
doctrine has been honed and conditioned by the common law’.103 He refers to the ‘nuanced’ nature 
of legislative power, enjoying strength in fields such as defence and economics, yet subject in other 
areas to moderation and interpretation by the values of the common law.104 Inherent in the 
common law are rights and principles that are fundamental to the constitution and the vindication 
of these rights has the potential to constrain legislative power.  Laws LJ states, 
where a clash seems to loom between the claims of the sovereign legislature and those of 
deep individual rights, it will time after time be resolved by recourse to interpretation, and 
therefore by the methods of the common law.105 
Laws LJ regards the fundamental rights and values inherent in the constitution to be the ‘axiom’106 of 
our constitution; the primary feature on which everything else is based and a higher order of law 
which sets out the framework for all other laws.107  He believes that true democratic power 
recognises genuine limits and that rights form a higher order of law, with which ‘no government can 
tamper’.108  On this reading, the UK courts properly guard the ‘apolitical’109 values and freedoms 
which are unobjectionable to democratic institutions.110  
In the HRA era, it could be said that common law rights and values have lost their import however 
the opposite appears to be the case. Michael Kirby notes that, 
the grafting onto the common law systems of the notions of fundamental human rights has 
introduced a new, and legitimate, stimulus to creativity in judicial lawmaking.111 
Lord Reed recently commented on the continued importance of the common law in light of the HRA. 
He cited his judgment in Osborn and stated that the rule of law requires domestic law to 
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substantiate the generic nature of Convention rights.112  The common law provides national context 
to important Convention principles such as that of proportionality. The balancing exercise under the 
principle of proportionality cannot be divorced from social values in the national context, which the 
domestic courts are better positioned to assess than the ECtHR.113 Reed refers to the long standing 
pedigree of the common law and the rights it contains, which have been influenced by the 
judgments of many top courts around the world. He concludes that, 
one would expect that the requirements of the Convention can usually be met by our 
domestic law, developed by the courts if need be, without having to rely specifically on the 
Human Rights Act.114 
The common law filter that applies to statutory law and Convention rights alike clearly provides the 
judiciary with an important role in interpreting, contextualising and substantiating statutory law in a 
way that is compliant with the common law’s inherent rights and values. There is clear potential for 
judicial power and influence to increase as the final word on the way that these statutory 
instruments are implemented appears to lie with the judiciary, as authors and enforcers of a 
strengthened and emboldened common law.  
The HRA 
 
The enactment of the HRA brought domestic remedies to bear for a violation of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms protected by the Convention and in doing so made justiciable issues that were 
previously regarded as political or exclusively under the remit of the executive and/or Parliament.115  
The mechanics of the HRA allocate power to specific branches of government. The Act is designed to 
retain Parliamentary Sovereignty in that a minister introducing a bill to Parliament, and thus 
Parliament itself, is still free under s19 to legislate incompatibility with the Convention rights. 
Furthermore, the judiciary cannot strike down primary legislation and instead can merely declare 
legislation to be incompatible under s4. If such a declaration of incompatibility is made, the 
legislation remains enforceable116and it is for the Minister concerned to develop a suitable course of 
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action in order to remedy the defects.117 The HRA retention of Parliamentary Sovereignty is, 
however, only one half of the power equation. The Act has been perceived to allocate greater power 
to the courts.118 The judicial power of review is evident not only in the ability to make a declaration 
of incompatibility under s4 but also under s3 HRA, which requires the courts ‘so far as it is possible 
to do so’ to give effect to both primary and subordinate legislation in a manner that is ‘compatible 
with Convention rights.’ The strength of this interpretative obligation was made clear by Lord 
Nicholls in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza119 when he declared that under s3 a court can, ‘… read in 
words which change the meaning of enacted legislation, so as to make it convention-compliant’120 
however in doing so the court cannot, ‘… adopt a meaning inconsistent with a fundamental feature 
of the legislation.’121 
The judiciary’s ability to review and interpret primary legislation in this way has been recognised as 
significant progression from the review mechanisms that the judicial branch possessed prior to the 
implementation of the HRA.122 Lord Bingham felt that ‘the 1998 Act gives the courts a very specific, 
wholly democratic mandate’ and endorsed Jowell’s comments that, ‘the courts are charged by 
Parliament with delineating the boundaries of a rights-based democracy.’123 For those advocates of 
dual sovereignty, the increased interpretative powers under the HRA are seen to ‘emphasize’ the 
nature of power sharing between the courts and Parliament.124  
The Supreme Court’s power as final domestic arbiter on rights based challenges has the potential to 
be extensive. Nevertheless it is curtailed to a large extent by both sovereignty and the notion of 
affording due deference to the views of public authorities. The degree of deference in play at any 
time is instrumental in establishing where the institutional power balance lies in rights-based 
jurisprudence. The extent to which the court should curtail the powers, granted to it by virtue of the 
HRA, to determine and uphold rights and assume a level of deference is a matter of acute 
controversy.  Allan, for one, finds no place for a doctrinal notion of deference in a constitutional 
setting, where highly positivist notions of sovereignty based on democratic will in reality succumb to 
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the liberal notions of respect for fundamental constitutional rights, the content of which are not 
exclusively determined by the legislature or the elected executive.125 He feels that, 
the only ‘deference’ called for, in a liberal democracy worth the name, is obedience to rules 
or decisions that comply with the constitutional constraints that competent legal analysis 
identifies.126   
Allan flips deference on its head and encourages state institutions to defer to independent 
constitutional rules as enforced by the judiciary, being the masters of ‘competent legal analysis’.  
Part of Allan’s ‘competent legal analysis’ is being aware of the proper limits of judicial review based 
on the Wednesbury rationality standards or the proportionality principle in the review of rights. 
Provided a judge follows such judicial review principles, he or she will naturally respect the 
competences of each institution to the extent that Allan does not regard there to be a need for a 
separate notion of deference.127 Too extensive an amount of deferential behaviour would, according 
to Alan, weaken the powers of the court to review matters and provide independent judgment. He 
states, ‘due deference turns out, on close inspection, to be non-justiciability dressed in pastel 
colours.’128 
Allan promotes a realist perspective to tracking current deference levels. This can be seen in his 
rejection of the attempt to provide normative guidance on the levels of deference through 
articulating general principles.129 Instead, he is in favour of examining how the judge actually makes 
decisions based on the facts in the case and the appropriateness in the circumstances of intervening 
with the decision of a democratically elected body.130  Abstract notions of deference should be 
abandoned in favour of looking at the context of the case. Although Allan dismisses the concept of 
‘deference’, he does appear to indicate that a judge should decide the levels of intervention 
appropriate, by examining the facts and applying rule of law standards and principles of review in 
any given case to reach their judgment. Allan fails to acknowledge that the level of intervention 
required by the courts in any given case is really just the flip side of the level of deference required.  
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He thereby implicitly acknowledges that there is a ‘deferential’ or ‘interventionist’ balance to be 
struck in any given case but that this should be determined in the realities of the context of the case 
rather than by abstract principle. Allan therefore rejects any abstract normative doctrine of 
deference and instead proposes an alternative of contextual interventionism. 
Poole uses Alain Badiou’s poles of ‘unity’ and ‘totality’ to outline the poles of opinion on deference. 
The ‘unity’ movement regard rights as an extension of the rule of law, the determination of which is 
exclusively within the domain of the courts.  Poole, however, favours the ‘totality’ view, which, by 
contrast, takes a more ‘empirical’ perspective and respects the institutional and social context within 
which administrative decisions affecting rights take place. The court is just one institution with a 
view on matters and the applicant’s rights are just one of many considerations to be taken account 
of, albeit that the court has an important role and the applicant’s rights are an important 
consideration which may take priority over other considerations.131 Poole therefore favours the 
realist ‘totality’ approach when assessing true rights-based power and levels of institutional 
deference by the courts.  Rights based theory is contextualised in the realities of the constitution and 
takes account of the complexities involved in administrative decision-making.   
The mechanisms of review under the HRA, together with the belief that the courts are ‘charged by 
Parliament with delineating the boundaries of a rights-based democracy,’132 allow for a growth in 
judicial power in rights-based cases. The notion of deference to other institutions’ views and the 
belief that other state institutions have a valid perspective that needs to be accounted for, to some 
extent, limits judicial power. The extent of the deference afforded to other institutions’ views is 
central to gauging judicial power and will be referred to in Chapter 4; the institutional relationship 
with the branches of state.  As with Knight’s doctrine of bi-polar sovereignty, TRS Allan’s critique of 
deference in a liberal constitution and Poole’s ‘totality’ view of deference recognise the value in 
avoiding abstract principles to make pronouncements on deference and instead favour an empirical, 
contextual approach to capture the true institutional power dynamics between the executive and 
the judiciary. It appears that be it right-based powers, levels of deference or power sharing via bi-
polar sovereignty, institutional power dynamics in the UK constitution demand realist empirical 
foundations.  
The Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence 
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The final constitutional theoretical doctrine that requires attention is that of the separation of 
powers. The separation of powers is also closely associated with the rule of law, which demands an 
independent judiciary free from external pressure in order to uphold the legal order.133    
The UK was fairly successful at preserving judicial independence and this had weakened the 
argument for adopting the formalist constitutional model of a fully separated judiciary.134 The CRA, 
nevertheless, sought to enhance both personal and institutional judicial independence. As well as 
creating an institutionally independent final appeal court, it created a statutory safeguard for judicial 
independence in s3 CRA135 and a statutory duty for the Lord Chancellor to defend the independence 
of judges.136 Malleson welcomed s3 CRA as the first step in moving from a ’pragmatic’ to a more 
‘principled’ approach to judicial independence137 and transforming a political obligation to respect 
judicial independence into a legal obligation to do so.138  Furthermore, the more formal approach to 
institutional independence protects the judiciary from external influence by ensuring independent 
processes for judicial appointments, discipline and dismissal, an independent body to set judicial 
salaries and allowing a degree of financial and administrative independence.139 
The institutional separation of the court could also assist in underlining the constitutional legitimacy 
of its review powers which, as outlined above, have expanded in recent decades. The executive is 
now ‘the most frequent litigator in the courts,’ contributing to the need for the judiciary to be seen 
to be free, in particular, from executive pressure.140   Webber would take the effects of institutional 
separation on the powers of review further and has suggested that the creation of a Supreme Court 
could be another step towards ‘a constitutionally limited form of government, one subject to full 
judicial review of democratic decision-making on the basis of constitutional limitations.’141  Webber 
believed that parliamentary primacy was reinforced by the highest appellate court being a 
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committee of one House of Parliament and by the entire governmental machinery being brought 
together under a singular institutional head; that of Parliament.142 Judicial independence in the UK 
was not necessarily ‘… about the strict separation of functions but about the creation of institutional 
friction ... ’.143 By contrast, a formal concept of judicial independence that insists on a distinct judicial 
branch is ‘… founded on premises that are fundamentally inconsistent with continued parliamentary 
supremacy’.144 Webber has therefore suggested that there could be a ‘symbolic’ repositioning of the 
constitutional status of the judiciary in the UK, and, more controversially, that this could open the 
door to full judicial review that would be in ‘the spirit’ of that seen in countries with a written 
constitution.145  
The recent conclusion of a three year research project into the politics of judicial independence has 
confirmed that both judicial independence and judicial accountability appear to be stronger 
following the implementation of the CRA and that the judiciary are more engaged with the political 
branches of state.146 The judiciary were found to have become ‘a more independent and self-
governing branch of government’ based on judicial appointments, discipline and the overall running 
of the court service.147 Judicial accountability was also stronger both in terms of ‘explanatory’ and 
‘culpable’ accountability with judges more regularly appearing before Parliamentary Committees.148 
The confirmation of a more democratically accountable and independent court lends further 
support to the idea that the CRA provided the infrastructure necessary to legitimise and therefore 
embolden the Supreme Court. 
Conclusion 
 
The fluidity of the UK’s constitution can accommodate fluctuating levels of judicial power and 
ultimately a more powerful Supreme Court. This is evident firstly in the judicial ability to operate 
under the legitimate mandate of the rule of law as a principle of rising and potentially equal import 
to Parliamentary Sovereignty, secondly through the importance of upholding rights in the 
contemporary UK constitution following the enactment of the HRA, thirdly in the expanding 
platform of judicial review and finally through the legitimacy of an institutionally independent and 
more democratically accountable judicial branch following the enactment of the CRA.   
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Before any change in the court’s institutional relations can be tracked, the objectives for the 
Supreme Court need to be reviewed. The blueprint for the court provides an insight into the extent 
to which the court’s role was intended to change and allows a distinction to be drawn between 
advertent and inadvertent change.  Both the legal and political reasons for reform need to be 
established in order to provide a comprehensive insight the CRA’s aims.  
The UK Supreme Court; Legal and Political catalysts for change 
 
The CRA substantially allayed any fear of radical redefinition of role by ensuring that there was a 
significant amount of continuity between the Appellate Committee and the Supreme Court. There 
was merit to be gained in the Supreme Court retaining substantially the same jurisdiction as the 
Appellate Committee,149 as well as the same personnel.150  These features of the CRA assisted in 
achieving a smooth transition between the two institutions. The ‘reforms’ envisaged by the Act were 
four fold; Part 1 enshrined the constitutional principle of the rule of law in statute, Part 2 made 
various changes to the role of the Lord Chancellor, the most significant being his/her removal as 
head of the judiciary;151 Part 3 created an institutionally independent Supreme Court and Part 4 
introduced a Judicial Appointments Commission. Each of these changes had a part to play in 
achieving the aim of the Government’s proposals which, externally at least, was to ‘reflect and 
enhance the independence of the judiciary from both the legislature and the executive.’152 The final 
appeal court was to become more ‘transparent’ and ‘independent’.153 The creation of a Supreme 
Court appeared to be the next stage in the Labour Government’s offensive to ‘modernise’ the 
constitution, which began with the HRA and devolution statutes in 1998. Nevertheless, the sudden 
announcement on 12 June 2003 of the plans to create a Supreme Court, without prior consultation, 
and which appeared to contradict previous governmental assertions of a commitment to 
maintaining the ‘expertise and experience’ that the Law Lords brought to Parliament,154 led some to 
question whether the proposals were in fact a political manoeuvre designed to oust Lord Irvine who- 
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as an active Lord Chancellor- was viewed by Blair as an obstacle to reform.155  The Government was 
therefore keen to demonstrate that the proposals for a Supreme Court had strong support across 
both legal and political factions.156   
The Political Case for Reform 
 
The political case for reform was set out in the Department of Constitutional Affairs consultation 
paper, A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, published in July 2003. Lord Falconer of Thornton, 
the then Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor, made clear that the 
Government’s intentions were not motivated by dissatisfaction with the Appellate Committee but 
rather by the need to separate the judiciary from the legislature and to ‘enhance the independence 
of the judiciary’.157  
 
The Government put forward legal and administrative reasons for reform. It began by noting the 
legal requirements of A6 ECHR which call into question any arrangement that may cast doubt over 
the independence and/or impartiality of the judiciary.158 The Government accepted that this concern 
had prevented the judges from participating fully in the legislature.159 The Government also 
commented on the increase in judicial review applications which ‘inevitably brought the judges more 
into the political eye’ and added to ‘the danger that judges’ decisions could be perceived to be 
politically motivated.’160  Practically, the Government was acutely aware of the ‘cramped conditions’ 
in the Palace of Westminster161 and the desirability of the court having separate facilities. Politically, 
however, the Government was quite clear that the constitutional role for the Supreme Court would 
remain largely unchanged. Parliament would remain supreme and the Supreme Court would not 
have powers of annulment over legislation akin to those of the US Supreme Court or be able to 
declare legislation unconstitutional as in European constitutional courts.162 The Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction would be the same as the Appellate Committee’s with the addition of the JCPC’s 
                                                             
155See Le Sueur’s discussion of the circumstance surrounding the Government’s announcement in A Le Sueur 
‘The Conception of the UK’s New Supreme Court’ in A Le Sueur, Building the UK’s New Supreme Court, 
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devolution issue jurisdiction.163 The remainder of the JCPC’s jurisdiction was to remain distinct from 
that of the Supreme Court in order to respect the fact that the JCPC hears appeals from various 
independent Commonwealth countries and Crown dependencies and was not solely a domestic 
court.164 
 
The Government’s intentions in establishing the court support the design of this thesis and the key 
themes it explores. Firstly, it was clear that the judiciary’s institutional ‘relationships’ with the other 
branches of state were to change by being placed on a more ‘modern footing’ and that the Supreme 
Court would assist in redrawing the relationship between the three branches of state.165 Secondly, 
the enactment of the CRA was to be regarded as the next step in the post-1997 programme of 
‘accelerated’ constitutional reform,166 with each of the preceding statutes prompting constitutional 
change and an associated redefinition of institutional relationships. 
The Legal Case for Reform 
 
Lord Bingham’s Case for Reform 
 
Reform of the House of Lords 
 
Lord Bingham identified three main legal reasons why the time was ripe for reform of the court.167  
Firstly, he saw it as an inevitable extension of the ongoing reform to the composition of the House of 
Lords. He predicted that the Second Chamber would become smaller in membership and inevitably 
seek to maximise the utility and skill set of each appointment to the House. Although the Law Lords 
were not lacking in terms of technical skill, they were found wanting in terms of their participation 
levels, either through practical constraints on their time or through consciously being aware of 
compromising their position in later litigation.168  
Requirements of A6 ECHR 
 
                                                             
163A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, n152, p19-20 
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165A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, n152, p13 
166See Bogdanor, The New British Constitution and King, The British Constitution, n16 
167
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168Lord Hoffmann was disqualified from sitting owing to perceived bias following the decision in R v Bow Street 
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Bingham’s second reason was the requirement to ‘take into account’ Convention jurisprudence 
under s2 of the HRA, which brought the UK’s obligations, as a signatory to the Convention, into 
sharper focus.  The Convention jurisprudence had taken a ‘stricter view’ on matters that actually had 
an effect on judicial independence and impartiality as well as those which might prompt a 
perception of independence or bias.169  
Procola v Luxembourg170 revealed the emphasis that the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) 
placed on appearances. Procola challenged the composition of the judicial committee of the Conseil 
d’ Etat on the basis that some of its members were involved in issuing the advisory opinion relevant 
to the appeal and the committee was not therefore independent or impartial. The ECtHR agreed 
with the Commission dissent which had emphasised ‘… the importance attached to appearances’171 
and that the ‘blurred’ lines between the judicial and advisory role of the Conseil’d Etat gave rise to a 
‘legitimate fear’ that the applicant’s case ‘… would not be heard by an independent and impartial 
tribunal within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Convention.’ The Court commented that it was not 
the actual independence of the Councillors which was being questioned172 but rather the doubts 
over the Conseil’s structural impartiality.173 
Individual impartiality was no longer enough to satisfy A6 ECHR. Parallels could immediately be 
drawn between the position of the Luxemburg Conseil d’ Etat and that of the Law Lords in the House 
of Lords. The Law Lords could oversee the revision of bills and debate the details of those bills as 
they passed through the legislative chamber, therefore structural impartiality in the UK was blurred 
in a way that would appear to be unacceptable to the ECtHR.174  
The decision of McGonnell v UK175 followed that of Procola. McGonnell raised a successful A6 
challenge to the position of the Bailiff of Guernsey who was President of the Royal Court, a 
professional judge and exercised legislative and executive functions, including presiding over the 
States of Deliberation.  The States of Deliberation had adopted a development plan, the 
implementation of which was later to have an adverse effect on the applicant.  The Bailiff, in his 
presiding role, possessed a casting but not an original vote on the matters at hand. There was also a 
                                                             
169Bingham, ‘A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom’, n156, p5-6 
170(1996) 22 EHRR 193 
171Procola v Luxembourg, 6 July 1994 (No. 14570/89) 
172
Procola, n170 [43] 
173
Procola, n170 [45] 
174
This cannot be said with any certainty as ECtHR jurisprudence does not require states to subscribe to a 
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conventional constraint on the use of the Bailiff’s vote so that it would only be used to maintain the 
status quo. Nevertheless, the ECtHR agreed with the Commission and held unanimously that there 
had been a breach of A6. The ECtHR made clear that the Council of Europe members were not 
required by the Convention to subscribe to any particular theoretical concept of the separation of 
powers, however there had to be a functional guarantee of the rights subscribed to under the 
Convention.176  
In a post-McGonnell world, the Law Lords’ position was open to attack on both independence and 
impartiality grounds. Firstly their appointment by the Lord Chancellor, who held both executive and 
judicial functions, was open to question. Secondly, their membership of the legislature arguably 
clouded the ‘appearance of independence’, and did not offer a strong enough guarantee of objective 
impartiality. Indeed, the Bailiff of Guernsey’s role in the legislative procedure was of a more 
removed nature to that of the Law Lords, who each possessed a vote on legislation in the same way 
as any other member of the House of Lords.   If any further confirmation was required of the 
precarious position that both the Lord Chancellor and the Law Lords occupied in the UK, it was 
provided when the ECtHR ruled that, 
any direct involvement in the passage of legislation, or of executive rules, is likely to be 
sufficient to cast doubt on the judicial impartiality of a person subsequently called on to 
determine a dispute over whether reasons exist to permit a variation from the wording of 
the legislation or rules at issue.177 
The Decreasing Workload of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
 
The final argument put forward by Bingham for the creation of a Supreme Court was the waning 
influence of the JCPC. Its workload had gradually reduced over the years, as successive 
Commonwealth countries gained their independence and professional bodies took control of their 
respective regulatory proceedings.178  The JCPC’s overseas jurisdiction was a relic of the past and its 
regulation of professional bodies seemed out of line with the modern trend for regulation of public 
services either by independent bodies accountable to Parliament, or regulatory bodies specifically 
                                                             
176McGonnell, n175, [51] 
177McGonnell, n175, [55] 
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set up to oversee professional services. Bingham felt that the only matter which served to reignite 
and enlarge the JCPC’s gradually decreasing jurisdiction was on the home-front when the Scotland 
Act 1998 granted the ‘devolution issue’ jurisdiction to the JCPC as opposed to the Appellate 
Committee.179    
Lord Steyn’s Case for Reform 
 
Lord Steyn’s case for a Supreme Court180 was not explicitly referred to in the Government White 
Paper.  There was a degree of overlap with some of the reasons put forward by Lord Bingham, 
however Steyn’s arguments for removing the Law Lords from the legislature were underpinned 
primarily by constitutional theory, as opposed to Bingham’s concerns which were linked to the 
strength of recent Convention jurisprudence and pragmatic considerations following the devolution 
settlement. Steyn concentrated on the traditional constitutional doctrines of the rule of law and 
judicial independence, which he believed formed the foundations for the doctrine of the separation 
of powers.181 Steyn’s argument centred on the premise that the UK lacked the constitutional 
infrastructure- of a more rigid separation of powers and a clearer perception of judicial 
independence- necessary to uphold current democratic values. His case for reform was not limited 
to the Law Lords and also explored the multifunctional position that the Lord Chancellor occupied 
within the constitution. Steyn did not feel that the two positions were mutually exclusive as he felt 
that the Law Lords only continued to be part of the legislature to prevent the Lord Chancellor’s 
position within the constitution from becoming anomalous.182 
Steyn accepted that the separation of powers was a dynamic concept and that the strict form was 
very rarely ascribed to by any constitutional democracy,183 nevertheless, the UK was unique in the 
extent to which it violated traditional separation of powers values:  
Nowhere outside Britain, even in democracies with the weakest forms of separation of 
powers, is the independence of the judiciary potentially compromised in the eyes of citizens 
by relegating the status of the highest court to the position of a subordinate part of the 
legislature.184 
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Steyn also felt that the ability for a serving Lord Chancellor to sit in the Appellate Committee as a 
judge was, ‘not consistent with even the weakest principle of separation of powers or the most 
tolerant interpretation of the constitutional principles of judicial independence or rule of law.’185 
Far from leading the democratic world, Steyn felt that the UK was out of step with the modern 
regard for principles of constitutionalism. He queried the ‘democratic legitimacy’ of not having a 
completely separate executive and judiciary.186 Further still, it seemed inappropriate where the 
executive was regularly a party to litigation before the courts, for it to continue to have a 
representative within that court.  
Together, Steyn and Bingham highlighted both the legal and constitutional case for a Supreme Court, 
which undoubtedly fed into the Government’s political case for reform several years later.  The 
political and legal case for reform underlined the need to reform the relationship between the 
judiciary, the executive and the legislature and to increase the perception of an independent judicial 
branch. The Supreme Court consultation paper, however, made clear that the Government did not 
intend to create a more prominent role for the final appellate court in the UK. This thesis aims to 
establish whether, by altering the nature of court’s institutional relationships, the inadvertent effect 
of the reform was to create a more powerful court within the UK constitution.  
Chapter Overview 
 
The substantive chapters that follow the Methodology Chapter are outlined below, with the focus of 
the thesis being the examination of the relative power of the Supreme Court in the time period. It is 
clear from the data that there are some differences in practice between the Supreme Court and the 
Appellate Committee, however the most significant findings, as regards the administrative efficiency 
and institutional relationships of the court, relate to the institutional influence of the ECtHR. 
Consequently, the way that the Supreme Court manages its relationship with the ECtHR in the future 
is likely to directly impact upon its domestic institutional relationships. The study concludes by 
suggesting that, on the basis of the results generated by the study, the enactment of the CRA may 
not have as significant implications for the administrative efficiency and institutional relational 
dynamics of the UK final appeal court as a future repeal of the HRA would.  
Administrative Efficiency of the Court 
 
                                                             
185Steyn, ‘The Case for a Supreme Court’, n180, 388 
186Steyn, ‘The Case for a Supreme Court’, n180, 388 
67 
 
This chapter precedes the substantive review of each of the court’s institutional relationships by 
examining the operational efficiency of the court in the time period. The aim of the chapter is to 
establish whether the court was in a position to regularly and effectively communicate with each of 
the institutions that it had a relationship. The analysis compares the average length of case, 
judgment gap and length of judgment for each final appeal court and identifies any changes in 
judgment style across the time period. This includes the size of the judicial panels convened, the rate 
of concurrence and dissent as well as the number of single judgments issued. The results then feed 
into larger questions relating to the operation of precedent, the clarity of the judgment delivered 
and the guidance offered to other institutions examined in this study. The significant findings are 
used to make recommendations as to how the Supreme Court could improve on efficiency and at 
the same time support institutional relations going forward.  
Relationship with State Institutions 
 
The first of the substantive chapters on the court’s institutional relations examines the relationship 
with the political institutions of state; the executive and Parliament. This thesis does not comment 
on whether it is desirable for the court to occupy a more powerful position in its relationship with 
the executive or Parliament, either under the HRA or, in the case of the executive, under orthodox 
judicial review187 and instead curtails its analysis to whether there appeared to be a change in those 
relationships using either of these review mechanisms.  
The Executive 
 
The quantitative data on the executive opens the chapter and has three main foci. Firstly, the data 
compares executive involvement as between the courts to gauge how often each court was required 
to review executive action in the time period and thus how often each court was in a position to 
have a bearing on executive policy. Secondly, the data compares the rate at which the executive was 
successful to indicate how often the executive was required to rethink its decisions in light of judicial 
interpretations of the law.  Finally, the data develops the findings in chapter 3 by reviewing whether 
executive involvement had any effect on the administrative efficiency or judgment style of the court. 
The chapter progresses by exploring the extent to which cases that involved the executive also 
involved consideration of ECtHR jurisprudence. The overlap found between cases that involved both 
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the Convention and the executive suggests that institutional relations between the judiciary and the 
executive are often three-dimensional and are influenced by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. This 
finding provides the infrastructure to review the observational data to reveal how the ECtHR 
appeared to influence judicial-executive relations both within and out-with the Convention context 
and how it may have subtly affected the characteristics of judicial-executive relations.    
The Legislature 
 
The hierarchical relationship between Parliament and the court appeared to characterise the 
judicial-parliamentary relationship in the time period, as shown in the need for the court to effect 
the clear institutional intent of the legislature and also in the need to defer any substantive law 
reform to the democratic and systematic law reforming procedures of Parliament. As a result, the 
orthodox judicial-parliamentary relationship is reviewed under the headings of ‘institutional 
communication’ and ‘institutional deference’. The institutional communication section examines the 
techniques that were used to ascertain and affect legislative intent and to interpret statutory 
language. The institutional deference section examines how the distinctive law making roles of the 
judiciary and Parliament interrelated and the extent to which the common law deferred to statutory 
law in the time period. Given the three-way institutional relational dynamic found in the executive 
section, the chapter closes by reviewing the effect of the Convention on the orthodox characteristics 
of the judicial-legislative relationship, in particular whether the orthodox relationship was either 
reflected or re-characterised by the infrastructure of the HRA.   
Relationship with Domestic Courts 
 
The Supreme Court exercises supervisory responsibility over courts in each of the three distinct legal 
systems within the UK. In England and Wales these courts include the Court of Appeal Civil Division 
(‘Court of Appeal (Civ)’), the Court of Appeal Criminal Division (‘Court of Appeal (Crim)’) and the High 
Court. In Scotland it includes the High Court of Justiciary and the Court of Session and in Northern 
Ireland it includes the Court of Appeal and the High Court.   
Chapter 5 begins with a review of the origin of appeals in order to contextualise the data by 
establishing which lower court had the most interaction with the final appeal court in the time 
period. The origination of appeals data also allows a comparison to be made between the two final 
appeal courts to see whether the proportion of appeals from a certain lower court changed 
following the transition to the Supreme Court.   The chapter also develops the preliminary 
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conclusions reached in Chapter 3 by ascertaining whether the court of origin had an effect on the 
administrative efficiency of the final appeal court.  
The umbrella themes of ‘overrule’ and ‘precedent’ are used as a template by which to examine all of 
the final appeal court’s institutional relationships with other legal institutions. The overrule section 
examines the frequency of overrule for each lower court and how overrule impacted upon the 
administrative efficiency of the final appeal court and the judgment style used. The quantitative data 
also measured the circumstance of the overrule, such as whether the lower court was divided 
and/or followed precedent and whether the involvement of another institution- for instance the 
executive being a party or the influence of ECtHR jurisprudence being considered- had an effect on 
rates of overrule. A high overrule rate demonstrates an active and assertive court prepared to 
declare its view of matters and also evidences a more unstable legal system.  
The precedent section aims to gauge the effectiveness of the system of precedent in the time period 
and how it facilitated institutional relations with the lower courts by helping to minimise overrule 
and guide them as to the correct legal outcome. The quantitative data on precedent examines which 
lower court followed precedent most often, and how lower court unanimity, following precedent 
and overrule each interrelated. The section also examines the effect that the involvement of the 
executive and the influence of ECtHR had on the lower court following precedent, as well as the 
effect that the involvement of precedent had on the administrative efficiency of the court.  
A separate section is devoted to Scottish precedent to establish how the creation of precedent in 
Scottish appeals struck the sensitive balance between capitalising on the resource of the English 
common law whilst being respectful to the integrity of Scots law.  The final section also reviews the 
cases arising under the Supreme Court’s new devolution issue jurisdiction to establish how the 
balance was struck between being sensitive to the Scots’ law origin of those appeals whilst 
determining the important Convention or constitutional issues that arose therein.   
Relationship with European Courts 
 
The European Court of Human Rights 
 
The significant findings in the preceding chapters on the effect that the influence of the ECtHR 
jurisprudence had on the administrative efficiency of the court, the judgment style adopted and the 
court’s institutional relationships, influenced the design of the final chapter. The chapter reviews the 
statistics on the institutional relationship with the ECtHR to discern further what it was about the 
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influence of ECtHR jurisprudence that appeared to cause the significant results in the preceding 
chapters.  The pillars of ‘overrule’ and ‘precedent’ are again loosely used to review the quantitative 
data. The ‘overrule’ section distinguishes between cases that followed, did not follow or were 
unclear as to the ECtHR jurisprudence and measures how this in turn affected the judgment style 
adopted and the administrative efficiency of the court. The ‘precedent’ section examines the 
average volume of ECtHR citations between each court and whether the fact that the executive was 
party to the case or the lower court decision was approved, had any effect on the volume of ECtHR 
citations.  The results were then used to refine the preliminary conclusions reached on the 
significance of the influence of the ECtHR in the preceding chapters. 
The European Court of Justice 
 
The relationship between the Supreme Court and the CJEU is slightly different to its relationship with 
the ECtHR as the Supreme Court is obliged to apply the law as stated in the EC treaties and to 
interpret national law consistently with EU Law.188 The enactment of the European Communities Act 
1972 (hereinafter the ‘ECA’) at a ‘formal’ level was perceived to be ‘the most fundamental change to 
the powers of the top courts in the UK in recent years’ however the practical effects on the UK 
constitution have been reduced by the irregularity with which the ECA is in issue.189  
The ‘irregularity’ with which EU matters arise was evident in this study. Only two cases responded to 
a CJEU reference meaning that no comment could be made on the empirical relationship between 
the court’s response to CJEU references and the effect on final appeal court’s domestic institutional 
relationships e.g. the success of the executive or the overrule of the lower court.  Nevertheless, to 
complete the review of the final appeal court’s institutional relationships in the time period, the data 
on cases that made a reference and declined to make a reference was reviewed under the ‘overrule’ 
heading to see how this impacted upon the judgment style and administrative efficiency of the 
court. Secondly, the data on volume of EU citations was reviewed under the ‘precedent’ heading to 
illustrate the difference in the extent of the jurisprudential review of EU cases compared to 
Convention cases. 
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Chapter 2; Methodology 
 
The law making functions of the final appeal court has been ‘surprisingly understudied’1 and the use 
of social science methodology to study the operation of the court has, until recently, been unusual in 
the UK.2 While the Ministry of Justice publishes official judicial statistics each year, these often do 
not focus on the final appeal court and have been found to contain discrepancies.3 By contrast, 
detailed empirical data on the work of the US Supreme Court is collated and published on an annual 
basis.4 The Supreme Court now has a statutory obligation under s54 CRA to publish an annual report, 
which contains quantitative information on the administrative functionality of the court5 alongside 
commentary on the institutional relations with devolved authorities and with European and 
Commonwealth courts. The report’s overview of the Supreme Court’s practice aligns with the 
structure of this thesis and highlights the merit in using both quantitative and observational data to 
provide a window into the characteristics of the Supreme Court.  
This study makes a distinctive contribution to the empirically-informed analysis of the final appeal 
court by systematically measuring the administrative efficiency and institutional relational dynamics 
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of the final appeal court in an important transitional period. The findings not only conclude on the 
significance of the influence of the ECtHR in the time period, they also identify clear changes in final 
appeal court practice and institutional relations since the move to the Supreme Court in statistical 
terms. In this sense the research addresses ‘the empirical question of whether the change [to the 
Supreme Court] will lead to the court exercising more power.’6 It also provides an empirical review 
of the effect of the CRA on the final appeal court’s institutional relationships to complement the 
non-empirical research into the effect of the CRA on the court’s relationship with the political 
branches of state.7 The research identifies trends which cannot be fully substantiated within the 
current study and may require further examination. Throughout the study supplements, advances 
and, where relevant, contextualises itself within the findings of the existing empirical studies on the 
final appeal court that form the methodological foundations of this thesis.  
The first of these empirical studies is Blom-Cooper and Drewry’s Final Appeal.8 In Final Appeal, the 
authors pointed to the unique social and supervisory role of the Appellate Committee, owing to its 
generic and wide jurisdiction over both civil and criminal matters.9 Blom-Cooper and Drewry also 
recognised the breadth of the error correcting role that the court held; propagated by the 
precedential nature of the legal system in the UK.10   The core aim of Final Appeal was to provide 
empirical evidence and significant statistical patterns to support the debates over reform or 
abolition of the Appellate Committee.11  The aim of this study is not to debate the value of a second-
tier appeal court. Instead this thesis seeks to provide empirical evidence and reveal significant 
statistical patterns to inform the debate over whether the change from the Appellate Committee to 
the Supreme Court had an effect on the administrative efficiency of the court as well as its relative 
power in the constitution. Both Final Appeal and this study cover a transformative period in the 
court’s history. In Final Appeal, it was the 1960s when leapfrog appeals were introduced, the 
doctrine of stare decisis was amended by the Practice Statement and criminal appeals increasingly 
came before the court.12 Here, it is the four year transitional period covering the move from the 
Appellate Committee to the Supreme Court.   
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Final Appeal focussed on four foci of enquiry; ‘mechanical efficiency’, ‘litigant contentment’, ‘lawyer 
satisfaction’ and ‘social function.’13 Litigant contentment and lawyer satisfaction are beyond the 
scope of this study however ‘mechanical efficiency’ is addressed in Chapter 3 and ‘social function’ is 
addressed by examining the court’s institutional relationships.  ‘Mechanical efficiency’ in Final 
Appeal sought to identify the ‘wrinkles and anachronisms in the judicial process’ and suggest 
improvements.14 The efficiency question in this study is still concerned with judicial process and asks 
whether, in the transitional period, the Supreme Court became a more efficient institution in 
dispensing justice. ‘Efficiency’ was measured, in this study, through the expeditious hearing, writing 
and delivery of judgments as these factors have a direct bearing on the volume of cases that the 
court can hear and provide guidance on each year.15  This in turn, impacts upon wider issues such as 
refreshing the system of precedent, the continuing development of the common law and the 
regularity of communication with the other institutions examined in this study. In other words the 
‘efficiency’ of the court affects what Final Appeal termed the ‘social function’ that the court 
performs.   ‘Social Function’ was regarded in Final Appeal as an accumulation of the other three 
categories and described as ‘the relationship of the House of Lords to other legal institutions’.16  This 
relational theme clearly overlaps with the current study.  Nevertheless, the design of this study 
reflects the wide-ranging programme of constitutional reform that has taken place since the 
publication of Final Appeal and the impact those reforms have had on the institutional relationships 
of the final appeal court. For instance, in Final Appeal there was no cause to examine the 
relationship with the CJEU or the ECtHR. Furthermore, Final Appeal’s conclusions were ‘medicinal’ 
rather than ‘surgical’ in character, reflecting a more evolutionary constitution at that time.17  In 
summary, Final Appeal was written in a different constitutional setting and with a different aim to 
the current study. Nevertheless, the empirical processes underpinning the work have clear parallels 
with the current study and the findings, where relevant, will be referenced throughout to provide 
empirical context to the results in the current study. 
Alan Paterson’s 1970s study, The Law Lords was another major empirical study on the Appellate 
Committee based upon qualitative rather than quantitative data. Paterson focussed on the 
processes behind decision-making in the Appellate Committee. Paterson was keen to explore the 
                                                             
13Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p4 
14Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p4 
15A complete picture of the efficiency of the court would require an examination of decision-making in the 
Appeal Committee as well as the financial efficiency of the court. 
16
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p4 
17
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal n1, p397. For instance, it was suggested that the Appellate 
Committee changed its name to underline the separation between and to disassociate itself with class 
privilege and hereditary nature of the legislative chamber of the House of Lords. This is far removed from the 
changes that were eventually wrought by the CRA; See p406. 
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relationship between role and the perception of role18 to the decision-making process, particularly in 
what he termed ‘hard’ cases.19 He used a number of resources including the cases arising in the 
House of Lords between 1957 and 1973, interviews, judicial biographies, extra judicial writings, 
books and articles.20  His primary resource was based on ‘in-depth’ interviews conducted with the 
Law Lords and counsel. Paterson also drew upon his own observations of the interaction between 
counsel and the Law Lords.  The interviews followed a pre-prepared checklist of open-ended 
questions with an element of flexibility incorporated to respond to the interviewees’ answers.21 This 
method afforded him a ‘behind the scenes’ view of the internal discussions between the Law Lords 
and counsel and how those discussions influenced the decision-making processes in the Appellate 
Committee.22  
In his recent book, Final Judgment, The Last Law Lords and The Supreme Court,23 Paterson examined 
decision-making in the final appeal court as a social process, turning his focus to the underlying 
dialogues behind the court’s decision-making.  Dialogues – like role analysis - are influenced by and 
often respond to the expectations of the court.24 Paterson primarily relied upon ‘elite’ interviews, 
however he also included some quantitative analysis and was able to take advantage of the 
availability of judicial notebooks as well as the Supreme Court broadcasts of courtroom dialogues.25 
Paterson’s empirical study reviewed the ‘dialogues’ held between the final appeal court and each of 
the institutions explored in this thesis including with Parliament, the executive, the Court of Appeal, 
with Scotland and the overseas courts, although some of these institutions were covered more 
comprehensively than others. Paterson’s findings on ‘role’ and ‘dialogue’ in decision-making clearly 
link with the quantitative results in this study and provide further context to the core theme of 
institutional relations and relationships and the role that the final appeal court has- or perceives 
itself as having- in each of these relationships. Paterson’s findings will therefore be referenced 
throughout. 
The Methodology of this Study 
 
Time Period and Number of Appeals 
 
                                                             
18See also discussion in text at Chapter 1, n23 
19Paterson, The Law Lords, n1, p3 
20Paterson, The Law Lords, n1, p4 
21Paterson, The Law Lords, n1, p5-6 
22Paterson, The Law Lords, n1, p7 
23Paterson, Final Judgment, n2 
24
Paterson, Final Judgment, n2, p3 
25
Paterson, Final Judgment, n2 p3-5 
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Final Appeal’s time period ran from 1952-1968, covered 500 House of Lords decisions26 and took 5 
years to compile.27 The authors also examined leave to appeal petitions heard in both the House of 
Lords and the Court of Appeal during the same time period. The time constraints of this doctorate 
and the fact that it was carried out by a single coder meant that leave to appeal applications were 
out-with the scope of this study and the data collected only covered the 4 year transitional period 
between the House of Lords and the Supreme Court. At the time of Final Appeal, the House of Lords 
heard an average of 33 appeals per year.  The number of appeals heard by the court per annum has 
risen substantially since that time. As a result, this study still covered 246 decisions; just under half 
the number in Final Appeal.28 The time period allowed a symmetrical picture to be obtained by 
reviewing the two years prior to the opening of the Supreme Court and the two years thereafter. 
The four year time period was also long enough to generate statistically significant patterns. 
Empirical study of the JCPC in the relevant years would have added a more complete picture to the 
empirical database, however for the same reasons provided in Final Appeal, namely space and time 
constraints, an empirical analysis of the JCPC appeals arising in the time period was omitted from 
this study.29 
Final Appeal identified similar drawbacks to those in the current study, namely sample size, sample 
bias and whether or not something is a causal factor.  The authors felt that the sample size of 17 
years was a sufficiently long time to avoid sample bias and that a ‘methodologically safe ground’ 
could be achieved if they curtailed their findings to the time period studied.30 The time period 
covered in this study is far less than that in Final Appeal, however the number of appeals covered is 
closer i.e. just under half. Larger sample sizes are preferable as the results from the sample are likely 
to be closer to the results of a study covering the whole population.31  Given the smaller number of 
appeals and the shorter time period, this study avoids the issue of ‘sampling error’32 by limiting its 
findings to a description of the final appeal court’s activities in the transitional period studied and 
makes no attempt to use the findings to empirically predict how the court may operate in the future.  
                                                             
26The number of appeals was fairly consistent during this time at around 30 appeals a year; Blom-Cooper and 
Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p241 
27Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p5 
28Final Appeal recommended an increase in the Appellate Committee’s caseload to around 100 cases a year. 
This would increase subject expertise, avoid too much reformist zeal being attached to any case and avoid 
errant decisions being left unreversed for too long. The average number of cases each year in this study still 
fell short of this recommendation at 61.5 appeals; Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p399-400 
29
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p103 
30
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p8 
31
A Field, Discovering Statistics using SPSS (Sage, 2009) p35 
32
A Agresti and B Finlay describe this as ‘… the error that occurs when we use a statistic based on a sample to 
predict the value of the population parameter.’ See Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences (Pearson, 2009), 
p18 
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The sampling method in this study is akin to random sampling in that it was entirely random which 
cases arose in the 4 years studied and no case was discriminated against, provided it arose in the 
sessions covered by the study. As such each case arising in the 4 year period had the same 
probability of being selected (100%) and each case not arising in the 4 year period had the same 
probability of not being selected (0%). Random sampling eliminates the issue of sample bias, 
however there is still a danger of under-coverage with a certain group lacking representation in the 
time period studied.33  As will be seen later in the study, this was particularly true of appeals 
originating in Northern Ireland and appeals that responded to a CJEU reference.34 Where bias is an 
issue through under-coverage or otherwise, the conclusions should be limited to the time period and 
avoid wider inference beyond the data collected.35  Although this supresses, to a certain extent, the 
impact of the conclusions that can be drawn, Final Appeal acknowledged that these limitations are 
always present in sociological research and by limiting conclusions to those which may properly be 
drawn on the basis of the data, it should still ‘… illuminate rather than befog the mechanism of the 
judicial process.’36 
Corroboration using Observational Data 
 
The empirical study was very much the starting point for further analysis.  It was therefore essential 
to corroborate the empirical data with evidence gathered from other sources.  Corroboration allows 
flesh to be placed on the bare statistics and helps to explain why a particular pattern has developed, 
or provide possible reasons for surprising results. The empirical data was corroborated using the 
observational data collected from the judgments,37 published judicial interviews, judicial lectures as 
well as relevant academic literature and empirical studies.  In Final Appeal, the authors conceded 
that gathering points from judicial dicta across a wider variety of cases ‘… is impressionistic and not 
governed by hard and fast rules.’38 The impressionistic nature of the observational data analysed in 
this study was compounded by the fact the study was conducted by a single coder. Calderone’s 
caveat is consequently endorsed in this study; ‘… statistics … should be read not as hard-and-fast 
numbers but as broadly indicating my feel of the data.’39 
                                                             
33
Agresti and Finlay, Statistical Methods, n32, p20 
34
Blom-Cooper and Drewry identified this issue with Scottish appeals; Final Appeal, n1, p8 
35Agresti and Finlay, Statistical Methods, n32, p21 
36Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p8 
37Blom-Cooper and Drewry also collated ‘points of interest’ outside that required for the empirical study; Final 
Appeal, n1, p9 
38Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p146 
39R Calderone, ‘Precedent in Operation: A comparison of the Judicial House of Lords and the US Supreme 
Court’ [2004] PL 759, 778-779 
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SPSS 
 
SPSS version 19 was used to input and analyse the data that was generated from the cases.  The 
judgments were read, coded and the data inserted into SPSS. A set of research analysis questions40 
was compiled for each variable and discussed with a statistician at the University of York, who 
assisted with the generation of the statistical analysis in SPSS.   The figures in the crosstabs 
generated were then manually crosschecked against the original SPSS database, to ensure accuracy 
and that the correct variables had been used for each research question.  
Quantitative Empirical Analysis 
 
The quantitative data used in this study is descriptive rather than predictive. The statistics describe 
the numeric frequency of a phenomenon as well as the spread of the data around a centre point i.e. 
the standard deviation from the mean and the standard error of the mean.  Statistical significance 
tests were run on the data to gauge whether any difference in the data collected for the Appellate 
Committee and the Supreme Court was more than could be expected by chance.  A mixture of 
discrete and continuous variables was used in the coding i.e. some variables had a discrete number 
of categories that the data could fall into and others simply recorded the number of instances along 
a continuous continuum.  Whether a variable was continuous or categorical had an effect on how 
the data was displayed and the significance test used.   
Mean, 5% Trimmed Mean and Median 
 
The mean was the most common measure of the centre point of the data used, and was calculated 
by dividing the sum of the values recorded for a variable by the number of values recorded. The 
mean can be adversely affected by outliers. Occasionally the 5% trimmed mean figure was used in 
the analysis to disregard any outliers and provide a mean figure that was closer to the median. The 
median is the true midpoint in the data and is not affected by outliers or significant variance 
between the data.   
Standard Deviation 
 
The standard deviation measured the standard variance of the data from the mean. A low value 
indicated that there was a slight variation between cases from the mean. By contrast, where the 
data was widely dispersed there was a larger variation from the mean, indicating that the mean did 
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not actually represent the majority of cases.41 A standard deviation figure of more than two or three 
times the value of the mean indicated a lot of variability around the mean.  
Standard Error of Mean and 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
The mean could vary between different sessions or years in the court, therefore the standard error 
of mean was used to determine the level of confidence that if the study was repeated with a 
different sample, it would deliver a similar mean value.  The standard error of mean is calculated by 
dividing the standard deviation figure by the square root of the number of cases.    
A 95% confidence interval for the mean was occasionally used.  It provides a ‘lower bound’ and an 
‘upper bound’ figure with 95 out of 100 cases falling between these figures. The wider the 
confidence interval, the less accurate the sample mean was.42 Confidence intervals are therefore 
affected by sample size. The smaller the sample size, the larger the confidence intervals are likely to 
be as it is less easy to predict where future cases will fall. There were various instances, highlighted 
throughout this project, where the analysis proceeded with a degree of caution owing to the large 
confidence intervals returned.  
Correlation and Covariance 
 
Correlation looked at the relationship between two variables whereas covariance tested whether 
the deviation of one variable from the mean also caused the other variable to deviate from the 
mean, either in the same or the opposite way. The direction of travel indicated whether the two 
variables were positively or negatively related.43  
Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
 
Covariance can be affected by the scale of the measurement used. As such, it is standardised into 
the same type of measurement unit, known as the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, to allow a 
comparison to be made.44 The Pearson value produced a figure that lay between -1 and 1, with a 
negative value indicating a negative relationship, a positive value indicating a positive relationship 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
40See Annex III. 
41Field, Discovering Statistics, n31, p39 
42L Epstein and A Martin, An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research (OUP, 2014), p153-154 
43Field, Discovering Statistics, n31, p167-168 
44Field, Discovering Statistics, n31, p169-170 
79 
 
and 0 indicating no relationship between the two variables.45 This figure was used in this study to 
gauge the relationship between two variables and can be identified as the ‘r’ value.  
Significance Tests 
 
Various significance tests were used to identify whether a difference between the courts or in the 
relationship between two variables was more than what would occur if left to chance.  The test used 
depended on whether the data being compared was continuous or categorical and how many 
variables were being compared. 
The ‘p’ value measured probability and operates on a 5% significance level i.e. for there to be a 
significant difference, the ‘p’ value had to be less than or equal to 0.05. In other words, there was 
less than a 5% chance of that pattern occurring by pure chance.46 A non-significant difference in the 
data generated by the Appellate Committee compared to the Supreme Court did not mean that the 
move to the Supreme Court had no effect on that variable, but rather that the difference recorded 
could have occurred by chance. Significance tests were not just used to compare the data between 
the two courts. The data collected for all four years was occasionally analysed to create a larger 
sample size. The result from a four year period could be expressed with more confidence than with a 
two year period.  For instance, the effect of executive involvement on average length of case was 
not something that necessarily had to be compared between courts and was measured across all 4 
years to create a larger sample size and to determine with more certainty whether executive 
involvement had a significant effect on case length. 
Where statically significant results were returned, occasionally post-hoc analyses- using the 
Bonferroni correction- were carried out in order to pinpoint in a more precise way where the 
statistically significant differences lay. 
Independent sample t-tests were used to compare the differences in the mean for the continuous 
variables47 between two groups i.e. the Supreme Court and the Appellate Committee.  However, the 
independent t-test assumes the same heterogeneity of data in the two groups.   Where there was a 
lot of variation between cases, for example, in terms of the number of citations that were made, the 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance was used in order to test how significant the 
heterogeneity of the data was.  Where there were found to be significant levels of heterogeneity, 
                                                             
45J McClave and T Sincich, Statistics (Pearson, 2013), p579 
46
Field, Discovering Statistics, n31, p50 
47For instance, the number of ECtHR citations would be a continuous variable. 
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the Welch statistic was used instead as this takes into account heterogeneity of data and gives a 
more accurate picture of significance. 
A one way analysis of variance (ANOVA), identifiable by an F statistic, was used to compare the 
difference in the mean of three or more groups, for instance between the four separate sessions. 
ANOVA has limitations and cannot reveal between which years the significant differences lie.48 
The Chi squared test can be identified by the 2 symbol and was used to test the relationship 
between two independent categorical variables such as ‘court’ and ‘finding against the executive’.  It 
tested whether the frequencies in each category were different to the expected frequency if it were 
left to chance.49 Categorical data records the frequency of each category for each court. As such, it 
requires a test that compares relative frequencies of the data rather than comparing means, as the 
latter cannot be calculated when the data is not continuous.50  
Displaying the Data 
 
The data is principally displayed using cross tabulations as it provides a clear visual of the differences 
between the Appellate Committee and the Supreme Court in respect of frequencies for categorical 
variables and in respect of the mean for continuous variables. Bar charts and pie charts were 
occasionally used to illustrate the frequency distribution for the categorical data or the number of 
observations for each category.51  
A stem and leaf diagram was used to display the spread of continuous data for judgment length and 
judgment gap. The stem groups the data in units of ten and each leaf on the stem represents a case. 
The judgment gap stem, by way of example, grouped all the cases that had a judgment gap in the 
forties together, then the fifties, and so forth. The diagram assists in visually representing the spread 
of the data and where most cases clustered.   A scatter plot was then used to provide a visual of the 
linear relationship that existed between the judgment gap and judgment length, being two 
continuous variables.  
Variables and Coding 
 
A standardised and systematic method of approaching each case was achieved by using the same 
variables with the same coding categories for each variable as displayed in Annex 2.  The data 
                                                             
48Field, Discovering Statistics, n31, p349 
49Field, Discovering Statistics, n31,  p688 
50Field, Discovering Statistics, n31 p688. See also Agresti and Finlay, Statistical Methods, n32, p31 
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collected from each of the 246 judgments was coded into SPSS across the 22 different variables.52  
The variable outline below reveals how each variable fed into the wider thesis. Occasionally, the 
circumstances in a case proved difficult to fit within a predetermined code.  Any difficulties in the 
coding process, which could have affected the results generated from the variable, are accounted 
for below, together with the measures taken to counteract the difficulty.  
Functional Variables 
Name of Case 
 
This categorical variable was used for identification purposes only and listed the case name and 
citation for all 246 judgments. Conjoined appeals were counted as one case, provided they shared 
the same citation. This was the approach taken by Shah and Poole53 and by Final Appeal54 however it 
is acknowledged that this is not always the approach of the official judicial statistics.  The latter can 
therefore differ in the number of appeals recorded for a given session. 
Court 
 
This categorical variable recorded whether the case arose in the Appellate Committee or Supreme 
Court. The variable had a purely functional purpose to allow the substantive statistics to be 
compared and analysed, depending on which court the case arose.  The case was attributed to the 
court in the citation. In the transition between the courts, a case was occasionally heard in the 
Appellate Committee, with final judgment being delivered in the Supreme Court. This was coded as a 
Supreme Court case as it was published as a Supreme Court judgment and that court took ownership 
of it. This may artificially increase the Supreme Court case numbers, however as the majority of the 
variables are ‘judgment’ rather than ‘hearing’ focussed the process of the judgment writing was 
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Agresti and Findlay, Discovering Statistics, n32, p32 
52
Blom- Cooper and Drewry asked 60 questions of each appeal; Final Appeal, n1, p9 
53Shah and Poole, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act’, n2, 361-362 
54
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p39 
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likely to have taken place after the close of the Appellate Committee.55 Ten cases were affected by 
this, amounting to just 4% of the judgments.56  
Court Session 
 
This categorical variable was used to compare the substantive statistics between each session.  
Sessional differences could suggest that other factors had an impact on the results generated, aside 
from the changeover between courts.  External factors, which may affect the operation of the court, 
include personnel differences such as the retirement, appointment or absence from court of a 
particular judge, a particularly problematic piece of legislation leading to several cases or a change in 
court budgets or procedure.  Session differences could also reflect annual fluctuations in caseload, 
including an unusually large number of a particular category of case or a large number of appeals 
from a particular lower court. The sessional distinction allowed these factors to be accounted for at 
the analysis stage. 
Subject matter and Category of Case 
 
Each case was coded as one of 79 different subject matters.  If there were several subject matters 
identified in the case, a decision was taken as to the main and secondary subject matters.  Each 
individual subject matter then fed into 4 umbrella categories; (i) Human Rights (ii) Domestic 
Constitutional, Administrative or Public Law (‘DCAPL’) (iii) Private Party/ Law of Obligations or (vi) 
International (other than Human Rights) and were analysed according to the umbrella categories to 
ensure large enough numbers were present for meaningful analysis.    
The main points under appeal were discerned primarily from the facts and legal issues outlined in 
the judgment, with the Westlaw case categorisations being used as a secondary reference point to 
see how another resource, albeit equally subjective, had classified the appeal. As a result, this study 
occasionally departed from the Westlaw classification. The classification of each issue into a subject 
matter is a subjective process and is complicated further by a lack of clarity and/or consistency 
between judges on the certified points of appeal. The correct classification of appeals is not an issue 
                                                             
55These cases tended to be heard in late June or July immediately prior to the summer recess suggesting that 
judgment writing took place over summer or immediately after the Supreme Court opened its doors. Paterson 
found that Law Lord’s would ‘constantly’ discuss the issues informally during the course of an appeal. The first 
formal conference took place as soon as the hearing ended where judges presented a series of ‘monologues’ 
outlining their initial views before judgment writing was apportioned. This was followed by an, on average, six 
week drafting period after which opinions where circulated and perhaps reduced in number; Paterson, The 
Law Lords, n1, p89-97. 
56R v Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14 was one of the ten and was a key case in the study period that departed from 
the ECtHR line. This will be accounted for at analysis stage. 
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exclusive to this study. The official judicial statistics’ can be overly generic and inconsistent in their 
classifications each year.57 Shah and Poole felt that their method may have led, ‘… to an over-
counting of ‘human rights’ cases and thus to a possible over-accentuation of the importance of 
human rights.’58 Final Appeal referred to the ‘formidable problem of classification’ given that ‘any 
subject- classification [they] construct is essentially arbitrary and the assignment of marginal cases 
to particular categories is often extremely difficult.’59  Final Appeal used 36 different categories and 
a miscellaneous category which was then condensed into a shorter list of 16 categories.60 The 
authors did, however, admit that the final list was a product of personal preference and they 
caveated the validity of this aspect of the work depending upon how the data was to be utilised.61 As 
such any conclusions drawn on subject-matter have to be mindful of these limitations. 
The value of looking at all subject areas is that it provides a complete and systematic picture of what 
the court was doing over a certain period of time without selecting those cases that appear to take a 
more interesting analytical line.  The suggestion that ‘rights’ based discourse transports the judges 
into the political decision-making arena, where they are required to make value judgments,62 has led 
to past studies of the courts using the ‘rights’ filter to focus their enquiry.63 In this study, all cases 
were fed into SPSS to provide a complete picture of the patterns emerging from the final appeal 
court in the time period. Nevertheless, the deeper analysis tends to centre on those cases arising in 
the human rights or wider public law field. This was partly because private law matters fall out-with 
the author’s area of expertise and also because, contrary to the empirical database’s equality of 
treatment between cases, not all cases were of equal legal and constitutional ‘significance.’64 Private 
law matters seldom provided much insight into the developing legal or political institutional 
relations of the final appeal court. 
The frequency of certain subject categories provided evidence of the type of court that the Supreme 
Court is becoming. Past studies have suggested that the Appellate Committee was becoming a more 
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B Dickson, ‘The Lords of Appeal and their Work’, n1, p147 
58
Shah and Poole, ‘The impact of the Human Rights Act on the House of Lords’, n2, p356 
59Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p244 
60
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p244 
61Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p244 
62Laws LJ, ‘The Common Law and Europe’ (Hamlyn lecture, 27 November 2013) para 23 
<www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/laws-lj-speech-hamlyn-lecture-
2013.pdf> accessed 30 December 2015. See also J McGarry, The Principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty (2012) 
32(4) LS 577, 596 
63
Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court, n1. Shah and Poole, ‘The Impact of the 
Human Rights Act on the House of Lords’ and Shah and Poole, ‘The Law Lords and Human Rights’, n2 
64Shah and Poole highlight A v UK [2004] UKHL 56 (Belmarsh) as an example of a constitutionally significant 
decision; ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act’, n2, 352  
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specialist public law court and moving away from the generalist traditions of the past.65 A more 
specialist function would have some advantages such as reducing the irregularity of certain subject 
matters, increasing expertise in those areas and regularly updating and renewing precedent within 
that specialist area.  
Administrative Efficiency Variables 
Length of Case 
 
This continuous variable measured any change to the average length of time taken to hear a case in 
the transition to the Supreme Court.  An efficient court which deals with cases in a timely manner 
will minimise the risk of attracting future criticism on the basis of delay.66  Nevertheless, a more 
efficient court may be achieved at the expense of another desirable facet.  Decision-making in cases 
in the Appellate Committee depended largely upon oral argument and there was a degree of 
expectation that the judges curtail their consideration of legal issues to those raised by counsel.67 
Furthermore the hearing time must allow for a process of interruption and ‘interrogation’ of 
counsel’s arguments which are motivated by a need,‘… to test counsel’s propositions, to sound out 
counsel’s view on particular points, to obtain clarification of counsel’s argument and to persuade 
fellow Law Lords.’68  
Justice must be delivered in an expeditious manner however the final appeal court must also sound 
out the issues, comprehensively review the relevant authorities and produce an informative and 
well-reasoned judgment that appreciates the wider social context of the issues at hand. The hearing 
time reflects the need for full and tested argument on each issue in order to meet the legal and 
constitutional role of the court. The average length of case provides an insight into the balance being 
struck by each court between efficiency and satisfying such demands. 
Judgment Gap 
 
                                                             
65Shah and Poole found a ‘more pronounced public law profile’ following the enactment of the HRA with an 
increase of 20% in the number of rights-related appeals being granted leave; ‘The Impact of the Human Rights 
Act’, n2, 361. Paterson also notes the ‘dramatic increase’ in public law and human rights cases and the 
corresponding decline in tax, criminal and shipping cases; Final Judgment, n2, p17 
66The Appellate Committee received criticism for having a large back-log of cases prior to the implementation 
of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, which detracted from the efficient administration of justice; J Vallance 
White, ‘The Judicial Office’ in Blom-Cooper, Dickson and Drewry (eds) The Judicial House of Lords 1876-2009 
(OUP, 2009), p31 
67Paterson, The Law Lords, n2, p36-38. Although the Law Lords were not in agreement on the weight of this 
expectation.  
68Paterson, The Law Lords, n2, p66 and 72 
85 
 
This continuous variable measured the difference between the Appellate Committee and the 
Supreme Court in terms of the average number of days taken to hand down judgment after the 
hearing.  The results fed into the analysis on the overall efficiency of the court by asking whether the 
court is able to provide guidance to the other institutions in an expeditious manner. A similar 
balance must be struck between the need to deliver the judgment as soon as possible after the 
hearing and the need to deliver carefully crafted judgments, of the highest quality, that provide clear 
direction to the public and the lower courts.  
The judgment gap mean was affected by recesses in the court.  The mean included recesses to 
provide a measure of the average time it took, in real terms, to receive a judgment.  
Length of judgment 
 
This continuous variable measured the average length of judgment and was part of the analysis on 
the efficiency of the court.  A clearly reasoned judgment which the public can comprehend is part of 
due process and the rule of law.69 As such, a delicate balance has to be struck between aiding 
accessibility without compromising the substance of the judgment.  Judgments can, however, be 
repetitious on several fronts. Each judge may repeat the facts, the relevant statutory provisions or 
the key points from the authorities when delivering their judgment. Concurring opinions will also 
further increase the danger of unnecessary repetition in the case. Since the close of this study there 
has been a call from the current President of the Supreme Court for judges to reduce the length of 
their judgments and to curb the number of opinions issued.70 This variable measured the extent to 
which this call was prompted by lengthy judgments in the time period and established the empirical 
link between judgment length and other factors such as judgment gap, the number of Justices on 
the panel, the number of concurrences and dissents and the subject matter of the appeal. 
Panel Size 
 
This categorical variable measured the frequency of each size of judicial panel. The Supreme Court 
more routinely convened larger panels than the Appellate Committee. This variable sought to 
measure the extent of that increase and to confirm the circumstances where a larger panel tended 
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Lord Neuberger, ‘No Judgment- No Justice’ (First Annual Bailli Lecture, 20 November 2012), para 11-
13<www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-121120.pdf>last accessed 22 February 2016  
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to be convened.71 The implications of convening a larger panel were also reviewed, including 
unanimity levels in larger panels, the effect of convening a larger panel on the efficiency of the court 
and the consequent effect on the court’s institutional relationships. For instance, if the case 
originated in Scotland, a larger judicial panel- without the addition of temporary Scottish judges- 
would dilute the weighting of the Scottish judicial vote even further.  
Single judgments 
 
This categorical variable established whether single judgments were becoming more frequent in the 
Supreme Court in the time period. The Appellate Committee was constrained by the need for the 
Law Lords to each provide an individual opinion; however, it is now open to the Supreme Court to 
issue a single collective judgment, as is common in other appellate courts. The discerning use of a 
single judgment could increase legal certainty and the new court’s authority through speaking more 
often as a collective.  Nevertheless, single judgments may compromise content and as such the data 
from this variable was reviewed alongside the data collected on citation levels. 
It should be noted that academic and international comparative citations were recorded in the 
empirical data, however are not specifically analysed in this thesis.  Where relevant, the results from 
these variables were included to support the analysis on the substantive variables reviewed. As such, 
the relationship between single judgments and the volume of academic and international citations 
was reviewed as part of the analysis on the content of single judgments. 
Concurring Opinions 
 
This categorical variable established whether the practice of providing a concurring opinion reduced 
in the Supreme Court.  A judge ‘concurred’ when that judge provided any additional words above 
and beyond the standard formal concurrence wording, namely, 
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the opinion of my noble and learned friend 
(judge x) for the reasons he/she gives, with which I entirely agree, I too would allow/dismiss 
the appeal and make the order proposed.  
                                                             
71
Lord Hope suggested that a larger panel will be convened ‘if the court is being asked to depart from a 
previous decision, or there is a possibility of it doing so, or if the case raises significant constitutional issues or 
for other reasons of great public importance.’; ‘The Creation of a Supreme Court was it worth it?’ (Gresham 
College Lecture, 24 June 2010) < https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_100624.pdf>  accessed 18
th
 
September 2015 
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This methodology occasionally resulted in a single paragraph that went beyond the standard 
wording being coded as a ‘concurring opinion’. This was necessary in order to avoid any arbitrary 
lines being drawn in terms of what constituted a concurring opinion.  To be a concurring opinion, the 
enhanced paragraph had to contribute some substantive reasoning to the appeal or 
associate/disassociate itself with a particular aspect of another judge’s opinion. If neither were 
present then it was coded as a formal concurrence.72 
It is acknowledged that this may artificially inflate the number of substantive concurring opinions, 
however this methodology is broadly in accordance with what Shah and Poole label the ‘Harvard 
Rules’ that govern the Harvard Law Review’s statistics on concurrence and dissents; 
(a) a concurrence or dissent is recorded as a ‘written opinion’ whenever a reason, however 
brief, is given; (b) a Justice is considered to have dissented when he or she voted to dispose 
of the case in any manner different from that of the majority of the court; (c) plurality 
opinions that announce the judgment of the court are counted as ‘opinions of the court’; (d) 
opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part are counted as dissents.73 
The empirical database took a slightly different route in scenario (d). Multiple issues can lead to a 
concurrence on one issue and dissent on another.  In such an instance the database was 
sophisticated enough to record the position on different issues and so the judge was recorded as 
having provided both a concurring and a dissenting opinion in the case. 
Two judges were occasionally considered to share the lead judgment. This occurred where those 
judges provided a joint lead opinion or in conjoined appeals where different judges took the lead on 
the separate appeals or where different judges took the lead on separate issues. In such a scenario, 
the other judges tended to concur with both opinions in their judgments. The presence of a second 
lead judgment had the effect of reducing the overall number of concurring opinions for that case 
and the overall average for the court. However, this only occurred on 9 occasions in the Appellate 
Committee and 7 in the Supreme Court and as such had an almost equal effect on each court. 
Dissenting Opinions 
 
                                                             
72See Lord Clarke’s formal concurrence in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v The Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46 [163]; ‘I agree that this appeal should be dismissed 
for the  reasons given by the other members of the court. Both Lord Mance and Lord Collins have analysed the 
relevant principle so fully and so expertly that it would be inappropriate self-indulgence for me to attempt a 
detailed analysis of my own.’ Technically, this is an ‘enhanced paragraph’, however as Lord Clarke provided no 
substantive legal reasoning of his own and did not align himself with any other opinion, it was regarded as a 
formal concurrence. 
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This categorical variable examined the volume of dissenting opinions in each court.  A dissenting 
opinion was recorded if a judge disagreed with the majority of the court on the outcome of at least 
one issue, however it was not recorded where a judge concurred as to outcome but dissented as to 
reasoning.  The study explored the relationship between dissent and variables such as subject 
matter and panel size to gain a perspective on how dissent was accommodated in the new court and 
to build upon other quantitative studies in the area, such as Shah and Poole’s findings in human 
rights and rights-related judgments.74 A lower dissent rate in larger judicial panels, for instance, may 
indicate a decision taken by the Supreme Court to employ extra judicial resource and deliver a 
collective decision to increase the weight behind the decision.  
Dissent has its supporters in a common law system, where the heritage of the common law and each 
Law Lord providing their opinion in the Appellate Committee encouraged independence of thought 
and as a consequence dissent.75 Alder advocates an institutional focus on certainty of outcome 
rather than certainty in the law, as he believes dissent reflects and accommodates legitimate 
disagreement in values in a democracy.76 This is in stark contrast to those who believe certainty and 
efficiency would be enhanced by a reduction in dissent77 and would bring the court in line with the 
practice of other top courts. This study contributes to this debate by demonstrating empirically the 
effect of dissent in the time period. 
Split Votes  
 
This categorical variable examined the most common way a judgment is carried.  Arguably a close 
split such as a 3:2 spilt is harder to justify than a 4:1 split as it demonstrates that there is strong 
judicial support for two different ways of applying the law to the issues.  The danger of convening a 
larger panel is the occurrence of a 5:4 split, which is as close as the Supreme Court could be to 
having a completely divided court.   Close splits become even more controversial where the court is 
overturning a unanimous lower court, departing from precedent or departing from an established 
line of ECtHR authority.  The authority of the court in these types of cases is reduced to perhaps as 
little as three judges on the case.   
                                                                                                                                                                                             
73
Shah and Poole, ‘The Law Lords and Human Rights’, n2, 84 
74
Shah and Poole, ‘The Law Lords and Human Rights’, n2, 87. The authors found that additional ‘noise levels’ 
came from concurring rather than dissenting opinions and that the dissent rate in fact decreased in human 
rights and rights-related cases. 
75
J Alder, ‘Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?’ (2000) 20(2) OJLS 221; Paterson, The Law Lords, 
n1, p100-101; Lord Kerr, ‘Dissenting Judgments, self indulgence or self sacrifice?’ (Birkenhead Lecture, 8 
October 2012) < https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-121008.pdf> accessed 29 September 2015.  
76J Alder, Dissents in Courts of Last Resort, n75, p226 
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The decision splits for each issue were recorded for each appeal. Occasionally, a judge’s position on 
each issue could not be recorded as (s)he would decide an issue one way, which would render the 
other issue redundant.  For instance, Lord Rodger only answered two of the three issues in R (on the 
application of Al-Jedda) (FC) v Secretary of State for Defence78 because the first issue knocked out 
the second. If all the judges agreed that one or more of the issues need not be determined, then 
they were not coded as an issue under appeal.  Nevertheless, if at least one judge felt that the issue 
needed determined, it was counted as an issue under appeal. 
Relations with Other Branches of State Variables 
Finding for or against the Executive 
 
This categorical variable measured how often the Supreme Court and the Appellate Committee 
handled cases involving the core executive and secondly how often they found against the executive 
in the time period. The study was interested in the relationship between ‘core’ executive function 
and the final appeal court, in particular the rate at which core Government policy was found to 
contravene the law.  The final appeal court has a difficult political and legal balance to maintain in its 
relations with the executive. Legally, it is required to judicially review executive action to ensure that 
it is legal.  Nevertheless, a court which is frequently seen to find against the executive runs the 
political risk of being accused of acting against the democratic will of the electorate and having too 
much unaccountable power.79  This variable provided an empirical illustration of where the balance 
lay in the transitional period. 
Executive involvement has the potential to be quite wide, especially if ‘local government’ actions are 
included within the definition. For the purposes of this study, ‘executive involvement’ was defined as 
appeals that had a governmental department as a party. As such, all ministerial departments were 
coded as the executive and some non-ministerial departments were included such as HM Revenue 
and Customs80 and the Rent Office.81  Appeals involving the Security Services82 were also classed as 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
77Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p89 and Shah and Poole, ‘The Law Lords and Human Rights’, n2, 
p91 
78[2007] UKHL 58 
79See the launch of the Judicial Power Project at Policy Exchange on 20 October 2015 which ‘aims to 
understand and correct the undue rise in judicial power … ’. <www.judicialpowerproject.ork.uk/about> 
80
Blom-Cooper and Drewry classified the Inland Revenue as the executive and it was stated to be one of the 
main areas where the individual would ‘confront’ the executive; Final Appeal, n1, p141 
81
R (on the application of Heffernan (FC)) v The Rent Service [2008] UKHL 58; the Rent Office is an executive 
agency of the Department of Work and Pensions established to carry out a practical act in assessing benefit 
levels. 
82R (on the application of A) v B [2009] UKSC 12; Al Rawi v The Security Service [2011] UKSC 34 
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the executive.83 There were exceptional cases that were also coded as involving the executive, 
where the named parties to the appeal did not involve a governmental department, however a 
government department then intervened and supported the arguments of a party to the appeal and 
the court treated their arguments as one.84  Another exceptional case was where a Health Authority 
took the action challenged in the case, in lieu of the Secretary of State, pursuant to the Secretary of 
State’s powers under s30 of the Registered Homes Act 1984.85 Local authority cases were not 
included as they focussed on micro rather than macro policy such as resource decisions pertaining to 
the care, housing or social security of specific individuals.  In a similar vein cases taken against a 
specific police force were akin to local government actions and not coded as involving the 
executive.86 The CPS was not classed as the ‘executive’ as any successful criminal prosecutions had 
the potential to artificially inflate the results on executive success. Furthermore, in extradition cases, 
the executives of foreign countries were not coded as involving the ‘executive’ as the variable only 
related to the UK executive.  
Relations with Lower Courts variables 
Originating Court 
 
This categorical variable recorded the origin of appeals and whether the proportion of appeals from 
a particular lower court changed in the time period. The variable’s function was to measure which 
lower court, on average, raised more ‘points of general public importance’ to be determined by the 
final appeal court and thus which lower court had the most interaction with the final appeal court. It 
also had a procedural function to distinguish between lower court origination in the analysis of the 
other variables. 
Conjoined appeals affected the coding for this variable as well as the ‘overturn’ and in some 
instances ‘finding against the executive’ variables. Such appeals could have two different originating 
courts as well as two different outcomes. Furthermore, one case may involve the executive when 
the other did not. In these circumstances no value was coded for the variable and so the cross 
tabulations in these variables do not total 246 cases to reflect the missing data. The database was 
                                                             
83Guidance was taken from Laws LJ’s statements in International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 158 [85-86] where he declared that ‘the first duty of Government is 
the defence of the realm’ and this did not solely amount to, ‘… tanks on the wrong lawns.’ It is therefore clear 
that the judges regard Security Services as an important part of the executive’s defence role. 
84
Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2008] UKHL 74. 
85Trent Strategic Health Authority v Jain [2009] UKHL 4 
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nevertheless sensitive enough to record the judicial voting on each issue, be it a conjoined or single 
appeal and the dissent rates on each. 
Lower court; overrule, unanimity and precedent  
 
These categorical variables each interrelated and taken together measured the rate of overturn of 
each lower court in the time period and whether the overruled lower court was unanimous and/or 
following precedent.  
The rate of overrule of the lower courts provided a measure of the stability of the law in the time 
period. Furthermore, a high rate of overrule of a particular lower court, such as the High Court of 
Justiciary, may be even more acutely sensitive,87 given the historical absence of Scottish criminal 
appeals to the Appellate Committee together with the minority Scottish representation on Supreme 
Court panels.88  Thus, a stable legal system which promotes strong relations between the courts 
should seek to minimise overrule where possible. 
Clearly there will be times when a divergence of views is unavoidable particularly in especially acute 
cases, where the lower court is constrained by precedent or where the final appeal court has a role 
to play in overseeing the development of the law beyond the particulars of the case. Nevertheless, if 
the system of precedent is working correctly, it should enhance the certainty and stability of the law, 
provide clear communication of the legal position to the lower court and keep overrule to a 
minimum. Should the data reveal that the Justices regularly interpret the law differently to the lower 
courts, then further study would be required to uncover the reason for this.89   
The position of the lower court judges was taken from the lower court judgment. Occasionally, the 
official transcript of the lower court decision was not available.  As such, the Westlaw case digest 
was used to gauge the result in the lower court without the support of the official transcript.  The 
database only recorded whether the lower court was divided on at least one issue and did not 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
86R (on the application of GC) v The Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21 was an 
exceptional case that was taken against the top of the police chain of command. The Secretary of State 
intervened and made arguments synonymous with that of the police. The case was therefore coded as an 
executive case. 
87Alex Salmond accused the Supreme Court of ‘intervening aggressively’ in the Scottish legal system following 
the Cadder decision. See S Carrell ‘Salmond provokes fury with attack on Supreme Court’ published on 1
st
 June 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/jun/01/alex-salmond-scotland-supreme-court?CMP=twt_fd> 
88
By convention only 2 Scottish Justices will sit on Scottish cases in the Supreme Court, compared to 3 or more 
judges who will have sat on the case in the High Court of Justiciary.   
89
Possible explanations include (i) statutory ambiguities (ii) a large number of cases where the issues are very 
finely balanced, (ii) the judges were asked to depart from established precedent set by either the Court of 
Appeal or by the Appellate Committee or (iii) the Justices are being asked to look at a new or old issue 
following the enactment of the HRA.   
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measure unanimity and dissent rates in relation to each issue.  This is a drawback of the database in 
that it could indicate that a divided lower court was overruled when the lower court was actually 
unanimous on the issue before the Supreme Court.90  The resultant effect is that rate of overrule of 
unanimous decisions could actually be higher than suggested in the thesis. Without reading every 
lower court judgment in full it would not have been possible to gauge the level of unanimity on each 
issue raised in each lower court decision, as was carried out for the final appeal court judgments.  
Furthermore, the limitation had minimal impact as it only affected ‘divided’ decisions and the vast 
majority of lower court decisions were unanimous.  
The lower court ‘unanimity’ categorical variable complemented the ‘overrule’ variable by 
establishing whether overrule occurred more frequently when the lower court was divided. It is 
more controversial for the judges to overturn a unanimous lower bench as it demonstrates that two 
senior judicial panels would interpret the law differently. This has the potential to aggrieve litigants 
further, reduce overall certainty in the law and create disharmony in relations between the two 
courts.91   
The ‘lower court following precedent’ categorical variable also complemented the ‘overrule’ variable 
by establishing how often the final appeal court overruled the lower court where the lower court 
believed that it was following established precedent.  Again, a regular overrule of a lower court 
following precedent would suggest that the system of precedent is not providing effective guidance 
to the lower courts.  The method used in order to determine whether House of Lords92 or Court of 
Appeal precedent was followed by the lower courts was impressionistic. The final appeal court’s 
summary of the lower court judgment and the Westlaw case analysis for each lower court decision 
was the starting point. A case was coded as ‘not following precedent’ where either no judgment was 
mentioned as being ‘followed’ or ‘applied,’ there was confusion among the judges over which line of 
cases should be followed, a case was followed that Westlaw regarded as having ‘negative’ or ‘mixed 
or mildly negative’ judicial treatment or where a court of first instance was cited in support of the 
lower court’s findings.  When the position was unclear using this primary method, then the lower 
court transcript was reviewed to determine whether the judges appeared to be following precedent. 
                                                             
90
See e.g. Scottish Widows Plc v Commissioners for HM Revenue and Customs [2011] UKSC 32. The Court of 
Session was coded as being divided, however the judges were unanimous on the issue which the Supreme 
Court decided was the sole issue required to determine the case. 
91Although Paterson felt that a divided final appeal court would offset these issues and be of ‘comfort to 
judges in the lower courts who are being reversed and to losing litigants.’ Paterson, The Law Lords, n1, p100 
92Read Supreme Court, High Court of Justiciary or Privy Council precedent. Where an overseas JCPC case was 
‘applied’ by the lower courts it was not coded as following established precedent as the case is not binding in 
this jurisdiction. However, when the High Court of Justiciary applied JCPC authority it was coded as following 
House of Lords precedent, as the JCPC was the highest court in relation to devolution issues prior to the CRA.  
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If the lower court felt that it was following both a House of Lords authority and a Court of Appeal 
authority it was coded as a ‘House of Lords’ precedent, being the higher of the two courts.  Where it 
was only Court of Appeal judgments which the lower court was listed as following, it was coded as a 
‘Court of Appeal’ precedent being followed.  One final process undertaken was to establish whether 
the precedent followed by the lower court related to the point under appeal. This method 
attempted to create a standardised system in order to illustrate whether the lower court was 
attempting to follow an established line of authority.   
There are several issues with the ‘following precedent’ method. Firstly, it is possible that the Court of 
Appeal authority relied upon was itself based upon a House of Lords authority.  However, if the 
lower court did not explicitly mention the House of Lords authority and instead felt bound to follow 
the Court of Appeal authority, then it was coded as following lower court precedent. Furthermore, in 
cases where there were several issues, with precedent being followed on one issue but not on 
another, it was coded as following established precedent as there was at least one issue before the 
final appeal court where the lower court believed that it was following precedent. Thus the final 
appeal court could overturn the lower court primarily on an issue that was not the issue on which 
the lower court was following precedent. On the face of it, the database records an overturn of the 
lower court that followed precedent, however the final appeal court could have substantially agreed 
with the Court of Appeal on the point in which it followed precedent.93 Again, without reading each 
lower court judgment, the database was not sophisticated enough to cater for such instances. The 
analysis therefore accounts for a potential over-counting of overturn of precedent. 
There will also be cases where the lower court followed the correct precedent but then interpreted 
or applied that precedent wrongly so that it resulted in an overturn.  Such an instance would be 
coded as an overturn of the ‘lower court following established precedent’.  Nevertheless, what is 
being measured is not the rate of ‘overturn of precedent’ but rather the rate of ‘overturn of the 
lower court’s decision in relation to that precedent’. Thus overrule includes the final appeal court 
correcting the interpretation or application of the precedent where the lower court was mistaken.  
Whether it is the ‘precedent followed’ that is being overturned or the correction of the 
interpretation of that precedent, it still results in the law being interpreted in a different way by the 
final appeal court and does little to upset the thesis surrounding these variables.   In a similar vein, 
the lower court could apply the precedent incorrectly and yet reach the correct conclusion. In this 
instance the coding database would indicate that the lower court had followed precedent and that 
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision. The correct picture was that the lower court incorrectly 
                                                             
93See e.g. Chartbrook Limited v Persimmon Homes Limited [2009] UKHL 38 
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interpreted the precedent but reached the correct result.94 Again, this was a drawback of the 
database. 
In conjoined appeals, if the judgments both followed Court of Appeal authority or both followed 
House of Lords authority, then they were coded as such.  However if there was a difference in terms 
of whether the respective lower courts followed precedent or the level of the precedent followed, 
then no figure was entered for the appeal as the statistical database could not cater for such 
information. 
With these limitations in mind, the empirical data could only provide, at best, an indication of the 
relationship between precedent and overrule. The analysis concedes these drawbacks and offers a 
starting point to assessing the effectiveness of the precedent communication channels between the 
two courts.  
Domestic citations 
 
This continuous variable measured the volume of citations from a case originating in a different UK 
jurisdiction. The final appeal court acts as a UK court and unites all four nations by providing a legal 
service which could not necessarily be obtained, were the final of appeal to be geographically 
located within each separate jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the court has a sensitive legal and political 
balance to maintain between respecting the distinctive character of each legal system whilst at the 
same time providing an element of comparative value to the case.  In order to obtain that value, the 
thesis quantitatively measured the extent that the judges utilised their knowledge of comparable 
cases in other domestic jurisdictions so as to enhance the quality of the judgment eventually 
received by each nation state. 
Scottish appeals recorded English and Welsh and Northern Irish case citations whereas English and 
Welsh appeals recorded the volume of Scottish and Northern Irish citations.  One unusual case arose 
in the time period that conjoined a Northern Irish Court of Appeal and an England and Wales Court 
of Appeal decision.95 In that instance, the only ‘comparative’ authorities recorded were Scottish. 
Relationship with the European Courts Variables 
Relationship with ECtHR 
 
                                                             
94See e.g. Multi-link Leisure Developments Limited v North Lanarkshire Council [2010] UKSC 47 
95R (on the application of Adams) v Secretary of State for Justice In the Matter of an Application by Eamonn 
MacDermott for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2011] UKSC 18 
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ECtHR citations 
 
This continuous variable measured the number of ECtHR authorities cited in each case, and provided 
the empirical foundations to assess the scale of jurisprudential review that the final appeal court 
undertook in its s2 HRA duty to ‘take into account’ the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  The results fed 
into the relationship with the ECtHR chapter, with its specific focus on s2 HRA, and also into the 
literature debating the level of obligation that s2 HRA demands.  A court that is engaging with the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence in a meaningful and sustained manner is able to demonstrate outward 
engagement and a preparedness to enrich human rights protection for UK citizens under the HRA by 
drawing on cases with similar facts raised in other European countries.   
A high level of ECtHR citations also demonstrates the role that a second tier of appeal plays for each 
separate legal system.  The lesser caseload of the top court removes the time-constraints faced by 
the lower courts and thus the level of research and enquiry into the jurisprudence of the ECtHR that 
the final appeal court is able to undertake should be extensive.   
Is the decision in line with the ECtHR? 
 
This categorical variable measured the instances where the final appeal court followed or departed 
from the line taken by the ECtHR. The results fed into the analysis on whether the court felt 
compelled to follow the ECtHR line or whether it was able to distinguish the UK’s unique domestic 
situation, where appropriate. The thesis used the data to conclude on whether the Supreme Court 
departed from the ECtHR line more frequently than the Appellate Committee and whether the court 
became more confident in safeguarding rights in a uniquely British manner and creating a distinct 
domestic jurisprudence under the HRA. The thesis also examined how clarity, or otherwise, in the 
ECtHR line of authority affected the administrative efficiency and institutional relations of the court.   
The judges cited ECtHR authorities even in cases where an article of the Convention was not under 
consideration.  In such instances, the variable still recorded whether the judges approved of the line 
taken by the ECtHR, as the judges still had a legal obligation under s2 and s6 HRA to take into 
account the case law of the ECtHR and to act compatibly with Convention rights. 
Relationship with CJEU 
CJEU Reference 
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The thesis examines the court’s relationship with the CJEU through the narrow lens of the reference 
procedure and the incorporation of CJEU jurisprudence into judgments. This categorical variable 
measured how often the final appeal court sought guidance from the CJEU via the reference 
procedure and whether the frequency of references changed following the transition from the 
Appellate Committee to the Supreme Court.   
The Supreme Court has a different relationship with the CJEU compared to its relationship with the 
ECtHR.  There is reduced scope for dialogue96 and the Supreme Court must accept the CJEU’s 
interpretation of the EU treaties.  Nevertheless, the court’s use of the reference procedure is 
important, as it needs be able to recognise where there is uncertainty in interpreting the EU treaties 
and seek guidance from the CJEU.  The CJEU also needs to have confidence that the Supreme Court 
is capable of fulfilling this role.  
CJEU citations 
 
The data generated from this continuous variable indicated the court’s level of engagement with 
CJEU case law. This fed into larger questions such as whether the more linear relationship between 
the CJEU and the final appeal court, alongside the more civilian style of judgment of the CJEU, 
resulted in fewer CJEU authorities being cited.   
Conjoined cases appearing before the CJEU had one citation number for both cases and from a 
coding perspective were counted as one case. 
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Dialogue is the term used by academics to refer to the reciprocity of communication between the court and 
other institutions, in particular the ECtHR.   
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Chapter 3; Administrative Efficiency of the Court 
 
For the court to command the respect of other constitutional actors, it must function effectively as 
an institution. The court needs to be in a position to regularly and efficiently communicate with the 
other institutions; otherwise it will not be able to operate effectively as a hub between sub-national, 
national and international judicial and governmental bodies. In practical terms, this means effective 
management of its caseload and ensuring that the judges produce comprehensive and accessible 
judgments. Effective institutional communication is a thread that runs through each of the 
relationships discussed and is principally measured in this study through the judgment produced.1 
Comprehensive, accessible and regular judgments will ease institutional interpretation and minimise 
error. This chapter therefore contextualises the substantive work of the thesis by reviewing the 
mechanical efficiency of the Appellate Committee and the Supreme Court. 
Across the time period the Appellate Committee heard 129 appeals, with the Supreme Court hearing 
117. A difference of 12 appeals, over a time period of only 2 years, was not large enough to suggest 
a general reduction in caseload in the Supreme Court or to provide strong evidence of a less efficient 
Supreme Court during its fledgling years. Appeal petitions were marginally lower in the first three 
years of the Supreme Court and averaged at 204 per year, compared to an average of 220 in the 
Appellate Committee between 1999 and 2009.2  The lower number of appeal petitions will have had 
a direct effect on the number of substantive appeals heard. Indeed, the Supreme Court may have 
exercised a degree of caution at appeal petition stage to avoid the accusation that it was more 
‘activist’ than its predecessor in its willingness to see points of general importance in petitions.3  The 
reduction in appeal numbers could also have been attributable to a greater use of larger panels, 
which inevitably requires a greater deployment of judicial resource and reduces the volume of 
appeals that the court can process in any year. This trend is discussed in further detail below. 
Length of Case 
 
                                                             
1Paterson regards it as ‘intellectually dangerous and academically unsound’ to rely too heavily on judgments, 
being the end product of the court. Nevertheless, the judgment is the publication of the court’s decision and is 
the other institutions’ starting point. This study differs in focus from Paterson’s study (which focussed on the 
dialogues that led to the judgment) and reviews how the judgments, as end products, are effective in 
supporting the court’s institutional relationships. See Final Judgment, The Last Law Lords and The Supreme 
Court (Hart Publishing, 2013), p64 
2Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p67-68. There was a peak of 240 appeals in 2003-2005. 
3See B Dickson, ‘The Lords of Appeal and their Work 1967-1996’ in The House of Lords, Its Parliamentary and 
Judicial Roles edited by Brice Dickson and Paul Carmichael (Hart Publishing, 1999), p140 
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Table 1 shows the average length of case for all 246 appeals.  The vast majority of cases lasted for 2 
days or fewer and it was rare for a case to last for more than 5 days.4 Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate 
that although there is a marginal fluctuation in average case length between sessions, there was no 
discernible difference in the average length of time taken to hear a case between the Appellate 
Committee and the Supreme Court in the time period. 
Table 1. Length of Case Frequencies 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 
1 day 68 27.6 27.6 27.6 
2 days 118 48.0 48.0 75.6 
3 days 44 17.9 17.9 93.5 
4 days 12 4.9 4.9 98.4 
5 days 1 .4 .4 98.8 
Longer than 5 days 3 1.2 1.2 100.0 
Total 246 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 2. Average Length of Case by Court 
 
House of Lords or Supreme 
Court Mean N Std. Deviation 
House of Lords 2.05 129 1.067 
Supreme Court 2.08 117 .779 
Total 2.06 246 .939 
 
Table 3. Average Length of Case by Session 
 
Session the case was 
heard in  Mean N Std. Deviation 
HL 2007-2008 2.05 79 1.049 
HL 2008-2009 2.04 50 1.106 
SC 2009-2010 1.98 57 .744 
SC 2010-2011 2.17 60 .806 
Total 2.06 246 .939 
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This confirms findings by Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p39 
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The average length of case has continued a downward trajectory from the 1950s-1970s where 
appeals were, on average, heard over 3-4 days but ‘could last for weeks’.5 It has also dropped 
marginally since the publication of the 2003 Supreme Court Consultation Paper.6  This reduction 
largely reflects restrictions on the length of oral argument and may also be a result of Lord 
Bingham’s reluctance to allocate more than 2 days of the Appellate Committee’s time to individual 
cases.7 These efficiencies have clearly been maintained in the Supreme Court, notwithstanding 
Bingham’s absence. As well as demonstrating the continued skill of counsel at capturing their main 
submissions in a succinct manner,8 it also suggests that the Justices are perhaps limiting the number 
of interruptions from Bench to Bar.9 The interchange between counsel and the judges, including the 
number of ‘judicial interventions,’10 was not specifically reviewed in this study, however the 
relationship between concurring or dissenting opinions and length of case was measured. A 
relationship between these variables could indicate that judges who are minded to provide a 
judgment intervene more in order to test their developing perspectives on the case.11 Furthermore, 
cases that move a judge to provide a concurrence or a dissent may have particularly acute issues, 
where the correct outcome needs to be achieved by looking at the issue from a number of 
perspectives, and thus more time needs to be allocated.  Although there was a slight increase in the 
length of case where the decision lacked unanimity (see Table 5) and relative to the number of 
dissenting opinions (see Table 4), unlike concurring opinions, the increase in average hearing time 
was not conclusively linear and the differences were not statistically significant.12   
Table 4. Average Length of Case by Number of Dissenting Opinions 
Dissent Mean N Std. Deviation 
.00 2.02 183 .980 
1.00 2.21 28 .787 
2.00 2.12 26 .766 
                                                             
5Paterson, Final Judgment,n1, p34-35 
6Department of Constitutional Affairs, A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom (CP 11/03, July 2003), p16 
noted that hearings in the Appellate Committee lasted for an average of 2.5 days. 
7Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p38-39 
8
Paterson Final Judgment, n1, p49 
9
Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p46 
10Paterson used this term to describe both procedural interventions, such as clarification of page numbers as 
well as for substantive interventions that tested counsel’s arguments; Final Judgment, n1, p40 
11
Paterson found that judicial intervention in the Appellate Committee evidenced how the judge was thinking 
as there was less time during the hearing to exchange views outside the courtroom. In the Supreme Court, a 
15 minute meeting prior to the hearing allows preliminary judicial views to be discussed. See Final Judgment, 
n1, p 40, p74-75 and p78-81 
12
F(3,242)=0.67, p = 0.57 
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3.00 + 2.33 9 1.000 
Total 2.06 246 .939 
 
Table 5. Average Length of Case and Unanimity of Final Appeal Court 
Unanimity Mean N Std. Deviation 
Yes 2.02 183 .980 
No 2.19 63 .800 
Total 2.06 246 .939 
 
The number of concurring opinions, by contrast, did have an adverse effect on overall length of case, 
as can be seen from Table 6 below.  This was statistically significant but only at the point where 5 or 
more concurring opinions were produced.13 5 concurring opinions are only possible in panels of 7 
Justices or more, demonstrating that these results were in fact related to an increased panel size. 
Therefore, even if 4 concurring opinions were delivered in a standard 5 Justice panel hearing, this 
only slightly increased the hearing length and not in a significant way. The panel size section below 
found that only 9 Justice panels significantly increased the length of case, however these results 
suggest that a 7 Justice panel can also do so, provided most of the judges are minded to provide a 
concurring opinion.14 
Table 6. Average Length of Case by Number of Concurring Opinions (re-coded) 
Concur Mean N Std. Deviation 
.00 1.83 64 .883 
1.00 1.91 33 .678 
2.00 2.04 48 .771 
3.00 2.09 35 .981 
4.00 2.24 55 1.071 
5+ 3.00 11 1.183 
Total 2.06 246 .939 
 
Judicial disagreement marginally increased the length of case and a greater number of opinions also 
increased the length of case. This may suggest that judges who are minded to provide an opinion do 
indeed ‘interrupt’ proceedings more.  Nevertheless, the judges have also shown that they may be 
                                                             
13
This result was statistically significant (F(8,237) = 3.64, p=0.001). A post-hoc Bonferroni test revealed that the 
only significant difference was between those cases with no concurring opinions and those with 5+ (mean 
difference: 1.17, p = 0.02, 95%CI 0.29 to 2.06). 
14
See text at n116 below. 
101 
 
prompted to provide an opinion when the court is divided,15 or where the issues are particularly 
sensitive or complex.16 Therefore, the link established between the number of opinions and an 
increased hearing time may instead be a reflection of the complexity or importance of the issues in 
the case. 
Indeed the importance of the issues did seem to have an influence on the length of case as Table 7 
demonstrates that human rights cases, on average, lasted almost half a day longer than the other 
three broad categories of case. The standard deviation from the mean is slightly higher in human 
rights cases than for the other categories; however, it is still far below the mean itself and only 
suggests some variability in individual cases. Thus, where the rights of an individual were affected, 
the judges took marginally longer to consider the issues. Interestingly Final Appeal did not find a 
great difference between subject matters with the exception of patent hearings that could last 7 or 
more days and procedural cases that only lasted between 1-2 days.17 Unlike patent cases at the time 
of Final Appeal, human rights cases are not substantially out of line with the hearing time of other 
subject matters. Table 7 shows that public law generally dominated the workload of the final appeal 
court in the time period, however human rights specific cases did not. As such, human rights appeals 
would only have had a relatively minor impact on the overall efficiency of the final appeal court. 
Table 7. Average Length of Case by Subject Matter (re-categorised) 
Case_Type Mean N Std. Deviation 
HR 2.40 43 1.330 
DCAPL 1.98 111 .842 
LOPL 2.03 61 .795 
INT 1.94 31 .814 
Total 2.06 246 .939 
 
One reason for the increased hearing time in human rights cases could be owing to the need to 
consider the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in addition to any domestic precedent. Chapter 5 examines 
the role of precedent in the institutional relationship with the lower courts and finds that the final 
                                                             
15See e.g. Maco Door and Window Hardware (UK) Limited v HM Revenue and Customs [2008] UKHL 54 [49] 
(per Lord Neuberger) 
16An issue repeatedly cited by the judges in the time period as a reason for providing a concurring opinion: 
Total Network v HMRC [2008] UKHL 19 [47]; Spencer-Franks v Kellogg Brown and Root Limited [2008] UKHL 46 
[30]; R (on the application of JL) v Secretary of State for Justice [2008] UKHL 68 [85]; R (On the application of E) 
v The Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15 [55] 
17
L Blom-Cooper and G Drewry, Final Appeal: A Study of the House of Lords in its Judicial Capacity (Clarendon 
Press, 1972), p235 and p303 
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appeal court hearing length increased when the lower court was following precedent.18 The results 
displayed in tables 8, 9, 10 and 11 below confirm that the number of comparative citations that 
appear in the judgment also had an effect on the average length of case, with a positive linear 
relationship (subject to a few exceptions) found for ECtHR citations, international comparative 
citations, European comparative citations and domestic comparative citations.  
Table 8. Average Length of Case by Number of Strasbourg Citations (re-categorised) 
Stras_citations Mean N Std. Deviation 
0 1.90 165 .816 
1-9 2.14 44 .765 
10+ 2.70 37 1.309 
Total 2.06 246 .939 
 
Table 9. Average Length of Case by Number of International Citations (re-categorised) 
 
Int_citations Mean N Std. Deviation 
0 1.95 153 .930 
1 1.88 24 .797 
2 2.11 19 1.243 
3-4 2.23 22 .685 
5+ 2.68 28 .819 
Total 2.06 246 .939 
 
Table 10. Average Length of Case by Number of European Citations (re-categorised) 
 
European Mean N Std. Deviation 
0 2.05 233 .957 
1+ 2.31 13 .480 
Total 2.06 246 .939 
 
Table 11. Average Length of Case by Number of Domestic Citations (re-categorised) 
 
Domestic Mean N Std. Deviation 
.00 1.98 143 .892 
1.00 1.90 42 .878 
                                                             
18See text at Chapter 5, n111 
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2.00 2.22 18 .808 
3.00 + 2.42 43 1.118 
Total 2.06 246 .939 
 
Whilst this may appear counterintuitive in that cases that consider and apply precedent should be 
more straightforward, it would appear logical that the more cases cited to and considered by the 
Justices in oral argument, the longer the oral hearing would be.  Whilst 3 or less citations did not 
affect the length of case in a significant way, more than this began to have an impact.19 This is 
perhaps another way of saying that the more concurring opinions there are (and thus the greater 
number of citations), the longer the case will be. Nevertheless, the connection found between the 
length of case and the number of comparative citations that appeared in the judgment, alongside 
the longer hearing time required when the lower court followed precedent suggests that the 
precedent and comparative authorities are cited and discussed at length in the hearing.  The 
connection may also suggest that it is less common for judges to conduct their own research after 
the close of oral argument and to use any authorities found in the final judgment. Individual judicial 
research of this nature may call into question the convention that cases are determined on points of 
law raised by counsel and tested in an adversarial setting.20 Taken together, these statistics show the 
effect that consideration of authority had on the length of case and suggests that the court still relies 
heavily on the cases cited in the hearing to form the basis of the precedent in the instant case. The 
point is returned to in Chapter 5; Relationship with lower court when discussing the breadth of the 
precedent set. 
Judgment Gap 
 
                                                             
19International case citations highlighted statistically significant differences (F(5, 240) = 3.39, p = 0.006). The 
post hoc analysis revealed that the comparison between zero international citations and 5+ citations was 
statistically significant (Mean difference = -0.73, p = 0.002, 95%CI -1.29 to -0.17).  Domestic citations revealed 
significant differences; F(3,242) = 3.08, p = 0.028. The post hoc analysis revealed that the comparison between 
zero and 3+ domestic citations was statistically significant (Mean difference = -0.44, p = 0.041, 95%CI -0.87 to -
0.01). There was also a statistically significant result between length of hearing and the number of Strasbourg 
citations (F(2,243)=12.34, p < 0.002). Post hoc Bonferroni tests revealed statistically significant differences 
between 0 and 10+ citations (Mean difference = 0.81, p < 0.0001) and between 1-9 and 10+ citations (Mean 
difference = 0.57, p = 0.015). The result for European domestic citations t(244) = 0.97, p = 0.33 was not 
statistically significant. 
20Although judicial research does not ordinarily breach this convention, Paterson suggested that it raises the 
query ‘when is material so new that it constitutes a new issue’; Final Judgment, n1, p21 
104 
 
Judgment Gap is another measure of the efficiency of the final appeal court and measures the time 
period from the last day of the hearing to the date when judgment is formally handed down.21 In 
Final Appeal, Blom-Cooper and Drewry found that the usual judgment gap was 6 weeks including 
recesses.22  
During the sample period, there was a positive linear correlation between the judgment gap and the 
length of case (as reviewed above) with the exception of cases that last for 3 days, or more than 5 
days (see Table 12). The longer a case took to hear, the longer it took to hand down judgment. This 
relationship appeared to support the preliminary conclusions that the length of case increased 
alongside the number of authorities cited and the number of judicial opinions, as both these factors 
could also increase the complexity of the judgment writing and the time taken to produce the 
judgment. Nevertheless, the relationship between judgment gap and length of case was not 
statistically significant23 and, as will be seen below, the number of judicial opinions and authority 
citations did not in fact increase judgment gap. Further data would consequently be needed to 
confirm if the judgment gap-length of case relationship occurred by chance or whether it had 
another cause, such as the complexity of the issues in the appeal.  
Table 12. Average Judgment Gap by Length of Case (re-categorised) 
 
No of days case lasts for Mean N Std. Deviation 
1 day 60.00 68 26.935 
2 days 96.50 118 147.623 
3 days 85.14 43 40.273 
4 days 102.92 12 46.316 
5 days 111.00 1 . 
Longer than 5 days 58.33 3 30.022 
Total 84.28 245 106.288 
 
Tables 13 and 14 removed 8 outliers with excessively long judgment gaps. These cases tended to be 
where a reference had been made to the CJEU and also one case24 where no judgment gap was 
recorded as the conjoined appeals had a split hearing, 3 months apart. The tables reveal that the 
Supreme Court had the greater average judgment gap and that this difference was statistically 
significant.25 These results confirm Paterson’s finding that the time taken to produce judgment rose 
                                                             
21
Judgments are made available to counsel a week before this for error correction; UKSC PD 6; The Appeal 
Hearing at 6.8.1 
22Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17, p16 
23
F(3, 239)=1.15, p = 0.34 
24Birmingham City Council v Ali and Moran v Manchester City Council [2009] UKHL 36 
25t(235) = 2.96, p = 0.003 
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in the handover from Lord Bingham to Lord Phillips, with Lord Phillips being less strict as to when 
judgments were handed down.26 The average judgment gap increased between 2008 and 2009, then 
remained at the same level between 2009 and 2010 before increasing again from 2010 onwards. The 
differences in sessions were statistically significant27 with post hoc Bonferoni tests revealing 
statistically significant differences between Sessions 2007-2008 and 2010-2011.28  
 
Table 13; Average Judgment Gap by Court 
House of Lords or Supreme Court Mean N Std. Deviation 
House of Lords 65.87 126 28.706 
Supreme Court 78.68 111 37.801 
Total 71.87 237 33.816 
 
Table 14; Average Judgment Gap by Session 
Session the case was heard in Mean N Std. Deviation 
HL 2007-2008 62.35 79 30.421 
HL 2008-2009 71.79 47 24.757 
SC 2009-2010 71.79 56 38.155 
SC 2010-2011 85.71 55 36.446 
Total 71.87 237 33.816 
 
A stem and leaf diagram for all 4 years provided a much more accurate visual of the dispersion of 
appeals, including the 8 outliers, and their respective judgment gap. A minority of appeals had 
judgment handed down in under 40 days with the vast majority taking somewhere between 41-99 
days.  A minority of appeals took longer than 100 days, although there were slightly more appeals in 
this longer category than the under 40 day category. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
26Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p120-121 
27
F(3, 233) = 5.45, p = 0.001 
28Mean difference= 23.35, p = 0.0001 
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Figure 1. Stem & Leaf Plot of Judgment Gap 
 
 Frequency    Stem & Leaf 
 
     2.00         0 .  17 
     5.00         1 .  34578 
    10.00        2 .  1122235777 
    19.00        3 .  4444445566666677799 
    31.00        4 .  1111111112222233333333444899999 
    30.00        5 .  000000011111555555666667778889 
    26.00        6 .  11222233333344444444999999 
    28.00        7 .  0000011111112225666778889999 
    20.00        8 .  33333333444455555566 
    21.00        9 .  001111122377777788889 
     9.00        10 .  344555667 
    12.00       11 .  111111138999 
     9.00        12 .  555666677 
     4.00        13 .  2348 
     5.00        14 .  00066 
     3.00        15 .  333 
     3.00        16 .  789 
     8.00 Extremes    (>=173) 
 
 Stem width:        10 
 Each leaf:       1 case 
The average judgment gap did not necessarily increase in a linear fashion for either concurring or 
dissenting opinions. 2 dissenting opinions appeared to increase the judgment gap significantly, as 
can be seen from Table 1629 and interestingly Table 15 also shows a spike in judgment gap where 2 
concurring opinions were provided. Caution needs to be attached to these results as the outliers 
have been included in the tables and given the wide range of recorded judgment gaps, this resulted 
in a higher standard deviation figure and standard error of mean for 0 concurring opinions and for 2 
concurring opinions.  Therefore further data needs to be collected to confirm or deny these results. 
The decision to provide a concurrence or a dissent did not necessarily increase the judgment gap 
and this may be because the separate judgments are written simultaneously and then circulated 
among the Justices. 
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Table 15. Average Judgment Gap by Number of Concurring Opinions 
Concur Mean N Std. Deviation 
Std. Error of 
Mean Minimum Maximum 
.00 81.44 64 163.752 20.469 1 1331 
1.00 71.97 32 35.143 6.213 22 153 
2.00 107.67 48 137.090 19.787 14 954 
3.00 78.57 35 37.717 6.375 22 187 
4.00 74.85 55 28.937 3.902 34 167 
5.00 105.11 9 32.960 10.987 56 169 
8.00 76.50 2 40.305 28.500 48 105 
Total 84.28 245 106.288 6.790 1 1331 
 
Table 16. Average Judgment Gap by Number of Dissenting Opinions 
Dissent Mean N Std. Deviation 
Std. Error of 
Mean Minimum Maximum 
.00 81.71 182 119.577 8.864 1 1331 
1.00 85.57 28 42.470 8.026 7 211 
2.00 99.27 26 65.695 12.884 34 365 
3.00 89.00 9 23.848 7.949 48 125 
Total 84.28 245 106.288 6.790 1 1331 
 
Although the number of dissenting opinions did not necessarily increase judgment gap, Table 17 
shows that a lack of unanimity did.  These results were not statistically significant30 and an increase 
of 10 days does not support Paterson’s suggestion that a divided court results in the judgment gap 
‘increasing substantially.’31 It, nevertheless, seems logical that judgments that are not unanimous 
would take slightly longer to produce, perhaps in a bid to persuade the dissenting judge around to 
the majority view. 
Table 17. Average Judgment Gap and Unanimity of Final Appeal Court 
Unanimity HLSC Mean N Std. Deviation 
Yes 81.71 182 119.577 
No 91.71 63 51.392 
Total 84.28 245 106.288 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
29
F(3, 235) = 4.86, p = 0.003. The post hoc Bonferroni tests revealed a significant difference between those 
cases with no dissenting opinions and those with 2 dissenting opinions (Mean difference: -29.38, p = 0.005, 
95%CI: -52.41 to -6.36) 
30
t(243) = 0.64, p = 0.52 
31
Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p121 
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The lack of relationship between the number of concurring opinions and judgment gap is supported 
by the fact that a higher volume of comparative citation of authorities in the final judgment did not 
affect judgment gap in the same way as for the length of case. Table 18 demonstrates that whether 
European citations were made in the case had a negligible impact on the judgment gap. Table 19 
demonstrates no consistent pattern in judgment gap in terms of number of international citations 
made.32 Table 20 also demonstrates that the number of domestic comparative citations revealed no 
obvious pattern or statistically significant results in relation to judgment gap.33 Finally, Table 21 
demonstrates that cases which cited at least one ECtHR case actually had on average a shorter 
judgment gap than those cases that did not make any ECtHR citations. This shorter time period was 
not, however, statistically significant.34 These results do not reveal any strong pattern, however if 
they reveal anything, it is the counterintuitive conclusion that more authorities cited in the final 
judgment appeared to reduce judgment gap. Chapter 5, however, supports these findings by 
demonstrating that the judgment gap was shorter where the lower court was following some kind of 
precedent.  Taken together, these results suggest that following precedent or referring to 
comparative authorities seems to aid the judgment writing process, as the reasoning in previous 
cases can facilitate the reasoning process in the instant appeal. Thus the inefficacies of extending 
hearing time to consider precedent and/or a greater number of authorities seems to be offset by the 
quicker production of the judgment.  
Table 18. Average Judgment Gap and European Citations 
EUR Cited Mean N Std. Deviation 
No 84.29 232 108.952 
Yes 84.08 13 34.659 
Total 84.28 245 106.288 
 
Table 19. Average Judgment Gap and Number of  International Citations (re-categorised) 
 
International Citations Mean N Std. Deviation 
.00 84.96 152 129.418 
1.00 63.17 24 27.492 
2.00 91.60 20 77.526 
3.00 101.50 10 44.665 
                                                             
32F(5,244) = 0.29, p = 0.92 
33F(3, 241) = 0.60, p = 0.62 
34t(243) = 0.58, p = 0.56 
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4.00 76.73 11 35.839 
5+ 90.29 28 42.406 
Total 84.28 245 106.288 
 
Table 20. Average Judgment Gap and Number of Domestic Citations (re-categorised) 
 
 Mean N Std. Deviation 
.00 91.77 142 136.271 
1.00 73.90 42 34.387 
2.00 66.78 18 30.412 
3+ 77.00 43 35.740 
Total 84.28 245 106.288 
 
Table 21. Average Judgment Gap and Strasbourg Citations (re-categorised) 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
No 87.05 164 127.255 7 1331 
Yes 78.67 81 37.598 1 173 
Total 84.28 245 106.288 1 1331 
 
The fact that the influence of ECtHR authorities assisted in reducing judgment gap, may account for 
why the longer case length in human rights cases did not continue in terms of judgment gap.35 Law 
of obligations/ private law matters had, on average, the longest judgment gap however these 
differences were not statistically significant.36 This supports Final Appeal’s observations that 
intellectual property and commercial cases can often be quite complex. At the other end of the 
spectrum, international cases (which included extradition, EU, international law, competition law 
and conflict of laws) saw judgment handed down quicker than the other subject categories, perhaps 
because, at least in EU cases, the CJEU determines exactly how the treaties should be interpreted. 
 
 
                                                             
35Re W (Children) [2010] UKSC 12 demonstrates that where matters are not in line with the Convention, such 
as where the presumption against a child being called to give evidence is not compatible with the fair 
balancing of the child’s and the accused’s rights under the Convention, the Supreme Court is prepared to take 
immediate action. ReW had the shortest judgment gap in the whole time period, standing at only 1 day. The 
Supreme Court did not wish to delay that hearing, given that the children could be at risk of abuse if proper 
protection measures were not in place. 
36F(3,241) = 0.51, p =0.68 
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Table 22. Average Judgment Gap and Subject Matter 
Case_Type Mean N Std. Deviation 
HR 84.05 43 34.109 
DCAPL 82.31 110 129.122 
LOPL 96.23 61 118.279 
INT 68.10 31 33.496 
Total 84.28 245 106.288 
 
Longer judgments were found to have an effect on judgment gap as confirmed by the modest but 
statistically significant positive correlation, shown in Figure 2, between the length of judgment in 
pages and judgment gap.37  The correlation cannot be explained by the inclusion of comparative 
authorities in the judgment as that would increase judgment length, yet it was found to reduce 
judgment gap. Furthermore, there was inconclusive evidence to suggest that the number of 
concurrences or dissents had an effect on the judgment gap, despite the fact that this had a 
significant effect on judgment length, as seen below.  Instead, the factor that could increase both 
judgment length and judgment gap may have been the detailed consideration of each authority, 
through repeat citations, which was not measured in this study. The pattern could also be explained 
by the inclusion of a detailed review of the background to the appeal or the applicable legislative 
regime. Indeed, an obvious target for reducing the length of judgments is avoiding repetition of the 
main facts of the case with each judge’s opinion.38 Furthermore, the longer each individual judicial 
opinion is, the more time the judges will presumably require to read each other’s drafts and perhaps 
respond to those drafts in their own judgment, thus increasing the judgment gap. Whatever the 
reason for the association, the strong efficiency correlation between judgment gap and judgment 
length demonstrates that a reduction in judgment length would have a positive effect on other 
efficiency measures of the court. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
37r = 0.44, p < 0.001 
38Lord Bingham revealed, in an interview, that an effort was made to avoid this at the First Conference where 
the fact writing role is assigned, however often a judge will prefer to start from the beginning when writing 
and there was no method of preventing this. See Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p92-93 
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Figure 2 Correlation between Judgment Gap (days) and Length of Judgment (pages) 
 
Length of Judgment 
 
The number and complexity of the issues will determine whether a judgment is capable of being 
dealt with succinctly.  There is no optimum length of judgment and instead it is a question of each 
judgment attempting to focus the issues under consideration so that a reduction in the length of the 
judgment inevitably follows suit. In this sense, Lord Neuberger advocates ‘weed[ing] out the 
otiose.’39 The excessive length of judgments is a recognised problem for other common law 
appellate courts with the High Court of Australia, the Supreme Court of Canada and the US Supreme 
Court judgments all being identified as particularly ‘verbose’.40 The Appellate Committee did 
attempt to focus the issues. Murphy and Rawlings41 found that common features in the construction 
of all Appellate Committee judgments was the assertion of the material that was ‘extraneous’ and 
could be disregarded, alongside a ‘particularisation’ of the issues in order to achieve focus.42  
Nevertheless, there are competing virtues in this field. Brevity may suggest an effective disregard of 
extraneous aids, however equally length could enable a detailed and extensive review of the 
                                                             
39Lord Neuberger, ‘No Judgment- No Justice’ (First Annual Bailli Lecture, 20 November 2012), p9 
<www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-121120.pdf>last accessed 22 February 2016 
40
L Blom-Cooper, ‘Style of Judgments’ in  L Blom-Cooper, B Dickson and G Drewry (eds),The Judicial House of 
Lords 1876-2009, p160 
41
The study covered a total of 58 cases and examined the presentation of Appellate Committee decisions and 
reasons provided for those decisions made by the 14 Law Lords that served in the 12 months from October 
1979; WT Murphy and RW Rawlings, ‘After the Ancien Regime: The Writing of Judgments in the House of Lords 
1979/1980’ (1981) 44 MLR 617 
42Murphy and Rawlings, ‘After the Ancien Regime’ [1981], n41, 621-622 
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authorities, sufficient explanation and evidence based reasoning. Reasoning, as seen in Chapter 5, 
forms the backbone of precedent and ‘it is unlikely that a modern decision unaccompanied by 
reasoning would ever be considered much of a precedent.’43  The technical skill of Supreme Court 
judgment writing could lie in the art of reducing judgment length without compromising on reason. 
As Lord Walker revealed to Paterson in the context of oral advocacy, ‘sometimes the most effective 
advocacy is quite brief and has at any rate a superficial appearance of simplicity although no doubt 
there is an awful lot of art that goes into that.’44 
Tables 23 and 24 demonstrate that there was very little change in the average length of judgments 
between the Appellate Committee and the Supreme Court. The mean number of pages was 33 
across all 4 years, with the Appellate Committee mean being 31 pages and the Supreme Court mean 
being 35 pages. The range was broadly similar with the Appellate Committee number of pages 
ranging between 4- 129 pages and the Supreme Court mean ranging between 5- 126 pages. The 
stem and leaf diagram at Figure 3 reveals that the most common length of judgment is somewhere 
between 10-34 pages with a substantial cluster falling in the 15-24 pages grouping. 
Table 23. Average Length of Judgment by Court  
 
House of Lords or 
Supreme Court Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
House of Lords 31.18 129 20.263 4 129 
Supreme Court 35.37 117 24.446 5 126 
Total 33.17 246 22.402 4 129 
 
Table 24. Average Length of Judgment by Session  
 
Session  Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
HL 2007-2008 29.03 79 19.001 4 92 
HL 2008-2009 34.58 50 21.876 9 129 
SC 2009-2010 31.53 57 24.330 5 126 
SC 2010-2011 39.02 60 24.193 6 125 
Total 33.17 246 22.402 4 129 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
43N Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent (CUP, 2008), p65 
44
Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p43 
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Figure 3. Stem and Leaf Plot of Length of Case in Pages  
 
 Frequency    Stem & Leaf 
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    23.00        1 .  00000111112233333334444 
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    36.00        2 .  000000111111111111222222233334444444 
    27.00        2 .  555566666677777788888888999 
    23.00        3 .  00000001111112222223444 
    16.00        3 .  5555666677788899 
    14.00        4 .  00011122233344 
    15.00        4 .  555566678888899 
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     6.00         5 .  555666 
     9.00         6 .  002234444 
     4.00         6 .  6679 
     2.00         7 .  34 
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    11.00 Extremes    (>=83) 
 
 Stem width:        10 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
There were 11 outliers that had a judgment length of 83 pages or more; 4 arose in the Appellate 
Committee and 7 in the Supreme Court. These outliers are displayed in Table 25 below. Together, 
the outliers had an average judgment length of 102 pages. Although the Supreme Court had a 
greater number of extremely lengthy judgments during the time period, the net effect of this was 
counterbalanced by shorter judgments, as the average judgment length was not that much higher in 
the Supreme Court than the Appellate Committee. 
Table 25. Length of Judgment (outliers) 
Case Pages 
Total Network SL (a company incorporated in Spain) (Original Respondents and Cross-
appellants) v HMRC (suing as Commissioners of Customs and Excise) (Ord App and Cross-res) 
[2008] UKHL 19  
92 
R (on the application of Bancoult) (Respondent) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs (Appellant) [2008] UKHL 61  
84 
RB (Algeria) and another (Appellants) v S of S for the Home Department (Res); OO (Jordan) 
(Original Rest and X App)v S of S for the Home Department (Orig App and X Res) [2009] UKHL 
10  
105 
Moore Stephens (a firm) (Respondents) v Stone Rolls Limited (in liquidation) (Appellants) [2009] 
UKHL 39  
129 
R (on the application of E) (Respondent) v The Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions 
Appeal Panel of JFS and others (Appellants) [2009] UKSC 15  
91 
Her Majesty's Treasury (Respondent) v Mohammed Jaber Ahmed and others (FC) (Appellants) 
[2010] UKSC 2  
102 
R (on the application of Smith) (Respondent) v Secretary of State for Defence and another 
(Appellants) [2010] UKSC 29  
126 
114 
 
Sienkiewicz (Administratrix of Enid Costello deceased) (Resp)  v Grief (UK) Limited (Appellant) 
Knowsley Metropolitan council (App) v Willmore (Resp) [2011] UKSC 10  
83 
Walumba Lumba 1 and 2 and Kadian Mighty (Appellants) v Secretary of the State for the Home 
Department (Respondents) [2011] UKSC 12 
125 
Baker (Respondent) v Quantum Clothing Group Limited (Appellants) and others [2011] UKSC 17 98 
R (on the app of Adams)(FC)(Appellant) v S of S for Justice; App by Eamonn MacDermott for 
Judicial Review (NI); App by Raymond Pius McCartney for Judicial Review (NI) [2011] UKSC 18 
96 
 
Paterson found that the Justices of the Supreme Court wrote fewer individual opinions but wrote 
more paragraphs when they did write an opinion.45 The net effect of this was only a marginal 
increase in the overall number of pages in the judgment.  Thus, for every judge that wrote a few 
paragraphs more, an opinion was produced to which one or more judges joined.46 This pattern 
seems to strike an appropriate balance between reducing the distraction of too many individual 
opinions, yet not compromising on the level of reasoning provided by the judges who do provide an 
opinion. 
Table 26 demonstrates that the more judges that provided an opinion, the greater the length of the 
judgment. There was a positive linear, statistically significant,47 relationship between the length of 
judgment in pages and the number of concurring opinions. Table 27 revealed a multitude of 
significant relationships from the post hoc Bonferroni test. There were significant differences 
between 0 and 1,2,3,4 and 5 concurring opinions, demonstrating the significant effect on judgment 
length of issuing a multi-opinion rather than a single opinion judgment. Furthermore, the 
significance lying between 1-4 and 1-5 concurring opinions shows that once there was one 
concurring opinion, it did not make a statistically significant difference to the overall judgment 
length to have a second or third concurring opinion but it did to have a fourth. There were more 
instances of 4 concurring opinions than 2 or 3 across the 4 years although, as per Table 40 below, 
the average number of concurring opinions was less than this. Therefore reducing the number of 
concurring opinions by just 1 or 2 in these instances would have a significant effect in reducing 
judgment length and improving the efficiency of the court. 
Table 26. Average Length of Judgment and Number of Concurring Opinions 
Concur Mean N Std. Deviation 
.00 15.64 64 7.623 
1.00 28.09 33 15.495 
2.00 35.12 48 23.132 
                                                             
45Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p106-107 
46Paterson found this style of judgment to be gradually rising year on year from 12.5% of cases in 2009 to 96% 
of cases up to the end of July 2013; Final Judgment, n1, p107 
47F(5,239) = 28.67, p < 0.0001 
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3.00 35.74 35 15.719 
4.00 44.55 55 19.137 
5.00 69.78 9 27.865 
8.00 108.50 2 24.749 
Total 33.17 246 22.402 
    
 
Table 27. Post hoc Bonferroni tests for Length of Judgment and Number of Concurring Opinions 
(incidences of 8 concurring opinions were too small to include in the table) 
(I) New_Concur (J) New_Concur 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
.00 1.00 -12.450
*
 3.762 .016 -23.60 -1.30 
2.00 -19.484
*
 3.352 .000 -29.42 -9.55 
3.00 -20.102
*
 3.690 .000 -31.04 -9.16 
4.00 -28.905
*
 3.227 .000 -38.47 -19.34 
5.00 -61.178
*
 5.729 .000 -78.16 -44.19 
1.00 .00 12.450
*
 3.762 .016 1.30 23.60 
2.00 -7.034 3.969 1.000 -18.80 4.73 
3.00 -7.652 4.259 1.000 -20.28 4.98 
4.00 -16.455
*
 3.865 .000 -27.91 -5.00 
5.00 -48.727
*
 6.111 .000 -66.85 -30.61 
2.00 .00 19.484
*
 3.352 .000 9.55 29.42 
1.00 7.034 3.969 1.000 -4.73 18.80 
3.00 -.618 3.902 1.000 -12.19 10.95 
4.00 -9.420 3.467 .106 -19.70 .86 
5.00 -41.693
*
 5.868 .000 -59.09 -24.30 
3.00 .00 20.102
*
 3.690 .000 9.16 31.04 
1.00 7.652 4.259 1.000 -4.98 20.28 
2.00 .618 3.902 1.000 -10.95 12.19 
4.00 -8.803 3.795 .318 -20.06 2.45 
5.00 -41.075
*
 6.067 .000 -59.06 -23.09 
4.00 .00 28.905
*
 3.227 .000 19.34 38.47 
1.00 16.455
*
 3.865 .000 5.00 27.91 
2.00 9.420 3.467 .106 -.86 19.70 
3.00 8.803 3.795 .318 -2.45 20.06 
5.00 -32.273
*
 5.798 .000 -49.46 -15.08 
5.00 .00 61.178
*
 5.729 .000 44.19 78.16 
1.00 48.727
*
 6.111 .000 30.61 66.85 
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2.00 41.693
*
 5.868 .000 24.30 59.09 
3.00 41.075
*
 6.067 .000 23.09 59.06 
4.00 32.273
*
 5.798 .000 15.08 49.46 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 28 shows that there was also an increasing linear, statistically significant,48 relationship 
between the number of dissenting opinions and the length of the judgment. The post hoc Bonferroni 
tests, displayed in Table 29, demonstrated a significant relationship between 0 and 1,2 and 3+ 
dissenting opinions, between 1 and 3+ dissenting opinions and between 2 and 3+ dissenting 
opinions. As such, it made a statistically significant difference to judgment length when a dissent was 
provided, however once one dissent was provided it only significantly affected judgment length if 
three or more justices provided a dissent. This number of dissenting judges indicates a split panel 
and the results suggest that, in those circumstances, each judge would devote more pages to 
justifying their individual position over that of the opposing side. These results were supported by 
the data displayed in Table 30 whereby the average length of judgment approximately doubled 
where there was no unanimity in the final appeal court, compared to when there was unanimity. 
This difference was statistically significant.49 Dissents and division were therefore not conducive to 
reducing the length of judgments. As seen below, dissents were more common in the Supreme 
Court and may partly account for the longer judgment length in that court. 
Table 28. Average Length of Judgment and Number of Dissenting Opinions 
Dissent Mean N Std. Deviation 
.00 26.51 183 16.093 
1.00 44.25 28 19.759 
2.00 52.88 26 25.852 
3+ 77.22 9 34.347 
Total 33.17 246 22.402 
 
Table 29.  Post hoc Bonferroni tests for Length of Judgment and Number of Dissenting Opinions 
 
 (I) Dissent (J) Dissent 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
.00 1.00 -17.742
*
 3.777 .000 -27.79 -7.70 
2.00 -26.376
*
 3.901 .000 -36.75 -16.00 
3.00 -50.714
*
 6.354 .000 -67.62 -33.81 
                                                             
48F(3,246) = 37.66, p < 0.0001 
49t(233) = 7.89, p < 0.0001 
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1.00 .00 17.742
*
 3.777 .000 7.70 27.79 
2.00 -8.635 5.069 .539 -22.12 4.85 
3.00 -32.972
*
 7.131 .000 -51.94 -14.00 
2.00 .00 26.376
*
 3.901 .000 16.00 36.75 
1.00 8.635 5.069 .539 -4.85 22.12 
3.00 -24.338
*
 7.198 .005 -43.48 -5.19 
3.00 .00 50.714
*
 6.354 .000 33.81 67.62 
1.00 32.972
*
 7.131 .000 14.00 51.94 
2.00 24.338
*
 7.198 .005 5.19 43.48 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 30. Average Length of Judgment and Unanimity of Final Appeal Court 
Unanimity_HL Mean N Std. Deviation 
No 52.52 63 26.669 
Yes 26.51 183 16.093 
Total 33.17 246 22.402 
 
As with length of case, Table 31 demonstrates that human rights cases had on average the longest 
judgment length and this result was statistically significant.50 The post hoc Bonferroni tests shown in 
Table 32 revealed significant differences between human rights cases and both domestic, 
constitutional and public law cases and also international cases. 
Table 31. Average Length of Judgment by Subject Matter 
Case_Type Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
HR 42.12 43 24.407 10 126 
DCAPL 28.92 111 18.846 4 96 
LOPL 37.79 61 25.293 7 129 
INT 26.90 31 20.423 4 102 
Total 33.17 246 22.402 4 129 
 
Table 32. Post hoc Bonferroni tests for Length of Judgment by Subject Matter 
 (I) Case_Type (J) Case_Type 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
HR DCAPL 13.197
*
 3.915 .005 2.78 23.61 
LOPL 4.329 4.340 1.000 -7.22 15.88 
                                                             
50
F(3,231) = 6.40, p < 0.0001 
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INT 15.213
*
 5.136 .020 1.55 28.88 
DCAPL HR -13.197
*
 3.915 .005 -23.61 -2.78 
LOPL -8.868 3.474 .068 -18.11 .37 
INT 2.016 4.428 1.000 -9.76 13.80 
LOPL HR -4.329 4.340 1.000 -15.88 7.22 
DCAPL 8.868 3.474 .068 -.37 18.11 
INT 10.884 4.808 .147 -1.91 23.67 
INT HR -15.213
*
 5.136 .020 -28.88 -1.55 
DCAPL -2.016 4.428 1.000 -13.80 9.76 
LOPL -10.884 4.808 .147 -23.67 1.91 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Again, this result seems to be related to the volume of citations made in such cases. Table 33 
demonstrates statistically significant associations between the length of case in pages and ECtHR, 
international and domestic citations. The strongest association was shown between length of case in 
pages and the number of international citations (r=0.53).51  
Table 33. Association between Length of Judgment and Number of Strasbourg, European, 
International and Domestic Citations 
 
Length of 
case in 
pages 
No of times 
different 
European 
comparative 
caselaw is 
cited 
Stras_citati
ons 
No of times 
different 
domestic 
authorities 
are cited 
No of times 
different 
International 
comparative 
caselaw is 
cited 
Length of case in 
pages 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .108 .326
**
 .154
*
 .528
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .091 .000 .016 .000 
N 246 246 246 246 246 
No of times different 
European 
comparative caselaw 
is cited 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.108 1 .018 .045 .099 
Sig. (2-tailed) .091  .773 .482 .121 
N 246 246 246 246 246 
Stras_citations Pearson 
Correlation 
.326
**
 .018 1 .167
**
 .074 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .773  .009 .246 
N 246 246 246 246 246 
                                                             
51Note that there was a slight, positive association between the number of international citations and the 
length of the case in days (r = 0.24, p < 0.001) but no association between citations and judgment gap (r = 
0.034, p 0.59). 
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No of times different 
domestic authorities 
are cited 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.154
*
 .045 .167
**
 1 .055 
Sig. (2-tailed) .016 .482 .009  .387 
N 246 246 246 246 246 
No of times different 
International 
comparative caselaw 
is cited 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.528
**
 .099 .074 .055 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .121 .246 .387  
N 246 246 246 246 246 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
In summary, the relationship between judgment length and judgment gap has been established as 
well as the effect that concurring and dissenting opinions and authority citation appeared to have on 
these two efficiency measures. At this juncture it is illustrative to examine the data on the style of 
judgment and the extent to which the single or multi-opinion judgment style contributed to the 
institutional efficiency of the court. 
Judgment Style 
Single judgments 
 
The statistics demonstrate that the Supreme Court is increasingly moving towards single judgments 
of the court, now that judgments no longer have to be delivered as speeches.52 The benefits of this 
as against the inevitable compromises that it entails have long been debated.53  From the 
perspective of the court’s institutional relations, a single judgment provides the court with a voice 
thereby allowing for a level of institutional and not just individual accountability.54 It also appears to 
provide more instant clarification of the legal position following the decision and could support 
institutional communication. As will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the clarity of precedent plays a key 
role in institutional relations between the domestic courts. The clarity of the decision may therefore 
enhance the functioning of the system of precedent in the short term. Nevertheless, this certainty of 
                                                             
52
Lady Hale noted that she and her judicial assistant were ‘surprised’ at the level of plurality of opinion in the 
first year of the Supreme Court, with 20 judgments of the court and a further 11 cases that had some form of 
plurality of opinion, be it the majority judgment or otherwise. See ‘Judgment writing in the Supreme Court’ 
(First Anniversary Seminar, 30 September 2010), p2 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_100930.pdf>accessed 22 February 2016 
53See Paterson, The Law Lords (Macmillan Press, 1982), p184-186  
54Le Sueur felt the Appellate Committee’s use of multiple opinions increased individual judicial accountability; 
however, it did little to ease comprehension of the majority view and thus institutional accountability; 
‘Developing Mechanisms for judicial Accountability in the UK’ (2004) 24 (1/2) LS 73, 90 
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approach could have detrimental long-term effects were it to reduce flexibility in the authority’s 
application and be applied by the lower courts in a manner akin to an ‘Act of Parliament’.55  
The multi-opinion judgment, by contrast, can accommodate different judicial perspectives from 
different specialist areas and may be of more assistance in clarifying the law as it stands or 
supporting the future development of the law.56 Furthermore, the quality of multi-opinion 
judgments need not be compromised in an effort to retain a united view.57 Nevertheless, the 
benefits of multi-opinion judgments have to be measured in the context of the number of 
concurring opinions provided.  The more concurring opinions provided, the more difficult it may be 
for future lower courts to interpret the meaning behind each individual opinion58 and as seen above, 
the more likely it is to have a significant impact on the efficiency of the court.  The individual nature 
of concurrences can mean that they do not necessarily complement one another or correlate in lines 
of reasoning.59 This particular difficulty was found to be the most profound in the instant study when 
it came to ascertaining the issues to be determined under the appeal.  Often, the Justices would 
have their own opinion on what the true issues to be determined were and they would write their 
judgment on the basis of their own assessment of the case.  Thus each concurring opinion could 
reach the same result but have taken a very unique line of reasoning to reach that point. This 
particular finding supports the need for the court to issue an agreed statement of both the facts and 
legal issues raised. A statement of this nature would also dispense with the need for multiple recitals 
of the facts and thus facilitate the reduction of judgment length, without compromising on 
reasoning. Final Appeal also made a forceful call to assenters to focus on the value gained from 
publishing their opinion60 and recommended that assenting opinions should not become part of the 
ratio decidendi of the case.61 This recommendation was made on the basis that the majority of 
lawyers thought an authoritative court should speak clearly and with one voice.62  Indeed, there is 
precedent for such a style of judgment in the JCPC, which traditionally provided collective legal 
advice to the sovereign.63   
                                                             
55Lord Reid, ‘The Judge as Law Maker’ [1972] JSPTL 22, 26 
56Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’, (2007) 66 CLJ 67, 70-71, a view which he believes Lord Reid would have shared. 
Blom-Cooper and Drewry also felt that in a system of stare decisis, concurring opinions helped to explain the 
result of the case and acted as useful guidance for future cases; Final Appeal, n17, p80 
57
The compromised nature of collective judgments is an issue in the JCPC. See Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, 
p91 
58
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17, p90 
59
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17, p90 
60
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17, p95 
61
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17, p94 
62
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17, p80 
63Judicial Committee (Dissenting opinion) Order in Council 1966. 
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Tables 34 and 35 reveal that the Appellate Committee increased the proportion of single judgments 
issued since Final Appeal64 and that there was a further 10% increase in the volume of single 
judgments issued by the Supreme Court.  The proportion of single judgments in the Appellate 
Committee was 19% (7% being composite or collective judgments and 12% being a single judgment 
with others formally concurring).65 In the Supreme Court, the proportion of single judgments was 
30% (26% being composite or collective and 4% being a single judgment with others formally 
concurring). There was a slight variation between sessions, with 2007-2008 returning 24% of its 
judgments as single judgments, with 2008-2009 returning 12% of its judgments as single judgments, 
2009-2010 returning 35% of its judgments as single judgments and 2010-2011 returning 27% of its 
judgments as single judgments. There has also been a change in the style of the single judgment 
issued, with the Supreme Court favouring the composite/collective style and the Appellate 
Committee favouring the single judgment with others formally concurring. As a result, the Appellate 
Committee’s increased use of single judgments was not exclusively attributable to Lord Bingham’s 
introduction of the single opinion of the Committee in criminal appeals,66 it was also largely 
attributable to Law Lords increasingly choosing to formally concur.  This judgment style allowed the 
Appellate Committee to produce single judgments, whilst respecting the convention for all Law 
Lords to ‘speak’ and thus provide an opinion.   
Table 34. Single Judgments by Court 
 
 
House of Lords or Supreme Court 
Total House of Lords Supreme Court 
Was the case a single 
judgment case? 
No 104 81 185 
Yes-composite or collective 
judgment 
9 31 40 
Yes- Single judgment with 
others only formally 
concurring 
16 5 21 
Total 129 117 246 
 
 
                                                             
64Blom-Cooper and Drewry did not distinguish between type of single judgment. They found the overall 
proportion of single judgment cases to be 11.3% with it being deployed most often in criminal or Scottish 
appeals; Final Appeal, n17, p184 
65Between 2001-2009, the proportion of single judgments in the Appellate Committee was always less than 
20% of its total caseload, however in the years prior to that it was higher, reaching peaks of 68% in 1985 under 
the presidency of Lord Diplock and 70% in 1993 under Lord Keith. Figures taken from Paterson, Final 
Judgment, n1, p100-102 and Table 3.2. 
66
See Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p92 
122 
 
Table 35. Single Judgments by Session 
 
 
 
Session the case was heard in  
Total 
HL 2007-
2008 
HL 2008-
2009 
SC 2009-
2010 
SC 2010-
2011 
Was the case a single 
judgment case? 
No 60 44 37 44 185 
Yes-
composite or 
collective 
judgment 
7 2 18 13 40 
Yes- Single 
judgment with 
others only 
formally 
concurring 
12 4 2 3 21 
Total 79 50 57 60 246 
 
Single judgments were found to increase the institutional efficiency of the court, although it is 
acknowledged that all judges in the case will still have made some level of contribution.67 Table 36 
demonstrates that both styles of single judgment were shorter in a statistically significant way.68 
These judgments were, on average, less than half the average length of judgments that included 
concurring and/or dissenting opinions. Hearings that eventually resulted in a composite/collective 
judgment were, on average, shorter, supporting the preliminary conclusion above that judges who 
are minded to provide an opinion may interrupt more, however this was not statistically 
significant.69 Table 36 demonstrates that whereas composite/collective judgments had a shorter 
judgment gap than judgments with concurring or dissenting opinions, the opposite was true of single 
judgments with the other judges formally concurring.  This could be because single judgments with 
formal concurrences may start off as multi-opinion judgments, however after circulation of the draft 
judgments, some judges may decide to formally concur to avoid duplicity.70 Again these results were 
not found to be statistically significant.71 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Supreme Court’s 
preference for the composite/ collective style of single judgment has the potential to increase the 
                                                             
67All judges will read and perhaps amend the single judgment as was the practice in the Privy Council. Dickson, 
‘The Lords of Appeal and their work’, n3, p151. Single judgments can be written in different ways. Paterson 
compared Norris v USA [2008] UKHL 16 where several sections were written by different Law Lords with 
Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 which was written by one judge with suggestions from the 
other judges; Final Judgment, n1, p87  
68
F(2,243) = 32.99, p < 0.0001 
69F(2,243)=2.46, p = 0.088 
70
See Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p99 
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overall efficiency of the court far more the Appellate Committee’s preference for a single judgment 
with the others formally concurring.  
Table 36. Single Judgment and Average Length of Judgment, Judgment Gap and Length of Case 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
No of days case lasts for No 185 2.14 .943 
Yes-composite or collective 
judgment 
40 1.88 .911 
Yes- Single judgment with 
others only formally 
concurring 
21 1.76 .889 
Total 246 2.06 .939 
No of days between hearing 
the case and handing down 
judgment  
No 184 84.86 76.728 
Yes-composite or collective 
judgment 
40 67.28 43.650 
Yes- Single judgment with 
others only formally 
concurring 
21 111.62 280.847 
Total 245 84.28 106.288 
Length of case in pages No 185 39.10 22.559 
Yes-composite or collective 
judgment 
40 15.40 8.127 
Yes- Single judgment with 
others only formally 
concurring 
21 14.76 4.888 
Total 246 33.17 22.402 
 
There are clearly efficiency gains to be made from having composite style single judgments; 
however, such judgments may be compromised in terms of content. Only comparative and academic 
citations were empirically measured in this study, however, these statistics do reveal significant 
sacrifices in content where a single judgment was delivered. Table 37 collapses the two types of 
single judgment into one category and then tests for significance. With the exception of European 
comparative case law,72 the average number of citations decreased significantly when a single 
judgment was delivered: international comparative,73 domestic comparative74 and Strasbourg.75 In 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
71
F(2,242) = 1.21, p = 0.30 
72
t(244) = 0.77, p = 0.44 
73t(244) = 3.31, p = 0.001 
74t(244) = 2.19, p = 0.03 
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terms of content, the multi-opinion judgment, with concurrences and dissents was by far the 
preferable option. 
Table 37. Single Judgment and Average Number of European, Domestic, International and 
Strasbourg Citations 
SINGLE  No of times 
different 
European 
comparative 
caselaw is 
cited 
No of times 
different 
domestic 
authorities 
are cited 
No of 
times 
different 
academics 
are cited 
No of times 
different 
International 
comparative 
caselaw is 
cited 
No of 
different 
Strasbourg 
authorities 
cited by 
division/ 
chamber 
No Mean 0.19 1.75 5.07 2.43 4.51 
 N 185 185 185 185 185 
 Std. 
Deviation 
1.461 3.531 5.971 4.988 8.163 
Yes Mean 0.05 0.7 1.3 0.31 1.16 
 N 61 61 61 61 61 
 Std. 
Deviation 
0.284 2.052 2.171 0.847 3.95 
Total Mean 0.16 1.49 4.13 1.91 3.68 
 N 246 246 246 246 246 
 Std. 
Deviation 
1.276 3.256 5.532 4.439 7.481 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
 
Concurring and dissenting opinions are categorised as such according to their end result; however, 
characteristically they are very similar in that each may contain areas of agreement and 
disagreement. Final Appeal observed that concurrences will normally agree with the disposal of the 
case on the facts, albeit sometimes via a different legal pathway, whereas a dissent may agree with 
the legal rule to be applied but disagree with the way that the majority applied it on the facts.76 In 
the middle are partial dissents,77 where the Justices appear to disagree with the opinion of the 
majority but then refrain from following these doubts through to outright dissent, as it will make 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
75
t(244) = 3.08, p = 0.002 
76
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17, p79 
77
Blom-Cooper and Drewry used a ‘partial dissent’ category i.e. if the judge’s reasoning ‘would have produced 
a different result only on a subsidiary matter.’ The authors admit however that ‘sometime a ‘partial dissent’ is 
hard to distinguish from an assent in result reached by different argument.’; Final Appeal, n17, p184.  
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little difference to the appeal’s outcome. The partial dissent shows that outright dissent is reserved 
for the truly deserving cases and unanimity should be sought wherever possible.78   
The statistics revealed an empirical link between concurrence and dissent. Table 38 demonstrates 
that, on average, there was almost twice the number of concurring opinions where the judicial panel 
was divided on at least one issue than when it was unanimous. This result was statistically 
significant.79 The coding of a judge’s position, in this study, meant that it was possible for an opinion 
to concur on some issues and dissent on others. Therefore the results in Table 38 may partially 
reflect the fact that elements of a dissenting opinion will occasionally concur with one or more 
issues at the same time.  Table 39 does suggest that as the number of dissents increased in a case, it 
was proportionately more common to have at least 4 concurrences.  The results in Table 38 could, 
nevertheless, indicate that division in the court was one of the reasons that prompted a judge to 
provide a concurring opinion and thus confirm Lee’s argument that judges provide concurring 
opinions out of ‘respect’ to their colleagues in a divided court.80   Nevertheless, a degree of caution 
needs to be exercised owing to how concurrences and dissents were coded in the study. 
Table 38. Average Number of Concurring Opinions and Unanimity of Final Appeal Court 
SCHL_Unanimity Mean N Std. Deviation 
SC/HL Divided 3.32 63 1.674 
SC/HL Unanimous 1.72 183 1.605 
Total 2.13 246 1.763 
 
Table 39. Relationship between Number of Dissenting Opinions and Number of Concurring 
Opinions 
 
No of dissenting opinions provided in the case 
Total 0 1 2 3 4 5 
No of concurring 
opinions provided in the 
case 
0 61 3 0 0 0 0 64 
1 29 1 3 0 0 0 33 
2 34 5 9 0 0 0 48 
3 26 7 2 0 0 0 35 
4 29 11 11 3 1 0 55 
5 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 
6 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 
                                                             
78
Blom-Cooper and Drewry criticised the latent dissent on the basis that it compromised the ‘vigorous 
intellectual integrity’ of the judges; Final Appeal, n17, p27 and p86 
79t(243) = 6.74, p < 0.0001 
80J Lee, ‘A Defence of Concurring Speeches’ [2009] PL 305, 324 
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7 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 
8 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Total 183 28 26 6 2 1 246 
 
Tables 40 and 41 show that there were slightly more concurring opinions, on average, in the 
Appellate Committee (between 2-3) than in the Supreme Court (between 1-2), and this was true of 
all sessions. The average number of concurring opinions in the Appellate Committee has decreased 
since the time of Final Appeal (averaging between 3-4)81 and the results indicate that the Justices 
appear to be making a conscious, although not yet statistically significant,82 move towards reducing 
concurring opinions further in the Supreme Court. These statistics support Paterson’s finding that 
there is ‘now a prevailing view amongst the Justices that concurrences should be curbed unless they 
are going to add something to the lead judgment.’83  
Since this study, the trend has continued downward, suggesting that statistically significant results 
may be returned in the future.84 The reduction in concurrences may, however, not be universally 
welcomed. James Lee, writing in support of concurring opinions, felt that they provide a ‘third 
dimension to common law reasoning’, allowing a distinction to be drawn between outcome and 
reasoning.85 In this sense, concurring opinions may arrive at the outcome from a different 
perspective and thus strengthen precedent by providing additional guidance to lower courts.86 He 
also noted the ‘buttressing’ function of concurrences, particularly where there was a strong 
dissent.87 Concurring opinions can, therefore, have value. 
Table 40. Average Number of Concurring Opinions by Court 
House of Lords or Supreme Court 
No of concurring opinions 
provided in the case 
House of Lords Mean 2.33 
N 129 
Std. Deviation 1.602 
Supreme Court Mean 1.91 
                                                             
81
It was also common for 5 full length speeches to be handed down; Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, 
n17, p82 and 401-402. This reduction in concurrences is despite the fact that Lord Bingham was known to be 
more relaxed towards dissenting and concurring opinions under his presidency; Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, 
p115 
82t(244) = 11.36, p = 0.068, and F(3,242) = 1.39, p = 0.25 respectively.  
83
Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p108 
84Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p109 
85Lee, ‘A Defence of Concurring Speeches’, n80, p318 
86Lee, ‘A Defence of Concurring Speeches’, n80, p329 
87Lee, ‘A Defence of Concurring Speeches’, n80, 315-316 
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N 117 
Std. Deviation 1.910 
Total Mean 2.13 
N 246 
Std. Deviation 1.763 
 
Table 41. Average Number of Concurring Opinions by Session 
 
Session the case was heard in  
No of concurring opinions 
provided in the case 
HL 2007-2008 Mean 2.22 
N 79 
Std. Deviation 1.646 
HL 2008-2009 Mean 2.50 
N 50 
Std. Deviation 1.529 
SC 2009-2010 Mean 1.89 
N 57 
Std. Deviation 2.050 
SC 2010-2011 Mean 1.93 
N 60 
Std. Deviation 1.784 
Total Mean 2.13 
N 246 
Std. Deviation 1.763 
 
In the 2007-2011 period, there was a marginally higher dissent rate recorded in the Supreme Court 
compared to the Appellate Committee across all sessions (See Tables 42 and 43). This suggests that 
the increase in single judgments in the Supreme Court did not translate into a greater overall 
unanimity rate, as instances of dissent in fact increased. The quantitative data on ‘panel size’ below 
may provide a reason for this, as it indicates that the Supreme Court sat in larger panel sizes more 
frequently than the Appellate Committee and that larger panels tended to include more 
concurrences and dissent. Despite this apparent rise in disagreement, it must be remembered that 
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dissent was still used ‘sparingly’ in the Supreme Court, at less than 1 dissenting opinion on average 
per case, and in most cases the Supreme Court was both authoritative and united.88   
Table 42. Average Number of Dissenting Opinions by Court 
House of Lords or Supreme Court 
No of dissenting 
opinions 
provided in the 
case 
House of Lords Mean .38 
N 129 
Std. Deviation .752 
Supreme Court Mean .53 
N 117 
Std. Deviation 1.013 
Total Mean .45 
N 246 
Std. Deviation .887 
 
Table 43. Average Number of Dissenting Opinions by Session 
 
Session the case was heard in  
No of dissenting 
opinions 
provided in the 
case 
HL 2007-2008 Mean .34 
N 79 
Std. Deviation .696 
HL 2008-2009 Mean .44 
N 50 
Std. Deviation .837 
SC 2009-2010 Mean .54 
N 57 
Std. Deviation 1.070 
SC 2010-2011 Mean .52 
N 60 
Std. Deviation .965 
                                                             
88Blom-Cooper and Drewry advocated the sparing use of the dissent as opposed to its outright abolition. This 
would preserve the intellectual independence of each judge without hindering legal development by too many 
dissenting opinions; Final Appeal, n17, p89. 
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Total Mean .45 
N 246 
Std. Deviation .887 
 
Dissents can have value. They have been seen to elucidate the alternative perspectives on the case 
and thus assist the majority in forming a clear and comprehensive judgment.89 Stronger decisions 
can be formed through sustained debate and the ability to identify and address possible issues or 
weaknesses with the majority’s favoured route.90  Dissents can also pacify an unsuccessful litigant or 
overruled lower court by knowing that at least one judge had sympathy with their argument or line 
of reasoning. Dissent could, therefore, be important in maintaining institutional relations with the 
lower courts. Again, however, there is a fine line between providing a level of contentment and 
increasing disappointment with the outcome of the appeal.91  
Dissents also characterise the decision-making process of the final appeal court and bring it closer to 
the participatory democratic decision-making of Parliament. Alder believes that dissent has a deeper 
political role that stretches beyond mere disagreement with the outcome of the appeal. Dissent 
reflects, within the judicial setting, the competing societal values in a democracy which ‘helps to 
offset the democratic deficit in the common law’ and brings judicial decision-making closer to the 
participatory nature of legislative decision-making.92  Paterson also views dissent in a participatory 
and open manner as it can initiate dialogue in the ‘earliest and premeditated’ sense, both by 
supporting a judge who seeks legal review of matters at a later stage93 and who hopes to win over 
the majority in the instant case.94 Kirby echoes these sentiments in that dissent is part of the 
‘indeterminate’ and ‘creative’ nature of judicial decision-making in common law countries where 
‘today’s dissent occasionally becomes tomorrow’s orthodoxy.’95 In this sense, a rising dissent rate in 
the Supreme Court may assist in balancing any increase in institutional power of the final appeal 
court, by ensuring that there is still evidence of active and participatory decision-making, where as 
many views as possible are taken account of, and where areas of concern can be highlighted for 
review at a later date. 
                                                             
89Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17, p87 
90This is provided the majority decision is not ‘exaggerated’ when criticised, which can make the determination 
of the ratio decedendi a difficult task for lower courts; Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17, p87.  
91Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17, p89  
92
J Alder, ‘Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?’(2000) 20(2) OJLS 221, p223. See also: Lee, ‘A 
Defence of Concurring Speeches’, n80, 327 
93Paterson provides the example of Lord Bingham’s dissent in Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] 
UKHL 55, a case covered in the time period; Final Judgment, n1, p66-67 
94
Paterson Final Judgment, n1, p110-111 
95M Kirby, ‘Judicial Activism’, Hamlyn Lectures (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), p18 
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Concurrences and dissents are perhaps not equally likely to arise in all types of appeals.  Final Appeal 
found that family law had a higher than average dissent rate and correspondingly patent and 
procedural cases had a lower dissent rate.96 Table 44 shows that human rights cases had the highest 
average number of concurring opinions in the time period. This result was statistically significant.97 
The post hoc Bonferroni tests revealed statistically significant differences between Human Rights 
and Domestic, Constitutional and Public Law cases,98 as well as between Human Rights and 
International cases.99 These results confirm previous empirical findings that recorded a rise in 
concurring opinions from the pre to post HRA era of around 25% and ‘a noticeable increase in 
human rights judgments that were unanimous by concurrence’ which rose from 46% pre HRA to 61% 
thereafter.100 They also lend support to the idea that all Justices wish to actively participate in any 
dialogue with the ECtHR by providing a judgment. Interestingly, Chapter 5 demonstrates that the 
lower courts are overturned less in the human rights field which could suggest that a greater 
number of concurrences, in such cases, assisted the lower court in reading precedent. 
Table 44. Average Number of Concurring Opinions by Subject Matter 
Case_Type Mean N Std. Deviation 
HR 2.93 43 1.831 
DCAPL 1.93 111 1.772 
LOPL 2.26 61 1.611 
INT 1.48 31 1.568 
Total 2.13 246 1.763 
 
The clarity of precedent in the human rights field may also be assisted by the fact that although 
dissent rates are slightly higher in human rights and public law cases, they are still in line with the 
other categories of case. The only category that had a slightly lower average dissent rate was 
international cases.  The numbers returned for average dissents were all less than one per case and 
were too small to allow for any further analysis. The figures, however, suggest that although human 
rights cases are often controversial and sensitive, they do not necessarily cause a greater level of 
disagreement in the final appeal court compared to other cases, and a relatively unanimous voice is 
presented to the ECtHR. 
 
                                                             
96Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17, p188. 
97F(3,210) = 3.75, p = 0.012 
98Mean difference = 0.92, p = 0.026 
99
Mean difference = 1.28, p = 0.026 
100S Shah and T Poole, ‘The Law Lords and Human Rights’ (2011) 74(1) MLR 79, 87-88 and 90 
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Table 45. Average Number of Dissenting Opinions by Subject Matter 
Case_Type Mean N Std. Deviation 
HR .49 43 .960 
DCAPL .50 111 .923 
LOPL .44 61 .922 
INT .26 31 .514 
Total .45 246 .887 
 
Concurring opinions may assist the reasoning process by extending the range of sources that are 
reviewed and cited to support the conclusions reached. Table 46 confirms that as concurring 
opinions increased the number of citations and references also increased. Statistically significant 
associations were present between the number of concurring opinions and the volume of academic 
citations, international comparative citations, domestic citations and ECtHR citations. These 
associations, alongside the increase that concurring opinions caused to the length of judgment, seen 
above, suggests that concurring opinions were not ‘almost always’ short in the time period.101 
Dissents also increased the length of judgment. However Table 47 demonstrates that the only 
statistically significant association for dissenting opinions in terms of additional citations was 
international comparative citations. There was also a modest association between the number of 
academic citations and the number of dissenting opinions.102 Table 48 confirms these results, which 
records the relationship between the number of citations and unanimity. There was a rise in the 
mean number of international comparative, ECtHR and CJEU authorities when the final appeal court 
was not unanimous. However, only the difference in international citations was statistically 
significant.103 
Table 46. Relationship between Concurring Opinions and Category of Citation  
 
No of 
concurrin
g 
opinions 
provided 
in the 
case 
No of 
times 
different 
academic
s are 
cited 
No of times 
different 
Internationa
l 
comparativ
e caselaw 
is cited 
No of times 
different 
European 
comparativ
e caselaw 
is cited 
No of 
times 
different 
domestic 
authoritie
s are 
cited 
No of 
different 
ECtHR 
authorities 
cited by 
division/ 
chamber 
How 
many 
CJEU  
authoritie
s are 
cited in 
the case? 
No of Pearson 1 .356
**
 .267
**
 .030 .211
**
 .316
**
 -.047 
                                                             
101Neuberger, ‘No judgment- No Justice’, n39, p12 
102
r = 0.35, p < 0.0001 
103International citations t(244) = 2.94, p = 0.004. Strasbourg citations: t(244) = 1.32, p = 0.19,  European 
citations t(244) = .69, p = 0.49; CJEU citations t(244) = 0.56, p = 0.58 were not statistically significant. 
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concurring 
opinions 
provided in 
the case 
Correlatio
n 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.000 .000 .637 .001 .000 .461 
N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
No of times 
different 
academics 
are cited 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.356
**
 1 .482
**
 .260
**
 .155
*
 .256
**
 -.040 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 
 
.000 .000 .015 .000 .534 
N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
No of times 
different 
Internationa
l 
comparativ
e caselaw 
is cited 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.267
**
 .482
**
 1 .095 .054 .075 -.084 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 
 
.137 .400 .242 .191 
N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
No of times 
different 
European 
comparativ
e caselaw 
is cited 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.030 .260
**
 .095 1 .030 .034 .000 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.637 .000 .137 
 
.635 .591 .997 
N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
No of times 
different 
domestic 
authorities 
are cited 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.211
**
 .155
*
 .054 .030 1 .142
*
 -.032 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.001 .015 .400 .635 
 
.026 .615 
N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
No of 
different 
Strasbourg 
authorities 
cited by 
division/ 
chamber 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.316
**
 .256
**
 .075 .034 .142
*
 1 .043 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .242 .591 .026 
 
.505 
N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
How many 
CJEU 
authorities 
are cited in 
the case? 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
-.047 -.040 -.084 .000 -.032 .043 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.461 .534 .191 .997 .615 .505 
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N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 47. Relationship between Dissenting Opinions and Category of Citation  
 
No of 
dissentin
g 
opinions 
provided 
in the 
case 
No of 
times 
different 
academic
s are 
cited 
No of times 
different 
Internationa
l 
comparativ
e caselaw 
is cited 
No of times 
different 
European 
comparativ
e caselaw 
is cited 
No of 
times 
different 
domestic 
authoritie
s are 
cited 
No of 
different 
Strasbour
g 
authorities 
cited by 
division/ 
chamber 
How 
many 
CJEU 
authoritie
s are 
cited in 
the case? 
No of 
dissenting 
opinions 
provided in 
the case 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
1 .348
**
 .290
**
 -.045 .062 .105 -.024 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.000 .000 .481 .330 .101 .707 
N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
No of times 
different 
academics 
are cited 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.348
**
 1 .482
**
 .260
**
 .155
*
 .256
**
 -.040 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 
 
.000 .000 .015 .000 .534 
N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
No of times 
different 
Internationa
l 
comparativ
e caselaw 
is cited 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.290
**
 .482
**
 1 .095 .054 .075 -.084 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 
 
.137 .400 .242 .191 
N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
No of times 
different 
European 
comparativ
e caselaw 
is cited 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
-.045 .260
**
 .095 1 .030 .034 .000 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.481 .000 .137 
 
.635 .591 .997 
N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
No of times Pearson .062 .155
*
 .054 .030 1 .142
*
 -.032 
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different 
domestic 
authorities 
are cited 
Correlatio
n 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.330 .015 .400 .635 
 
.026 .615 
N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
No of 
different 
Strasbourg 
authorities 
cited by 
division/ 
chamber 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.105 .256
**
 .075 .034 .142
*
 1 .043 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.101 .000 .242 .591 .026 
 
.505 
N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
How many 
CJEU 
authorities 
are cited in 
the case? 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
-.024 -.040 -.084 .000 -.032 .043 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.707 .534 .191 .997 .615 .505 
 
N 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 48. Relationship between Unanimity of Final Appeal Court and Average Number of Citations 
Unanimity 
No of times 
different 
International 
comparative 
caselaw is cited 
No of times 
different 
European 
comparative 
caselaw is cited 
No of different 
Strasbourg 
authorities cited 
by division/ 
chamber 
How many 
CJEU 
authorities are 
cited in the 
case? 
Yes Mean 1.43 .19 3.31 .91 
N 183 183 183 183 
Std. Deviation 3.410 1.472 6.955 3.203 
No Mean 3.30 .06 4.75 1.17 
N 63 63 63 63 
Std. Deviation 6.407 .246 8.810 3.577 
Total Mean 1.91 .16 3.68 .98 
N 246 246 246 246 
Std. Deviation 4.439 1.276 7.481 3.297 
 
One final point of note is that Table 47 revealed significant associations between certain types of 
citation. There was a significant association between the number of academic citations and 
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international comparative, domestic comparative, European comparative and Strasbourg citations. 
Domestic comparative citations also had a significant association with Strasbourg citations.104 The 
relationship between domestic comparative citations and Strasbourg citations may be owing to the 
need to have a consistent approach to the Convention in all UK legal jurisdictions. This is important 
to ensure that the minimum standards required by the Convention are met in each nation state and 
that the UK is not in breach of its international obligations. Furthermore, it ensures that the level of 
rights protection for UK citizens does not vary between each nation state.  The results also suggest 
that at the point where comparative law features in the judicial reasoning process, academic 
citations also feature. Thus once 1 or 2 concurring opinions feature either comparative, Strasbourg 
or academic citations, the likelihood is that other types of citation will also be included to assist the 
reasoning process.  How the strands of citation specifically interrelate would be an interesting 
subject for further qualitative analysis. Academic sources, for instance, could make international 
sources more accessible. Alternatively, academic and comparative citations could occur in cases 
where there was no clear precedent and the court sought guidance from other sources. 
Panel Sizes and Split Votes 
 
Table 49 and Figure 4 demonstrate that the move from the Appellate Committee to the Supreme 
Court has led to an increase in the number of 7 and 9 justice panels. Figure 5 illustrates how this 
pattern changed across the 4 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
104
r = 0.14, p = 0.026 
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Figure 4. Pie Charts of Panel Size by Court 
 
Table 49.  Panel Size by Court 
 
 
House of Lords or Supreme Court 
Total House of Lords Supreme Court 
Panel 3 justices Count 1 1 2 
% within new_panel 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
5 justices Count 126 82 208 
% within new_panel 60.6% 39.4% 100.0% 
7 justices Count 0 22 22 
% within new_panel .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
9 justices Count 2 11 13 
% within new_panel 15.4% 84.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 129 116 245 
% within new_panel 52.7% 47.3% 100.0% 
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Figure 5. Pie Charts of Panel Size by Session 
 
In the Appellate Committee, it was exceptional for a case to be heard by more than 5 Law Lords in 
the time period.105 The 5 judge panel served a practical purpose in a court with 12 permanent 
justices; it permitted 2 panels to be convened each week and 2 judges to be allowed time out of 
court to write, read and fulfil their other duties.106  The 2003 Consultation Paper sought views on 
whether the membership of the court should be retained at 12 or whether a larger number would 
be of assistance to the new court. The advantage of a larger number of permanent justices would be 
the ability for more cases to be heard simultaneously. However, the then Government favoured the 
status quo on the basis that the larger the number of justices the more exposed the court is to 
criticisms based on panel selection and the potential that an alternative panel would have found 
differently.107 The Labour Government dismissed the argument that judicial panel selection in the UK 
                                                             
105Paterson notes that between 2000-2009 the Appellate Committee only sat in larger panels on 13 occasions; 
Final Judgment, n1, p72. Blom Cooper and Drewry found only 2 cases during their period of study that did not 
convene a panel of 5 judges; Final Appeal, n17, p50 
106A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, n6, p16  
107
A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, n6, p23-24 
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could still affect outcome108 and felt that the risk was lower than in courts where appointments are 
made with an awareness of the judges’ political beliefs.109   
The Consultation Paper also considered whether the Supreme Court should sit en banc in a similar 
way to the US Supreme Court.110 This proposal garnered support from practitioners,111 academics,112 
and would have placed the UK in line with ‘virtually all Supreme Courts the world over.’113   Sitting en 
banc would have also have alleviated the criticism based on panel composition; however, the 
Government felt that it would have a detrimental effect on the Supreme Court in several other ways. 
The number of cases that could be heard each year would be limited as well as the simultaneous 
sitting of the Supreme Court and JCPC and the tailoring of panels to judicial specialism.114 Other 
notable effects would include,  
… restricting the length of oral hearings, requiring more judicial assistants and restricting the 
current system for delivering concurring opinions; reducing the number of appeals that can 
be heard; and making the exercise of identifying the ratio of a decision more difficult ...115 
The selective use of 7 and 9 Justice panels, primarily in cases that engage particularly sensitive issues 
appears to strike a balance between not compromising the overall efficiency of the court, yet adding 
weight and authority to a decision and immunising it from criticisms based on judicial panel 
selection. 
The effect on the operational efficiency of the court of an increased panel size is confirmed by Table 
50. The average length of the hearing went up by a full day where a 9 Justice Panel was convened in 
                                                             
108Clayton nonetheless has suggested that the composition of the first panel in R. v Bow Street Metropolitan 
Stipendiary Magistrate ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No.1) [2000] 1 AC 61 HL had a dramatic effect on the course of 
the next two Pinochet appeals. He also refers to the conflicting cases of R. v DPP ex p. Kebeline [2000] 2 AC 326 
HL (obiter) and R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37, which reached opposing conclusions on the retrospective 
applicability of the HRA to criminal trials heard prior to the HRA coming into force. R Clayton, ‘Decision-making 
in the Supreme Court: new approaches and new opportunities’ [2009] PL 682, 682 
109A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, n6, p37 
110A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, n6, p37 
111 See Memorandum by Clifford Chance LLP dated 23rd April 2004 as part of the written evidence submitted to 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Constitutional Reform Bill Session 2003-2004 available 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldcref/125/125we13.htm> accessed 25 February 
2016   
112
Memorandum by Richard Cornes, Essex University, 28 April 2003 as part of the written evidence submitted 
to the House of Lords Select Committee on Constitutional Reform Bill Session 2003-2004, n111 
113
Clayton, ‘Decision-making in the Supreme Court’, n108, 682 
114
A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, n6, p37 
115
Clayton, ‘Decision-making in the Supreme Court’, n108, 684 
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place of a 5 Justice panel.  This was statistically significant.116 The effects of a 7 Justice panel were 
not so marked, raising the length of the hearing by just under half a day. However, as discussed,117 
the effect on operational efficiency was dependent upon how many of the 7 Justices provided 
concurring opinions. As the 7 Justice panel was the more common deviation from the standard panel 
size this may explain why the increase in larger judicial panels in the Supreme Court did not have a 
marked effect on the overall average length of case. The negligible effect on overall length of case 
may also be owing to the net effect of the increase in composite/collective judgments in the 
Supreme Court.  As seen above, these had, on average, a shorter hearing time than cases where 
multiple judgments were eventually produced.  
Table 50.  Panel Size and Average Length of Case 
Panel Size Mean N Std. Deviation 
3 justices 1.50 2 .707 
5 justices 1.98 208 .892 
7 justices 2.32 22 .894 
9 justices 3.08 13 1.188 
Total 2.06 245 .941 
 
An increased panel size also resulted in a linear increasing relationship in judgment gap, as can be 
seen from Table 51. These results were statistically significant.118 The post hoc Bonferroni test 
revealed a significant difference between panels consisting of 5 and 9 Justices,119 demonstrating 
again, that a significant impact on the efficiency of the court only occurred when a 9 Justice panel 
was convened.  
Table 51. Panel Size and Average Judgment Gap 
Panel Size Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
5 71.70 206 38.655 1 365 2.693 
7 85.59 22 42.769 7 153 9.118 
9 116.85 13 58.284 43 216 16.165 
Total 75.41 241 41.479 1 365 2.672 
 
                                                             
116
This difference was statistically significant (F(3, 241) = 6.86, p < 0.0001). The post hoc analysis revealed that 
the statistical difference was between the 5 and 9 Justice panels (Mean difference = 0.911, p < 0.05, 95%CI 
0.29 to 1.54). 
117See text at n14 
118
F(2, 234) = 8.46, p < 0.0001 
119Mean difference: -47.02, p < 0.05, 95%CI -75.94 to -18.10 
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There was also a linear increasing, statistically significant,120 relationship between panel size and the 
length of judgment produced (see Table 52). The post hoc Bonferroni test again demonstrated that 
the significance lay between 5 and 9 Justice panels.121 This result is supported by Tables 53 and 54, 
which show that the average number of concurring and dissenting opinions increased in a linear, 
statistically significant,122 manner alongside panel size.123 The post hoc Bonferroni tests for 
concurring opinions revealed statistically significant differences between panel sizes of 5 and 9 
justices124 and 7 and 9 justices.125 This result again demonstrates that 7 Justice panels did little to 
upset general efficiency considerations; however, the increase to a 9 Justice panel would do so in a 
significant manner. The average number of dissenting opinions was extremely low for all but the 9 
justice panels and as such no further statistical analysis could be undertaken. Nevertheless, the 
average dissent rate increased when a 9 Justice panel was convened (between 1- 2 per case) from 
when a 7 Justice panel was convened (around 1 in every 2 cases). 
Table 52. Panel Size and Average Length of Judgment 
Panel Size Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
3  12.00 2 1.414 11 13 
5  30.33 208 18.764 4 129 
7  43.05 22 26.180 6 102 
9  67.15 13 35.660 6 126 
Total 33.28 245 22.385 4 129 
 
Table 53. Panel Size and Average Number of Concurring Opinions 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
3 justices 2 .00 .000 
5 justices 208 2.00 1.516 
7 justices 22 2.09 1.925 
9 justices 13 4.77 2.891 
Total 245 2.14 1.762 
 
 
                                                             
120F(3,229) = 15.46, p < 0.0001  
121
Mean difference = 36.82. p < 0.05 
122F(2, 241) = 12.67, p < 0.0001 
123This supports Paterson’s reference to comparative studies, that suggest that concurrences and dissents are 
more common in larger panel sizes. See Paterson, Final Judgment, n1, p116-117 
124
Mean difference = -2.77, p < 0.0001 
125Mean difference = -2.68, p < 0.0001. 
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Table 54. Panel Size and Average Number of Dissenting Opinions 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
3 justices 2 .00 .000 
5 justices 208 .38 .772 
7 justices 22 .55 .912 
9 justices 13 1.46 1.761 
Total 245 .45 .889 
 
Table 55 demonstrates that larger panel sizes did also issue single judgments on occasion. Of all the 
composite/collective styles of single judgment that were issued, 79% were 5 Justice panels, 13% 
were by 7 Justice panels and  5% were by 9 Justice panels. This meant that of all the 7 Justice panel 
decisions, 23% were single judgments and of all the 9 Justice panel decisions, 15% were single 
judgments.  Therefore, whilst the vast majority of composite opinions are issued by 5 Justice panels 
and whilst the majority of 7 and 9 Justice panels will include multi-opinion judgments, it is not 
always the case that convening a 7 or 9 Justice Panel will result in the compromises on 
administrative efficiency outlined above. As the number of larger panels increases alongside the 
number of composite opinions in the Supreme Court, there may be a natural synergy of these two 
practices. This would strengthen the weight behind the decision without necessarily compromising 
on the operational efficiency of the court. 
Table 55. Panel Size and Single Judgments 
 
Panel Size 
Total 
3 
justices 
5 
justices 
7 
justices 
9 
justices 
Was the case a 
single judgment 
case? 
No Count 0 157 17 11 185 
% within 
new_panel 
.0% 75.5% 77.3% 84.6% 75.5% 
Yes-composite or 
collective judgment 
Count 1 31 5 2 39 
% within 
new_panel 
50.0% 14.9% 22.7% 15.4% 15.9% 
Yes- Single 
judgment with others 
only formally 
concurring 
Count 1 20 0 0 21 
% within 
new_panel 
50.0% 9.6% .0% .0% 8.6% 
Total Count 2 208 22 13 245 
% within 
new_panel 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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One of the dangers of convening larger panels is the ability to achieve unanimity among a greater 
number of Justices. The close-call decisions with a 3:2 split and the effect that these decisions have 
on institutional relations with an overruled lower court or a party to the case could be even more 
acute were there to be a 5:4 or 4:3 split and would emphasise even further the close nature of such 
decisions.126 In Final Appeal, Blom-Cooper and Drewry found that a ‘high proportion of cases were 
not unanimous,’127 and when they looked at decision splits they found exactly the same number of 
3:2 dissents as 4:1 dissents.128 The 3:2 split in particular was taken to show how ‘finely balanced’ 
judicial opinion can be, with 11% of cases, arising between 1952-68, having been decided in this 
way.129 Blom-Cooper and Drewry used the number of such finely balanced cases to conclude that in 
such appeals it may be that the composition of the panel could have affected the outcome of the 
appeal and that, despite the administrative and staffing issues, there is a strong argument for the 
court sitting en banc.130 The Supreme Court’s preference to convene enlarged panels of judges, may 
go some way to addressing issues surrounding the composition of the panel, however it has the 
potential to exacerbate close splits even more than previously.  
In the time period, the percentage of 4:1 dissents on at least one issue arising in the case was 12% in 
the Appellate Committee compared to just 9% in the Supreme Court. These percentages were not, 
however, consistent across the sessions with 2007-2008 returning a 9% rate of 4:1 dissents, 2008-
2009 a 16% rate, 2009-2010 an 11% rate and 2010-2011, an 8% rate. Again with 3:2 dissents, the 
percentage of cases having at least one issue arising in the case with this split was 13% in the 
Appellate Committee compared to just 9% in the Supreme Court. This time, the percentages were 
consistent across the sessions with 2007-2008 returning a 13% rate of 3:2 dissents, 2008-2009 a 14% 
rate, 2009-2010 a 9% rate and 2010-2011 an 8% rate. The database returned very similar results for 
the Appellate Committee as in Final Appeal, with almost exactly the same number of 4:1 as 3:2 
dissents and 12-13% of cases being decided in this way, compared to Final Appeal’s 11%. The 
Supreme Court had exactly the same number of 3:2 as 4:1 splits however these were slightly rarer 
than in the Appellate Committee. There were no cases arising in the Appellate Committee during the 
time period that convened a 7 Justice panel.  The Supreme Court, on the other hand, returned a 3% 
rate of at least one issue on the case being decided 6:1, a 2% rate of at least one issue being decided 
                                                             
126
On this point, Clayton highlights that the statistical probability of a 5:4 or 4:3 split is a lot less than that of a 
3:2 split;  ‘Decision-making in the Supreme Court’, n108, 685 
12722.5% of all appeals involved at least one dissent; 24.6% of English Civil Appeals, 20.6% of Scottish Appeals 
and 15.2% for English Appeals; Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17, p184 
128Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17 p186 
129Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17 p403 
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5:2 and a 2% rate of at least one issue being decided 4:3. Although there were 2 decisions in the 
Appellate Committee that convened 9 Justice panels both of these were unanimous on all issues. By 
contrast, in the Supreme Court, 3% of 9 Justice cases had a split of 8:1 on at least one issue, no cases 
recorded a 7:2 split, 3% of cases had a split of 6:3 on at least one issue and 2% of cases had a split of 
5:4.  
Taken as a whole, these small percentages do not reveal that larger panel sizes exacerbated the 
close nature of certain decisions. The narrower margins exist in the Supreme Court however larger 
panels appeared to be as successful as 5 Justice panels at garnering unanimity in the vast majority of 
cases.  This is confirmed in Table 56 below which shows that 13% of 5 justice panels, 16% of 7 Justice 
panels and 8% of 9 Justice panels were divided. 
Table 56. Relationship between Panel Size and Unanimity of Final Appeal Court 
 new_panel 
Total 3 justices 5 justices 7 justices 9 justices 
What the result was in the 
lower court 
Unanimous 1 172 16 11 200 
Divided 0 25 3 1 29 
Total 1 197 19 12 229 
 
Conclusion 
 
Significant differences in the administrative efficiency and the judgment style of each court were 
evident in the transitional period.  The Supreme Court had a significantly longer average judgment 
gap than the Appellate Committee and more frequently opted for a composite/collective style of 
judgment, which, by character, was significantly shorter in length than multi-opinion judgments. The 
Supreme Court also convened a larger judicial panel more regularly than the Appellate Committee.  
9 Justice Panels were found to significantly affect the operational efficiency of the court in a way 
that 7 justice panels did not. These increased panel sizes also led to the emergence of 4:3, 6:3 and 
5:4 splits in the time period which emphasise even more acutely the close nature of certain 
decisions. A slightly higher dissent rate was recorded in the Supreme Court, yet at the same time it 
recorded a smaller percentage of 3:2 and 4:1 splits than the Appellate Committee. Taken together, 
these results appear to suggest that the higher dissent rate in the Supreme Court was partially linked 
to the greater use of larger panels. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
130Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n17 p403 
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Aside from the differences recorded between the Appellate Committee and the Supreme Court, it 
was clear that human rights related appeals could also significantly affect the administrative 
efficiency of the court and judgment style used. In these appeals, the hearing length was found to 
be, on average, half a day longer than in cases involving other subject matters and it increased in a 
positive linear manner, alongside the volume of ECtHR citations. Furthermore, human rights 
judgments were on average 42 pages in length- significantly longer than judgments for other subject 
matters. The length of the judgment was also found to increase in line with the volume of ECtHR 
authorities cited.  By contrast, the judgment gap in human rights appeals was shorter than in appeals 
dealing with other subject matters and reflects the results in Chapter 5, that following precedent 
reduced judgment gap. The results suggest that the involvement of either precedent or the influence 
of ECtHR guidance appeared to aid the reasoning process and thus make the judgment quicker to 
write. Human rights cases also significantly affected the judgment style, with a statistically significant 
higher number of concurring opinions in those cases. Given the relationship between concurring 
opinions and citation levels as well as the statistical relationship between ECtHR citations, academic 
citations and domestic comparative citations, it can also be concluded that human rights judgments 
appeared to draw upon a wide variety of different citations as part of the reasoning process.    
Chapter 5 reveals that human rights cases decreased in the Supreme Court and this may partially 
explain the reduction in concurring opinions in that court, alongside what Paterson and Neuberger 
have revealed, above, is a deliberate policy to curtail concurrences.  There has been a number of 
compelling arguments in favour of concurring opinions, outlined in this chapter, and the quantitative 
data has revealed the contribution they can make in terms of increased citation levels, references to 
academic resources and thus the overall reasoning process. Lord Neuberger, in his call for a 
reduction in concurrences and dissents acknowledged that ‘decisions without reasons are certainly 
not justice; indeed they are scarcely decisions at all’ and conceded that occasionally the ‘benefit of 
judicial clarity is trumped by the need for judicial dialogue.’131  It is perhaps no coincidence that 
concurring opinions were found to be at their highest in the time period in human rights cases and in 
Chapter 5 it is revealed that human rights cases were where lower courts were overruled the least 
and more successful in applying precedent. The relative success of the lower court may be owing to 
the additional reasoning and significantly higher numbers of academic, international, domestic 
comparative and ECtHR citations that concurring opinions were found to provide. 
The significant findings in this chapter have enabled some suggestions to be made to assist in 
improving Supreme Court efficiency and in supporting institutional relations going forward. These 
                                                             
131Neuberger, ‘No judgment-no Justice’, n39, p1 and p11 
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suggestions relate to the practice of providing concurring opinions and of convening larger judicial 
panels. Firstly, there is a need to provide an agreed statement of facts and legal issues to avoid 
repetition and ensure that as far as possible, when concurring opinions are provided, they align by 
addressing themselves to an agreed set of issues.  This would aid clarity and may assist in reducing 
the extra length that concurring opinions were found to add. Secondly, thought should be given to 
whether 1, 2 or 3 concurring opinions would be sufficient to enhance the reasoning of the judgment 
and if so limiting the number of concurrences accordingly. This would address the fact that 4 
concurrences or above significantly affected the efficiency of the court, yet respond to the 
preliminary conclusion that the additional reasoning provided by concurring opinions appeared to 
support lower court reading of precedent. Thirdly, thought should be given to whether a 7 Justice 
panel would be sufficient to hear the issues in a case, as these panels had a significantly lesser 
impact on the administrative efficiency of the court than convening a 9 Justice panel.  By adopting 
these suggestions, the court will retain the clear authoritative benefits of convening larger panels 
and the contribution to precedent that concurring opinions can add, whilst limiting the adverse 
effects on the administrative efficiency of the court. 
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Chapter 4; Relationship with the Branches of State 
 
This chapter examines the institutional relationship that the final appeal court had with the 
executive and parliamentary branches of state in the time period. These relationships have an 
obviously political as well as legal dimension and differ in character from the relationship with the 
legal institutions reviewed in Chapters 5 and 6.  The introduction outlined the theoretical 
constitutional infrastructure that describes the final appeal court’s relationship with the other 
branches of state and the scope for the each power dynamic to be realigned. With Parliament this 
was seen in the possibility that the final appeal court may, in a sense, share sovereignty through the 
interpretation and enforcement of statutes and through the rising import of alternative 
constitutional principles that to some extent challenge sovereign power.1 As regards the executive, 
this realignment was seen in the expansion of judicial review and the increasing justiciability of 
otherwise political issues in order to protect fundamental rights. Indeed, it was in the context of 
these latter areas that the judges predicted a more assertive court may begin to emerge.   
The constitutional relationship between the executive and the judiciary is notoriously delicate.  Lord 
Phillips regards the maintenance of ‘a proper balance between executive and judicial decision-
making’ as ‘perhaps the most important and most difficult role of the Supreme Court.’2 The judges 
have to be particularly sensitive to the limits of their role, otherwise it could lead to Parliament 
curtailing powers of judicial review and reducing the constitutional role for the judiciary in the 
future.3 The core of that role is to police the limits of the executive’s constitutional functions and 
therefore a degree of tension in the judicial-executive relationship is to some extent ‘entirely 
proper’4 and ‘the best guarantee the subject can have against the abuse of power.’5  The extent of 
the tension will largely depend upon the context of the interaction, with threats to national security 
notoriously pushing each branch of state to the extremities of their legitimate constitutional role: 
                                                             
1See Knight and Allan’s arguments; text at Chapter 1, n66 
2
Lord Phillips, ‘Judicial Independence & Accountability: A View from the Supreme Court’, (UCL Constitution 
Unit Lecture, 8 February 2011), p15 and p20 http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_110208.pdf> 
accessed 25 February 2016 
3Lord Phillips, ‘Judicial Independence and Accountability’, n2, p15  
4
Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ (2007) CLJ 67, 79 
5J Steyn, ‘The Weakest and least dangerous Department of Government’ [1997] PL 84, 93 
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governments understandably go to the very limit of what they believe to be their lawful 
powers to protect the public, and the duty of the judges to require that they go no further 
must be performed if the rule of law is to be observed.6 
The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution felt that severing the link between senior 
members of the judiciary and the executive under the CRA could exacerbate rather than relieve the 
strain between the two branches; 
… it would not be unreasonable to expect that such profound structural changes, with the 
judiciary assuming a more distinct identity, would lead to increased tensions between these 
two branches of state.7   
This chapter reviews the empirical and observational data collated to comment on the nature and 
characteristics of the relationship between the executive and the judiciary in the time period. The 
quantitative data on the number of cases that involved the executive together with the success rate 
of the executive in each of the courts opens the chapter to establish the basics of the interaction 
during the time period. The empirical data revealed that judicial-executive relations were often 
three-dimensional owing to the influence of ECtHR. This three-dimensional context formed a 
framework to review the observational data to reveal the impact of the jurisprudence of ECtHR on 
judicial-executive relations in the Convention context before reviewing the extent to which the 
incorporation on the Convention also appeared to affect the orthodox judicial-executive relationship 
in the time period. The section closes with an examination of the extent to which the influence of 
the Convention appeared to also influence the character of judicial-executive relations. 
The parliamentary section begins with a review of the strength of institutional communication in the 
time period, to discern whether weaknesses in statutory language resulted in a more constructive 
role for the court and the use of wider interpretative techniques. Judicial interpretative techniques 
vary in their level of respect for the principal text and their use feeds into the wider debate on 
shared sovereignty. The chapter then moves away from the specifics of language and examines 
institutional deference levels, both in terms of the subservience of the common law to statutory law 
and the respect for the law reforming role and position of Parliament.  The effect that a threat to the 
rule of law or fundamental rights had on orthodox levels of deference was also reviewed to gauge 
whether the rule of law did in fact appear to be the ‘ultimate controlling factor’ in the constitution in 
                                                             
6Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’, n4, 79 
7
House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Relations between the Executive, the Judiciary and 
Parliament (HL 151), July 2007, para 31 
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the time period.8  Finally, the section concludes with a review of how the influence of the 
Convention appeared to affect this institutional relationship in the time period.  
The review of the court’s institutional relations with Parliament uses the observational data collated, 
as the quantitative study was not specifically directed at judicial-parliamentary relations. The review 
of institutional relations with the executive uses a mixture of observational and quantitative data. 
The cases were recorded in the observational database for the insight that either the case itself or 
the judges provided to the institutional relational theme. Occasionally, the analysis was based on a 
relatively low number of cases and as such it was difficult to draw any definitive conclusions.  In Final 
Appeal, it was warned that: 
One or two juristic swallows hardly make a public law summer. Although, when the swallow 
flies at such an exhalted height, it attracts attention beyond the intrinsic fact of flight not 
only in the lower courts but also among those professionally concerned with public 
administration.9 
The observational data provided some indication of the institutional relationship with Parliament 
during the transitional period, including the influence of the Convention and thus was worthy of 
inclusion alongside the empirical analysis for a more complete picture of institutional relations in the 
time period. 
Relationship with the Executive 
Quantitative Data 
Executive Involvement and Executive Success 2007-2011 
 
Executive involvement in appeals by court and session are displayed in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
The overall percentage of cases involving the executive between the Appellate Committee and the 
Supreme Court remained stable at around 31.5%. Nevertheless, there was some fluctuation 
between sessions. In the final session of the Appellate Committee, the percentage of cases involving 
the executive fell by 50%. The figures remained at that level in the first session of the Supreme Court 
before recovering in the Supreme Court’s second session. Thus, in the immediate transfer from the 
Appellate Committee to the Supreme Court, less than 20% of appeals involved the core executive. 
The fluctuation between sessions is reflective of the varied caseload in any given year. Nevertheless, 
                                                             
8Jackson v HM Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 [107] (per Lord Hope). 
9
L Blom-Cooper and G Drewry, Final Appeal: A Study of the House of Lords in its Judicial Capacity (Clarendon 
Press, 1972,  p267 
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the fact that just under a third of both Appellate Committee and Supreme Court cases that arose in 
the time period involved the executive, allowed for a relatively equal comparison to be made 
between courts. 
Table 1. Executive Involvement by Court 
 House of Lords or Supreme Court 
Total House of Lords Supreme Court 
Exec_Involvement No involvement Count 87 76 163 
% within 
Exec_Invol
vement 
53.4% 46.6% 100.0% 
% within 
House of 
Lords or 
Supreme 
Court 
68.5% 68.5% 68.5% 
% of Total 36.6% 31.9% 68.5% 
Involvement Count 40 35 75 
% within 
Exec_Invol
vement 
53.3% 46.7% 100.0% 
% within 
House of 
Lords or 
Supreme 
Court 
31.5% 31.5% 31.5% 
% of Total 16.8% 14.7% 31.5% 
Total Count 127 111 238 
% within 
Exec_Invol
vement 
53.4% 46.6% 100.0% 
% within 
House of 
Lords or 
Supreme 
Court 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 53.4% 46.6% 100.0% 
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Table 2. Executive Involvement by Session 
 
 
Session the case was heard in  
Total 
HL 
2007-
2008 
HL 
2008-
2009 
SC 
2009-
2010 
SC 
2010-
2011 
Exec_Involvement No involvement Count 51 36 40 36 163 
% within 
Exec_Invol
vement 
31.3% 22.1% 24.5% 22.1% 100.0% 
% within 
Session 
the case 
was heard 
in  
65.4% 73.5% 74.1% 63.2% 68.5% 
% of Total 21.4% 15.1% 16.8% 15.1% 68.5% 
Involvement Count 27 13 14 21 75 
% within 
Exec_Invol
vement 
36.0% 17.3% 18.7% 28.0% 100.0% 
% within 
Session 
the case 
was heard 
in  
34.6% 26.5% 25.9% 36.8% 31.5% 
% of Total 11.3% 5.5% 5.9% 8.8% 31.5% 
Total Count 78 49 54 57 238 
% within 
Exec_Invol
vement 
32.8% 20.6% 22.7% 23.9% 100.0% 
% within 
Session 
the case 
was heard 
in  
100.0% 100.0
% 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 32.8% 20.6% 22.7% 23.9% 100.0% 
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Table 3. Executive Success by Court 
 
 
 
Total 
House of 
Lords 
Supreme 
Court 
Whether the case 
involved a finding 
against the executive 
Not Applicable Count 87 76 163 
% within Whether the 
case involved a finding 
against the executive 
53.4% 46.6% 100.0% 
% within House of Lords 
or Supreme Court 
68.5% 68.5% 68.5% 
Yes Count 16 21 37 
% within Whether the 
case involved a finding 
against the executive 
43.2% 56.8% 100.0% 
% within House of Lords 
or Supreme Court 
12.6% 18.9% 15.5% 
No Count 24 14 38 
% within Whether the 
case involved a finding 
against the executive 
63.2% 36.8% 100.0% 
% within House of Lords 
or Supreme Court 
18.9% 12.6% 16.0% 
Total Count 127 111 238 
% within Whether the 
case involved a finding 
against the executive 
53.4% 46.6% 100.0% 
% within House of Lords 
or Supreme Court 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The empirical data collected demonstrates that across the 4 years there were an almost equal 
number of findings for the executive compared to findings against (37 and 38 cases respectively).  
Taking cases that involved the executive, 60% were successful in the Appellate Committee whereas 
only 40% were successful in the Supreme Court.10 The lower success rate in the Supreme Court goes 
                                                             
10Paterson also found a drop in the success rate of central government from 57% in the Appellate Committee 
between 2006-2009 to 54% in the early years of the Supreme Court; Final Judgment, The Last Law Lords and 
The Supreme Court (Hart Publishing, 2013), p289. The differences between the statistics are likely to lie in 
Paterson’s slightly different time period and what was coded as ‘core Executive.’  For instance, the Crown in 
criminal appeals was not counted as core executive for the purposes of this study. 
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against Lord Bingham’s previous observation that the executive, ‘… is usually successful, but not 
invariably so.’11 It also counters quantitative research that found central government to be a high 
status repeat litigator that could draw upon extensive resources and was more likely to succeed in 
appeals.12 Instead, the results appear to lend support to the suspicion that a newly independent 
Supreme Court may feel more able to challenge the policies of the executive than the Appellate 
Committee. Given the small time frame, these statistics have to be treated with a degree of caution. 
A larger study, capable of rising above annual fluctuations in caseload, would be needed before the 
Supreme Court could conclusively be regarded as more assertive in its approach towards the 
executive.   
It should also be noted that a successful result for the executive did not necessarily mean that there 
was less ‘tension’ between the judiciary and the executive as the quantitative data was not sensitive 
enough to measure this. In Odelola v Secretary of State for the Home Department,13 for instance, the 
executive was empirically successful after it was found that decisions authorising leave to enter or to 
remain had to be made in accordance with the rules in force at the time of the decision rather than 
at the time of the application. Nevertheless, the Law Lords still advised the Government on aspects 
of the scheme which they did not think were fair or proportionate, such as the level of fees that had 
been paid by the applicant given the rule change and the fact that the applicant’s request was bound 
to fail.14 Thus executive policy could still be challenged in cases that ultimately upheld the executive. 
Administrative Efficiency and Executive Involvement 
 
Executive involvement had little effect on the time it took to hear an appeal in the time period.  
Table 4 demonstrates that cases that involved the executive only had a slightly longer hearing time 
than cases that did not and this was not significant.15 Table 5 also demonstrates that there was next 
to no difference in length of hearing depending on the success of the executive.  
Table 4. Executive Involvement and Average Length of Case  
Exec_Involvement Mean N Std. Deviation 
No involvement 1.99 163 .816 
Involvement 2.16 75 1.103 
Total 2.04 238 .918 
 
                                                             
11Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’, n6, 78 
12C Hanretty, ‘Have and Have-nots before the Law Lords’ (2014) 62(3) Pol.Stud 686, 689 and 695. 
13[2009] UKHL 25 
14
Odelola, n13 [2] (per Lord Hope), [10] (per Lord Scott) and [40] (per Lord Brown) respectively. 
15t(236) = 1.35, p = 0.18 
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Table 5. Executive Success and Average Length of Case  
Exec_Finding Mean N Std. Deviation 
Yes 2.14 37 .976 
No 2.18 38 1.227 
Total 2.16 75 1.103 
 
Table 6 demonstrates that those cases involving the executive took, on average, slightly longer than 
those not involving the executive to produce a judgment, however this was not statistically 
significant.16 Table 7 also demonstrates that where there was a finding against the executive, this 
increased the average judgment gap further still, but again this was not statistically significant.17 The 
lack of significance may be attributable to the high standard deviation figure for ‘executive 
involvement’, which was more than twice the level of the mean for ‘findings against the executive’. 
This suggests that there was a lot of variability in the length of the judgment gap for individual 
appeals and a study covering a larger time period would be required to confirm whether executive 
involvement and findings against the executive did genuinely extend the length of time it took to 
hand down judgment. 
Table 6. Executive Involvement and Average Judgment Gap 
Exec_Involvement Mean N Std. Deviation 
No involvement 80.40 162 82.314 
Involvement 92.45 75 149.518 
Total 84.21 237 107.999 
 
Table 7. Executive Success and Average Judgment Gap 
Exec_Finding Mean N Std. Deviation 
Yes 111.57 37 209.800 
No 73.84 38 34.115 
Total 92.45 75 149.518 
 
The average length of judgment was only 2 pages longer when the executive was involved (see Table 
8) and there was next to no difference in judgment length depending on whether the executive was 
successful or not (See Table 9). Nevertheless, chapter 3 demonstrated that 7 of the 11 outlier 
appeals, that had a judgment length of 83 pages or more, involved government departments or 
                                                             
16
t(236)=0.8, p=0.43 
17t(74) = 1.09, p = 0.28 
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ministers.18 4 of these outliers involved consideration of the Convention and 2 had among the 
highest number of Strasbourg citations recorded in the time period.19 As such, the average length of 
case involving the executive was on a par with those not involving the executive, however 
occasionally an appeal arose that involved a particularly potent combination of issues and had the 
capacity to grossly inflate the number of pages in the judgment.  
Table 8. Executive Involvement and Average Length of Judgment  
Exec. Involvement Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
No involvement 31.84 163 19.998 4 129 
Involvement 33.27 75 21.254 6 125 
Total 32.29 238 20.368 4 129 
 
 
Table 9. Executive Success and Average Length of Judgment 
 
Exec_Finding Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Yes 32.95 37 21.828 7 125 
No 33.58 38 20.969 6 92 
Total 33.27 75 21.254 6 125 
 
Overall, executive involvement only had a mild impact on final appeal court efficiency and none of 
the increases recorded in the time period were statistically significant.  There was a 6% increase in 
findings against the executive in the Supreme Court as compared to the Appellate Committee, 
however the statistics suggest that the only effect this would have, from a efficiency perspective, is a 
slight increase in the time it takes to hand down judgment. Any increase in the number of executive-
related appeals in the future would, based on the results in this study, appear to have a negligible 
impact upon the Supreme Court’s overall efficiency unless those appeals also involved a Convention 
matter. The involvement of Strasbourg jurisprudence had the capacity, in the time period, to affect 
the administrative efficiency of the court, as established more generally in Chapter 5 and as evinced 
by the length of the ‘outlier’ judgments involving the executive in this chapter.  Indeed, the large 
                                                             
18HM Treasury v Mohammed Jaber Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2; R (on the app of Adams) v S of S for Justice; App by 
Eamonn MacDermott for Judicial Review (NI) [2011] UKSC 18; R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61; R (on the application of Smith) v Secretary of 
State for Defence [2010] UKSC 29; RB(Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10; 
Total Network SL v HMRC [2008] UKHL 19; Walumba Lumba 1 and 2 and Kadian Mighty v Secretary of the State 
for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12 
19R (Smith), n18 cited 49 different Strasbourg authorities and RB (Algeria), n18 cited 25 Strasbourg authorities. 
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amount of overlap in cases that reviewed executive decision-making and Convention matters meant 
that judicial-executive relations often had a three- dimensional perspective in the time period. 
Judgment Style and Executive Involvement 
 
The quantitative data explored the extent to which involvement of the executive influenced the 
judgment style, outlined in Chapter 3. For instance, it was slightly harder to return a unanimous 
verdict where the executive was involved in both the lower courts and the final appeal court. Table 
10 demonstrates that, in the lower courts, just under 81% of cases involving the executive returned 
a unanimous decision, which is slightly less than the 90% unanimity rate in non-executive cases. 
Findings against the executive were 86% unanimous and only 76% unanimous when the executive 
was upheld. The lower court therefore tended to be slightly stronger in its convictions when going 
against the executive than in decisions to uphold the executive. This may suggest a stronger push to 
achieve unanimity in controversial findings against the executive. Table 11 compares these results 
with the unanimity rate in the final appeal court in decisions involving the executive. In executive 
cases, the final appeal court was only unanimous on 68% of occasions compared to a 77% unanimity 
rate in non-executive cases. In those cases that found against the executive, the unanimity rate was 
65% and in those cases that upheld the executive, the unanimity rate was 71%. These results 
confirm that cases involving the executive were harder to return a unanimous verdict, however the 
final appeal court differed from the lower court in that it was more likely to be unanimous in cases 
that upheld the executive than those that found against the executive. The difficulty in garnering 
unanimity in such appeals may do little to relieve the apparent ‘tension’ that exists between the two 
branches. In particular, it is perhaps desirable that a strong unanimous judicial panel executes a 
finding against the executive. 
Table 10. Executive Involvement and Unanimity of Final Appeal Court 
 
What the result was in the lower 
court 
Total Unanimous Divided 
Exec_Involvement No involvement 138 15 153 
Involvement 59 14 73 
Total 197 29 226 
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Table 11. Executive Success and Unanimity of Final Appeal Court 
 
Whether the case involved a finding against the 
executive 
Total Not Applicable Yes No 
SCHL_Unanimity SC/HL Divided 36 13 11 60 
SC/HL Unanimous 127 24 27 178 
Total 163 37 38 238 
 
One way to ensure a clear unanimous judgment in cases that involve the executive would be to issue 
a single judgment. Table 12 demonstrates that 21% of all single judgments issued involved the 
executive but only 16% of all decisions that involved the executive were single judgments. As such, it 
was still relatively rare for single judgments to be used in preference to multi-opinion judgments in 
executive cases. The statistics reveal a general trend towards increasing the volume of single 
judgments that are issued by the Supreme Court compared to the Appellate Committee and as cases 
involving the executive make up just over a fifth of all single judgments, it could be that as one 
increases the other will organically increase alongside it.   
Table 12. Executive Success and Single Judgments (dichotomised) 
 
Whether the case involved a finding against the 
executive 
Total Not Applicable Yes No 
SINGLE No 118 32 31 181 
Yes 45 5 7 57 
Total 163 37 38 238 
 
The statistics on concurring and dissenting opinions in cases involving the executive, however, 
suggest that it would take a significant change in mind-set for the Justices to move towards more 
single judgments in such cases. These cases tended to have higher numbers of both dissenting and 
concurring opinions, with the highest average for each being in cases that found against the 
executive (see Table 13). These results were not statistically significant20 however tend to suggest 
that the Justices regarded it as important to provide their own individual opinion in such cases, 
especially in cases that found against the executive.  
 
                                                             
20F(2,235) = 1.22, p = 0.30, and F(2,235) = 0.86, p = 0.43, respectively. 
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Table 13. Executive Success and Average Number of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
Whether the case involved a 
finding against the executive 
No of 
concurring 
opinions 
provided in the 
case 
No of dissenting 
opinions 
provided in the 
case 
Not Applicable Mean 1.99 .39 
N 163 163 
Std. Deviation 1.642 .835 
Yes Mean 2.41 .59 
N 37 37 
Std. Deviation 1.950 1.040 
No Mean 2.32 .47 
N 38 38 
Std. Deviation 1.694 .830 
Total Mean 2.11 .44 
N 238 238 
Std. Deviation 1.703 .868 
 
Another method of adding weight and authority to decisions involving the executive would be to 
increase the panel size that hears such cases. In cases that involved the executive, Table 14 
demonstrates that 80% were heard by 5 Justice panels, 12% were heard by 7 Justice panels and 7% 
were heard by 9 Justice panels. That compares to cases not involving the executive where 88% were 
5 justice panels, 7% were 7 Justice panels and 4% were 9 Justice panels. These figures suggest that 
although the vast majority of cases that involved the executive were still heard by 5 Justice panels, 
there was a modestly increased tendency, in such cases, to convene either a 7 or 9 justice panel. An 
increased panel size, in such cases, could be justified on the basis of the public importance of the 
issues at hand. Out of the 9 cases that involved the executive and convened a 7 Justice panel, 6 cases 
(67%) found against the executive and 3 (33%) upheld the executive. Out of the 5 cases that involved 
the executive and convened a 9 Justice panel, 3 cases (60%) found against the executive and 2 cases 
(40%) upheld the executive. These figures suggest that larger panel sizes had an increased tendency 
to find against the executive and may be one of the reasons that there was a slightly higher rate of 
findings against the executive in the Supreme Court.  
Larger panel sizes can bring extra weight to the decision, especially if the panel is unanimous in its 
view. Nevertheless, the statistics reveal that larger panels were often divided. Of the 9 occasions 
involving the executive where a 7 Justice panel was convened, there was division on 3 occasions and 
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in all 3, the finding was against the executive. Of the 5 occasions when a 9 Justice panel was 
convened, there was again division on 3 occasions, twice when the finding was against the executive 
and once where the finding was for the executive.  As seen in chapter 3, division across a larger 
panel is perhaps even more dissatisfying to the litigant than in a standard 5 justice panel and this 
appeared to happen more often in findings against the executive. An increased use of larger panels 
in cases that involve the executive- which then divide in cases that find against the executive- could 
add another dimension to existing judicial-executive tensions. 
Table 14. Executive Involvement and Panel Size 
 
new_panel 
Total 
3 
justices 
5 
justices 
7 
justices 
9 
justices 
Exec_Involvement No involvement Count 1 144 12 6 163 
% within 
Exec_Involve
ment 
.6% 88.3% 7.4% 3.7% 100.0% 
% within 
new_panel 
50.0% 70.9% 57.1% 54.5% 68.8% 
% of Total .4% 60.8% 5.1% 2.5% 68.8% 
Involvement Count 1 59 9 5 74 
% within 
Exec_Involve
ment 
1.4% 79.7% 12.2% 6.8% 100.0% 
% within 
new_panel 
50.0% 29.1% 42.9% 45.5% 31.2% 
% of Total .4% 24.9% 3.8% 2.1% 31.2% 
Total Count 2 203 21 11 237 
% within 
Exec_Involve
ment 
.8% 85.7% 8.9% 4.6% 100.0% 
% within 
new_panel 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total .8% 85.7% 8.9% 4.6% 100.0% 
 
Three Dimensional Institutional Relationship 
 
The institutional relational dynamic between the judiciary and the executive has to accommodate a 
third institution whenever a Convention article is engaged. Within the Convention context, the 
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impact of the institutional influence of the ECtHR on this relationship was especially evident in the 
time period in the decision-making balance struck between the judiciary and the executive, 
particularly where A5 and A6 of the Convention were engaged and secondly in the proportionality-
based review of executive decision-making, particularly where A8 of the Convention was engaged.  
Before looking in more detail at the interactions between the three institutions, the chapter reviews 
the quantitative data to contextualise the frequency that the ‘three-way institutional dynamic’ arose 
in the time period, whether the ECtHR line was followed in such cases and whether the executive 
was more likely to be overruled in this context.  In other words, it assesses the extent to which 
executive policy was challenged by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
Quantitative Data; the Final Appeal Court, the Executive and the ECtHR 
 
Table 15. Executive Involvement and Following the Strasbourg Line  
 Executive involvement 
Total No Yes 
Does the case follow 
Strasbourg line of authority? 
Not applicable 124 42 166 
Yes 31 27 58 
No 2 1 3 
Justices unsure of what 
Strasbourg line is 
6 5 11 
Total 163 75 238 
 
Table 15 demonstrates that of all the cases where the executive was a party, 44% related to a 
Convention matter. Thus whereas it was more common for the executive to be party to a case that 
did not involve the Convention, there was a substantial amount of overlap between cases that 
involved the executive and a Convention matter.  In such cases the institutional relational dynamic 
was three-dimensional involving the court, the executive and also the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
Table 15 demonstrates that of the 44% of cases involving the executive and a Convention matter, 
82% of cases followed the Strasbourg line of authority, in 15% of cases the ECtHR line was unclear, 
and 3% of cases rejected the ECtHR line. The Appellate Committee has shown itself to be virtually 
bound to follow a decision of the Grand Chamber21 and only three cases rejected the ECtHR line in 
                                                             
21Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28 
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the time period, one of which involved the executive.22 The final appeal court was therefore no more 
likely to reject the ECtHR line of authority when the executive was involved in the case. The statistics 
confirm that the final appeal court takes very seriously the need to follow clear and constant ECtHR 
authority and in the vast majority of cases it will be logical for it to do so, unless there are special 
reasons that suggest otherwise.23  This point is returned to in Chapter 6 below.  
Where the ECtHR jurisprudence was not clear and constant, there was a very real prospect that the 
ECtHR could disagree with the court’s decision. These cases were at the start of the dialogue process 
and it may well be some time before the final resolution of the issue at hand. Table 15 reveals that 
just less than 50% of cases where the Justices were unsure of the ECtHR line involved the executive.  
Given the extent of the three-way institutional dynamic, relations between the executive and the 
final appeal court depend upon the relationship between the final appeal court and the ECtHR 
operating smoothly and for cases where the ECtHR line of authority is unclear to be minimised. A 
degree of uncertainty will always be present, given the generic nature of the ECtHR’s 
pronouncements on the requirements of the Convention, the need to proportionately assess the 
extent of the rights interference and owing to the margin of appreciation that is afforded to states in 
striking that balance.24 Furthermore, the ECtHR is not bound by its own decisions and can always 
depart from a previous expressed line of reasoning. The absence of the need for Strasbourg to 
rationalise its decisions with the past occasionally caused the court difficulty in trying to reconcile 
two different strands of ECtHR jurisprudence.25 The degree of flexibility built into ECtHR 
jurisprudence has many benefits however it can also result in some uncertainty over the correct 
approach, which- given the three-dimensional institutional relationship- could adversely affect 
judicial-executive relations. 
 
 
 
                                                             
22R (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport 
[2008] UKHL 15. Animal Defenders was coded as ‘not following Strasbourg jurisprudence.’ The Appellate 
Committee did not suggest that Strasbourg would find the UK in breach; however, the court appeared to 
distinguish VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland (24699/94) (2002) 34 EHRR 4, which had very similar 
facts, on narrow grounds. Animal Defenders sat closer to VGT (where a breach was found) than Murphy v 
Ireland (44179/98) (2004) 38 EHRR 13 which involved religious speech and no breach was found. Furthermore, 
a s19(1)(b) HRA 1998 declaration had been made by the minister introducing the Communications Act 2003, 
demonstrating that the executive was also not certain as to the statute’s compatibility with the Convention. 
23This was the approach advocated by Lord Bingham in R v Special Adjudicator ex p Ullah [2004] 2 AC 323 [20] 
24Handyside v UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737 [48 -49] 
25
See R (on the application of Wellington) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 72 and R 
v Briggs-Price [2009] UKHL 19 by way of example. 
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Table 16. Executive Success and Following the Strasbourg Line 
 
Whether the case involved a finding 
against the executive 
Total Not Applicable Yes No 
Does the case follow 
Strasbourg line of authority? 
Not applicable 124 23 19 166 
Yes 31 12 15 58 
No 2 0 1 3 
Justices unsure of what 
Strasbourg line is 
6 2 3 11 
Total 163 37 38 238 
 
Table 16 refines the results of Table 15 to establish whether the cases that followed or declined to 
follow ECtHR authority tended to more commonly find for or against the executive. The Animal 
Defenders case26 rejected the ECtHR line and in doing so upheld the executive.  Nevertheless, the 
judicial dicta in that case revealed that the result was actually owing to a strong statement of 
parliamentary supremacy in balancing democratic values rather than executive supremacy and 
reinforced the fact that the supreme institutional power, even in the Convention context, was still 
Parliament. As such, the case is discussed in more detail below when assessing the influence of the 
Convention on the institutional relationship with Parliament. 
In the cases where the Justices were unsure of the ECtHR line of authority, there were an almost 
equal number of cases that found for as found against the executive. As such, it cannot be said with 
any certainty, based on the small numbers of cases involved, that the final appeal court interprets 
conflicting or unclear ECtHR authorities so as to either defeat or uphold the executive. Again, in 
cases where the ECtHR line was followed, there was a marginally higher rate of upholding the 
executive (55%) compared to a finding against the executive (45%). This was the opposite way 
around when the Convention was not involved, where there was a marginally higher rate of finding 
against the executive (55%) compared to finding for the executive (45%).  As numerically, these 
percentages are only based on a difference of three or four cases, it is not enough to draw any firm 
conclusions. Nevertheless, the results from the time period appear to call into question the 
accusation that ECtHR jurisprudence more often than not interferes with executive or state policy. 
Instead, the court followed the clear jurisprudence of the ECtHR in the vast majority of cases and 
executive- or state- policy appeared to adhere to the requirements of the Convention, or rather how 
the final appeal court interpreted the requirements of the Convention, in the majority of cases.   
                                                             
26Animal Defenders, n22 
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To summarise, in the time period, a minority of cases (44%) were found to involve the executive and 
a Convention related matter. 82% of those cases followed the Strasbourg line of authority and 
majority of those cases (55%) upheld the executive line. Should the proportion of Convention 
decisions rise, even marginally, in the coming years it may be that a majority of executive decisions 
are decided on the basis of Strasbourg jurisprudence. This may serve to reinforce claims that 
domestic sovereignty is regularly being challenged by the ECtHR and that Parliament should have the 
final authority over whether a decision of the ECtHR is adopted (see also Chapter 5).27 Nevertheless, 
the time period demonstrated that the influence of Strasbourg had a positive effect on the success 
of the executive in the majority of cases and this should not be overshadowed by the well-publicised 
instances where the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has required Parliament or the executive to rethink 
matters.28   
The decision-making balance under the Convention 
 
The three dimensional institutional relationship, the loyalty of the court to ECtHR jurisprudence and 
the relative success of the executive in the Convention context was all evident in the time period 
when it came to determining the institutional decision-making balance and the decision-making 
procedures required by the Convention.  
Executive success was in part owing to the judicial ability to isolate deficiencies in executive decision-
making or procedure domestically from the minimum standards of decision-making required by the 
Convention. This was evident in the context of A5 ECHR which prescribes the appropriate state 
institution to make a decision affecting an individual’s liberty.  A5(4) epitomises the decision-making 
balance that is to be struck between executive and the court; 
Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court 
and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
A5(4) was raised in R (on the application of Black) v Secretary of State for Justice,29 where the Law 
Lords were presented with an issue of justiciability over prisoner release dates and had to determine 
where the proper division of power lay between the courts and the executive. The Law Lords (Lord 
                                                             
27See ‘Tories plan to withdraw the UK from the European Convention on Human Rights’, The Guardian, 3rd 
October 2014 <www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/03/tories-plan-uk-withdrawal-european-convention-
on-human-rights> last accessed 26th October 2015 
28See Hirst v UK (No 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41, in relation to prisoner voting rights and R (on the application of F) 
and Thompson v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17 in relation to the incompatibility 
of notification requirements following a sexual offender’s release from prison. 
29[2009] UKHL 1 
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Phillips dissenting) upheld the executive argument that once a prisoner’s parole eligibility date had 
passed in a determinate sentence, A5(4) ECHR did not require a court hearing to determine the 
lawfulness of the continued detention. ECtHR jurisprudence indicated that the requirements of 
A5(4) were satisfied for determinate sentences when the initial court imposed the sentence and that 
early release was an administrative action that could be carried out by the executive. Although, a 
declaration of incompatibility was avoided, it did not prevent the Law Lords from criticising the 
executive’s role domestically. Lord Rodger found,  
it hard to understand why [the Secretary of State] should wish to cling tenaciously to this 
last vestige of his power to determine when prisoners should be released, since she accepts 
that there can be no legitimate political input into the decision.30 
Lord Carswell also suggested that the executive review the power given that, ‘there appears to be no 
good reason for its retention … ’.31 Therefore, although the executive’s sentencing powers fulfilled 
the institutional decision-making requirements of ECtHR and the executive was successful, that 
success was still accompanied by the Law Lords’ suggesting a change to the institutional decision-
making process.  
Another A5(4) challenge, this time relating to indeterminate sentences, came in Secretary of State 
for Justice v James.32 Again, Lord Hope found no immediate breach of A5(4) where a parole board 
had been denied the information it needed to review the continued detention of a prisoner and 
their safety for release. The continued detention of the prisoner would only violate A5(4) to the 
extent that ‘the system breaks down entirely’ i.e. ‘the Parole Board is denied the information that it 
needs for such a long period that continued detention has become arbitrary’.33 Again, a distinction 
was made in the case between the Secretary of State being in clear breach of their domestic public 
law duty and the continued detention of prisoners being unlawful under A5(4) ECHR. Lord Brown 
had sympathy with the appellant’s argument but read A5(4) as merely a procedural requirement to 
decide matters quickly rather than requiring any substantive guarantees in terms of provision of the 
material required to make the decision.34 This was in accordance with the current institutional 
guidance of the ECtHR35 and although a wider reading of A5(4) could occur in the future, this was 
regarded as a matter for the ECtHR and not the domestic court.36 The case demonstrated that 
                                                             
30Black, n29 [50] 
31
Black, n29 [58] 
32[2009] UKHL 22 
33James, n32 [21] 
34James, n32 [59] 
35
As approved by R v Special Adjudicator ex p Ullah [2004] 2 AC 323 
36James, n32 [62] 
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domestic issues, such as a failing in public law duty, were a separate consideration to whether the 
executive had satisfied the institutional decision-making requirements of the Convention. 
Furthermore, the final appeal court was only prepared to hold the executive to the decision-making 
standard advocated in the ECtHR jurisprudence at that time and no more.37  
Despite the court only following the minimum standards imposed by clear and constant ECtHR 
jurisprudence, the court was faithful to the requirements of the HRA and the understanding that it 
required the court to vindicate Convention rights in domestic law.  Executive success or otherwise 
would follow from that constitutional role. This was evident in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AF.38 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (‘PTA’) control order regime was a 
legislative response to the Belmarsh39 decision that declared s23 of the Antiterrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 to be incompatible with A5 and A14 ECHR.  The Law Lords were therefore aware of 
the ‘acute tension’ in AF caused by the Convention challenge to the PTA control order regime.40  The 
9 judge panel found against the executive, ruling that under A6 ECHR an individual subject to a non-
derogating control order needed to be informed sufficiently of the allegations against them, in open 
material, so that they could respond to those allegations. The court felt bound to follow the Grand 
Chamber decision of A v UK.41 Lord Hoffmann’s position confirmed that the ‘clear and constant’ 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR- particularly a Grand Chamber decision- would be compelling in 
informing the court of how to vindicate Convention rights in domestic law. He believed A to have 
been wrongly decided and expressed his ‘considerable regret’ at having to follow it, given that the 
UK control order regime would likely be ‘destroyed’.42 Therefore, although James indicated that the 
court would not go beyond the minimum requirements of the Convention in prescribing executive 
decision-making, AF demonstrated that the court would also not go below the clear requirements of 
the Convention. 
The Supreme Court appeared to lighten the obligation on the executive in closed material 
proceedings by curtailing the obligation in AF to its specific context in Home Office v Tariq.43 By a 
majority of 8-1, the court found for the executive and distinguished the situation where closed 
material was used in answer to a civil claim for discrimination to that in AF where an individual’s 
                                                             
37The ‘mirroring’ of Convention requirements rather than using the HRA to establish a domestic human rights 
jurisprudence that can go further than the Convention has been criticised. See J Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling 
on Human Rights’ [2007] PL 720 
38
AF, n21 
39A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 
40AF, n21 [77] (per Lord Hope) 
41[2009] 49 EHRR 29 
42
AF, n21 [70] 
43[2011] UKSC 35 
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liberty is at risk by some kind of detention. Nevertheless, this outcome followed a line of cases from 
the ECtHR, the most recent being Kennedy v UK.44 It cannot, therefore, be concluded that the strong 
line taken by the Appellate Committee in AF was weakened by the line taken by the Supreme Court 
in Tariq as in both instances the judges were faithfully following the requirements of the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence. Again, the procedural decision-making process was effectively determined by the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence and the finding for or against the executive followed from this. 
These select cases support the empirical data that the court would follow the ECtHR in nearly all 
cases and that the executive was usually successful when it did so. The cases also show that 
executive success may have been attributable to the judicial tendency to isolate domestic failings 
from the standard required by the Convention and to not hold the executive to a standard greater 
than that required by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Nevertheless, it was clear that the court was 
faithful first and foremost to the requirements of the HRA and the understanding that clear and 
constant ECtHR jurisprudence should be implemented in order to vindicate Convention rights in 
domestic law. The ECtHR had a de facto institutional role in prescribing the domestic institutional 
decision-making processes and procedures in the time period and the three-way institutional 
relational dynamic was very apparent in this context.  
Proportionality Review under the Convention 
 
The three-way institutional relational dynamic was also identifiable in the proportionality-based 
review undertaken during the period. Proportionality review has fundamentally altered the type of 
review of executive decision-making that the courts can legitimately undertake. Nevertheless, 
relative executive success was also seen in the tailoring of the review depending on the Convention 
article under consideration and the level of deference that should be afforded to the executive 
owing to the context. This variable standard of proportionality-based review is often overlooked in 
academic writing.45  
The Appellate Committee made clear that the intensity of the review in Convention cases depended 
upon the article under consideration and whether the article accommodates different levels of 
review. In R (on the application of RJM) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,46 the court 
looked at the ‘rationale’ behind the executive’s approach to consider whether the ‘discrimination’ 
                                                             
44(Application No 26839/05) (unreported) 18 May 2010. See Lord Brown [89] 
45Contrast H Wilberg and M Elliott (eds), The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart’s 
Rainbow (Hart Publishing, 2015) 
46[2008] UKHL 63 
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capable of breaching A14 ECHR was justified and to what extent.47 The Secretary of State still had to 
justify the discrimination as pursuing a legitimate aim and being proportionate to that aim, however 
as the discrimination was not one of the core protected grounds under A14,48  ‘the court’s scrutiny 
of the justification advanced will not have the same intensity as when a core ground of 
discrimination is in issue.’49 This lesser intensity of review led to a finding for the executive. Lord 
Mance accepted the Secretary of State’s justification for how the executive had chosen to allocate 
resources in that it pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate, although he was still careful to 
note some ‘residual doubt’.50 On the authority of R (Carson) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions,51 Lord Neuberger opined that the justification put forward by the Secretary of State was 
not unreasonable.52 However, in an effort to reinstate a role for the court he went on to say that; 
Of course, there will come a point where the justification for a policy is so weak, or the line 
has been drawn in such an arbitrary position, that, even with the broad margin of 
appreciation accorded to the state, the court will conclude that the policy is unjustifiable. 
However, this is not such a case in my judgment.53 
Despite the wider latitude and deference afforded to the executive within the purview of A14 
review, there was still an acceptable line that the Appellate Committee was not prepared to allow 
the executive to deviate from. 
Another finding for the executive based upon an A14 ECHR challenge came in Al-Serbia v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department.54 The Appellate Committee confirmed the lesser standard of review 
in executive decision-making where the substance of the claim is based on an A14 non-
discrimination ground which is parasitic upon substantive Convention rights. The Appellants relied 
upon A14 to challenge the propriety of the indefinite leave to remain concession that was granted to 
children arriving in the UK with families as compared to those arriving without parents. Lord 
Bingham demonstrated that the policy had to be looked at objectively, through the eyes of both 
parties, to determine whether it had a legitimate aim. From the appellant’s perspective it appeared 
unfair to grant a lesser immigration status to children who have already suffered the loss of their 
                                                             
47RJM, n46 [10] 
48R (Carson) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 37 [15]; ‘Characteristics such as race, 
caste, noble birth, membership of a political party and (here a change in values since the Enlightenment) 
gender, are seldom, if ever, acceptable grounds for differences in treatment.’ 
49
RJM, n46 [14] (per L.Mance) 
50RJM, n46 [15] 
51Carson, n48 
52RJM, n46 [56] 
53
RJM, n46 [57] 
54[2008] UKHL 42 
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parents. Nevertheless, from the Secretary of State’s perspective it was simply an administrative tool 
put in place as there was ‘difficulty, delay and expense’ associated with removing families.55 Lord 
Hope added that an administration that did little to address the backlog in asylum claims and made 
no effort to promote greater efficiency ‘would be failing in its duty of sound government.’56 He also 
felt that how to address these problems lay ‘peculiarly within the executive’s area of 
responsibility’.57 Once again, the court recognised the need for the executive (and Parliament) to 
make general policy where ‘bright lines’ had to be drawn.58 The case reiterated R (on the application 
of RJM) in that a different standard of review applies to A14. ‘Adulthood’ had not been recognised as 
one of the grounds that required ‘particularly weighty reasons’ to support a difference in 
treatment.59 Lord Hope went on to provide guidance on when the courts will intervene;  
Deliberate discrimination will always risk intervention by the judiciary. But a difference in 
treatment of people outside the so-called suspect categories which is simply a by-product of 
a legitimate policy will not normally do so.60 
The case was one of four cases all taken against the Secretary of State for the Home Department61 
and heard in succession by the same panel of Law Lords.62All 4 cases related to immigration matters, 
however the first three were based on A8 complaints and Al-Serbia was based on an A14/A8 
complaint. Each had a similar judgment gap (mean 72 days) and judgment length (mean 18 pages) 
and returned a unanimous verdict.  Nevertheless, the Appellate Committee imposed a stronger 
standard of review of executive action where A8 was engaged and Al Serbia was the only case where 
the executive was successful and the lower court upheld.  
Chikwamba v Secretary of State for the Home Department63 was one of the three cases where the 
executive lost on the proportionality of requiring an appellant with a child to apply for leave to enter 
the UK from abroad under s65 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The court held that it was 
disproportionate to separate a 4 year old child from her mother for several months simply to gain 
entry clearance.64 Lord Scott criticised the executive for seeking to send the appellant back to 
                                                             
55 Al-Serbia, n54 [2] 
56Al-Serbia , n54 [6] 
57Al-Serbia, n54 [8] 
58Al-Serbia, n54 [51] (per L.Brown) 
59Al-Serbia, n54 [9] 
60Al-Serbia, n54 [10] 
61
Beoku-Betts v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 39; Chikwamba v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 40; E B Kosovo v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 
UKHL 41 and Al (Serbia), n54 
62Lord Hope, Lady Hale, Lord Brown, Lord Bingham, Lord Scott. 
63
Chikwamba, n61 
64Chikwamba, n61 [8] (per L.Hale) 
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Zimbabwe when she had every prospect of success and queried why she could not remain in the UK. 
He was unimpressed by the response that it was government policy to do so and suggested that ‘this 
[wa]s elevating policy to dogma.’65 Lord Brown clearly demonstrated the level of enquiry into 
executive policy that proportionality-based review of a substantive Convention article, such as A8, 
required. The court will look beyond the acceptable legitimate aim put forward of ‘the maintenance 
and enforcement of immigration control’ and ask ‘precisely what purpose is served and what in 
reality is achieved by this policy?’66 This involved uncovering the ‘real rationale’ for the policy which 
Lord Brown believed to be deterrence rather than queue jumping.67 He also used the facts of other 
immigration cases that had come before the court to probe the Secretary of State as to why the 
policy in the instant case was not applied to those persons and thus subtly disarmed the executive 
by demonstrating that the policy was not being applied consistently.68  Chikwamba revealed how 
close the court came to determining the merits of policy in proportionality-based review of a 
substantive Convention article and the difference, again, in the intensity of the review depending on 
the article of the Convention engaged.  
The impact of the Convention on the Orthodox Institutional Relationship; Judicial Review 
 
The three-dimensional relationship was not just evident in the Convention context but also 
appeared to have a more subtle impact on the orthodox judicial review mechanisms of the executive 
and also in characterising the relationship between the executive and the judiciary in the time 
period.  The influence of the Convention could be seen in the willingness to separate the legal from 
the political and to find matters justiciable, especially where a matter affected an individual’s rights 
and had not been subject to legislative scrutiny. The Convention may also have been influential in 
the suggestion, made in the time period,69 that the rule of law legitimises judicial review powers 
where an individual’s rights are affected.  
Justiciability  
 
Matters of ‘law’ and ‘policy’ rarely come neatly packaged and instead an element of judicial 
excavation is usually required.  
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 The courts … have always distinguished -artificially- the separate provinces of ‘law’ and 
‘policy’, and have, for the most part, contented themselves with regulating such matters as 
the extent of powers conferred by statute and the observance of such judge-made 
procedural rules as ‘natural justice’.70 
The enactment of the HRA and the advent of proportionality-based review have brought the 
distinction between law and politics and the relative competencies of each state institution into 
even sharper focus. The distinction has been managed by the court through fluctuating levels of 
institutional deference and an increased willingness to find matters justiciable.  Justiciability and 
deference share a close relationship in that each indicates where primary responsibility for a 
particular decision lies.71 Deference is less absolute in its delineation of institutional competence and 
the shift from ‘non-justiciability’ to ‘due deference’72 in areas such as national security is regarded as 
one of the subtle changes to domestic adjudicative powers in the post HRA era.73 This shift in 
institutional capability brings into question whether any matter can ever be deemed to be ‘peculiarly 
within the competence of the executive’.74 For instance, the determination of what constitutes a 
public emergency threating the life of the nation was only regarded as a ‘pre-eminently’ political 
question best left to the judgment of the executive and Parliament in Belmarsh.75  There, Lord 
Bingham’s leading judgment rejected any general notion of deference by the courts on such political 
questions. Instead, he viewed it as a matter of ‘relative institutional competence’ coupled with a 
healthy respect for proper ‘demarcation of functions’ between state branches.76 
The influence of the Convention on the institutional relationship with the executive can therefore be 
witnessed in the narrowing of the margin between the legal and political and the resultant 
narrowing of the ground separating executive responsibility and judicial responsibility. This was 
evident in the transitional time period in the willingness of the court to find a route to justiciability 
and the methods used to isolate the legal from the political. 
The Appellate Committee demonstrated that it was not prepared to accept the blanket opinion of 
the executive as to what constituted ‘political matters’ and instead proceeded to conduct its own 
investigation in order to unpack questions of justiciability.  In R (on the application of Baiai) v 
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Secretary of State for the Home Department77 the Secretary of State argued that the scheme under 
s19 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 ‘involve[d] an area of broad 
social policy where the judgment of the legislature and executive should be given considerable 
weight.’78 Lord Bingham, nevertheless, felt that this was ‘too sweeping’. He conceded that certain 
matters were aspects of political judgment and not for the court to assess however, 
the court cannot abdicate its function of deciding whether as a matter of law the section 19 
scheme, as promulgated and operated, violated the respondents’ right to marry guaranteed 
by article 12. The answer to that question does not turn on considerations of broad social 
policy but on an accurate analysis of the scheme and law.79 
The Appellate Committee was therefore prepared to launch its own investigation into the boundary 
between law and policy. 
In R (on the application of A) v London Borough of Croydon,80  the willingness of the Supreme Court 
to find a justiciable matter divorced from the evaluative decision was evident. Contrary to the Court 
of Appeal, Lady Hale found the decision of whether someone was ‘a child’ to be a ‘limiting condition 
stated in objective terms’ and a jurisdictional question for the courts, capable of divorce from the 
more evaluative judgment of ‘whether the child [wa]s in need’.81 In so ruling, she accepted that the 
‘evaluative’ decision of what service to provide was principally for the local authority, subject to the 
judicial review grounds of fair process and unreasonableness. Nevertheless, she also dismissed any 
notion that evaluative decisions could never be part of legal decisions as courts were quite used to 
making value judgments in children’s care proceedings as part of the legal decision over what order 
to make. The express acknowledgement of the need for judges to also make evaluative decisions will 
be welcomed by those who have pointed out the fallacy of the positivistic notions that judges 
merely declare the law and instead value judicial honesty as to the process involved in judging.82 The 
balancing exercises involved in rights-based adjudication are inherently evaluative and it may be that 
the HRA has prompted frankness about this aspect of judicial decision-making. The evaluative nature 
of judicial as well as political decision-making narrows the differences between the decision-making 
of the two branches even further.  
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The narrowing of the divide between the legal and the political was also evident in the time period in 
the willingness for the judges to express broad opinions on policy. In R (on the application of JL) v 
Secretary of State for Justice,83 Lord Walker commented on the state of prisons including the fact 
that they were overcrowded and officers found it difficult to fulfil their duty of care to each 
prisoner.84 He recognised that the Secretary of State sought guidance from the court to inform the 
executive in future policy. After expressing the reservation that, ‘there are obvious limits to how far 
it is for your Lordships, or any court, to give anything like detailed guidance on these matters’ and 
that any statements made could only ever be, ‘… expressions of opinion’, he nevertheless went on to 
‘tentatively’ provide his view.85 The inherent danger in the Law Lords expressing opinion on policy is 
the damage caused to the perception of political neutrality and the lack of democratic mandate for 
such a role.  Nevertheless, the executive clearly welcomed the judicial view here and provided these 
‘opinions’ are kept as generic as possible, they may prove useful in assisting with policy development 
and characterising the judicial-executive relationship as one of mutual cooperation. 
Similarly, in In the matter of an application by ‘JR17’ for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland),86 Lord 
Rodger stated that it was a matter of ‘policy’ to be determined by the Northern Ireland executive 
whether the ability to suspend a pupil on a precautionary basis was part of the school principal’s 
general management powers.87 Lady Hale agreed that it was a policy choice however she put 
forward her views on the matter anyway.88 Lord Brown also offered his views on precautionary 
suspension together with practical ways that suspension on a precautionary basis could be 
implemented, before subtly calling on the Northern Ireland executive to address these matters.89 
The acute awareness of the political polarisation of the issue again did not detract the judges for 
offering their views. In doing so, they maintained institutional boundaries whilst facilitating the 
institutional relationship as one of mutual cooperation.  
This characterisation of supportive relationship between the executive and the judiciary was evident 
in Holmes Moorhouse v London Borough of Richmond upon Thames,90 where the Appellate 
Committee filled in gaps in guidance provided by the Secretary of State. Lord Hoffmann recognised 
that the Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities issued by the Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister stated that, ‘residence does not have to be fulltime and a child can be considered to 
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reside with one parent even where he or she divides her time between both parents,’ however he 
felt that it lacked any guidance on when it would be reasonable for that child to be resident with one 
parent and the considerations needed to be taken into account when making that assessment. Lord 
Hoffmann clearly did not feel that deference to the executive was required and instead stated that, 
‘it is this gap which I would invite your Lordships to fill.’91 Guidance on housing policy would 
traditionally lie with the executive although the courts are used to making assessments of what is 
‘reasonable’ in judicial review cases. The case demonstrated that hard lines can be inappropriate in 
delineating relative institutional competence of the legal and political. Instead, where the court feels 
particularly well-placed to provide extra direction, the judiciary and the executive can work together 
to produce comprehensive guidance and thus prevent future cases coming before the courts. 
Nevertheless, R (on the application of Gentle) v The Prime Minister92 demonstrated that there is still 
a firm line where matters will be regarded as political and non-justiciable. It was argued that the 
government’s breach of A2 of the Convention provided a legal right to demand an independent 
inquiry into the decision to go to war in Iraq. The Appellant requested a judicial review of the 
Government’s decision not to hold such an inquiry. In trying to detach the legal right from the highly 
politicised circumstances, Lord Bingham made clear that if a legal right exists then it is justiciable in 
the courts. However, in deciding whether a legal right exists, the court had to consider whether the 
tribunal would be required to rule upon matters of ‘high policy, peace and war, the making of 
treaties, the conduct of foreign relations,’ which clearly should remain exclusively in the political 
domain.93 Lord Bingham found it difficult to believe that when signing the Convention, Council of 
Europe members agreed to a right to a procedural inquiry into decisions to go to war.94 Political 
decisions were instead to be accounted for before Parliament and the electorate rather than being 
reviewable in any court.95 Thus the Appellate Committee drew a clear line between the powers of 
the court and powers of Parliament to hold to account political decision-making. This was the case 
despite the fact that the Law Lords empathised greatly with the appellants’ case and candidly 
revealed that if there was any possible legal argument that permitted the review, the Appellate 
Committee would have been minded to grant it.96 
Prerogative powers and Independent Executive Action 
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The effect of the Convention may also be seen in final appeal court’s willingness to ensure that 
decision-making power was exercised via the correct state institutional channels when either the 
rights or legitimate expectations of individuals were affected. This resulted in a particularly robust 
review of executive action that had not been subject to legislative scrutiny, or was exercised under 
the prerogative, to ensure that proper decision-making procedures were followed.  In this way, the 
influence of the Convention may well have had an impact on the level of deference afforded by the 
court in areas where the prerogative was exercised. 
In R (on the application of Bapio Action Limited) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,97 the 
Appellate Committee demonstrated that it would insist that decision-making was made through the 
proper channels, despite the political cost, when the decision affected the legitimate expectations of 
individuals. The Secretary of State’s guidance on recruitment of International Medical Graduates 
(IMGs) as part of the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP) was declared unlawful by the 
Appellate Committee. The guidance sought to give priority to home graduates for positions in the 
NHS and therefore undermined the legitimate expectations of the IMGs. Lord Rodger’s concluding 
paragraph revealed that he was clearly influenced in his finding against the executive by the fact that 
it appeared to be trying to achieve a change in immigration policy via the backdoor. 
Obviously, the Government could have achieved its objective if it had amended the 
Immigration Rules. For various reasons, it chose not to do so. But if it had chosen to try to 
amend the Rules, it would have required to pay the political price of subjecting the proposed 
change and its highly damaging effects on IMGs with HSMP status in the country, to the 
scrutiny of Parliament.98 
Lord Rodger’s comments suggest that had the change been brought about by amending the 
Immigration Rules, with clear parliamentary approval, the result of the case would have been 
different. Thus the court viewed with particular scepticism executive changes in policy that affected 
the rights or expectations of individuals, which had not been openly laid before and sanctioned by 
Parliament.  
An equally strong stance in this regard was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of HM Treasury v 
Mohammed Jaber Ahmed.99 The case was of such import that it convened a panel of 7 Justices, 
including the President and Deputy President of the court as it raised, ‘… fundamental questions 
about the relationship between Parliament and the executive and about judicial control over the 
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power of the executive.’100 The procedure under s1 of the United Nations Act 1946 enabled the 
executive to make Orders in Council without parliamentary scrutiny. The Terrorism (United Nations 
Measures) Order 2006 and the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 had 
both been made without parliamentary scrutiny, instead being laid before Parliament for 
information rather than having their merits subject to either the affirmative or negative resolution 
procedure. The Orders were fairly ‘draconian’ in terms of the way they affected individual rights. 
Lord Hope, with whom Lord Walker and Lady Hale agreed, commented that: 
The consequences of the Orders … are so drastic and so oppressive that we must be just as 
alert to see that the coercive action that the Treasury have taken really is within the powers 
that the 1946 Act has given them.101 
The Orders were declared by the Supreme Court to be ultra vires, as Parliament needed to have the 
opportunity to squarely confront measures that affected the rights of UK citizens in a fundamental 
way.  Lord Hope noted that the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee had recommended 
that such orders be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, however the executive did not 
act on these recommendations in the belief that it would place the UK in breach of its international 
obligations were the resolutions to not be approved.102 Lord Hope dismissed this argument on the 
basis that other Commonwealth countries that had previously used regulations to implement 
Security Council Resolutions (‘SCRs’), had used primary legislation to affect asset freezing regimes.103 
Lord Rodger concurred, stating that even if Parliament chose to enact exactly the same measures as 
the executive, then at least those matters had ‘not pass[ed] unnoticed in the democratic process.’104 
Again, Mohammed Jabar demonstrated the willingness of the Supreme Court to ensure that actions 
which impacted severely on individual rights went through the proper domestic institutional 
channels. 
Even in cases where the court did not ultimately challenge the method by which the executive had 
enacted measures, it still reviewed the institutional decision-making process behind an Order in 
Council, responding to a SCR, to determine whether the process could have been any different.  R v 
Forsyth105again considered the executive’s powers to legislate by Orders in Council under s1 of the 
United Nations Act 1946. This time the court found for the executive in that the power to make an 
Order in Council was not time limited.  The court inferred that delay was not an issue for Parliament 
                                                             
100
Mohammed Jabar, n18 [5] (per Lord Hope) 
101Mohammed Jabar, n18 [6] 
102Mohammed Jabar, n18 [48-49]  
103Mohammed Jabar, n18 [50] 
104
Mohammed Jabar, n18 [186] 
105[2011] UKSC 9 
175 
 
given that no time limit was mentioned in the legislation and the executive had the power to amend 
Orders long after the SCRs had been made.106 The court admitted that it took a ‘somewhat blinkered 
approach’ by deciding the issue in the manner advocated by the Crown i.e. ‘purely as one of 
principle and on the barest of facts’ in order to block any future individual challenges to a delayed 
Order.107 Nevertheless, where the court did adopt a slightly wider approach was in reviewing the 
history of measures taken against Iraq to discern that SCRs often had to respond to a changing 
international landscape and were rarely just one off measures. As such, there might be good reason 
for executive delay in implementing the measures.108 Thus the court appeared to conduct a ‘close 
contextual assessment of the institutional factors bearing on the case’, as advocated by 
Kavannagh,109 before deferring to the executive’s power to determine when to implement 
measures.  In this sense, the court did not unquestioningly defer to the executive’s ability to 
determine when Orders in Council should come into effect and instead looked more closely at the 
realities of the institutional processes involved. 
The justiciability of executive action under the prerogative was not a consequence of the HRA and 
instead was established following the decision of Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the 
Civil Service.110 In, R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs,111 the Law Lords provided a robust defence to the principles established in 
the CCSU case and did not take up the invitation to distinguish CCSU on the basis that it concerned a 
decision taken pursuant to powers conferred by an Order in Council rather than the validity of the 
Order in Council itself.112 Where the HRA appeared to have an effect in Mohammed Jabar, was in 
narrowing even further the scope of what could be achieved under the prerogative and to demand 
certain institutional decision-making processes in decisions that affected the rights of individuals. 
Nevertheless in Bancoult, only Lords Bingham and Mance were prepared to hold that the right of 
abode was fundamental and that no prerogative existed to deprive the Chagossians of this right. The 
majority of the Law Lords upheld the two Orders in Council that forbid the Chagossians from 
returning to their island as they found the right of abode was not a fundamental principle that had 
been breached and the Chagossians had no legitimate expectation to return to the island. Lords 
Rodger and Carswell expressly condemned the way that the Chagossians had been treated at the 
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hands of the executive,113 however in determining whether the power to legislate for the ‘peace, 
order and good governance of the overseas territory’ was in any way limiting, Lord Rodger was 
unambiguous in stating that such matters were not justiciable.114 Instead, the check on 
inappropriate use of the power was recognised to lie in the political rather than legal domain and 
Parliament would be required to scrutinise the Orders.115  Therefore, whilst Mohammed Jabar 
appeared to demonstrate a more interventionist judicial approach to Orders in Council that affected 
the rights or legitimate expectations of individuals, particularly in the Supreme Court, the Bancoult 
decision also revealed that much depended on the particular rights asserted. Furthermore, a clear 
area of non-justiciability still existed in the prerogative domain, which had not been weakened by 
the incorporation of the Convention. 
The Rule of Law  
 
The final area where the influence of the Convention and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR appeared 
to have an impact on the domestic judiciary-executive relations was in reinforcing the domestic 
principle of the rule of law. Firstly, ECtHR jurisprudence guided the domestic court in administering 
closed material proceedings in accordance with an individual’s rights, where the rule of law principle 
of open justice had to be balanced against the public interest in national security. Secondly, the 
willingness to find a route to justiciability alongside the need for proper institutional decision-
making, where rights were affected, appears to have reinforced the suggestion that the courts have 
distinct judicial review powers under the rule of law.116  Finally, the ability to be awarded damages 
under s8 HRA for breach of an individual’s rights may well have influenced the suggestion by certain 
judges, that more than nominal damages should be awarded where an individual’s rights are 
affected by a disregard for the rule of law or a breach of public duty.  
R (on the application of Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office117 made clear 
that rule of law considerations had to occasionally be compromised in the interests of national 
security. The case concerned the lawfulness of the Director’s decision to discontinue a criminal 
investigation into corruption allegations against the main contractor in an arms contract between 
the Government and Saudi Arabia.  This decision was made in light of Saudi Arabia’s threat to stop 
counterterrorism cooperation with the UK.  Although the Divisional Court felt that the Director had 
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acted unlawfully by submitting to a threat instead of exercising the power to make independent 
judgment, as required by Parliament and the rule of law, the Appellate Committee allowed the 
appeal and declared the Director’s decision to be lawful. Lord Bingham noted the high level of 
deference afforded to an independent prosecutor, given the wide discretion they are afforded in 
their role and stated that the court would only interfere with the Director’s decision in ‘highly 
exceptional circumstances’.118 Nevertheless, the decision still had to be lawful.119 The defence of the 
rule of law was perhaps not as robust as might be expected. Lady Hale suggested that the rule of law 
was just one of several public interest considerations that could be weighed against a serious 
security risk and that ultimately the latter consideration could trump the former.120  Lord Brown felt 
that public authorities, in such circumstances only needed to have due regard to rule of law 
considerations and this duty was fulfilled by the Director and Attorney General, who ‘gave prolonged 
and profound thought to the implications for the rule of law …’.121 The rule of law did not appear to 
be the defining principle of the constitution where national security was at stake and instead was 
demoted to a consideration that had to be given due weighting in the face of a number of competing 
public interest concerns. 
Nevertheless in RB(Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,122 the court was clearly 
guided by the ECtHR in the acceptable compromises to the rule of law in matters of national 
security.   The case engaged the rule of law principle of open and fair justice. The court held that the 
use of closed material when considering the safety on return of deportees was not unfair and did 
not breach principles of legality. Lord Phillips felt that there was justification for keeping diplomatic 
reports on the prevailing conditions in a country closed so that diplomats were free to be open and 
frank and so relationships between states remained uncompromised.123  In so holding the Law Lords 
were influenced by the fact that the SIAC was specifically set up as a tribunal that could deal with 
closed material and was in response to ECtHR recommendations in Chahal v UK.124  The SIAC was 
therefore likely to meet the requirements of the Convention.125 The rule of law, however, demanded 
that ordinary courts continued to adhere to principles of open justice.126 Again, it was evident that 
the demands of national security took precedence over an idealised constitution firmly based on the 
rule of law. Nevertheless, the court used ECtHR guidance to ensure the appropriateness of 
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alternative safeguards where there was an interference with the rule of law- for instance, only using 
specialist tribunals with the protection of specialist advocates to review closed material. 
The interrelationship between an individual’s rights and rule of law considerations was again evident 
in HM Treasury v Mohammed Jaber Ahmed,127 as discussed above,128 in that the rule of law 
demanded that decisions affecting the rights of individuals were not solely determined by the 
executive. The case also appeared to suggest that the rule of law can legitimise judicial review of 
executive action in addition to ordinary principles of judicial review.   Lord Hope provided the lead 
judgment and compared the case to the infamous judicial-executive clash in Liversidge v 
Anderson.129 He robustly defended rule of law principles in the context of national security: 
Even in the face of the threat of international terrorism, the safety of the people is not the 
supreme law. We must be just as careful to guard against unrestrained encroachments on 
personal liberty.130 
Lord Hope’s defence of the rule of law was reinforced by the consideration of an individual’s rights. 
Firstly, he stated that the closer executive action comes to affecting the basic rights of the individual, 
‘the more exacting’ the court’s scrutiny should be.131 He went on to state that, ‘If the rule of law is to 
mean anything, decisions as to what is necessary or expedient in this context cannot be left to the 
uncontrolled judgment of the executive.’  Secondly, Lord Hope approved of Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s 
sentiments in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Pierson,132 that where general 
powers are conferred by Parliament there must be some implied limits to that power especially 
where it is exercised in such a way as to adversely affect the rights of citizens.133 Finally, he dismissed 
counsel’s suggestions that it was simply a matter of ‘political control’ that the Treasury opted to use 
its powers under s1 of the United Nations Act 1946 to issue freezing orders rather than using the 
Parliamentary affirmative resolution procedure under the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001. Instead he confirmed the legitimacy of the court’s scrutinising Treasury actions under the rule 
of law.134  
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In quashing both executive orders as ultra vires in the case, Lord Hope’s leading judgment showed 
that the Supreme Court was not swayed by arguments of due deference to the executive’s political 
judgment in the context of rights. Instead, the matter was justiciable on the basis of the rule of law. 
Thus the increasing justiciability of matters in the political context that affect an individual’s rights 
following the incorporation of the Convention appears to contextualise Lord Hope’s declaration of a 
power of review under the rule of law.  Declaring such a power to exist, appears to be the next step 
in Lord Hope’s previously expressed belief that, ‘the rule of law enforced by the courts is the 
ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is based.’135  
Lord Hope’s firm belief in the rule of law could be reinforced further by the ability to award more 
than nominal damages where its values are breached.  In Walumba Lumba v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department,136 the Secretary of State was found to have acted unlawfully in detaining the 
appellants under an unpublished (potentially non-existent) policy instead of the published policy. 
The rule of law clearly demands that law is open and accessible so that individuals are capable of 
governing their conduct accordingly.  The majority found the appellants to have been falsely 
imprisoned, however awarded only nominal damages, given that the appellants would have been 
detained under the published policy. The majority declined to award vindicatory damages as it was 
felt that the claimant could still have his rights vindicated through nominal or exemplary damages 
where appropriate.137 Lord Dyson did not want to set such an ‘unruly horse’ loose on the law, given 
that such damages would be met by the public purse and could result in defensive practices of public 
authorities keen to avoid litigation.138 The dissent would have awarded more than nominal damages 
even though it was not a case where compensatory damages were appropriate. Lord Hope was at 
pains to emphasise that aim of such damages was not to punish the executive but to recognise the 
importance of the rights breached by unlawfully detaining the individuals concerned and to act as a 
deterrent in future cases.139 Lord Hope endorsed Lord Walker’s belief that there had been ‘a serious 
abuse of power and it was deplorable.’140 Lady Hale also endorsed Lord Walker’s suggested award 
believing that it was necessary to in some way vindicate the claimant’s rights given, ‘the claimant’s 
fundamental constitutional rights have been breached by the state and to encourage all concerned 
to avoid anything like it happening again’.141 Thus, where domestic constitutional rights had been 
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breached, some members of the judiciary were prepared to reinforce the finding against the 
executive on the rule of law point by an award of damages that recognised the nature of the breach. 
In Shepherd Masimba Kabadzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department,142 Lord Hope refused 
to read Walumba Lumba on a narrow basis in that only nominal damages could be awarded and 
stated that each case would depend upon the facts.143 The case also raised a claim for false 
imprisonment, this time for failure to regularly review the detention of the appellant under a 
published policy.  The executive had discretion to detain a person without any court authorisation 
under the Immigration Act 1971, however the court still had to ensure that the power to detain was 
‘exercised reasonably and in a manner which is not arbitrary’.144 The judges withheld their judgment 
until after the 9 justice decision in Walumba Lumba, given the similarity of the issue. Following the 
frank executive disclosures in Walumba Lumba, Lord Hope revealed his scepticism of the Home 
Secretary’s position that published policies on detention were always applied.145 The court awarded 
damages at common law for false imprisonment, however in doing so the dissenting view in 
Walumba Lumba on the damages award was not discounted. It therefore remains open to the 
Supreme Court, on the right facts, to award more than nominal damages as a deterrent to the 
executive breaching the rule of law and detaining persons unlawfully. 
The impact of the Convention in characterising the Relationship between the Court and 
the Executive 
 
The orthodox understanding of the nature of judicial-executive relations centres on terminology 
such as the ‘review’ and ‘scrutiny’ of executive action and lends support to the idea that the 
relationship between the judiciary and the executive is one of tension. The use of these terms can 
mask the finer characteristics of the relationship that centres upon a mutual respect and 
understanding between the institutions. The observational data revealed two areas where the 
influence of the Convention may have had an effect on the more subtle characteristics of the 
relationship between the judiciary and the executive in the time period. The first was the relevance 
of the wider context that executive decisions are made within to the review of executive action. The 
second was the search for executive intent as a means of justifying the decisions or actions that the 
executive had taken.  
                                                             
142[2011] UKSC 23 
143Shepherd, n142 [55] 
144
Shepherd, n142 [49] (per Lord Hope) 
145Shepherd, n142 [27] 
181 
 
The Context of Executive Decisions 
 
The judges recognised that the executive often work in an imperfect setting where policy and 
decision-making are constrained significantly by limits on resources, bureaucracy and public opinion. 
A sharp distinction was, however, drawn between how executive contextual constraints fitted into 
the judicial review of executive decision-making and how they fitted into the consideration of an 
alleged infringement of a Convention right.  
In judicial review actions, context was relevant to determining whether the decision lay particularly 
within executive competence and thus judicial deference was required unless the decision was 
plainly irrational or breached the rule of law.  In R (on the application of Ahmed) v Major and 
Burgesses of London Borough of Newham,146 it was recognised that difficult decisions, taken with a 
view to resource constraints, would not in themselves render the scheme to be irrational or 
unlawful.147 Lady Hale endorsed the words of the Depute Judge that ‘judges must be particularly 
slow in entering the politically sensitive area of allocations policy by overbroad use of the doctrine of 
irrationality.’148 Lord Neuberger further recognised that the court was not best suited to determining 
such matters given that ‘housing allocation policy is a difficult exercise which requires not only social 
and political sensitivity and judgment, but also local expertise and knowledge.’149 The exception to 
this was when the court felt that it had a ‘duty’ to intervene such as ‘if a policy does not comply with 
statutory requirements, or if it is plainly irrational.’150 Allocation policies were therefore not immune 
to being ultra vires however the court was sensitive to the political context and the democratic 
mandate of the executive to make difficult decisions. 
In the Convention context, however, alleged contextual difficulties did not change whether a 
Convention right had been infringed without justification. Thus in R (on the application of AP) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department,151 Lord Dyson was not swayed by the ‘practical 
difficulties’ that the executive faced in seeking to uncover the effect of a control order on a 
controllee. Even in cases where the control order time period was not in itself enough to constitute a 
deprivation of liberty, the Secretary of State was still obliged to ‘have regard to’ the effect of the 
order on the controlee, otherwise she may find herself in breach of A5(1).152   
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Furthermore, in R (on the application of JL) v Secretary of State for Justice,153 where the court ruled 
that an attempted suicide of a prisoner with a risk of long term injury necessitated an enhanced type 
of investigation under A2 ECHR, Lord Brown confirmed that, ‘… the nature and extent of the state’s 
article 2 obligation in cases of near-suicide cannot be measured in monetary terms.’154  Instead the 
executive would need to consider how to keep costs within manageable limits, whenever the 
Secretary of State carried out the enhanced investigation required by A2.155  
The judges were still understanding of the difficulties faced by the executive in balancing its 
constitutional role alongside the requirements of the Convention. In EB Kosovo v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department,156 Lord Bingham recognised that, ‘the search for a hard edged or bright-
line rule to be applied to the generality of cases is incompatible with the difficult evaluative exercise 
which article 8 requires.’157 The Appellate Committee held that the delay in processing EB’s claim 
should have been taken into account when assessing the proportionality aspect of his human rights 
claim. There was considerable sympathy demonstrated by the judges towards the role that the 
executive had to undertake in the immigration context, in particular the need to develop general 
policies and rules in an area where the law requires the rights of individuals to be taken into 
account. Lord Brown tried to smooth relations between the two branches by emphasising that the 
court’s task was not to ‘punish’ the Secretary of State for the delay in the case or to in any way state 
whether the conduct was ‘blameworthy’ rather the court was simply looking at the effect of the 
delay on the applicant in light of the Convention.158   
These cases reiterate the findings in R (on the application of Begum) v Denbigh High School 
Governors159 and Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd160 that where Convention rights are at issue, 
the focus of the court is on whether those rights have been infringed substantively and not on the 
quality of the decision-making process.161 The focus of the review on the substantive decision leaves 
less scope, in such cases, for a contextual assessment of executive decision-making and for judicial 
‘sympathy’ (or deference) towards executive pressures.162 
Executive Intent and Justification 
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The importance of ascertaining legislative intent stems from the need to objectively apply the 
intention of the sovereign lawmaker and reflects the hierarchical relationship that the judiciary has 
with Parliament. The institutional relationship with the executive is less linear with more scope for 
review of executive action and interference with executive intent. Nevertheless, ascertaining 
executive intent is important in the Convention context and in domestic proportionality-based 
review to establish the justification for the policy.  The effect of the Convention could therefore be 
seen in the need to ascertain executive intent and in the willingness to review the justification for a 
policy or decision domestically. This was evident in several cases in the time period, outlined below. 
As with parliamentary intent, techniques will need to be developed in order to effectively discern 
the true intention of the executive. 
Lord Brown demonstrated that there was a difference in technique in ascertaining the intention of 
the executive in immigration rules compared to uncovering the intention of Parliament in statute: 
The rules are not to be construed with all the strictness applicable to the construction of a 
statute or a statutory instrument, but, instead sensibly according to the natural and ordinary 
meaning of the words used, recognising that they are statements of the Secretary of State’s 
administrative policy.163  
He believed that there was no scope for a purposive style of construction and instead the Secretary 
of State’s intention ‘is to be discerned objectively from the language used, not divined by reference 
to supposed policy considerations.’164  
Lord Dyson had a slightly different enquiry in Walumba Lumba v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department165 where he sought to find out if the executive deliberately applied an unpublished 
policy. In order to do this, he went through a series of internal emails to uncover the attitudes to the 
policy by Home Office senior officials.166 Lord Dyson used the email evidence and draft policy 
submission circulated to come to his conclusion that there was not a deliberate Home Office 
decision to keep the policy applied unpublished.167 Thus wider evidence of executive intent was used 
where the enquiry did not relate to the executive intention behind written rules or secondary 
legislation. 
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The impact of proportionality-based review on domestic judicial-executive relations could also be 
seen in that the court was prepared to find a legal element to the justifications put forward by the 
executive for an immigration decision. Thus in R (on the application of JS) (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department,168 Lord Brown found the Secretary of State’s reasoning in his 
decision letter on the application for asylum to be wrong. In order to be proper reasoning with a 
legal basis it needed to focus on the actual role that the applicant played within the LTTE as opposed 
to his membership of the LTTE.169 Thus the justification of a decision on immigration status was 
found to have a legal as well as a political element and appeared to highlight the effect that 
proportionality-based review, particularly the enquiry into whether executive policy was justified, 
had on the domestic review of executive decision-making.  
Relationship with Parliament 
 
Institutional Communication 
 
The statute, as the primary source of law in the UK, continued to be treated as authoritative across 
all 4 years of study.  The court regarded each provision of a statute to be the product of conscious 
deliberation by Parliament.  Lord Rodger commented that, 
… a court is sometimes forced to conclude that provisions in a statute are redundant, but 
the basic rule is that statutes are best construed as a whole and by giving due effect to all 
their provisions.170 
In this sense a statute was acknowledged to be a ‘carefully crafted code’ and was one of the reasons 
used by Lord Phillips in R v Horncastle to support the legislative scheme on hearsay evidence 
contained in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 over that contained in the ECtHR jurisprudence.171 
Horncastle was one of the few cases in the time period to reject the ECtHR line. The detail and clarity 
of the statutory scheme in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 allowed the court to establish that when 
hearsay evidence was sole or decisive it did not create a mandatory block on that evidence being 
given. Instead, alternative safeguards could be implemented such as evidence being given 
anonymously.172  
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Nevertheless the time period also revealed that institutional communication was frustrated where 
statutory language was unclear, the statutory scheme was incoherent or when it was not 
comprehensive enough to deal with the problem facing the court. In each of these situations there 
was a failing in legislative communication and the judiciary had to respond by using different 
interpretative techniques and undertaking a more constructive role. Poor legislation resulted in a 
more active court and gave some credence to the view that the enforcing and interpreting role of 
the judiciary allowed the court to share sovereign power.173 The judges, nevertheless, always sought 
to justify their course of action on the basis of legislative intent.  
Legislative Intent and Pepper v Hart 
 
Establishing legislative intent will always be important in a constitution governed by legislative 
supremacy. Acting in accordance with legislative intent objectifies the process and neutralises the 
judicial role.174 Although the interpretation of statutory language is the exclusive purview of the 
courts,175 its scope is limited by the constitutional need to give effect to true intention of Parliament. 
In this way the hierarchical relationship between Parliament and the courts is preserved.  
The strongest evidence of legislative intent comes from clear statutory words and a comprehensive 
statutory scheme. In re McE,176 the authority of clear parliamentary intent expressed in clear 
statutory language was strong enough to dispense with common law rights. In reviewing the 
interplay between the common law right of legal privilege and the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 Pt II (‘RIPA’), Lord Hope observed that certain parts of RIPA had dealt expressly 
with the effect of the statutory provisions on legal privilege, however the fact that Part II had not 
addressed the matter (which dealt with surveillance and covert human intelligence sources) must 
have been a deliberate Parliamentary decision to make intrusive surveillance lawful, in spite of 
breaching common law legal privilege.177 Lady Hale agreed owing to the ‘plain words’ of the statute 
and the ‘history of the legislation,’ however she found it an ‘unpalatable’ conclusion.178  In the face 
of this clear intention, the Law Lords recognised the simpler implied overrule technique used by 
Parliament, whereby provided the action taken was in accordance with RIPA, it was lawful. This 
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meant that RIPA overruled earlier statutory rights to a private consultation, however the choice over 
how to draft a statute was regarded as ‘a matter for Parliament.’179   
The judicial expectation is that Parliament would usually not leave important points to be implied 
from the statutory words and would deal with these points expressly in legislation.  In Kay,180 a mass 
cycle ride that always began from the same point and at the same time each month but had no 
predetermined route was argued not to be a ‘customarily held procession’ within the meaning of 
s11(2) Public Order Act 1986, as the notification system set up by the Act impliedly required a 
predetermined route. Lord Rodger, however, felt that had Parliament intended such a result, ‘… then 
it would not have done so by a side wind in a section creating a system of notification: it would have 
done so specifically.’181 Lord Rodger made similar remarks in McConkey,182 which had to determine 
whether ‘political opinion’ in the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 
included opinion that favoured the use of violence and if so whether past beliefs were included. He 
stated, 
… if the intention of the legislature had been to force everyone, however deeply affected, to 
ignore previous expressions of the approval of the use of violence, I would expect to find it 
stated in plain words on the face of the Order for all to see, not left to be unearthed in the 
lubrications of lawyers.183  
Parliamentary intention was derived, on occasion, from common sense or logic. In R (on the 
application of Purdy) v DPP184 in relation to the Suicide Act 1961, Lord Phillips commented that ‘It 
seems unlikely that Parliament intended, in an Act whose primary purpose was to decriminalise 
suicide and attempted suicide, to widen the scope of assisted suicide.’185 Similarly, in R v G,186 the 
Committee stated: 
Parliament cannot have intended to criminalise the possession of information of a kind 
which is useful to people for all sorts of everyday purposes and which many members of the 
public regularly obtain or use, simply because that information could also be useful to 
someone who was preparing an act of terrorism.187  
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An alternative technique, and moving further away from the literal approach, was to derive 
Parliamentary intent from the ‘policy’ that lay behind a statute. In R (on the application of M) v 
Slough Borough Council,188 the Appellate Committee was aware of the socio-political interchange 
that had occurred between Parliament, the executive and the courts.  Parliament had enacted the 
Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 in response to a Court of Appeal ruling that primary legislation 
was needed to affect the necessary policy.189 The Act sanctioned executive action blocking asylum 
seeker attempts to claim social security after failing at the point of entry.190 This informed Lady 
Hale’s later assertions that the court needed to be weary of interpreting ‘care and attention’ under 
s21(1)(a) of the National Assistance Act 1948 as a general power to provide housing, as the 
background indicated this would definitely not be what Parliament would have intended.191     
The various methods that can be used to ascertain legislative intent, on occasion, led to division in 
the court.  Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Lewisham v Malcolm192 centred on two 
interpretative issues pertaining to s24(1)(a) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, which required 
the Law Lords to understand the intention of Parliament at the time the words were enacted. Lord 
Brown, representing the majority view, used what appeared to be a common sense approach in 
identifying the correct statutory comparator under s24. He felt that Parliament must have intended 
the comparator test to mean something in practice and not be rendered a nullity. He declared it to 
be a person who had taken the action complained of and did not suffer from the disability.193 Lady 
Hale dissented on this point and believed that her approach gave effect to the intention of 
Parliament.194 She used the legislative history of the statute- believing the case to be one of 
ambiguity that sanctioned the use of such material- to conclude that ‘the history alone is enough to 
indicate that Parliament did not intend the comparison to be with someone who did not have the 
disability.’195  
Sugar v BBC 196 also divided the court and illustrated the difficulties in establishing a unanimous view 
as to parliamentary intent as well as the different methods used to gauge parliamentary intent. The 
Law Lords had to determine whether the Information Commissioner had issued a ‘decision notice’ 
under s50(3) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 by making a decision on a report held by the 
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BBC. This involved determining whether the BBC was a ‘public authority’. Phillips (in the majority) 
believed that the BBC must either be a public body or not, even if it held exempt information, 
whereas Lord Hoffmann (in dissent) believed that public body status depended upon the nature of 
the information held. Lord Hoffmann believed his interpretation was loyal to the literal wording in 
the Act.197  Lord Neuberger (in the majority) admitted that he had adopted a more purposive 
approach to reading the Act and parliamentary intent to avoid what he perceived to be an anomaly 
in the operation of the legislation. For instance, he thought it odd for Parliament to have intended 
that the Information Commissioner have jurisdiction under s50 to determine whether the 
information possessed was ‘exempt,’ but have no jurisdiction to determine whether a hybrid 
authority possessed information that was ‘excluded’.198 Both Sugar and Malcolm provided a stark 
example of how different judicial methods could be used to ascertain Parliamentary intent and lead 
to different conclusions.   
Resort to Hansard is, on occasion, a legitimate aid to ascertaining parliamentary intent. Pepper v 
Hart,199 made it possible to refer to the parliamentary debate during the passage of a bill to assist in 
elucidating parliamentary intent. Nevertheless, the use of ministerial statements in this way is 
controversial and can only be referred to in very limited circumstances.200 The academic controversy 
stems from constitutional principle as ministerial statements made in the passage of a Bill are not 
intended to have any legal effect.201 These statements are evidence of ‘… what the government 
would like the law to be’202 as opposed to what the legislature enacted. There are also difficulties 
with ‘attributing’ such statements to the intention of Parliament as ‘a composite and artificial 
body.’203  These concerns were each acknowledged by Lord Hoffmann in the time period. Firstly, it 
affected ministerial behaviour, by providing Minsters with a motivation to make statements in the 
hope of influencing any future construction in the courts. Secondly, it tended to be overused in the 
courts where ‘evidence will be produced in any case where there is the remotest chance that it may 
be accepted’, resulting in much additional expense.204 
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R v JTB205 confirmed the judicial caution in the decision to use Hansard and the preference, where 
possible, to arrive at the answer via an alternative route.  The language of the relevant statutory 
section was ambiguous and Lord Phillips felt that it was one of the ‘rare’ cases where the principle in 
Pepper v Hart206 could be invoked.207  Lord Rodger agreed that the passages from Hansard, ‘put the 
position beyond doubt,’ however he would have reached the same conclusion without resort to 
Hansard. Lord Carswell concurred, and although believing it to be a case where it was legitimate to 
refer to Hansard, he personally would have used a different pathway, construing the statute and 
‘taking account of the mischief and consequences of the legislation.’208 Lord Brown adopted a 
compromise approach, stating that it was ‘one of those comparatively rare cases where weight may 
legitimately be put upon the parliamentary materials,’ however that transparency demanded explicit 
acknowledgement of which ministerial statements were relied upon.209 Interestingly, Lords Rodger 
and Carswell united once again in their reluctance to resort to Hansard in McConkey, where the 
order under consideration was not ‘ambiguous, irrational or absurd’ and the ministerial debate 
appeared ‘confused’.210  
The debate over the appropriateness of the use of Hansard continued into the Supreme Court. Lord 
Hope, with whom Lord Clarke agreed, did not deem Star Energy Weald Basin Limited v Bocardo SA211  
to be a case where resort to Hansard was permissible as it did not fall within the limited exceptions 
stated in Pepper v Hart and the executive was not seeking to place a different meaning on the words 
of legislation than that attributed to it when the legislation was promoted in Parliament.212 Lord 
Collins expressly acknowledged the academic controversy over Pepper v Hart.213 Nevertheless, Lord 
Brown believed that the Pepper v Hart exceptions were fulfilled and proceeded to use Hansard to 
establish the intended basis of compensation.214 Again, in the Scottish case of Farstad Supply,215 Lord 
Collins was not prepared to use Pepper v Hart to find out the reason why there was an omission 
from s736A Companies Act 1985 of a provision equivalent to s258(3) Companies Act 1985. Although 
it produced an absurd result, when the shares in a subsidiary company in Scotland were charged, 
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there was no ambiguity in the statutory section itself and no clear ministerial statement which the 
court could use to aid interpretation of the statute.216  
Hansard appeared to be of use when reviewing measures that affected the rights of individuals. In R 
(on the application of F) and Thompson v Secretary of State for the Home Department217 Lord Phillips 
cited with approval statements made by Lord Nicholls in Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2)218 that 
the ‘proportionality’ of a matter could often be assessed on facts alone, however it is still 
permissible in such an assessment to have resort to Hansard to gain background on the practical 
impact of a statutory measure.219 Furthermore, in HM Treasury v Mohammed Jaber Ahmed,220 Lord 
Hope used both House of Lords and House of Commons Hansard to comprehend what the 1946 
Government felt the purpose of the UN Bill was and to review the history of the Government’s 
power to enact necessary measures by Order in Council. Hansard revealed that the 1946 
Government appeared unaware that the Security Council may require states to take action against 
their own citizens under A41 Charter of the United Nations 1945.221 Lord Hope used his research 
from Hansard to confirm the change of context in which the legislation now operates and that the 
executive should not be able to solely determine what is ‘necessary’ and ‘expedient’ when the 
measures taken impose coercive restraints on individuals.222  
Divisions over the use of Hansard therefore remained true across the time period, with some judges 
being more open to its legitimate use than others. Statutory explanatory notes were acknowledged 
as an alternative aid to Hansard in two cases.223 Explanatory notes are potentially closer to ‘… the 
shape of the proposed legislation than pre-parliamentary aids ...’224 and may be less controversial 
than the use of Hansard. Nevertheless, these notes should only be relied upon with a degree of 
caution as they are prepared by civil servants and do not necessarily indicate the intention of 
Parliament.   
Statutory Language and Interpretative Techniques 
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The techniques used to ascertain legislative intent were again reflected in the statutory 
interpretative techniques used. These techniques vary in their sensitivity to the statute. Literal 
interpretation is the most narrow of all forms of statutory interpretation and relies upon the 
‘ordinary, natural meaning’ of statutory words. Part of the ‘rationale’ behind literal statutory 
interpretation is to view judges simply as the enforcers of parliamentary intent which in turn assists 
in distancing judges from any notion of political decision-making.225  The literal approach, however, 
is often too simplistic and fails to account for judicial ‘choice,’ not only in the interpretative 
technique selected but in the multiple answers to a question that can be derived from that 
interpretation.226 Furthermore, statutory interpretation is ‘the opposite of an austere linguistic 
exercise’ and instead ‘evaluative’; ensuring that statutes are made effective through the values of 
the common law that have emerged from its ‘fourfold method’ of evolution, experiment, history and 
distillation of principles.227   
Purposive interpretation is less clinical than the literal approach and interprets the words of a 
statute in accordance with the purpose of the legislation. This form of statutory interpretation 
developed in line with judicial review in the 1960s and the need to determine whether legislation 
could be interpreted in a way that permitted the executive act.228 The purposive approach is an open 
acknowledgement of a more creative judicial methodology that does not simply ‘mechanically’ apply 
the law.229 That is not to suggest that the interpretive act is devoid of standards, instead rules of 
interpretation have a normative character ‘as full of value as any legal principle.’230 A review of the 
use of more ‘creative’ statutory interpretation methods, in the time period, provides an insight into 
the extent that the final appeal court played a constructive role in applying statutory law, and  
assists in establishing whether the respect shown by the final appeal court to legislative intent went 
beyond mere rhetoric. 
The fact that the final appeal court interprets statutes in a purposive manner was openly 
acknowledged in the Appellate Committee in the time period: 
The time is … long-since past when legislation, especially legislation implementing this 
country’s European obligations, is given an entirely literal as opposed to purposive effect.231 
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The clarity of statutory language was central to the decision over which interpretative technique to 
adopt.  In R (on the application of A) v B,232 the judges were reluctant to use a purposive 
interpretation to give effect to what was presumed to be Parliament’s intention, where that went 
against the express language of the statute.  It was argued that the ordinary courts, rather than the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (‘IPT’), had jurisdiction to hear a judicial review application of the 
decision not to allow the publication of the appellant’s memoirs depicting his time in the security 
service.  It was also suggested that s62(5)(a) of RIPA conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the IPT, but 
only in respect of proceedings that related to the RIPA regulated investigatory powers. Although 
Lord Brown, giving the leading judgment of the court, suspected that this must have been what 
Parliament had intended, he found that ‘the difficulties of such a construction … are obvious and in 
the end, to my mind, insurmountable … it would involve reading into section 65(3)(a) limiting words 
which are simply not there.’233  He explained that this ‘would be difficult enough at the best of times’ 
but it also went against the rest of s65(3) RIPA as properly construed.234   
The Supreme Court was less reticent to read in words where the statute was not clear and it was 
required to make sense of that statute.  In R (on the application of Noone) v The Governor of HMP 
Drake Hall,235 Lord Phillips criticised the draftsman of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement 
No.8 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2005 as being ‘too economical’ with words and 
responded by reading in words to make sense of provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003.236 Each of the judges rationalised the approach of the court in different 
ways. Lord Mance believed a purposive interpretation was open to the court as no literal 
interpretation would have made sense.237 Lord Saville believed it must be what Parliament 
intended,238 Lord Brown thought that no rational draftsman could contemplate or intend anything 
else239 and Lord Judge justified it on the basis of justice and common sense.240  
Nevertheless, a purposive statutory interpretation remained controversial and division in the court 
over the correct method of statutory interpretation again came back to judicial differences over 
whether legislative intent should be ascertained from the words used or the policy behind a statute. 
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In R (on the application of the Electoral Commission) v Westminster Magistrates Court,241 Lord 
Phillips dispensed with a literal interpretation in favour of an interpretation that addressed the 
mischief he perceived the statute to address, namely to prevent foreign donations to political 
parties.242Thus, he interpreted the legislation to rebut the presumption in favour of full forfeiture 
where the donor could have been registered on the electoral roll but had not been purely as an 
administrative oversight. The majority believed this approach was consistent with the policy of the 
legislation and the established principle that ‘legislation should be construed to serve its statutory 
purpose’.243 Lord Rodger, however, believed the majority had usurped the role of the courts by 
second guessing what Parliament meant in the legislation and had substituted the aim of the 
legislation for the means by which Parliament had chosen to implement it using express language.244  
He did not believe the statute permitted anything less than full forfeiture to be ordered where a 
political party had accepted an impermissible donation.  
The court also divided over whether a purposive approach to legislation extended to providing the 
judges with a constructive role to update the meaning of statutory words. Lady Hale felt that it was 
rare for the language of statutes to be fixed and that words could change their meaning over time, 
however she limited an otherwise wide judicial power to place statutes on a more modern footing 
by stating that the updated wording still had to tie in with the overall purpose of the statute.245 Lord 
Rodger also regarded it as, 
… common place for courts to have to consider whether circumstances, beyond those at the 
forefront of Parliament’s consideration, may properly be held to be within the scope of a 
provision, having regard to its purpose.246  
As such, the word ‘violence’ in s177(1) of the Housing Act 1996 received an updated meaning from 
the judges in Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow.247  Lord Brown did not officially dissent, 
however he could find no evidence, either in the primary meaning of the word or in the definition of 
‘violence’ used in the statute of Parliament ever meaning to extend the term ‘violence’ beyond the 
limits of physical violence and felt that the court may be overstepping the boundary.248  
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The power to update statutory words was not unlimited and certain statutory words were regarded, 
by the judges, as more suited to being updated than others. In NML Capital Limited v Republic of 
Argentina,249 Lord Mance felt that the words ‘relating to’ in s3(1)(a) of the State Immunity Act 1978 
could never merit an updated meaning in the way that words which vary with ‘social or professional 
attitudes’ such as ‘family’, ‘cruel or inhuman treatment’ or ‘true and fair view’ could. The former 
words were a ‘connecting factor’ which Parliament cannot have expected to be used by the courts to 
either widen or remove state immunity.250 Lords Clarke and Phillips dissented, with Lord Clarke 
believing that merely reviewing the circumstances as they were at the time of the enactment of the 
State Immunity Act 1978 was too narrow an approach to statutory construction.251 Although these 
views didn’t win around the majority in NML, there was still evidence in the time period of the break 
from a literal interpretation opening the door to the common law’s reforming role and ability to 
refresh statutory meaning.252 
Deficiencies in the Statutory Scheme 
 
Legislative communication tends to be in one direction and the process of statutory interpretation 
has been described as ‘making sense of a monologue’.253 Nevertheless, where there were 
deficiencies in statutory language, the statutory scheme or in the extent to which new legislation 
incorporates existing judicial interpretations, this ‘monologue’ did not necessarily prevent a more 
constructive role for the court. This role is what some might term the ‘broader’ concept of law 
reform; 
An … important function of the legislature is law reform, in the broader sense of sorting out 
the existing law, by removing anomalies and injustices, and also ensuring that new law is 
technically effective. It is a task which too often is ignored by Parliament because of other 
demands on Parliamentary time.254 
The ‘broader’ concept of law reform is technically the institutional role of Parliament, however again 
institutional pragmatism in the UK constitution means that it tends to fall to the judiciary. 
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A ‘constructive’ role was acknowledged to be required in areas where successive pieces of legislation 
had led to a confused picture.255 In Earl Cadogan v Pitts256 Lord Walker was critical of Parliament 
complicating the valuation process through successive Leasehold Reform Acts and not sticking to the 
simplicity of techniques used in earlier statutes. The confusion over ‘hope value’ in the case was just 
a symptom of the larger confusion.257 Similarly, in Commissioners for HMRC v DCC Holdings (UK) 
Limited,258 new sections added to the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 by successive finance 
acts had created a ‘patchwork’ of legislation that was ‘not easy reading.’259 Lord Walker felt that 
‘[the] difficulty lies not only in the language of particular sections, subsections and paragraphs, but in 
seeing how Parliament must be taken to have intended them to operate together.’260  
Poor coordination was not just evident within statutory regimes but also in the legal system 
generally through the lack of acknowledgement of the interplay between the statutory and common 
law systems. In Transport for London (London Underground Ltd) v Spirerose Limited,261 Lord Walker 
opined that: 
Until well into the 20th century Acts of Parliament were expressed in much plainer language 
than they are today … But as over the years statute law has changed both in its substance 
and in its style of drafting, it is sometimes difficult to discern whether Parliament intended 
to carry forward, or modify, or supplant the freight of judicial exposition of earlier statutes 
….262 
The extent to which prior judicial interpretations continued to apply to new legislation divided the 
Supreme Court in BA(Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.263 Lord Hope 
recognised that between the enactment of the 1993 and 2003 Immigration Acts, Parliament had 
changed the scheme quite dramatically and although the phrases used in statute may have 
remained, in his opinion, it was not simply a case of exporting the old judicial constructions into the 
words contained in the new statutory scheme. The value of these prior judicial interpretations would 
depend upon the circumstances.264 Nevertheless, Lady Hale dissented as she believed that it was a 
‘well-known principle of statutory interpretation’ that past judicial interpretation continue to attach 
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to re-enacted statutory words unless Parliament expressly states that it intends a different meaning 
to attach to those words.265   Institutional communication appeared to be weakened by a lack of 
express Parliamentary recognition of the judicial interpretations that had attached to repealed 
statutory words and instead the judiciary were required to make inferences from negative legislative 
action.  
The constructive role for the court was not always a consequence of deficiencies in the coordination 
of the statutory scheme or in the interrelationship between statutory and common law, but rather 
to the inability of Parliament to foresee the problem that arose before the court. In Scottish and 
Newcastle v Raguz,266 the difficulties in reconciling s17(2) with s17(4) of the Landlord and Tenant 
(Covenants) Act 1995, led Lord Hoffmann to ‘the inescapable conclusion … that the draftsman of the 
Act had not thought through the consequences of the scheme he had adopted.’267 He therefore 
chose to give s17(2) its natural meaning, which he conceded meant that s17(4) ‘will largely have 
misfired.’268 Even where lack of legislative foresight did not result in a constructive approach to the 
statute under interpretation, it did lead to a reversal of the ‘monologue’ in institutional 
communication, with explicit calls from the judges for ‘more thought’ to be given to the issue. Thus, 
in Barratt Homes Limited v Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig269 under the heading ‘the real problem,’ Lord 
Phillips stated that the absolute right for the owner or occupier of premises to connect to the public 
sewer under s106 of the Water Industry Act 1991 created no issue for a single house, however 
Parliament had failed to appreciate the strain on the system of connecting a whole housing 
development in this way.270 He therefore specifically called for the interrelationship between 
‘planning and water regulation systems’ to be addressed by modern law.271 
The time period therefore revealed several instances where a constructive role was demanded of 
the court as a response to failings in institutional communication, deficiencies in the statutory 
scheme or where a matter was not foreseen by Parliament. There were also times where the court 
ignored the literal words of a statute to instead give effect to what it believed was the policy or 
intention behind the statute. Nevertheless, this more ambitious form of interpretation could 
perhaps be attributable to individual judicial interpretative style as opposed to a difference in 
institutional approach between the courts. For instance, Lord Phillips and Neuberger were clearly 
comfortable with adopting a purposive approach and dispensing with plain words in favour of giving 
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effect to a broader conception of legislative intent. Other judges, such as Lord Rodger, appeared 
more cautious and preferred to treat the literal words of the statute as the authoritative expression 
of parliamentary intent. Either way, where institutional communication via statutory wording or 
legislative intent was clear, there was a very deferential approach to the authority of the legislature 
in the time period. The next section examines institutional deference between the court and 
Parliament in the time period in more depth. 
Institutional Deference  
 
Sovereign power is evident not only in the authority attributed to statutory language and the respect 
for legislative intent outlined above but also in the authority that comes from the constitutional 
position that Parliament occupies as a democratic consultative institution. This section examines the 
extent to which these institutional characteristics of the legislature commanded deference from the 
judiciary in the time period, including the deference of common law to statutory law and the 
deference of the judiciary to the law reforming capacity of Parliament. The section concludes with a 
review of areas where institutional deference was not as strong, such as where there had been 
interference with fundamental rights and freedoms, the rule of law or the jurisdiction of the courts.  
Statute Law and Common Law Constitutionalism 
 
The institutional deference afforded to the legislature by the judiciary in the time period can to 
some extent be gauged by the interrelationship between the two systems of law in the UK; statute 
law and the common law.  Statute law immediately declares the law until such time as it is repealed 
and can be contrasted with the more evolutionary character of the continually developing common 
law.272 This intrinsic distinction results in ‘judges alter[ing] the law more often, if less 
comprehensively than … legislators.’273 Legislative decision-making is characterised through being a 
‘collective’ and ‘participatory’ process that accounts for separate views in a democracy.274 The 
legislature also has broader research powers and is able to survey the wider implications of legal 
reform in areas that go beyond the four corners of a certain appeal. Final Appeal found that ‘time 
and again’ this resulted in ‘dutiful deference’ by the judiciary to the legislature, particularly in areas 
affecting social policy.275 The authors, however, called for more judicial action to assist in keeping 
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the law up to date with societal changes.276  This was based on findings that although Parliament 
tended to respond promptly to judicial calls for action, it did not always carry out a ‘wide survey’ of 
the law, as shown in the previous section.277 Moreover, the rafts of proposed Bills and draft 
legislation passing through Parliament meant that delay was inevitable. Whilst the time period 
revealed that the common law was resilient in areas where flexibility was recognised to be a virtue, 
at the same time the common law did not go on the offensive, either to areas already covered by 
statute or to initiate legal reform.  
The common law was not easily displaced by statute where flexibility was required to keep the law 
up to date and where the common law was well established. In Sienkiewicz v Grief278 it was held that 
s3 of the Compensation Act 2006 had not moved the determination of liability in tort in 
mesothelioma cases from common law to statute. s3 applied once a person had been found liable in 
tort, however whether they were liable and the circumstances of that liability were still matters for 
the common law.279 Lord Rodger extolled the virtues of the common law in this area and its ability to 
respond to the current state of medical knowledge. This was evident in the use of the ‘materially 
increases the risk’ rather than the ‘balance of probabilities’ test at a time when medical science 
remained unable to prove where the asbestos fibre derived from that caused the claimant’s 
condition.280 The common law was particularly recognised in the medical context for its ability to 
keep the law refreshed.  
Nevertheless, the common law was overruled where it was impossible to reconcile it with the 
statutory scheme. The Child Poverty Action Group v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions281 
concerned a benefits overpayment and whether the power to recover under s71 Social Security 
Benefits Act 1992 was in addition to a power to recover under the common law of unjust 
enrichment. Although the arguments were ‘closely balanced’,282 Lords Brown and Dyson felt that it 
would create administrative ‘chaos’ if the common law continued to apply, given that common law 
restitution claims could often be complex and differ from the statutory scheme in the details of 
recovery.  The judges were influenced by the carefully prescribed statutory scheme, which did not 
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appear to envisage a parallel common law power.283 The case was also distinguishable from the 
cases involving fundamental rights or engaging the principle of legality where Parliament could not 
displace the common law unless it did so expressly or by necessary implication.284 Lord Dyson set out 
a test to determine whether a common law regime was intended to coexist alongside a statutory 
regime namely, 
whether the differences are so substantial that they demonstrate that Parliament could not 
have intended the common law remedy to survive the introduction of the statutory 
scheme.285 
Lord Dyson warned against the courts being too liberal in dismissing the common law regime as it is 
always open to Parliament to expressly make its intentions clear.  Nevertheless, the case 
demonstrated that even where Parliament does not expressly address the need to displace the 
common law, it could still be displaced implicitly. 
There was also a mixed picture when it came to evidence of the common law being used to initiate 
legal reform.  The better positioning of Parliament to examine all the issues was used to reject 
common law legal reform in Spiller v Joseph.286 Lord Phillips rejected the opportunity to reform the 
defence of fair comment in defamation actions as ‘the proposed reforms go beyond changes that 
could properly be made by this court in the orderly development of the common law.’287 All Lord 
Phillips was prepared to do was rename the defence of ‘fair comment’ to ‘honest comment’ as ‘the 
whole area merited consideration by the Law Commission or an expert committee.’288  
Only a minority of judges who sat in Al-Rawi v The Security Service289 were prepared to use the 
common law to effect procedural reform under the inherent powers of the court. The Supreme 
Court had to determine whether it had the power under the common law to order a closed material 
procedure for the whole or part of a civil trial for damages. The court divided 6/3 over the issue. The 
majority believed that a closed material procedure was not part of the common law right to a fair 
trial that was premised upon principles of open justice. Lords Mance, Clarke and Lady Hale, 
dissenting, would have allowed a closed material procedure under the common law, in certain 
defined circumstances however they differed over what those circumstances were. Lord Clarke had 
the strongest belief in the capacity for the common law to effect quite fundamental change in that 
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‘the common law, should … very rarely, if ever, say never.’290 The differences in the dissent 
reinforced Lord Dyson’s views that Parliament was the institution better placed to determine when 
it is ‘necessary’ to order such a procedure, ‘after full consultation and proper consideration of the 
sensitive issues involved’.291 Lord Hope recognised that the decision could be viewed as overly 
deferential to Parliament, however he believed that Parliament should determine the correct 
balance between principles of open justice and national security needs, acting through the 
‘democratic process’ that involved ‘consultation’ and evidence gathering. The court’s role was 
instead confined to reviewing the Convention compliancy of the procedural changes effected.292 
Lord Brown agreed, however he reflected Final Appeal’s fears over placing too much faith in 
Parliament to initiate legislative reform and was troubled by whether Parliament would legislate 
promptly in response to the case.293  
Institutional deference to Parliament also arose where a matter was political or involved policy. In 
the case of Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police,294 Lord Phillips did not feel that the extent to 
which the police owed a common law duty of care to citizens to protect them from criminal activity 
was an easy issue for a court of law to resolve. Although judges are the masters of the common law, 
Smith involved issues of policy that Parliament was best placed to resolve. Thus it was for Parliament 
to determine the extent to which a duty of care would adversely affect the police in their duties.  
Lord Phillips was also guided by the fact that the Law Commission had recently issued a consultation 
paper dealing with this matter directly and so felt that this was an area where Parliament was better 
resourced than the Appellate Committee to direct legal change.295  
Deference to Parliament on such social and political matters brought with it a need to clarify the 
limited role of the final appeal court in such cases. In the ‘bank charges’ case,296 Lord Walker opened 
his judgment by making clear that the court did not seek to determine whether the charges imposed 
were ‘fair’.297 He emphasised that it was for Parliament to decide whether they should implement 
the European Directive in a more consumer friendly way and to revisit decisions made at a time that 
favoured ‘light touch regulation’.298 In Radmacher v Granatino,299 the majority were clear that the 
role of the court was not to declare whether prenuptial agreements were legally binding and thus 
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change the legislation in force, but rather to provide interim guidance to courts faced with 
prenuptial agreements as to the weighting to be accorded to them.300 The Law Commission was due 
to report on the matter in 2012301 and the court was merely providing guidance as a stopgap until 
Parliament had had the opportunity to fully consider the position on prenuptial agreements. The 
judges were aware of the need to bridge the divide between what the public may anticipate their 
role to be in a case and what that role actually was, given the respect and deference that the final 
appeal court accorded to Parliament as the legitimate law reforming institution. 
The supportive role of the Law Commission to the legislature was a strong reason for deferential 
behaviour that arose time and again. Lady Hale dissented in Radmacher, however she concurred in 
the view that ‘the law of marital agreements is a mess’ and that ‘it is ripe for systematic review and 
reform.’302 She went on to extoll the virtues of Law Commission-led parliamentary reform, which 
includes the ability to review the whole area, as well as the ability to draw on the experience of the 
public, practitioners and other common law countries. The Commission can also examine the 
economic perspectives and provide a range of options as well as a proposal for reform to be laid 
before Parliament.303 The need for reform to be led by a Law Commission Report and Parliament 
was also advocated in the dissenting opinions of Lord Hope and Lady Hale in Jones v Kaney.304 Lord 
Hope noted that the majority had abolished immunity for expert witnesses for England and Wales 
only and suggested that this would have been better achieved by the legislature following a Law 
Commission report. He therefore urged the Scottish Law Commission to look into the position in 
Scotland.305  Lady Hale agreed and commented that, ‘… it is irresponsible to make such a change on 
an experimental basis.’306 Nevertheless, the fact that the majority felt able to make a departure from 
long standing precedent, without deferring to Parliament and the Law Commission, suggests that on 
occasion the Supreme Court is prepared to lead the way in law reform. 
Indeed, there were areas where the judges were divided over whether the legislative or judicial 
forum was better positioned to initiate the necessary reforms. For instance, the Law Lords seemed 
unclear as to whether the legislature was the best forum where amendments to a common law rule 
were required. In Chartbrook Limited v Persimmon Homes Limited307 the Law Lords stated obiter that 
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they were not prepared to amend the common law rule in Prenn v Simmonds308  that pre-contractual 
negotiations were inadmissible in construing a contract. Lord Rodger found the judicial forum 
limited in this capacity; 
… if there is to be a change, it should be on the basis of a fully formed debate in a forum 
where the competing policies can be properly investigated and evaluated. Although counsel 
presented the rival arguments with conspicuous skill, your Lordships House in its judicial 
capacity is not that forum.309 
Lady Hale disagreed and demonstrated that there is a time when the judiciary are better positioned 
than the legislature to make amendments to the common law: 
My experience at the Law Commission has shown me how difficult it is to achieve flexible 
and nuanced reform to a rule of the common law by way of legislation. In the end abolition 
may be the only workable legislative solution … The courts, on the other hand, are able to 
achieve step by step changes which can distinguish cases in which such evidence is ‘helpful’ 
from cases in which it is not.310 
The Jewish Free School case311 highlighted that it can be difficult to discern when there is a 
fundamental problem with legislation that should be reviewed by Parliament or whether the desired 
result can be better achieved by judicial interpretation.  The case divided a 9 judge panel over 
whether ‘direct discrimination’ could be interpreted narrowly so that the refusal to admit a child to 
the JFS owing to their branch of Jewish descent was actually indirect discrimination and could be 
justified, or whether they were obliged to follow settled discrimination law under the Race Relations 
Act 1976 which suggested that the admissions policy was direct discrimination and thus no 
justification was available. In the latter instance, the majority acknowledged that there was a 
problem with the legislation in this context and Parliament would need to review the law.  The 
majority followed settled discrimination law,312 however Lord Kerr blamed the breadth of the 
legislation and reiterated that the governors of the school were free from any moral blame.313 
Nevertheless, Lords Brown and Hope (dissenting) felt that it was the court’s role not to interpret the 
legislation too widely.314 Lord Rodger also provided a strong dissent and was quite clear that if this 
was genuinely racial rather than religious discrimination, then there would be no need for 
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Parliament to amend the legislation as this was the very discriminatory practice which Parliament 
sought to outlaw. For him, the problem lay not with the legislation, but with the way that the 
majority interpreted the legislation.315  The JFS case therefore demonstrated that grey areas exist 
where either the legislature or the court, acting through the common law, could perceivably address 
an issue. However, it also demonstrated the preference to err on the side of caution and defer to the 
legislature. 
Degrees of Deference; interference with fundamental rights, the Rule of Law or the 
Jurisdiction of the Courts 
 
Malleson predicted that the post-Jackson world would see the ‘transition’ from Parliamentary 
Sovereignty to constitutional supremacy and a refinement of the relationship between the judiciary 
and Parliament.316 The threat to parliamentary omnipotence is especially apparent in a UK 
constitution where, as outlined in the introduction, alternative principles such as the rule of law are 
argued to command equal authority to that of a sovereign Parliament. McGarry is of the view that 
Parliamentary Sovereignty is a principle that can be balanced against other constitutional principles 
and that the ‘explicitness of the language’ of the statutory provision alongside ‘its substance, or 
subject matter’ will determine how much ‘authority’ it will command in the face of alternate 
constitutional principles.317 The importance that McGarry places on the explicitness of language, 
accords with the finding that clear parliamentary intent and clear statutory language were the 
ultimate constitutional trump cards in the time period, even where fundamental rights were 
contravened.318 The engagement of other constitutional principles such as the rule of law, 
fundamental rights or the jurisdiction of the courts did to some extent modify the level of deference 
afforded to the legislature in the time period, even in matters of social policy.  In this sense, the 
institutional relationship between the judiciary and the legislature was subject to ‘degrees’ of 
deference depending on the constitutional context. 
Matters of social policy did not warrant blanket deference from the court and were still found to be 
subject to the constitutional check required by the rule of law. In ReP,319 which centred on an 
unmarried couple’s right to adopt, Lord Hoffmann strongly denied that there was an irrebuttable 
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presumption in areas of social policy that the courts could not intervene. Instead, he suggested that 
the courts had a guardianship role to ensure that Parliament did not discriminate in areas of social 
policy without a rational basis.320 Lord Hope believed a distinction could be drawn depending on 
whether the issue was within the field of ‘social or economic policy’ or instead ‘constitutional 
responsibility’. Discrimination in social policy, as a fundamental tenet of the rule of law, would 
always be appropriate for the review jurisdiction of the courts.321  
Areas where fundamental rights are at stake also had an impact on the degree of deference afforded 
to the legislature. In R (on the application of Countryside Alliance) v HM Attorney General,322 Lord 
Bingham noted that the ‘degree of respect to be shown to the considered judgment of the 
democratic assembly will vary according to the subject matter and the circumstance.’323 Although 
the case at hand was deemed to be a matter of social policy, Lord Hope still believed that there were 
‘areas where the court can legitimately intervene on the ground that it is especially well-placed to 
assess whether an interference is needed and proportionate.’324 Lady Hale provided a philosophical 
justification for interference on the basis of substantive rights. She stated, ‘… democracy is the will of 
the people, but the people may not will to invade those rights and freedoms which are fundamental 
to democracy itself.’325 These candid statements demonstrated the delicate balance to be drawn by 
the judges, in a democratic state, between the respect for political, social and moral judgment of the 
democratically elected assembly and the legitimate role that the judges play in guarding against the 
disproportionate and unnecessary interference with democratic fundamental rights. The ability for 
the court to test the proportionality of matters, where rights were at stake, limited the 
unquestioning deference afforded to Parliament on matters of social policy.  
The Supreme Court also narrowed the deference to Parliament where the jurisdiction of the court 
was under threat. In R v Chaytor,326 a 9 judge panel delivered an assertive, unanimous, decision that 
the jurisdiction of the courts was not blocked by parliamentary privilege in relation to MP expenses 
claims.  Usually, matters deemed to be within the ‘exclusive cognisance of Parliament’ ousted the 
court’s jurisdiction, unless Parliament had legislated to permit the court access to such matters.327 
Nevertheless, Lord Phillips felt that substantial inroads had been made into areas that were 
previously regarded as Parliament’s alone and that whereas decisions as to how the expenses 
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scheme was run was a matter exclusively for Parliament, examining ‘the manner in which the 
scheme [wa]s being implemented’ was not.328 Lord Rodger was in no doubt that the courts had 
criminal jurisdiction alongside Parliament’s ability to try the individuals for contempt, given that the 
privilege had not been asserted by Parliament in the past and the speaker would have intervened if 
he genuinely believed such a privilege to exist.329 Lord Clarke concurred in that as Parliament had 
never claimed any such privilege, it was not now open to it to do so.330 Thus, the shield of 
parliamentary privilege did not necessarily exclude the jurisdiction of the courts without further 
inquiry and demonstrated that the Supreme Court would not unquestioningly defer in relation to the 
justiciability of matters relating to Parliament.331 
The influence of the Convention 
 
This final section examines how the incorporation of the Convention via the HRA appeared to impact 
upon the orthodox institutional relationship in the time period, including the institutional 
communication and levels of institutional deference between Parliament and the court.  The HRA 
has the capacity to transform the ‘monologue’ style of communication332 into a dialogue between 
the two institutions, as well as affect levels of deference. This was recognised by Lady Hale in one of 
the first judgments of the time period; 
For as long as the treaties of the European Community and the European Convention on 
Human Rights remain part of our law, the courts cannot shrink from telling Parliament when 
it has infringed the rights which those treaties protect. We cannot abdicate the role which 
Parliament itself has given us, even if we would prefer to leave certain kinds of question to 
the Parliamentarians.333 
The HRA permitted the courts to undertake Convention-compliant review of primary legislation for 
the first time, however this role should not be overstated. The HRA seeks to preserve legislative 
sovereignty and it is clear that Parliament can still choose to proceed in a Convention incompatible 
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manner.334 In this sense, the HRA has not displaced the primacy of legislative intent. Nevertheless, 
once it is clear that Parliament regards matters to be Convention compliant, the institutional power 
dynamics between Parliament and the court rests largely upon the use of either s3 or s4 of the 
HRA.335 Section 3 requires the court to read and give effect to legislation in a Convention compatible 
manner, so far as it is possible to do so, and s4 permits the court to make a declaration of 
incompatibility where it is satisfied that a provision of legislation is incompatible with a Convention 
right. Section 4 is the more deferential to the elected branches, as the latter must determine how (or 
whether) to remedy the deficient provisions. 
The cases arising in the time period demonstrated that the orthodox characteristics of the judicial-
legislative institutional relationship, outlined above, were reflected in the Convention context.  Thus 
the difference in judicial opinion over which ‘interpretative technique’ was appropriate was evident 
in the debate over how far the s3 obligation to interpret legislation compatibly could extend. The 
decision whether to use s3 or s4 reflected the judicial regard towards the institution that would be 
best placed to undertake the legislative reform. Furthermore, the need to ascertain legislative intent 
was still central to the court’s role in the Convention context, with the starting point being the use of 
s19 to see whether Parliament intended to legislate in a Convention-compatible manner.  
In R (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media 
and Sport,336 the Appellate Committee appeared to have little appetite to review Parliament’s 
decision to proceed with Convention-incompatible legislation under s19. The minister had made a 
s19(1)(b) HRA statement during the passage of the Communications Act 2003 as the executive was 
unable to categorically declare that the prohibition on political advertising was compatible with A10. 
Lord Bingham gave three reasons why Parliament’s decision to proceed in this manner should be 
given a strong weighting.  Firstly, he felt that ‘our democratically elected politicians will be peculiarly 
sensitive to the measures necessary to safeguard the integrity of our democracy. It cannot be 
supposed that others, including judges, will be more so.’ Secondly the s19(1)(b) statement showed 
that Parliament felt it was important to proceed with a ban on political advertising despite the 
possibility of infringement of A10. Thirdly, Parliament legislates by making general rules and hard 
cases should not in themselves invalidate an otherwise beneficial rule.’337 Lord Scott was the lone 
voice who, given the width of the ban, was not as deferential to the legislative decision to proceed 
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with incompatible legislation. Lord Scott did not issue a declaration of incompatibility, however he 
refused to discount the possibility that the courts could, on the correct facts, declare s319 and s321 
of the Communications Act 2003 to be incompatible.338 The deference to the parliamentary decision 
to proceed with incompatible legislation demonstrated the continued strength of clear legislative 
intent in the Convention context and meant that Animal Defenders was one of only three cases 
arising in the time period that did not follow the ECtHR line.339  
By contrast, where Parliament intended to legislate compatibly with Convention and the court found 
that legislation to be incompatible, the court’s role moved to determining whether a s3 or s4 remedy 
was more appropriate. In R (on the application of GC) v The Commissioner of the Police of the 
Metropolis,340 the majority thought that it was possible to read the section compatibility with A8 
ECHR, given the permissive language in s64(1A) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(‘PACE’), so that the need to retain data from all suspects indefinitely was not an essential part of 
Parliament’s scheme. The initial assessment under s19(1)(a) HRA was referred to as part of the  
evidence that Parliament must have intended the statute to be read compatibility with the 
Convention.341 Lord Phillips suggested a purposive approach was required, in the Convention 
context, to allow for parliamentary intent to change since the legislation was enacted. Therefore, 
even if Parliament had not envisaged the restraints on retention of data imposed by Strasbourg, it 
did not follow that it wished the police to continue without restraint.342  The purposive approach 
under the HRA allowed a very broad approach to be taken to what Parliament intended. The dissent, 
however, felt that, despite the discretionary language used, it was the intention of Parliament in 
s64(1A) of PACE to permit indefinite retention of biometric data from suspects of crime and that the 
police were obliged to retain that information indefinitely. Lord Rodger, in supporting a declaration 
of incompatibility under s4, and taking a literal approach to the statutory wording, was quite clear 
that the majority were ‘contradicting’ the legislation.343 Furthermore, he suggested that institutional 
deference to the law reforming position of Parliament, together with the likelihood of amending 
legislation being enacted, was relevant to the decision whether to use s3 or s4.344 He reminded the 
majority that Parliament had demonstrated that it was ‘willing to pass amending legislation’ and that 
there were several possible avenues to achieving this, of which the court was ill equipped to select 
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one.345  The judges therefore differed in whether to take a literal or a purposive approach to 
Parliamentary intent when the HRA was engaged and also in whether it was institutionally more 
appropriate to defer to Parliament to amend the legislation.   
Indeed, GC demonstrated that whilst judicial dicta exists to support a strong reading under s3, 
judicial dicta also exists that limits what is permissible under s3 and the judges appeared to divide 
over which they aligned themselves with. Although Lord Phillips did not believe that this was a case 
where it was necessary to go against legislative intent, he used the authority of Ghaidan v Godin-
Mendoza346 to state obiter that s3 can sometimes, ‘result in the court according to a statutory 
provision a meaning that conflicts with the natural meaning of a statutory provision’.347 He therefore 
approved of Lord Bingham’s dicta in Sheldrake v DPP348 that the s3 HRA interpretative obligation was 
so strong that it could require the court to take a different path from the legislative intention of 
Parliament.349 These statements confirm previous expressions of the reach of s3 made by Lord 
Phillips.350 In other words s3 alters the traditional role of the judiciary in seeking to find and loyally 
implement Parliament’s intent outlined above and permits the court to give effect to an implicit 
parliamentary intent to not legislate contrary to the Convention.  On the other hand, Lord Rodger 
reminded the majority of the limits of the interpretative obligation under s3, in that legislation 
should be read compatibly ‘so far as it was possible to do so’ and cited the words of Lord Nicholls in 
In Re S(Minors) that, ‘… a meaning which departs substantially from a fundamental feature of an act 
of Parliament is likely to have crossed the boundary between interpretation and amendment.’351  
The boundary can be difficult to discern. Reading in a proportionality requirement to a statutory 
provision fell on the right side of the line in Manchester City Council v Pinnock.352 The court rejected 
the argument that to give the county court power to consider the proportionality of a demotion 
order relating to a secure tenancy, where previously the court’s powers were limited to reviewing 
the procedural steps, would amount to an amendment rather than an interpretation of s143D(2) of 
Housing Act 1996.353 This was so even though the proportionality review would allow the court to 
examine the substance of the claim. On the other hand, an interpretation that went against specific 
directions in a statute fell on the wrong side of the line. In AS(Somalia) v Secretary of State for the 
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Home Department,354 the specificity of the directions in s85(5) of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002 to the adjudicator meant that, ‘reading them down would be to cross the boundary 
between interpretation and amendment of the statute.’355  
The judges provided some indication as to how they read down a statute in Principal Reporter v K.356 
There, s3 was used so that ‘relevant person’ in s93(2)(b) Children (Scotland) Act 1995 included more 
persons with an established relationship to a child and adhered to A8 requirements. The method 
selected would depend upon three factors, firstly the Convention right infringed, secondly finding a 
solution that was most in keeping with the ‘grain of the act’ and lastly going no further than is 
necessary to cure the incompatibility.357 Parliamentary intent was important and the words inserted 
were thought to be in keeping with the general scheme of the legislation. Nevertheless, the court 
did not rule out a stronger form of interpretation under s3 where this was required. Obiter 
comments suggested that had A6 been infringed then ‘considerable violence would have to be done 
to the language of section 93(2)(b) in order to put it right.’358 As in the non-Convention context, 
purposively reading words into a statute or reading those words down, was much more sensitive 
than where a Convention compatible reading could be achieved by giving the words in the statute 
their full weight.359  
The controversy that surrounds the extent of the s3 power could be avoided by more frequent use 
of s4 and deferring to Parliament to remedy the defect. The court will, however, consider carefully 
the need to issue a s4 declaration of incompatibility. Doherty v Birmingham City Council360 revealed 
that a declaration will not necessarily be issued if amending legislation is already before 
Parliament.361 Thus it is not simply declaratory as its name suggests, it must have a functional role of 
alerting Parliament to the incompatibility. That said, in R (on the application of Wright) v Secretary of 
State for Health,362 the court made clear that notification of new legislation per se was not enough to 
prevent a declaration of incompatibility being issued in circumstances where the court had not 
heard argument on whether the replacement legislation was Convention compatible. These cases 
suggest a degree of political sensitivity attaches to the decision to grant a declaration, however both 
Doherty and Wright also emphasised the inherent respect that s4 retains for sovereign legislative 
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intent and the primacy of legislature’s law-reforming role in the constitution. In Doherty, Lord 
Walker was clear that an integral part of the HRA mechanics was to preserve the ability for a 
sovereign Parliament to legislate in a way that is incompatible with the Convention and the court’s 
role was to recognise this, but alert Parliament to the incompatibility.363 In Wright, Lady Hale 
thought it appropriate that Parliament should strike the balance between the rights of care workers 
and the rights of the vulnerable adults with whom they work. She did not think it correct that the 
court even suggested ways to make the scheme compatible.364    
Interestingly, Ewing and Tham have cited the procedural challenges brought in the control order 
case of MB and AF365 as evidence of unwillingness to issue declarations of incompatibility and the 
judicial preference to use s3, which they regard as demonstrating a high level of deference to a 
sovereign Parliament in the control order context.366  Although there was a greater use of s3 than s4 
in the transitional time period, the use of s4 was acknowledged to respect Parliament’s ability to 
legislate in a Convention incompatible manner and was used as a mechanism of institutional 
deference to ensure that Parliament, rather than the courts, addressed the defect. In this sense, s4 
was the more deferential tool than s3; the latter playing host to the spectrum of different 
interpretative techniques seen in the non-Convention context that varied in their sensitivity to 
legislative intent and the literal word. 
Conclusion 
 
The statistical data revealed that there were an equal number of findings for as against the executive 
across the 4 year time period. The executive, however, was 20% more successful in the Appellate 
Committee compared to the Supreme Court. This could suggest that the Supreme Court is evolving 
into a more assertive court following its institutional separation; perhaps better positioned- or more 
willing- to challenge executive policy.  Such a conclusion could only be definitively drawn on the back 
of a wider study that covers a larger time period and has a more specific remit to examine the 
circumstance surrounding executive success. 
The quantitative data did, however, reveal a large amount of overlap (44%) between cases that 
involved both the executive and consideration of ECtHR jurisprudence, which suggests that in just 
under half the cases that involved the executive, there was a third institution influencing judicial-
executive relations. The rest of the chapter therefore explored the nature of the three-dimensional 
                                                             
363Doherty, n360 [97] 
364R(Wright), n362 [39] 
365
MB and AF [2007] UKHL 46 
366Ewing and Tham ‘The continuing futility of the Human Rights Act’, n344, 681-682 
211 
 
institutional relationship in the time period to gauge whether it could be partly responsible for the 
differences in the success rate of the executive between the courts and to assess how the three-
dimensional relationship impacted upon judicial-executive relations in the time period.  
In terms of executive success, the quantitative data revealed that the court followed the ECtHR line 
on 82% of occasions and the executive was successful in 55% of these cases. The executive was also 
found to be more successful in cases where the Convention jurisprudence had an influence, 
compared to cases that did not.  In Chapter 6, Table 8 reveals that less human rights cases arose in 
the Supreme Court than the Appellate Committee in the time period, perhaps accounting in some 
way for the lower success rate of the executive in that court. The relative success of the executive in 
the Convention field demonstrated that, in the time period, the executive- and, on occasion, the 
wider state- was more often than not able to conduct itself in accordance with the Convention. 
Furthermore, the fact that the ECtHR line of authority was very rarely departed from meant that the 
ECtHR was in a strong position to prescribe standards in domestic institutional decision-making and 
to influence judicial-executive relations within the Convention context.  
The influence on judicial-executive relations in the Convention context was evident firstly in 
prescribing the institutional decision-making process required where a decision affected a person’s 
rights and secondly in requiring proportionality-based review of executive decision-making. 
However, a review of select cases in the Convention context revealed three matters that appeared 
to impact on executive success. Firstly the judges’ ability to divorce domestic public law failings from 
the standard required to meet the minimum requirements of the Convention. Secondly, the fact that 
the court was loyal only to the minimum standards required by the Convention and no more. Thirdly, 
the level of proportionality-based review varied depending on the article of the Convention engaged 
and so a more exacting form of review than domestic judicial review was not always undertaken. 
Instead the intensity of review was a matter of degree depending on the Convention article invoked, 
the nature of the claim and the margin of appreciation afforded to the executive in the context.  
Each of these matters no doubt affected the quantitative data’s record of executive success in the 
Convention field and suggests that executive success may have been as much attributable to the 
judicial techniques employed to ascertain a Convention breach as to the executive’s ability to govern 
itself within the strictures of the Convention. 
The observational data also revealed the extent to which the incorporation of the Convention and 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR impacted upon judicial-executive relations in the non-Convention 
context. Firstly, from a judicial perspective, there was a willingness to isolate the legal from the 
political and to find matters justiciable wherever possible. Furthermore, the evaluative nature of a 
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decision did not necessarily render it incapable of being characterised as a legal decision. There was 
also an eagerness to ensure that a proper institutional decision-making process was undertaken 
where the rights or legitimate expectations of an individual were affected, which in turn affected 
what the executive could achieve acting by Order in Council. Finally, there appeared to be the 
reinforcement of the domestic principle of the rule of law. The Appellate Committee demonstrated 
that an absolutist vision of the rule of law, on occasion, had to be compromised for the sake of 
national security and diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, in doing so, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
was clearly influential in monitoring the extent of the compromises to the rule of law where it 
affected an individual’s rights, particularly where it came to administering closed material 
proceedings.   
The rule of law seemed to strengthen further in the Supreme Court with it seemingly providing a 
freestanding justification to judicially review executive action, taken without legislative scrutiny that 
affected an individual’s rights. There was also a divisive suggestion that serious breaches of the rule 
of law could in the future result in more than nominal damages as a firm rebuke to executive action. 
This suggestion is likely to have arisen from the ability to be awarded damages under s8 of the HRA 
to ‘vindicate’ the breach of an individual’s rights and would provide teeth to declarations of unlawful 
conduct of the executive.  Whether this arming of the rule of law can be attributed to the influence 
of the Convention, the move from Appellate Committee to Supreme Court or to the judge concerned 
is less clear. In the time period, Lord Hope proposed the freestanding justification for judicial review 
based upon the rule of law and was the main supporter of vindicatory damages where its principles 
had been breached. As such, the observational data may instead evidence the development of Lord 
Hope’s firm belief that the rule of law is the ‘ultimate controlling’ factor on which the UK 
constitution is based.367 
Finally, the influence of the Convention could be seen in its ability to re-characterise the more subtle 
aspects of judicial-executive relations, including whether the judges could take account of the wider 
context and circumstance in which the executive decide matters and the extent to which executive 
justification and intention behind policies had a legal as well as a political angle.  The context of the 
executive decision, particularly where it was a resource allocation decision, was incorporated into 
judicial review through the court recognising the need for the executive to make hard decisions with 
limited resources. The executive was given more latitude provided its actions were not plainly 
unlawful. Nevertheless, determining whether Convention rights had been infringed was a ‘matter for 
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judicial resolution’ and thus out-with the scope of any contextual conversation with the executive.368 
Furthermore, there was some evidence to suggest that the judicial investigation into executive 
intent and justification for policies could begin to characterise the domestic relationship between 
the judiciary and the executive, therefore reflecting the judicial role in the Convention context to 
examine the justification for an interference with a right.  
The influence of the Convention and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR therefore had a tangible 
empirical impact on judicial-executive relations as well as executive success in the time period and 
may have been partly responsible for the difference in executive success rates between the 
Appellate Committee and the Supreme Court. By contrast the influence of the Convention in judicial-
parliamentary relations did not so much re-characterise the orthodox relationship as reflect that 
relationship and the judicial-legislative power balance therein.  This is likely to be attributable to the 
more linear structure between Parliament and the judiciary and the fact that the infrastructure of 
the HRA sought to preserve legislative sovereignty.   
The orthodox relationship was characterised primarily by the need to implement legislative intent, 
however the judges varied in their methods of ascertaining legislative intent and in the 
interpretative techniques they employed. On occasion the lack of clarity in the statute required a 
purposive approach to be taken to ascertaining both statutory and legislative intent. This permitted 
a less prescriptive approach to ascertaining Parliament’s aims and allowed for a more constructive 
approach to interpreting the statute. As a result, it shifted the relative power balance back towards 
the interpretative role of the judiciary. This more interventionist judicial role in statutory 
implementation supports the views on shared sovereignty, outlined in the introduction, which is 
premised upon the interpretative and enforcing role of the court.  
Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded that as an institution, the Supreme Court was more open to 
the broader based interpretative techniques that realign judicial-parliamentary power boundaries. 
Instead, the observational data suggested that statutory interpretative style was more a matter of 
judicial rather than institutional preference. For instance, Lord Phillips appeared to be the most open 
and Lords Brown and Rodger the most sceptical towards purposive techniques.  These individual 
positions were also reflected in each’s openness to using Hansard as a legitimate aid to uncovering 
parliamentary intent. The impressionistic observations of individual judicial interpretative 
preferences have not been confirmed by systematic qualitative analysis. Therefore the 
methodologically safer ground is to suggest that the interpretative style of the court appeared to be 
characterised by the interpretative style preferences of the judges within the court. That said, a 
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more united judicial approach was evident in the need for a constructive approach to ensure the 
technical efficacy of statutes. A role evidently existed for the court where the statutory scheme was 
not comprehensive enough to envisage the situation currently before the court and there was an 
acknowledgement that opaque statutes in certain areas require a more active role from the court.   
There was a high level of deference afforded to the legislature as the primary law reforming 
institution- capable of initiating wide-scale review and consultation- especially where that reform 
was likely to be supported by the independent research of the Law Commission.  Final Appeal 
predicted that the Law Commission would balance ‘excessive judicial activism’ and ‘excessive 
reliance on parliamentary intervention.’369  Indeed, such was the support demonstrated by the 
Justices for the Law Commission, at times it appeared as though the judges were not just deferring 
to the political and social judgment of the democratically elected legislature but rather to the 
legislature’s ability to reform the law as supported by independent legal research.  
In summary, aside from the more active role of the judiciary where a statute was ineffective and the 
occasional individual judicial purposive approach to legislative intent, the orthodox judicial-
parliamentary relationship in the time period was characterised by the need to give effect to the 
clear communication of legislative intent in statute and the need to defer to the wider consultative 
law reforming position of Parliament.  
These orthodox judicial-legislative characteristics were also reflected in the Convention context. 
Ascertaining legislative intent was still the primary motivation of the court, albeit that there were a 
few additional stages to ascertaining legislative intent, where the Convention was involved. This was 
illustrated by the GC case.370 Firstly it needed to be ascertained whether Parliament intended the 
mandatory or permissive retention of data in the substantive statute. Secondly, it needed to be 
established whether Parliament intended to legislate contrary to the Convention (as that would 
appear to block the court’s powers of review if it had). Thirdly, once it had been established that 
Parliament did not intend to legislate contrary to Convention rights, it had to be established whether 
it would have intended for the court to utilise the s3 HRA powers to remedy the defect as far as 
possible or whether it was more respectful to parliamentary intent to issue a declaration of 
incompatibility under s4. The three stage process in GC confirms Nicol’s view that rights based 
interpretation under the HRA allows the wider consideration of parliamentary intent when it 
enacted the HRA as well as parliamentary intent behind the specific statute and therefore provides 
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the judiciary with more latitude to legitimise their actions than purposive statutory interpretation.371  
Again, the individual judicial interpretative preferences in the non-Convention context were 
reflected in how widely each judge was prepared to interpret the s3 HRA obligation in GC, with Lord 
Phillips favouring a wide approach and Lord Rodger adopting more narrow reading of what was 
permissible under s3. Furthermore, the need for proper institutional deference to the law reforming 
position of Parliament, seen in the domestic context, was again reflected in the consideration over 
whether to use s3 to the remedy the situation or to issue a declaration of incompatibility under s4.    
In this sense, the tenets of institutional communication and institutional deference that governed 
the institutional relationship between Parliament and the court, in the time period, were reflected in 
the way that the judges navigated the infrastructure of the HRA.  The court’s loyalty in the 
transitional period therefore remained to the primacy of a Sovereign Parliament.  
A line of Supreme Court cases that have been determined since the close of this study suggest that 
the Convention may impact upon judicial-parliamentary relations going forward in a different way; 
by adjusting the orthodox institutional deference of the common law to statutory law. These cases 
suggest a growing trend to reinforce and rely upon the common law when Convention rights are at 
play.372 This preference to utilise the common law is what Stephenson terms, ‘the Supreme Court’s 
renewed interest in autochthonous constitutionalism’373 and appears to be a judicial response to the 
trend observed in this study- the growing influence of the ECtHR.  A by-product of this could be an 
emboldened and strengthened common law, firmly based upon fundamental rights, that is less 
deferential to statutory law in the future.
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Chapter 5; Relationship with the Domestic Courts 
 
It is an important pseudo-political role of the final appeal court to maintain good relations with each 
of the lower courts to whom it provides a revisionary function.  The chapter focuses on two key 
themes that contextualise the institutional legal relationship between the final appeal court and the 
lower courts; overrule and precedent. These themes to some extent work together, with the system 
of precedent guiding lower courts as to the legal outcome in analogous cases and thereby 
minimising the chances of those courts being overruled. The regularity and circumstance of overrule 
indicates the level of influence that the final appeal court is exerting over the legal system, and the 
extent to which the system of precedent is creating certainty in the law, by successfully providing 
clear guidance to the lower courts. The ability for precedent and the wider system of stare decisis to 
successfully guide lower courts can also be assessed by examining the breadth or specificity of the 
reasoning in each authority and how resilient those authorities were in the time period.  
The thematic structure of ‘overrule’ and ‘precedent’ is again used to assess the state of relations 
between the Scottish courts and the final appeal court, with some adjustment to focus on the acute 
political sensitivities in the area.   For instance, the overrule section focusses on the composition of 
the panel overturning Scottish appeals as well as the outcomes of cases that arose under the court’s 
new devolution issue jurisdiction. The ‘precedent’ section focuses on the creation of precedent in 
Scottish cases by using quantitative data on the volume of citations in such cases alongside 
observational data to compare the composition of Scottish and English judgments in the time period.  
In doing so, the section explores whether the final appeal court acted as an outward looking 
‘national’ court in Scottish cases by comparing, aligning and, where necessary, distinguishing the 
separate legal systems in the UK or whether it acted in a manner more akin to a final court of appeal 
for Scotland, curtailing itself to the issues in the appeal or that which affected the wider Scottish 
jurisdiction. 
The methodological restrictions should be recalled in that the study only looks at the relationship 
with the lower courts from the perspective of the cases arising in the final appeal court.1  
Quantitative data on Northern Irish appeals was collected, however as only two Supreme Court 
appeals originated in Northern Ireland in the time period, it was difficult to undertake any 
                                                             
1Time constraints prevented the reading of each lower court judgment. The lower court judgment was only 
read if further information needed to be gathered in order to code data for the empirical database. Time 
constraints also prevented Blom-Cooper and Drewry from, ‘reading more than a fraction of the judgments in 
the court below.’ See L Blom-Cooper and G Drewry, Final Appeal: A Study of the House of Lords in its Judicial 
Capacity (Clarendon Press, 1972), p247 
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meaningful comparative analysis between the two courts or to assess the relationship that the final 
appeal court had with the Northern Irish appellate courts.2  The Northern Irish data is included in the 
‘origin of appeals’ quantitative analysis that opens this chapter and contextualises the overrule and 
precedent themes, by demonstrating which lower courts had the most interaction with the final 
appeal court in the time period. 
The Origin of Appeals 
 
The frequency of appeals from each originating court is displayed in Table 1 with the differences 
across the sessions displayed in Table 2. 
Table 1. Distribution of Cases by Originating Court 
 House of Lords or Supreme Court 
Total House of Lords Supreme Court 
Which court the appeal 
originated from 
Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
83 86 169 
Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division 
15 5 20 
High Court 10 4 14 
High Court of Justiciary 0 5 5 
Court of Session 9 9 18 
Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal 
8 2 10 
Northern Ireland High Court 2 0 2 
Total 127 111 238 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
2The low numbers are in line with the findings in Dickson’s study where only 42 appeals arose in 30 years; B 
Dickson, ‘The Lords of Appeal and their Work 1967-1996’ in The House of Lords, Its Parliamentary and Judicial 
Roles edited by Brice Dickson and Paul Carmichael (Hart Publishing, 1999), p146. Blom-Cooper and Drewry also 
devoted a proportionately smaller amount of analysis to Northern Ireland on the basis that the similarities to 
the English legal system meant that it could be regarded as ‘an extension of [the court’s] English jurisdiction’. 
See Final Appeal, n1, p387. 
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Figure 1. Pie Chart of Distribution of Cases by Originating Court 
 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Cases by Originating Court and Session 
 
 
Session the case was heard in  
Total 
HL 2007-
2008 
HL 2008-
2009 
SC 2009-
2010 
SC 2010-
2011 
Which court the appeal 
originated from 
Court of 
Appeal Civil 
Division 
49 34 43 43 169 
Court of 
Appeal 
Criminal 
Division 
8 7 1 4 20 
High Court 7 3 2 2 14 
High Court of  
Justiciary 
0 0 3 2 5 
Court of 8 1 4 5 18 
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Session 
Northern 
Ireland Court 
of Appeal 
6 2 1 1 10 
Northern 
Ireland High 
Court 
1 1 0 0 2 
Total 79 48 54 57 238 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Cases by Originating Court and Session 
 
 
The respective tables and pie charts reveal both similarities and differences in the distribution of 
appeals heard by each of the two courts. As has been found in previous studies,3 appeals from the 
Court of Appeal (Civ) dominated the workload of the final appeal court across all 4 years, with a 10% 
                                                             
3Dickson found that between 1967-1996 the CA Civ supplied 65% of appeals ‘… and from the mid-1970s there 
[was] a noticeable increase in the annual number reaching the House of Lords from that source.’ B Dickson, 
‘The Lords of Appeal and their work 1967-1996’, n2, p144 
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increase in such appeals recorded in the Supreme Court.4 There was also a corresponding decrease 
in the number of appeals in the Supreme Court originating in the Court of Appeal (Crim),5 the High 
Court,6 the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal7 and the Northern Ireland High Court.8 Only 2 Northern 
Irish appeals came before the Supreme Court, compared to 10 in the Appellate Committee.  By 
contrast, the addition of the devolution issue jurisdiction amounted to 5% of the Supreme Court’s 
overall workload, meaning that the number of appeals that originated in Scotland increased in the 
Supreme Court. 9 appeals originated in the Court of Session for both the Appellate Committee and 
the Supreme Court,9 however with the devolution issue jurisdiction just under 13% of the Supreme 
Court’s overall workload originated in Scotland, compared to 7% of the Appellate Committee’s 
workload.10 Table 2 demonstrates that there was variation between sessions, although this was less 
marked in the Supreme Court, which had a broadly similar profile across both years of study. Overall, 
the statistics underline the need for a strong institutional relationship between the final appeal court 
and the Court of Appeal (Civ). Furthermore, a strong institutional relationship with the Scottish 
courts is also becoming increasingly important, given the consistency in the number of Court of 
Session appeals in the transitional period, together with the addition of the new devolution issue 
jurisdiction. 
The periodical fluctuations in the origin of appeals to the final appeal court meant that it was 
illustrative to compare the results in this study with the annually published judicial statistics. These 
statistics are recorded by year rather than session, however they still provide useful comparative 
data.11 The percentage of Court of Appeal (Crim) appeals recorded in the first two years of the 
Supreme Court was at least 5% less than the percentages recorded in 2004, 2005 and 2006 in the 
Appellate Committee and correspondingly the Court of Appeal (Civ) figures recorded in the Supreme 
                                                             
4CA Civ appeals accounted for 65% of the Appellate Committee’s workload compared to 77% of the Supreme 
Court’s workload. 
5CA Crim appeals accounted for 5% of the Supreme Court’s workload compared to 12% of the Appellate 
Committee’s workload. 
6EWHC appeals accounted for 4% of the Supreme Court’s workload compared to 8% of the Appellate 
Committee’s workload. 
7NICA cases accounted for just 2% of the Supreme Court’s workload compared to 6% of the Appellate 
Committee’s workload. 
8No appeals from the NIHC arose in the Supreme Court in the time period and only 2 such appeals arose in the 
Appellate Committee. 
9
Paterson notes that ‘… only very rarely between 1930-2009 did … Scots Appeals determined by the House 
exceed 10 a year’. See Final Judgment, The Last Law Lords and The Supreme Court (Hart Publishing, 2013), 
p234 
10
Paterson observes that this increased to 17% of the Court’s decided cases by the end of March 2013. See 
Final Judgment, n9, p234 
11
In 2006, 2005 and 2004 respectively the distribution was CA Civ; 67%,73% and 67%, CA Crim; 14%, 12% and 
13%, EWHC; 6%, 8% and 3%, CoS;  11%, 4% and 13%, NICA; 2%, 3% and 4%, NIHC; 0% for each year. See 
Official Judicial Statistics < https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/judicial-and-court-statistics> 
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Court were circa 5% higher than the percentages recorded in 2004, 2005 and 2006 in the Appellate 
Committee. The Court of Session figures were around average for the last 10 years, and the time 
period did not include an annual spike in such cases, as had occurred in previous years.12 The official 
statistics also reveal that the low numbers of appeals from Northern Ireland are not out of line with 
previous years. Indeed a decline in Northern Irish appeals has been identifiable since the 1960s.13  
Furthermore, the low numbers recorded in the official statistics from the High Court suggest that the 
leapfrog process under the Administration of Justice Act 1969 has never fully established itself as a 
rival route of appeal.14 This looks set to continue in the Supreme Court with the decline in High Court 
appeals indicating a preference to hear appeals that have been through the process of refinement of 
a first tier of appeal.  
The official statistics suggest that the drop in Court of Appeal (Crim) appeals is noteworthy. The 
numbers recorded evidence a continued decline in criminal appeals that began in the final decade of 
the Appellate Committee.15 This is so, despite past empirical studies finding a greater willingness for 
the Appellate Committee to grant leave to appeal in criminal cases.16 The wider implication of a 
steady reduction in criminal appeals is the ability for the Supreme Court to remain as a generalist 
court, exercising supervisory jurisdiction over all areas of law.  Final Appeal identified the need to 
have sufficient case numbers in any given subject area to permit comprehensive law-making and the 
ability to develop an expertise.17  The House of Lords made some notable errors in the criminal 
                                                             
12Between 1998-2007, 4 appeals a year were the norm with the occasional spike of 10 appeals being recorded 
in 2004 and 2006 and 14 appeals in 2007. See N Walker; Final Appellate Jurisdiction in the Scottish Legal 
System, 22 February 2010, Appendix IV < http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2010/01/19154813/12>.  Dickson 
records that 12% of appeals between 1967-1996 originated in Scotland; ‘The Lords of Appeal and their work 
1967-1996’, n2, p146. Historically a far higher number of appeals came from Scotland. Final Appeal reported 
that almost 80% of the House of Lords’ caseload came from Scotland at the start of the 19
th
 century. At the 
time of writing, 1 in 5 of House of Lords appeals were Scottish however there was still fluctuation between the 
years with 1967 and 1968 returning 2 and 11 Scottish appeals respectively. See Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final 
Appeal, n1, p31-35 and p241. 
13
Northern Irish Appeals were as low as 3% at the time of writing Final Appeal.  The authors attributed this to 
the creation of the Republic of Ireland and the introduction of leave to appeal requirements for Northern Irish 
appeals; S1(2) Northern Ireland Act 1962. However, the authors also noted that the decline began prior to the 
enactment of this Act. See Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p36 
14
Dickson found that ‘throughout the thirty-year period there were only fifty-four of these appeals.  In the past 
ten years there have, on average, been only two such appeals per year’. This led Dickson to conclude that the 
procedure did little to relieve the workload pressures on the CA Civ. B Dickson, ‘The Lords of Appeal and their 
work 1967-1996’, n2, p146 
15 Paterson recorded that criminal appeals formed 24% of the Appellate Committee’s overall caseload in 2000-
02, 18% in 2003-05, 14% in 2006-08 and 6% in 2009-13. Paterson, Final Judgment, n9, p17 
16B Dickson, ‘The Lords of Appeal and their work 1967-1996’, n2, p141-144 
17
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p171 and p245 
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field18 and more recently Lord Carnworth has observed that, ‘few of the Law Lords are likely to have 
recent experience of criminal law. Their relatively rare incursions into this field have not always been 
found helpful by the lower courts.’19   
The low number of criminal appeals being heard by the Supreme Court suggests that the Court of 
Appeal (Crim) is likely to retain its authoritative criminal speciality and that court’s relationship with 
the Supreme Court will be less well developed. This could lead to the Supreme Court’s criminal 
expertise being diluted by a ‘continuous preoccupation with the civil law,’20 however the criminal 
law is acknowledged to contain fewer technicalities that can only be grasped with expertise.21  Given 
the criticism of the Appellate Committee in this field, the more removed nature of appellate 
supervision may strengthen relations with that division and avoid any accusations of unwelcome 
intrusions into the jurisprudence developed by the lower court. Nevertheless, the long-term effects 
of such a trend will be that the system of criminal precedent becomes more focussed on lower court 
decisions and the overturn of this court is likely to become even less common going forward. 
The Origin of Appeals, Overrule and the Efficiency of the Court 
 
Appeals from certain lower courts such as the Court of Appeal (Crim), the High Court and the 
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal could be heard, on average, in less than 2 days and a higher 
proportion of cases from these courts would have the capacity to reduce the average length of 
hearing. Table 3 demonstrates, however, that the caseload of the final appeal court was dominated 
by appeals from the Court of Appeal (Civ) which had the second highest average hearing length.  
Interestingly, the most time-consuming appeals to hear came from the High Court of Justiciary. 
Devolution issues are by their very nature important constitutional issues that often raise 
Convention compatibility matters. Therefore, the two courts with the longest hearing time were 
those where Convention-related issues were most likely to arise. The longer time taken to hear 
devolution issues may also be partly attributable to the sensitivities involved in indirectly hearing 
                                                             
18DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290; Where the House of Lords held that Smith’s actual intention was not material, 
instead he must have intended what the ordinary reasonable man would have viewed as the probable results 
of his actions. The results of this were eventually reversed by s8 Criminal Justice Act 1967; Shaw v DPP [1962] 
AC 220, where the Law Lords (Lord Reid dissenting) created a new offence of conspiracy to corrupt public 
morals and in doing so appeared to disregard fundamental principles of the rule of law and the separation of 
powers; Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528, where the appellant was found guilty of misprision of felony (an offence 
which the Law Lords revived) for failing to inform the police that certain persons had stolen firearms. This too 
was abolished by the Criminal Law Act in 1967. See Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p276 
19
Memorandum by Sir Robert Carnwarth, 22 April 2004, written evidence submitted to the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Constitutional Reform Bill, Session 2003-2004 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldcref/125/125we10.htm> 
20Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p275 
21
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p275-276 
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Scottish criminal appeals and the need for extra care to be taken when hearing such cases. 
Nevertheless, no statistically significant differences in the hearing length were recorded22 and only 
five cases originated in the High Court of Justiciary during the time period. Consequently, a longer 
time period would be needed before any firm conclusions could be drawn.  
Table 3. Originating Court and Average Length of Case 
Which court the appeal 
originated from Mean N Std. Deviation 
Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
2.12 169 .940 
Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division 
1.75 20 .786 
High Court 1.71 14 .611 
High Court of Justiciary 2.20 5 .837 
Court of Session 2.06 18 1.211 
Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal 
1.90 10 .568 
Northern Ireland High Court 2.00 2 1.414 
Total 2.05 238 .924 
 
A similar picture was painted by the judgment gap results, as seen in Table 4. There was a great deal 
of variation between the courts, however the Court of Appeal (Civ) had the longest average 
judgment gap, with the High Court of Justiciary coming second. At first sight, this may suggest the 
greater complexity involved in appeals that raised a Convention issue and the need for a longer 
period of time to produce the judgment, however Chapter 3 demonstrated that human rights cases 
only had the second longest judgment gap compared to private law matters and these were not out 
of line with the other subject matters.23 Instead, the results for the Court of Appeal (Civ) are perhaps 
explained by the inclusion of outlier cases that had a very long judgment gap, having had made a 
reference to the CJEU. The results for the High Court of Justiciary could be explained by there being 
only 5 cases that arose in the time period and the importance for the Scottish jurisdiction that 
attached to these devolution issue judgments, as will be seen below.24 The difference in judgment 
gap means between the courts was not statistically significant,25 with the exception of the difference 
between the Court of Session and Court of Appeal (Civ). Both of these courts handle civil matters 
                                                             
22F(6, 237) = 0.91, p = 0.49. 
23See text at Chapter 3, n36 
24Martin and Miller v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 10 and Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43 had an 83 and 
153 day judgment gap respectively. 
25F(6, 224) = 1.00, p = 0.426 
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however the judgment in relation to Court of Session appeals was delivered, on average, around 35 
days earlier. The 95% confidence intervals for the Court of Session are quite wide and so these 
results need to be treated with a degree of caution. If they are representative of a wider pattern, it 
would suggest that either the legal issues appealed from the Court of Session were not as complex 
to resolve as those of the Court of Appeal (Civ) (at the time there was no requirement for leave to 
appeal from the Court of Session),26 or that Scottish appeals were perhaps more discretely focussed 
on the jurisdiction and judgment was therefore quicker to produce. Either way, the shorter 
judgment gap recorded went some way to ensuring the efficient dispatch of appeals from Scotland 
and the overall ‘operational efficiency’ of sending Scottish appeals to London.27 
Table 4. Originating Court and Average Judgment Gap 
Originating Appeal Court Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 95%CI(l) 95%CI(u) 
Court of Appeal Civil Division 91.45 168 124.141 1 1331 72.68 110.22 
Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division 
76.9 20 71.167 15 365 45.71 108.09 
High Court 63.14 14 28.616 21 113 48.15 78.13 
High Court of Justiciary 85.4 5 38.708 63 153 51.47 119.33 
Court of Session 56.06 18 28.911 21 127 42.70 69.42 
Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal 
78 10 33.029 41 146 57.53 98.47 
Northern Ireland High Court 59 2 45.255 27 91 -3.72 121.72 
Total 84.89 237 107.839 1 1331 71.16 98.62 
 
The judgment gap results for the Court of Session continued in terms of length of judgment, with 
Court of Session originating appeals having, on average, the shortest judgments of all the courts.  
This empirically reflects the fact that judgment writing in Scots appeals was largely left to (or at least 
led by) the Scottish Justices.28  Again, the shorter judgments may suggest the relatively minor 
importance of the issues or even the reluctance of the final appeal court to act as a more outward 
looking court of review rather than a final court of appeal dealing with the narrow issues arising in 
Scottish civil appeals. The High Court of Justiciary appeals also did not result in unduly lengthy 
judgments when compared to other courts. Thus the increased time taken to hear and produce 
judgment in such cases was not reflected in the length of the final judgment and reflects the fact 
that although the complexity of a Convention matter or Scottish constitutional issue took time to 
hear and to reach a judgment on, the writing itself was still largely left to a Scottish judge. This is 
                                                             
26This changed for all Court of Session judgments pronounced on or after 22 September 2015 as a result of the 
Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014. 
27
See Walker Report, n12, p61 
28
See discussion in text at n179 below. 
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where Convention cases arising in Scotland and Convention cases arising in England and Wales were 
treated differently. The Court of Appeal (Civ) produced the most lengthy of all the judgments, with 
human rights cases generally being statistically significantly longer and including a statistically 
significant greater number of concurring opinions. Devolution issue judgements, by contrast, were 
slightly shorter and potentially still characterised by their jurisdictional context. That said, none of 
the differences in the length of judgments between the courts displayed in Table 5 were statistically 
significant29 and so no definitive conclusions could be drawn. 
Table 5.Originating Court and Average Length of Judgment 
Originating Appeal Court Mean N Std. Deviation 
Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
34.54 169 23.226 
Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division 
27.15 20 20.205 
High Court 29.07 14 17.903 
High Court of Justiciary 30.80 5 21.948 
Court of Session 25.06 18 11.775 
Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal 
33.40 10 15.328 
Northern Ireland High Court 29.50 2 28.991 
Total 32.71 238 21.764 
 
Overall, the efficiency of the court, in terms of length of hearing has improved since Final Appeal.30  
Nevertheless, the pattern that emerged from the statistics, taken alongside the data from Chapter 3, 
is that the longer judgment and case length in Convention-related appeals had an effect on relations 
between the final appeal court and the lower courts in which those appeals arose. Chapter 3 
revealed that human rights cases took, on average, a day and a half longer to hear than other 
subject matters and had statistically significant longer judgments with statistically significantly more 
concurring opinions.  Whereas appeals from the Court of Appeal (Civ) replicated this trend, appeals 
from the High Court of Justiciary did not do so for judgment length. This suggests that devolution 
issues were a discrete category of case that were characterised more by their jurisdiction of origin. 
Appeals from the Court of Session had the shortest judgments, on average, demonstrating that 
                                                             
29
F(6,222) = 0.481, p = 0.822 
30
See Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p235; ’79 per cent of appeals (96 per cent of Scottish 
appeals, 74 per cent of English civil appeals, and 81 per cent of criminal appeals) occupied four days or less in 
the House of Lords; 8 per cent took only one day (or part day), 19 per cent of Scottish appeals, 4 per cent of 
English civil appeals and 15 per cent of criminal appeals. Only 3 per cent of Scottish appeals occupied 7 days or 
more, as compared with 9 per cent of English civil appeals and 11 per cent of criminal appeals.’ 
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judgments pertaining exclusively to the Scottish jurisdiction tended to be shorter. These results may 
be symptomatic of the discrete way in which appeals from Scotland were handled, an idea that is 
more fully developed below. From an institutional relational perspective, it can be concluded that 
there was a difference, depending on the subject matter of the appeal and the lower court 
concerned, in the efficiency with which the lower court was upheld or overruled and, in some cases, 
the speed at which a precedent was established, distinguished or confirmed. 
Overturning the lower court also had the potential to increase hearing length, judgment gap and the 
length of judgment and thus affect the overall efficiency of the court. Table 6 demonstrates that 
there was a marginal increase in hearing length where the lower court was overturned and a more 
significant increase in hearing length when the lower court was reversed in part.31 The same was 
true for judgment gap (see Table 7) although the longest gap was found when the lower court was 
reversed in full. The judges, therefore, took longer to hand down judgment when the lower court 
was overturned, but not to a significant extent.32 Table 8 also demonstrates that the length of the 
judgment increased when the lower court was overturned, particularly when the lower court was 
reversed in part. These results were statistically significant33 with the post hoc Bonferroni test 
revealing the statistical significance to lie between those decisions not overruled and those reversed 
in part.34  
Table 6. Overrule of Lower Court and Average Length of Case  
 
Whether the lower court 
was overruled Mean N Std. Deviation 
Yes 2.06 106 .882 
No 1.99 102 .949 
Reversed in part 2.71 24 .908 
Total 2.09 232 .935 
 
 
 
                                                             
31F(2, 229) = 6.16, p = 0.002. Post hoc analyses revealed a significant difference both between cases that were 
overturned and reversed in part (Mean difference = -0.59, p < 0.05, 95%CI -1.03 to -0.16) and decisions which 
were not overturned compared to those reversed in part (Mean difference = -0.699, p < 0.05, 95%CI -1.13 to  -
0.26). 
32
These differences were not statistically significant when comparing the three decisions (yes, no, part 
reversal) together (F(2,228)=0.75, p = 0.47). There were not statistically significant differences when these 
were compared in pairs, i.e. “yes” v “part reversal”, “no” v “part reversal.” 
33F(2, 229) = 3.28, p = 0.039 
34Mean difference: -12.89, p = 0.034 
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Table 7. Overrule of Lower Court and Average Judgment Gap  
Whether the lower court 
was overruled Mean N Std. Deviation 
Yes 94.11 106 152.271 
No 75.75 102 48.412 
Reversed in part 88.70 23 32.809 
Total 85.46 231 108.604 
 
Table 8. Overrule of Lower Court and Average Length of Judgment 
Whether the lower court 
was overruled Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Yes 34.62 106 21.489 6 125 
No 31.70 102 21.488 4 129 
Reversed in part 44.58 24 27.924 19 126 
Total 34.37 232 22.437 4 129 
 
These results should be treated with caution.  They may well demonstrate that the cases where the 
lower court was reversed in full or in part were more complex or reviewed more authorities. The 
results may also suggest that counsel was subjected to an extended period of questioning when 
certain Justices were minded to take a different view to the lower court, or where the Justices were 
trying to establish how the lower court reached its decision. Nevertheless, the only significant 
differences found were when a judgment was reversed in part and these statistics included 
conjoined appeals, where one appeal was allowed and the other was not. Grouping of appeals that 
raised similar issues was a practice adopted by both the Appellate Committee and the Supreme 
Court.  The consideration of two sets of circumstances will naturally increase the length of time 
taken to hear the case and the length of judgment produced, however other efficiencies are thought 
to be gained by considering cases that raise similar legal issues together. These efficiencies include 
avoiding duplication of counsel’s submissions and the documents produced for the appeal,35 only 
requiring one hearing to be scheduled, one panel of judges to be convened and one judgment to be 
written. Consequently, a three day hearing for a conjoined appeal may overall be regarded as a 
more economical use of judicial time than several two day hearings with a separate judgment being 
produced for each appeal. A wider study would be required to see whether the practice of 
conjoining appeals, when viewed in the round, actually decreased the efficiency of the court.  By 
                                                             
35UKSC PD 8; Miscellaneous at 8.2.1 and 8.2.2. 
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contrast, overturning the lower court in full had only a marginal but insignificant impact on the 
efficiency measurements. 
Overrule of Appeals 
 
One of the key aspects of the institutional relationship between the final appeal court and each of 
the lower courts is the rate at which appeals are upheld and conversely the rate at which they are 
overturned.36 Tables 9 and 10 below suggest a general rise in the rate of overturn of the lower court 
from the Final Appeal time period.37 The tables demonstrate that although marginally fewer appeals 
were heard by the Supreme Court in the time period examined, taking overrule and ‘reversed in 
part’ together, the Appellate Committee overruled the lower court on at least one issue in 53% of its 
decisions and the Supreme Court did so in 59% of its decisions.38 The statistics are expected to be 
staked slightly in favour of overrule, given that leave to appeal is often granted by the final appeal 
court on the basis that the reasoning of the court below may be ‘problematic’ or may insufficiently 
guide lower courts.39 As outlined in the precedent section, poor guidance from authorities can have 
adverse consequences in a system of stare decisis. 
Table 9. Overrule of Lower Court by Court 
 Whether the lower court was overruled Total 
Yes No Reversed in 
part 
House of Lords or Supreme 
Court 
House of Lords 57 59 10 126 
Supreme Court 49 43 14 106 
Total 106 102 24 232 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
36R29 Supreme Court Rules 2009 state that the court may (a) affirm, set aside or vary any order or judgment 
made or given by that court; (b) remit any issue for determination by that court, (c) order a new trial or 
hearing, (d) make orders for the payment of interest; and (e) make a costs order. 
37
During that period 38% of appeals were allowed wholly or in part. This included a 36.1% success rate for 
English civil appeals, a 47% success rate for Scottish civil appeals, a 60% success rate for Northern Irish civil 
appeals and a 25.1% success rate for English and Northern Irish criminal appeals. See Blom-Cooper and 
Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p243 
38
Note that these figures are based upon 14 instances of no data for overrule. No data could be recorded 
where the case related to an CJEU reference, it was an Attorney General’s Reference, it related to a costs 
order, it involved the temporary suspension of an order or the decision to grant an anonymity order. In such 
instances there was no lower court decision to overrule. 
39
See Paterson, Final Judgment, n9, p209 
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Table 10. Overrule of Lower Court by Session 
 
 Whether the lower court was overruled Total 
Yes No Reversed in 
part 
Session the case was heard 
in 
HL 2007-2008 37 36 4 77 
HL 2008-2009 20 23 6 49 
SC 2009-2010 25 22 3 50 
SC 2010-2011 24 21 11 56 
Total 106 102 24 232 
 
The number of judgments overruled for each originating court is shown in Table 11 with the 
percentages displayed in Figure 3. Only the Court of Appeal (Civ) and the Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal had more cases overturned in full than upheld and in the latter case the difference was just 
one appeal. The Court of Session had its decision overturned in full in exactly the same number of 
instances as it had its decision upheld and the High Court of Justciary had 40% of its cases 
overturned. The Court of Session would join the list of courts where overruled cases outnumbered 
cases upheld, were the reversed in part statistics to be included.  
The percentages in Figure 3 demonstrate that there was a higher success rate for English civil 
appeals (49.7%) to that found in Final Appeal (36%) and a marginally lower success rate for Scottish 
civil appeals (44.4% compared to Final Appeal’s finding of 47%). The success rate for criminal appeals 
also appeared to have risen slightly, at 35% for the Court of Appeal (Crim), compared to a 25.1% 
success rate for English and Northern Irish criminal appeals in Final Appeal’s study period. 3 of the 12 
Northern Irish appeals were perceived to relate to a criminal or criminal procedure matter and in 
each the lower court was upheld.40 Therefore, the inclusion of Northern Irish criminal appeals would 
bring the overall success rate for criminal appeals down from 35%. The figures suggest that the final 
appeal court was more comfortable overruling civil appeals than criminal appeals, however the court 
overruled more criminal appeals in the time period than in the 1960s. The opening section revealed 
that the number of appeals from the criminal division continued to decline in the Supreme Court. If 
this pattern continued, it could result in a decline in Supreme Court criminal expertise and reduce 
the frequency with which the Court of Appeal (Crim) is overruled. Final Appeal drew an analogy 
between Scottish appeals and criminal appeals in terms of the relative expertise of the final appeal 
                                                             
40Ward (AP) v Police Service of Northern Ireland [2007] UKHL 50; In re Maye (AP) (Northern Ireland) [2009] 
UKHL 9; In re McE (Northern Ireland) [2009] UKHL 15 
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court compared to the lower court, however Scottish appeals had a greater chance of success than 
criminal appeals in the time period and did not appear to command the same hesitation to overrule.  
Table 11. Overrule of Lower Court by Originating Court 
 Whether the lower court was overruled Total 
Yes No Reversed in 
part 
Which court the appeal 
originated from 
Court of Appeal Civil Division 79 62 18 159 
Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division 
7 13 0 20 
High Court 4 9 1 14 
High Court of Justiciary 2 3 0 5 
Court of Session 8 8 2 18 
Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal 
5 4 1 10 
Northern Ireland High Court 0 2 0 2 
Total 105 101 22 228 
 
Figure 3. Bar Chart of Overrule of Lower Court by Originating Court 
 
Table 12 demonstrates the rate of overrule of each court as between sessions. There were more 
cases overruled than upheld in the Court of Appeal (Civ) across all sessions bar the Supreme Court 
2010-2011 session whereby the overturn rate equalled the uphold rate. Nevertheless, with reversed 
in part judgments included, the rate of disapproval of the Court of Appeal (Civ) still outweighed the 
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rate of approval in that session. The picture for the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal was not as 
consistent, with 100% of its appeals being upheld in session 2008-2009 despite being overruled 
more often than being upheld in all of the other sessions. The results for the Court of Session also 
did not show any consistency across the sessions, however numerically they were more revealing. 
The Appellate Committee upheld 6 appeals, overruled 2 appeals and reversed in part 1 appeal. The 
Supreme Court only upheld 2 appeals, overruled 6 appeals and reversed in part 1 appeal. Thus the 
success rate of appeals from the Court of Session was 22% in the Appellate Committee compared to 
67% in the Supreme Court (not including reversed in part statistics). This reduced to a 57% success 
rate of Scottish appeals in the Supreme Court when devolution issues were considered.41 The 
Supreme Court also appeared more willing to overrule the Northern Ireland High Court, however 
only a very small number of cases were returned in the time period and as a result it was difficult to 
draw any conclusions. An interesting pattern developed when the Court of Appeal (Crim) figures 
were examined as they revealed that that lower court was not overruled at all in the Supreme Court, 
yet it was often overruled in the Appellate Committee.  The Supreme Court therefore already 
appeared to be regressing back to a low success rate for criminal appeals; even lower than that 
recorded in Final Appeal. This perhaps reflects the smaller numbers of criminal appeals that came 
before the court alongside the acknowledged inexperience of the Justices in the criminal field. 
Indeed the Supreme Court would be keen to avoid any controversy in its fledgling years that would 
signal a repeat of the axel of criminal cases that generated so much criticism for its predecessor.42 
Table 12. Overrule of Lower Court by Originating Court and Session 
Session HL 2007-
08 
  HL 2008-
09 
  
Court / Overruled Yes No Reversed 
in part 
Yes No Reversed 
in part 
Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
55.3 40.4 4.3 50.0 35.3 14.7 
Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division 
50.0 50.0  42.9 57.1  
High Court 28.6 57.1 14.3  100.0  
Court of Session 25.0 75.0    100. 
Northern Ireland Court 
of Appeal 
50.0 33.3 16.7  100.  
Northern Ireland High 
Court 
 100.0   100.  
Total 48.1 46.8 5.2% 41.7 45.8 12.5 
       
Session SC 2009-
10 
  SC 2010-
11 
  
                                                             
41
The overall statistic reduced if statistics up to 2013 are considered. Paterson reports the success rate of 
Scottish appeals being 43%. See Final Judgment, n9, p237 
42See n18 
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Court / Overruled Yes No Reversed 
in part 
Yes No Reversed 
in part 
Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
52.6 39.5 7.9 40.0 40.0 20.0 
Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division 
 100.0   100.0  
High Court  100.0  100.0   
Court of Session  100.0  100.0   
High Court of 
Justiciary 
100.0    100.0  
Northern Ireland Court 
of Appeal 
75.0 25.0  60.0 20.0 20.0 
Northern Ireland High 
Court 
   100.0   
Total 49.0 44.9 6.1 44.4 38.9 16.7 
 
In order to provide weight and authority to the decision to overrule, and to smooth the relationship 
with the lower court, the final appeal court may try to garner unanimity and reflect the strength of 
its decision in the judgment style selected. For instance the court could choose to provide a single 
judgment, limit the number of concurring or dissenting opinions and/or increase the panel size.  This 
next section reviews the extent to which the decision to overrule the lower court affected unanimity 
levels and the judgment style used by the final appeal court.  
Final Appeal found dissent occurred more often when the lower court was being overruled.43 Table 
13 merged overrule in full and overrule in part into one column.  Interpreting the results in the same 
way as Final Appeal, of the 62 appeals where there was dissent in the final appeal court, only 50% 
overruled the lower court compared to a 56% overrule rate overall. On a different presentation, 
when the lower court was overruled in some way, the final appeal court was unanimous in 76% 
(130/ 232) of cases compared to when the lower court was not overruled where it was only 
unanimous in 70% (71/102) of cases. Contrary to the findings in Final Appeal, this suggests a 
marginally increased effort to be unanimous where the lower court was overturned. The fact that 
there was still a divided court in one quarter of decisions reflects the fact that cases that reach the 
final appeal court tend to involve issues that are very closely balanced.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
43
50% of appeals with a dissent overturned the lower court compared to a 36% overturn rate overall. 67% of 
Scottish Appeals with a dissent overturned the lower court compared to a 47% overturn rate overall. See 
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p190 
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Table 13. Overrule of Lower Court by Unanimity of Final Appeal Court 
 
 
Overrule 
Total Yes No 
SCHL_Unanimity SC/HL Divided 31 31 62 
SC/HL Unanimous 99 71 170 
Total 130 102 232 
 
Table 14 reveals whether any particular lower court was more likely to benefit from a unanimous 
decision provided by the final appeal court. The English courts had a very similar rate of unanimous 
final appeal court judgments: Court of Appeal (Civ) (74%), Court of Appeal (Crim) (75%) and the High 
Court (71%). The Scottish courts returned a higher unanimity rate; High Court of Justiciary (80%) and 
Court of Session (100%), whereas the Northern Irish courts had the lowest rate of unanimity at 50% 
for both the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal and the Northern Ireland High Court. Clearly the 
Scottish courts benefitted the most from unanimous judgments. Caution needs to be attached to the 
results for Northern Ireland, given the low numbers of cases involved however it appears that the 
Justices dissented in cases arising from this jurisdiction far more than in cases arising from Scotland. 
This may be owing to the greater familiarity that the Justices had with the Northern Irish legal 
system, which is more in line with that in England and Wales. 
Table 14. Originating Court and Unanimity of Final Appeal Court 
 
SCHL_Unanimity 
Total SC/HL Divided 
SC/HL 
Unanimous 
Which court the appeal 
originated from 
Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
44 125 169 
Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division 
5 15 20 
High Court 4 10 14 
High Court of Justiciary 1 4 5 
Court of Session 0 18 18 
Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal 
5 5 10 
Northern Ireland High Court 1 1 2 
Total 60 178 238 
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Tables 15 and 16 respectively demonstrate that there was no relationship between the number of 
concurring and dissenting opinions provided depending on whether the lower court was being 
overruled or upheld.44 Table 17 also demonstrates that although there was a slightly higher average 
number of concurring opinions when the lower court was reversed in part, generally there was no 
difference in the average number of concurring opinions depending on whether the lower court was 
overturned or not.45  For dissenting opinions (see Table 18) there was a slightly lower average 
dissent rate where the lower court was overturned. This suggests, contrary to the findings in Final 
Appeal, that overrule cases did not necessarily prompt the Justices to dissent or, as Lee suggests, to 
provide extra justification for the decision to overrule.46 Furthermore, the decision to overrule the 
lower court was no more likely to split the final appeal court and may slightly increase the chances of 
a unanimous judgment. 
Table 15.Overrule of Lower Court and Number of Concurring Opinions 
 Whether the lower court was overruled 
Total Yes No Reversed in part 
No of concurring opinions 
provided in the case 
0 22 26 4 52 
1 16 13 4 33 
2 25 18 5 48 
3 14 16 3 33 
4 25 24 6 55 
5 1 2 0 3 
6 1 1 1 3 
7 2 1 0 3 
8 0 1 1 2 
Total 106 102 24 232 
 
Table 16. Overrule of Lower Court and Number of Dissenting Opinions 
 
 
Whether the lower court was overruled 
Total Yes No Reversed in part 
No of dissenting opinions 
provided in the case 
0 82 71 17 170 
1 8 15 4 27 
2 12 13 1 26 
                                                             
44There were 233 concurrences when the lower court was overruled compared to 224 concurrences where the 
lower court was upheld. 
45F(229) = 0.42, p = 0.66 and t(230) = 0.01, p = 0.78, respectively 
46Lee thought that overturn may prompt a judge to provide a concurring opinion either to ‘chastise’ the lower 
court or out of respect for that court. See ‘A Defence of Concurring Speeches’ [2009] PL 305, 324 
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3 3 1 2 6 
4 0 2 0 2 
5 1 0 0 1 
Total 106 102 24 232 
 
Table 17. Overrule of Lower Court and Average Number of Concurring Opinions 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Yes 106 2.20 1.659 
No 102 2.20 1.780 
Reversed in part 24 2.54 2.000 
Total 232 2.23 1.745 
 
Table 18. Overrule of Lower Court and Average Number of Dissenting Opinions 
 
Whether the lower court 
was overruled Mean N Std. Deviation 
Yes .43 106 .916 
No .51 102 .898 
Reversed in part .50 24 .933 
Total .47 232 .907 
 
The relationship between the number of concurring opinions and overruling either a unanimous or a 
divided lower court was then tested to see if it revealed any differences (see Table 19).  A marginally 
higher average number of concurring opinions was recorded when the lower court was divided, 
whether it was overruled or upheld. Therefore, despite previous assertions,47 the judges were not 
more likely to write when overruling a unanimous lower court in the time period.   
Table 19. Overrule of Lower Court (Overrule and Reversed in Part Combined), Unanimity of Lower 
Court and Average Number of Concurring Opinions 
 
What the result was in the 
lower court Overrule Mean N Std. Deviation 
Unanimous Yes 2.21 108 1.713 
No 2.16 93 1.789 
                                                             
47See Paterson, Final Judgment,n9, p99 
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Total 2.19 201 1.745 
Divided Yes 2.45 20 1.849 
No 2.56 9 1.740 
Total 2.48 29 1.785 
Total Yes 2.25 128 1.730 
No 2.20 102 1.780 
Total 2.23 230 1.749 
 
Another way to add weight to an overrule decision is to use a single judgment.  Certain of the lower 
courts were more likely to benefit from the efficiency gains of having a single judgment delivered 
than others (see Table 20). 22% of all appeals originating in the Court of Appeal (Civ) were single 
judgments, compared to 40% of the Court of Appeal (Crim) originating appeals. 36% of the High 
Court, 0% of the High Court of Justiciary, 39% of the Court of Session, 10% of the Northern Ireland 
Court of Appeal and 50% of the Northern Ireland High Court originating appeals were single 
judgments. Discounting the latter result, as only 2 cases arose in the time period, it can be seen that 
the largest percentages were returned for the Court of Session and the Court of Appeal (Crim). 
These results confirm the favoured use of single judgments in specialist areas, such as criminal law, 
to increase certainty in the law.48 Scots law is also a specialist area, where the political sensitivities in 
the institutional relationship with the Scottish lower courts appear to make it appropriate for the 
specialist Scots law Justice or Law Lord to write the judgment of the court. This will be reviewed 
more closely below, when the focus moves to relations with the Scottish courts. 
Table 20. Originating Court and Single Judgments  
 
Was the case a single judgment case? 
Total No 
Yes-composite or 
collective judgment 
Yes- Single 
judgment with 
others only 
formally 
concurring 
Which court the appeal 
originated from 
Court of Appeal 
Civil Division 
132 25 12 169 
Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division 
12 7 1 20 
High Court 9 2 3 14 
High Court of 
Justiciary 
5 0 0 5 
                                                             
48
Paterson, Final Judgment, n9, p102 
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Court of Session 11 3 4 18 
Northern Ireland 
Court of Appeal 
9 0 1 10 
Northern Ireland 
High Court 
1 1 0 2 
Total 179 38 21 238 
 
Merging the ‘overrule’ with the ‘reversed in part’ column, Table 21 demonstrates that a 
composite/collective judgment was handed down in 13% of decisions that were overruled (17/130) 
compared to 12% (13/102) of decisions that were upheld.  A single judgment with others formally 
concurring was used in 7% (9/130) of decisions that were overruled compared to 10% (11/102) of 
decisions that were upheld.  Table 22 pulls the types of single judgment and overrule together and 
demonstrates that only 20% of judgments overruled (on at least one issue) were single judgments 
whereas 25% of judgments that were upheld were single judgments. Single judgments, therefore, 
did not appear to be used as a tool to add weight to a decision to overrule.  
It is possible that the general rise in single judgments being issued by the Supreme Court will 
naturally infiltrate into ‘overturn’ decisions. The increased use of the composite/ collective style of 
judgment in the Supreme Court resulted in an increase in the proportion of that style of single 
judgment being used in overturn decisions- 14 out of 17 composite/collective cases that overturned 
the lower court arose in the Supreme Court’s time period. Nevertheless, this is largely in substitution 
for the ‘single judgment with others formally concurring’ style with only 2 out of 9 such cases that 
overturned the lower court arising in the Supreme Court time period. Thus the net effect was that 
the Appellate Committee issued 10 single judgments that overturned the lower court compared to 
16 in the Supreme Court. This 6 case increase could be symptomatic of a gradual increase in the use 
of single judgments for such purposes, but it is not numerically strong enough to draw any firm 
conclusions. 
Table 21. Overrule of Lower Court and Single Judgments  
 Whether the lower court was overruled Total 
Yes No Reversed in part 
Was the case a single 
judgment case? 
No 84 78 20 182 
Yes-composite or 
collective 
judgment 
14 13 3 30 
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Yes- Single 
judgment with 
others only 
formally 
concurring 
8 11 1 20 
Total 106 102 24 232 
 
Table 22. Overrule of Lower Court and Single Judgments (dichotomised) 
 SINGLE 
Total No Yes 
Overrule Yes Count 104 26 130 
% within Overrule 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
No Count 78 24 102 
% within Overrule 76.5% 23.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 182 50 232 
% within Overrule 78.4% 21.6% 100.0% 
 
Table 23 demonstrates that there was a slightly higher instance of single judgments being used in 
cases that overruled the lower court where it was not following precedent (25% compared to 21%) 
or following final appeal court precedent (16% compared to 12%), however where single judgments 
were most frequently used was in upholding a lower court following lower court precedent (38% 
compared to 18%). These results are harder to rationalise. The court, in such scenarios, may wish to 
add weight to the decision to support a lower court precedent. Further study would be required to 
see whether this was symptomatic of a general trend rather than an anomaly in the results. 
Table 23; Overrule of Lower Court, Lower Court following Precedent and 
Single Judgment  
 
Does the lower court follow established 
precedent? 
SINGLE 
Total No Yes 
No precedent followed Overrule Yes 38 13 51 
No 40 11 51 
Total 78 24 102 
Yes; precedent set by 
House of Lords/Supreme 
Court 
Overrule Yes 32 6 38 
No 22 3 25 
Total 54 9 63 
Yes; precedent set by lower Overrule Yes 31 7 38 
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court No 16 10 26 
Total 47 17 64 
Total Overrule Yes 101 26 127 
No 78 24 102 
Total 179 50 229 
 
The final way to add weight to a decision would be to increase the panel size that determines the 
appeal. Table 24 demonstrates that the vast majority of overrule decisions were taken by the 
standard 5 justice panel. Nevertheless, 12% of all overruled decisions (including reversed in part) 
(16/129) were overruled by a 7 Justice panel (compared to 3% (4/102) of upheld decisions being 
upheld by a 7 Justice panel).  5% (6/129) of overruled decisions were overruled by a 9 Justice panel 
(compared to 6% (6/102) of upheld decisions being upheld by a 9 Justice panel). The 7 Justice panel 
pattern was not replicated by 9 Justice panels as these enlarged panels were just as likely to be 
convened in cases that were eventually upheld as overruled. The instances of 9 justice panels were 
much fewer in the time period, and a study over a longer time period would assist in concluding 
whether 7 Justice panels overrule the lower court more often than 9 Justice panels.  The results 
returned for 7 Justice panels could be explained in a number of ways. Firstly, that there was a slight 
tendency for 7 Justice panels to overrule lower courts. Secondly, that the cases that convene a 7 
Justice panel tend to be those in which the issues are more finely balanced, complex or where the 
law (which the lower court may have felt bound by) needs reviewing. Thirdly, a 7 justice panel was 
convened in cases where it was suspected that overrule may be forthcoming, to add weight to the 
decision. The latter scenario is unlikely, given the proportion of cases that are still overruled by a 5 
Justice panels.  The first two reasons are possible, but they don’t explain the difference in the results 
for 9 and 7 Justice panels- aside from the fact that the 9 Justice panel results were affected by low 
numbers.  If the first reason is true and larger panels are more likely to overrule the lower court, 
then the increased use of these panels in the Supreme Court will impact on relations with the lower 
courts and may be one of the reasons why the rate of overrule in the Supreme Court is slightly 
higher than in the Appellate Committee. Nevertheless, the greater propensity of such panels to 
overrule the lower court may be accepted owing to the increased weight attaching to a larger panel 
size’s decision, particularly where the court is unanimous.  
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Table 24. Overrule of Lower Court and Panel Size  
 Whether the lower court was overruled 
Total Yes No Reversed in part 
panel 3 justices 1 0 0 1 
5 justices 90 92 16 198 
7 justices 12 4 4 20 
9 justices 2 6 4 12 
Total 105 102 24 231 
 
The reason for overrule 
 
The frequency of overrule and the judgment style used in cases that overrule a lower court reveals 
little about the reasons behind the decision to overrule.  By the time an appeal reaches the final 
appeal court, the judicial vote for each party in the lower courts can be even.49 Certain cases will 
split both the lower and the final appeal court, with the arguments for each side either being ‘evenly 
balanced’50 or the issues being especially ‘difficult to resolve’.51 In Final Appeal it was noted that 
division in the court below was one of the criterion used for leave to appeal, partly because any 
conflict in how the law should be interpreted or applied should be settled by the final appeal court.52  
Alder’s more recent, yet more limited, study of one year found that in 1999 only 27% of appeals 
came from a divided Court of Appeal.53 The results of this study, shown in Table 25, demonstrate 
that this is now even lower, with only 12% of cases coming from a divided lower court. The Court of 
Appeal (Civ), of all the originating courts, was most frequently divided, followed by the Court of 
Session.  The High Court is usually presided over by a single judge and therefore had a 100% 
unanimity rate.  The Court of Appeal (Crim) and the High Court of Justiciary were always unanimous 
in the time period. Conventionally, the Court of Appeal (Crim) does not provide dissenting and 
concurring opinions. 
                                                             
49Lord Clarke refers to ‘the judicial score being two all’ in Farstad Supply AS v Enviroco Limited (Scotland) 
[2010] UKSC 18 [4] 
50Maco Door and Window Hardware (UK) Limited v HM Revenue and Customs [2008] UKHL 54; Chartbrook 
Limited v Persimmon Homes [2009] UKHL 38 were cases where the dissenting view in the lower court was 
preferred. 
51
R (on the application of E) v The Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKHL 15 [125] (per Lord Clark), although this 
was a case where the appeal was dismissed. 
52
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p134. The authors noted that, ‘Of 349 English civil appeals heard 
by the House of Lords during the period 1952-68 no fewer than 232 (66.5 per cent) involved an element of 
disagreement below i.e. either a dissenting judgment in the Court of Appeal, or a reversal (complete or partial) 
of the trial judge’s decision.’ 
53J Alder, ‘Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?’ (2000) 20(2) OJLS 221, p226 
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Table 25. Unanimity of Lower Court by Originating Court 
 
What the result was in the lower 
court 
Total Unanimous Divided 
Which court the appeal 
originated from 
Court of Appeal Civil Division 135 23 158 
Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division 
20 0 20 
High Court 14 0 14 
High Court of Justiciary 5 0 5 
Court of Session 14 4 18 
Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal 
9 1 10 
Northern Ireland High Court 1 1 2 
Total 198 29 227 
 
Table 26 reveals that in the vast majority of cases the lower court was unanimous therefore the vast 
majority of cases that were overruled were unanimous judgments (87/104).54 Nevertheless, 
counting ‘reversed in part’ and ‘overrule’ together, only 53% (108/201) of unanimous lower court 
judgments were overruled compared to 69% (20/29) of divided lower court judgments. Table 27 
confirms that when the lower court was divided it was almost twice as likely to be overruled 
(58.6%:31%) as upheld and the inclusion of reversed in part figures only increased this ratio. Thus a 
divided lower court, although relatively uncommon, increased the chance of overrule. Indeed, 
Paterson’s interviews with the Lord Justices in the Court of Appeal revealed that often a dissenting 
opinion in the Court of Appeal will be written as a way of initiating a conversation with the final 
appeal court on that point.55 
Table 26. Overrule of Lower Court and Unanimity of Lower Court 
 
What the result was in the lower 
court 
Total Unanimous Divided 
Whether the lower court was 
overruled 
Yes 87 17 104 
No 93 9 102 
                                                             
54Alder found that 66% of all reversals involved a unanimous Court of Appeal; Alder, ‘Dissents in Courts of Last 
Resort’, n53, p226-227 
55
Paterson, Final Judgment, n9, p210 
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Reversed in part 21 3 24 
Total 201 29 230 
 
Table 27. Overrule of Lower Court and Lower Court Unanimity (%) 
 Whether the lower court was overruled Total 
Yes No Reversed in 
part 
What the result was in the 
lower court 
Unanimous 43.3% 46.3% 10.4% 100.0% 
Divided 58.6% 31.0% 10.3% 100.0% 
Total 45.2% 44.3% 10.4% 100.0% 
 
Final Appeal also found the Court of Appeal more likely to be overruled when it was divided56 and 
that the Law Lords could be encouraged to reverse the lower court where they had the support of a 
judge below or if it was a hard case.57 Nevertheless, when Blom-Cooper and Drewry attempted to 
measure the extent to which the Appellate Committee departed from the line of reasoning adopted 
in the lower court, a task which they admitted was problematic given the difficulties in ascertaining 
the ratio decendi in any case, their ‘subjective impression’ was that the Appellate Committee hardly 
ever departed from the approach of the lower court.58  The authors found the instances where the 
two courts clashed based on ‘principle’ to be infrequent and instead it was more common to have 
differences in ‘emphasis’ i.e. in terms of construction or interpretation.59 
Examples were evident in the time period where the lower court was found to have applied the 
wrong legal test and thus was wrong in principle. In Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police v Van 
Colle,60 the Court of Appeal had lowered the Osman test used in A2 ECHR cases by placing too much 
significance on the respondents’ status as a witness; In re E61 the appeal was upheld however it was 
noted that the Smith test used by the lower court was not as intense as the proportionality test that 
the police actions needed to satisfy; in Agbaje v Akinnoye- Agbaje,62 the Court of Appeal incorrectly 
applied the traditional forum non convenies principles; in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of 
                                                             
56The rate of overturn for a unanimous Court of Appeal was 35% compared to 47.6% where it was divided. In 
Scottish cases, the rate of overturn was 45.5% for a unanimous Court of Session and 50% for a divided court. 
See Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p190. 
57
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p190 
58
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p247 
59
Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p247 
60
[2008] UKHL 50 [36] 
61
[2008] UKHL 66 [54] 
62[2010] UKSC 13 [76] 
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State for the Home Department,63 the Court of Appeal misread High Court of Australian authority 
and in so doing formulated a test that would refuse asylum if it would be reasonable to expect the 
applicant to be discreet on return to their home country. The Supreme Court found it inappropriate 
to ‘expect’ a person to live discreetly.   
However, as Final Appeal correctly identified, overrule was often owing to a difference in ‘emphasis’ 
or weighting.64 Such an approach can add a degree of indeterminacy to the grounds of appeal. An 
example was provided in determining what was ‘in the interests of justice’. Lord Dyson stated that: 
The interests of justice is not a hard-edged concept. A decision as to what the interests of 
justice requires calls for an exercise of judgment in which a number of relevant factors have 
to be taken into account and weighed in the balance.65 
The appeal was upheld, however Lord Dyson admitted that differently constituted courts may 
‘legitimately’ put different weighting on certain factors. Nevertheless, he downplayed the 
significance of this in that the final appeal court would be ‘slow to allow an appeal on the ground 
that the decision-maker failed to place sufficient weight on a relevant factor which it rightly took 
into account’.66  That being so, weighting seemed to play a part in overturning the lower court in R 
(on the application of Ahmed) v Mayor and the Burgesses of London,67 where Lord Neuberger 
suspected perhaps ‘unfairly’ that the lower court had had too much regard to the ‘circumstances 
and requirements’ of the individual applicant as opposed to the validity of the housing scheme as a 
whole.68 Overrule also occurred as a result of overemphasis by the majority in the lower court of a 
particular word in a statute.69   
It is inherent in the relationship between two legal institutions that they may disagree on the correct 
legal test to be applied or the weighting to be accorded to certain factors in making a decision.  The 
study also attempted to measure whether the final appeal court was more likely to overrule the 
lower court when the matter touched on one of its other institutional relationships such as that with 
Parliament, the executive or the ECtHR. 
Statutory misinterpretation was found to be a reason for overrule in the time period.  For instance, 
the Court of Appeal was found to have erred by interpreting two separate defences under s57(2) 
                                                             
63
[2010] UKSC 31 
64
Thorner v Majors [2009] UKHL 18 [60] (per Lord Walker) 
65
R v Maxwell [2010] UKSC 48 [19] 
66
Maxwell, n65 [35-36] 
67
[2009] UKHL 14 
68R(Ahmed), n67 [60] 
69See Majorstake Limited v Curtis [2008] UKHL 10 [17] 
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and s58(3) in the Terrorism Act 2000 as if they were substantially the same defence, despite the fact 
that different language was used and ‘Parliament had deliberately framed different defences to 
charges under the two sections.’70 In R (on the application of A) v London Borough of Croydon,71 the 
Court of Appeal incorrectly conflated the question of whether a person was a ‘child’ with whether 
they were a ‘child in need’ under the Children Act 1989, where the statute was found by the 
Supreme Court to draw a clear distinction.   
The final appeal court acknowledged when the issue lay with the statute itself rather than the lower 
court’s interpretation of it.  Thus, in R (on the application of Noone) v The Governor of HMP Drake 
Hall,72 the transitional provisions between two statutory regimes were unclear. Tribute was paid to a 
succession of Court of Appeal judgments that ‘sought to grapple with the intractable problems of 
construction thrown up by these ill-conceived transitional provisions’.73 In the end, the Supreme 
Court had to purposively interpret the provisions to reach its decision and in so doing, overturned 
the lower court. 
The final appeal court was also careful to ensure that lower court statutory interpretation did not 
result in impermissible judicial legislation. In Transport for London v Spirerose Limited,74 the Court of 
Appeal appeared to include an assumption for the purposes of valuation of land that was not one of 
the statutory assumptions listed in the Land Compensation Act 1961. Although Lord Neuberger 
acknowledged that this was an attempt to address an anomaly and act out of fairness, in his opinion 
it amounted to ‘judicial legislation’ and ‘inserted a judge-made assumption into a statutory formula, 
which seems to be complete and self-contained.’75 In Secretary of State for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs v Meier,76 the lower court was incorrect to grant the Secretary of State a wider 
possession order to sites with uninterrupted possession but where there was a danger of future 
occupation by travellers. Lord Neuberger firmly stated that the solution to travellers moving to the 
next piece of land needed to come from legislation, ‘… however desirable it is to fashion or develop 
a remedy to meet a particular problem, courts have to act within the law … Judges are not 
legislators.’77  The final appeal court’s loyalty to the statutory wording and statutory scheme of 
Parliament as well as its deference to the better position of Parliament to conduct necessary 
                                                             
70
R v G [2009] UKHL 13 [72] 
71
[2009] UKSC 8 
72[2010] UKSC 30 
73Noone, n72, [44] 
74[2009] UKHL 44 
75TFL, n74 [41] and [50] 
76[2009] UKSC 11 
77Meier, n76 [59] 
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statutory reform, as outlined in Chapter 1, appeared to play a part in the overturn of the lower 
courts in the time period.  
The quantitative data measured whether the lower court was overturned more in cases that 
involved the executive. As can be seen from Table 28 below, there was a tendency for judgments 
involving the executive to be upheld and conversely for judgments not involving the executive to be 
overruled. Once the ‘reversed in part’ and ‘overrule’ columns were conflated, overrule in cases 
involving the executive was 50.7% and overrule in cases not involving the executive was 57.8%. 
These figures indicate two points: Firstly that more cases were overruled than upheld and secondly, 
that slightly more cases not involving the executive were overruled. 
Table 28. Overrule of Lower Court and Executive Involvement  
 
 
Whether the lower court was overruled 
Total Yes No Reversed in part 
 No involvement 75 65 14 154 
Involvement 30 36 7 73 
Total 105 101 21 227 
 
At a very general level, the statistics appear to indicate that the accuracy of the lower court’s 
judgment and the subsequent ability for the final appeal court to uphold the lower court’s decision 
was stronger in cases where the executive was a party to the case. This is obviously a very superficial 
conclusion as a decision can be upheld but nonetheless be based on substantially different 
reasoning. As Final Appeal recognised this is a much harder measurement to record and the extent 
to which this is true of these figures would have to be the subject of further study, where the lower 
court judgments are also reviewed in full. Working on the assumption that the majority of these 
instances approved the lower court’s reasoning as well as its decision, there could be several reasons 
behind this. Firstly, the lower court may have produced fuller and more detailed explanatory 
reasoning in cases that involved the executive. Secondly, the final appeal court recognised when 
lower court judges were recognised experts in their field or closer to the facts and therefore tended 
to defer more to the lower court’s decision. This may have been particularly true of immigration 
cases, where the executive was often a party. Thirdly, the final appeal court wished to display a 
united judicial platform to strengthen the judicial viewpoint and leave the judgment less open to 
attack by the executive. This may have been particularly important in cases that found against the 
executive. Nevertheless, Table 29 demonstrates that overrule was actually more common when the 
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executive was unsuccessful, reducing the plausibility of the theory that the courts tried to form a 
united front when finding against the executive. 
Table 29. Overrule of Lower Court and Executive Success (%)  
 
 Whether the lower court was overruled Total 
Yes No Reversed in 
part 
Whether the case involved a 
finding against the executive 
Not Applicable 48.7% 42.2% 9.1% 100.0% 
Yes 55.6% 36.1% 8.3% 100.0% 
No 27.0% 62.2% 10.8% 100.0% 
Total 46.3% 44.5% 9.3% 100.0% 
 
Although, the lower court was more likely to be overruled in non-executive cases, when the final 
appeal court found against the executive this, more often than not, resulted in an overrule of the 
lower court and conversely a decision to uphold the executive, more often than not, resulted in the 
lower court being upheld. This pattern suggests that the lower courts were more cautious at finding 
against the executive and so when the Supreme Court was minded to do so, it tended to differ from 
the decision of the lower court. The results also suggest a degree of deference to the executive by 
the lower courts in the time period. 
The lower courts may have felt more comfortable following established precedent in cases that 
involved the executive. The involvement of the executive, however, did not appear to affect whether 
the lower court followed precedent or not.  Table 30 shows that the lower court followed precedent 
in 39/73 (53%) of cases where there was executive involvement compared to 85/152 (54%) of cases 
where there was no executive involvement.  
Table 30. Lower Court following Precedent and Executive Involvement 
 
 
Does the lower court follow established precedent? 
Total 
No precedent 
followed 
Yes; precedent 
set by House of 
Lords/Supreme 
Court 
Yes; precedent 
set by lower 
court 
 No involvement 67 38 47 152 
Involvement 34 22 17 73 
Total 101 60 64 225 
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Table 31 combines following precedent, executive involvement and overrule of the lower court. 
When the executive was not involved, the lower court was overruled in 55% (37/67) of cases where 
it was not following precedent, in 58% (22/38) of cases where it was following final court precedent 
and in 59% (28/47) of cases where it was following lower court precedent. By contrast, where the 
executive was involved, the lower court was overruled in 41% (14/34) of cases where it was not 
following precedent, in 59% (13/22) of decisions where it was following final appeal court precedent 
and in 59% (10/17) decisions where it was following lower court precedent. As such, the only 
difference that executive involvement appeared to make to the rate of overrule of the lower court, 
was in lowering the rate of overrule from 55% to 41% in unprecedented situations. This suggests 
that the lower court was overruled less in cases that involved the executive because the final appeal 
court was more open to the lower court’s ‘law-making’ in the context of decisions involving the 
executive.  ‘Judicial law-making’ is discussed further below, however suffice to say it strengthens a 
decision taken without precedent, particularly in cases that involved the executive, where two 
courts agreed on the legal position.  
Table 31. Overrule of Lower Court, Lower Court following Precedent and Executive Involvement  
Does the lower court follow established precedent? 
Overrule 
Total Yes No 
No precedent followed Exec_Involvement No 
involvement 
Count 37 30 67 
% within 
Exec_Involvement 
55.2% 44.8% 100.0% 
% within Overrule 72.5% 60.0% 66.3% 
% of Total 36.6% 29.7% 66.3% 
Involvement Count 14 20 34 
% within 
Exec_Involvement 
41.2% 58.8% 100.0% 
% within Overrule 27.5% 40.0% 33.7% 
% of Total 13.9% 19.8% 33.7% 
Total Count 51 50 101 
% within 
Exec_Involvement 
50.5% 49.5% 100.0% 
% within Overrule 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.5% 49.5% 100.0% 
Yes; precedent set by 
House of 
Lords/Supreme Court 
Exec_Involvement No 
involvement 
Count 22 16 38 
% within 
Exec_Involvement 
57.9% 42.1% 100.0% 
% within Overrule 62.9% 64.0% 63.3% 
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% of Total 36.7% 26.7% 63.3% 
Involvement Count 13 9 22 
% within 
Exec_Involvement 
59.1% 40.9% 100.0% 
% within Overrule 37.1% 36.0% 36.7% 
% of Total 21.7% 15.0% 36.7% 
Total Count 35 25 60 
% within 
Exec_Involvement 
58.3% 41.7% 100.0% 
% within Overrule 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 58.3% 41.7% 100.0% 
Yes; precedent set by 
lower court 
Exec_Involvement No 
involvement 
Count 28 19 47 
% within 
Exec_Involvement 
59.6% 40.4% 100.0% 
% within Overrule 73.7% 73.1% 73.4% 
% of Total 43.8% 29.7% 73.4% 
Involvement Count 10 7 17 
% within 
Exec_Involvement 
58.8% 41.2% 100.0% 
% within Overrule 26.3% 26.9% 26.6% 
% of Total 15.6% 10.9% 26.6% 
Total Count 38 26 64 
% within 
Exec_Involvement 
59.4% 40.6% 100.0% 
% within Overrule 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 59.4% 40.6% 100.0% 
Total Exec_Involvement No 
involvement 
Count 87 65 152 
% within 
Exec_Involvement 
57.2% 42.8% 100.0% 
% within Overrule 70.2% 64.4% 67.6% 
% of Total 38.7% 28.9% 67.6% 
Involvement Count 37 36 73 
% within 
Exec_Involvement 
50.7% 49.3% 100.0% 
% within Overrule 29.8% 35.6% 32.4% 
% of Total 16.4% 16.0% 32.4% 
Total Count 124 101 225 
% within 
Exec_Involvement 
55.1% 44.9% 100.0% 
% within Overrule 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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% of Total 55.1% 44.9% 100.0% 
 
The involvement of the executive clearly had an impact on the overrule statistics for the lower 
courts. The same was true when the jurisprudence of the ECtHR was considered. Table 32 shows 
that only around 45% of cases dealing with human rights were overruled in some way compared to 
between 50-60% of cases dealing with other subject matters.  
Table 32. Overrule of Lower Court by Subject Matter 
 Whether the lower court was overruled 
Total Yes No Reversed in part 
Case_Type HR 12 23 7 42 
DCAPL 55 42 8 105 
LOPL 29 25 7 61 
INT 10 12 2 24 
Total 106 102 24 232 
 
The data suggests that the lower court’s strongest record in terms of avoiding overrule was in the 
human rights field.   Table 33 also reveals that the percentage of cases overruled in full decreased as 
the number of Strasbourg citations recorded in the final appeal court judgment increased. The same 
was not true of reversed in part judgments, where the percentage of cases reversed in part 
appeared to increase as the number of Strasbourg citations increased. This suggests that in cases 
where a lot of Strasbourg jurisprudence was considered by the final appeal court, the lower court 
was less likely to be overruled in full and instead was more likely to be overruled in part or not at all. 
In other words, the lower court reading of Convention requirements was more likely to be correct 
than incorrect.  
Table 33. Overrule of Lower Court and Number of Strasbourg Citations 
 
 Whether the lower court was overruled Total 
Yes No Reversed in 
part 
Stras_citations 
0 75 66 12 153 
1-9 17 19 6 42 
10+ 14 17 6 37 
Total 106 102 24 232 
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Where the executive was a party, the lower court was found to be overruled less when acting 
without precedent. However, in human rights cases, the lower courts were more often than not 
applying some kind of precedent and doing so correctly.  Table 34 demonstrates that the lower court 
followed precedent set by the final appeal court in 54% of cases involving human rights and 
precedent as a whole in 71% of cases. The low overrule rate suggests that the lower court was 
applying those precedents correctly and that the articulation of the law through precedent was very 
strong in the human rights field. This is entirely proper, given the importance of clearly articulating 
the law in relation to an individual’s rights and owing to the support of the ECtHR jurisprudence to 
facilitate the final appeal court in developing jurisprudence under the HRA and the lower court in 
interpreting the domestic precedent. 
Table 34. Lower Court following Precedent by Subject Matter 
 
Does the lower court follow established precedent? 
Total 
No precedent 
followed 
Yes; precedent 
set by House of 
Lords/Supreme 
Court 
Yes; precedent 
set by lower 
court 
 HR 12 22 7 41 
DCAPL 43 28 34 105 
LOPL 35 8 17 60 
INT 12 5 6 23 
Total 102 63 64 229 
 
The findings above are supported by the results in Table 35. The lower court followed precedent in 
42/61 instances (69%) where Strasbourg jurisprudence had an influence on the case compared to 
85/168 instances (51%) where Strasbourg jurisprudence was not considered. This was statistically 
significant.78  
Table 35. Lower Court following Precedent and consideration of the Convention 
 
 
Does the lower court follow established precedent? 
Total 
No precedent 
followed 
Yes; precedent 
set by House of 
Lords/Supreme 
Court 
Yes; precedent 
set by lower 
court 
Strasbourg matter No 83 35 50 168 
                                                             
78
2(2) = 14.13, p = 0.001 
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Yes 19 28 14 61 
Total 102 63 64 229 
 
That is not to say that the lower court was never overruled when a Convention right was at stake. 
Even where the two courts agreed that a Convention right had been infringed, as seen in Chapter 4, 
the mechanics of the HRA are such that there are two possible avenues to achieving Convention 
compatibility. Overturn occurred in the time period, where the lower court resolved the issue using 
s3 of the HRA, whereas the final appeal court preferred to issue a declaration of incompatibility 
under s4.79 
Clearly, institutional relationships with Parliament, the executive or significantly the ECtHR had a 
direct impact on the rate of overrule of the lower court. The lower court appeared more successful 
at applying precedent in the human rights field, suggesting that domestic precedent is perhaps 
stronger in the human rights field. This latter point is evident in the next section, which reviews the 
data more closely in relation to the involvement of precedent and how that affected institutional 
relationships and the administrative efficiency of the court in the time period. 
Precedent 
The Role of Precedent 
 
The common law doctrine of stare decisis, ‘… compels judges to synthesise present decisions (or at 
least articulate the reasons for such decisions) out of the accumulated wisdom (or folly) of their 
judicial forbears.’80 It is complemented by the limited circumstances in which the final appeal court 
may depart from its own authority under the 1966 Practice Statement.81 Each has been retained in 
the Supreme Court.82 In this sense, precedent is an important institutional link between the Supreme 
Court and the Appellate Committee. Precedent ensures a degree of fairness, certainty, predictability, 
efficiency and stability in the development of the law,83 with a wholescale departure from precedent 
                                                             
79
R (on the application of Wright) v Secretary of State for Health [2009] UKHL 3 
80Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p65 
81Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234.  
82As confirmed in Austin v London Borough of Southwark [2010] UKSC 28 [24-25] (per Lord Hope). Counsel are 
now requested to make clear in advance of the hearing, via a separate paragraph in their heads of argument, 
whether they intend to ask the court to depart from its own precedent. UKSC PD 6; The Appeal Hearing at 
6.3.4. 
83N Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent (CUP, Cambridge, 2008), p36; F Schauer, Precedent [1986] 
39 Stan L.Rev 571, 574, p595-602 
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being regarded by some as damaging to the rule of law.84   Nevertheless, it is clear that a common 
law system cannot remain stagnant and that some legal development is necessary to keep pace with 
societal demands85 or to adhere to the requirements of Convention jurisprudence.86  Thus precedent 
is not strictly binding, however it has the capacity to influence and constrain a decision-maker by 
requiring them to reason through their decision-making with reference to past authority, be it 
through applying, distinguishing or departing from such authority.87 
Precedent forms an important institutional link between the final appeal court and the lower courts. 
The hierarchical court structure- including the final appeal court’s supervisory role over the legal 
system- is facilitated by precedent, which enables the final appeal court to correct any errors that 
may be appearing in an area of law.88 In this way, precedent can be an important consideration in 
the decision to grant leave to appeal.  For instance, the greater willingness of the Appellate 
Committee to grant leave to appeal in human rights cases following the implementation of the HRA 
appears to have been in ‘recognition of a responsibility to make sense of the new legal framework 
and to give lower courts guidance on how to interpret and apply it.’89 Furthermore, the relatively 
few occasions where the Court of Appeal grants leave to appeal is often in recognition of the need 
for the final appeal court to clarify a precedent.90  
Precedent can also be the root cause of an overrule, such as when the lower court is deemed to 
have departed from one of its own precedents in an unwarranted fashion91 or when the lower court 
                                                             
84See Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’, (2007) 66 CLJ 67, 71; ‘It is one thing to alter the law's direction of travel 
by a few degrees, quite another to set it off in a different direction.’   
85See R v R [1991] UKHL 12 
86See Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 
87N Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent, n83, p109-112 
88See In re B [2008] UKHL 35 [64] where Lady Hale took the opportunity to silence misconceptions of the 
standard of proof required to establish that a child ‘is likely to suffer significant harm’ under s31(2) Children 
Act 1989. There was room for misinterpretation of Lord Nicholls sentiments in reH (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: 
Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563. Lady Hale followed reH, however in relation to the misinterpretation she 
stated ‘it is time for us to loosen its grip and give it its quietus’. 
89
Shah and Poole, ‘The impact of the Human Rights Act on the House of Lords’ [2009] PL 347, 360 
90
The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 
28. Lord Phillips notes that the Court of Appeal added a postscript to their judgment explaining the uncertainty 
over whether they had interpreted the majority judgment in MB correctly. Although this point became 
academic, Lord Phillips still confirmed, for legal certainty, that the Court of Appeal’s interpretation was correct. 
See [37]. Paterson cites Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13 as an example of another case that arose in the time 
period where leave was granted to resolve the issues left over from Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17. See 
Paterson, Final Judgment, n9, p69 
91In R v Clarke [2008] UKHL 8, the lower court followed R v Ashton [2006] EWCA Crim 794 which in turn was an 
unwarranted departure from R v Morais [1988] 3 All ER 161. 
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misinterprets previous opinions of the final appeal court, including the test to be used,92 the effect of 
the decision,93 or perhaps focusses on the wrong speech and misunderstands that speech.94   
Precedent is in many ways an imperfect method of institutional communication. At its best, it allows 
the lower courts to use a past opinion with analogous facts to predict more accurately how the final 
appeal court will determine a decision. At its worst, it can complicate the decision-making process 
through the search to find an analogous precedent and the need to somehow categorise past cases 
and assimilate their reasoning to the current case.95 Furthermore, it can facilitate ‘suboptimal’ 
decision-making in the instant case for the benefit of the system of precedent as a whole.96  The 
relative weighting and authority to afford a precedent is often unclear. Precedents lack the authority 
of statutory wording but can incorrectly assume such a level of authority where they are 
characterised as such by canonical words or by the status of the judge that delivered it.97 Lord Reid 
regarded this as ‘the most dangerous pitfall’.98 It was evident in the time period in R v Islam,99 where 
Toulson LJ had noted that, 
Perhaps because of the high authority of Lord Bingham, the passage quoted above from his 
judgment in Dore appears to have been treated in later cases as if the words were statutory 
and applied in a very different context from that which Lord Bingham was considering.100 
Lord Mance warned of the different context that Lord Bingham made the obiter statement and that 
it would not be correct to attribute to Parliament knowledge of Lord Bingham’s words spoken in 
1997 to determine what it meant by ‘market value’ in the 2002 Proceeds of Crime Act.101 
Precedent is clearly a central institutional link between the final appeal court and the lower courts, 
yet it is full of complexity. The quantitative data below examined each lower court’s reliance on 
precedent in the time period and whether following precedent achieved a level of stability and 
certainty by reducing the rate of overrule. Furthermore, the data sought to measure whether the 
                                                             
92
See EM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 64 [53] (per Lord Carswell) 
93
In Gray v Thames Trains [2009] UKHL 33 [47-49], the Court of Appeal failed to recognise that they were 
precluded from awarding damages on a counterfactual basis by the Appellate Committee decision in Jobling v 
Associated Dairies ltd [1982] AC 794. 
94
See In reB (A child) [2009] UKSC 5 where the lower court focussed on Lord Nicholls’ speech in Re G (Children) 
[2006] UKHL 43 rather than Lady Hale’s leading speech. The lower court misread the context in which Lord 
Nicholls’ words were spoken and as a consequence the fact that the importance of biological parents rearing 
the child still had to be subject to the paramount consideration of the child’s welfare. See [26] and [34]. 
95See Schauer, ‘Precedent’, n83, 579 
96
Schauer, ‘Precedent’, n83, 589 
97N Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent, n83, p23 
98Lord Reid, ‘The Judge as Law Maker’ (1972) 12 JSPLT 22, 26 
99[2009] UKHL 30 
100R v Islam [2008] EWCA Crim 1740 [22] 
254 
 
lower court’s application of precedent was in fact more ‘efficient’ and allowed the final appeal court 
to consider the case and deliver its judgment more expeditiously. As outlined in the Methodology 
Chapter, the coding in this area was subjective and an overall impression was formed by the author 
as to whether the lower court was following precedent.  As such the conclusions reached are only 
very tentative. 
Quantitative Data on Precedent 
 
Tables 36 and 37 together with Figures 6 and 7 display the differences between courts and sessions 
in terms of whether the lower court was following precedent.  There was a discernible amount of 
fluctuation between both courts and sessions, with the cases arising in the Appellate Committee 
sessions more commonly following some type of precedent than in the Supreme Court Sessions 
(60% of cases compared to 49% of cases in the Supreme Court). This suggests that in the Supreme 
Court, the lower court was more often ‘law-making’ (a point returned to further below) and this 
could be one of the reasons for the higher rate of overrule in the Supreme Court compared to the 
Appellate Committee. The fluctuation recorded between court and session was not statistically 
significant.102   
Table 36. Lower Court following Precedent by Court 
 
Does the lower court follow established 
precedent? 
Total 
No 
precedent 
followed 
Yes; precedent 
set by House 
of 
Lords/Supreme 
Court 
Yes; 
precedent 
set by 
lower 
court 
  House of 
Lords 
49 35 40 124 
Supreme 
Court 
53 28 24 105 
Total 102 63 64 229 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
101Islam, n99 [43] (per L.Mance) 
102HL v SC, X2(2) = 3.38, p = 0.18; by Session, X2(6) = 3.89, p = 0.69 
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Table 37. Lower Court following Precedent by Session 
 
  
Total 
No 
precedent 
followed 
Yes; precedent 
set by House 
of 
Lords/Supreme 
Court 
Yes; 
precedent 
set by 
lower 
court 
  HL 
2007-
2008 
29 21 26 76 
HL 
2008-
2009 
20 14 14 48 
SC 
2009-
2010 
24 13 12 49 
SC 
2010-
2011 
29 15 12 56 
Total 102 63 64 229 
 
Figure 4. Bar Chart showing Lower Court following Precedent by Court 
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Figure 5. Bar Chart of Lower Court following Precedent by Session 
 
With the exception of the Court of Appeal (Civ) and the Northern Ireland High Court, Table 38 
demonstrates there were few differences in rates of following precedent between the various 
different courts. Each court, with the exception of the aforementioned courts, followed some kind of 
precedent more often than not, with the High Court of Justiciary and the Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal having the highest percentage (80% each) of cases that followed precedent. As only 2 cases 
arose in the Northern Ireland High Court no conclusions can be drawn from the fact that neither of 
its cases followed precedent. Interestingly, the Court of Appeal (Civ), which dominated the workload 
of the court had an almost 50/50 split between cases that followed precedent and cases that did 
not. The difference between this court and the other courts was not, however, statistically 
significant.103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
103
2 (12) = 11.79, p = 0.46 
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Table 38. Lower Court following Precedent by Originating Court 
 
Which court the appeal originated from 
Does the lower court follow established 
precedent? 
Total 
No precedent 
followed 
Yes; precedent 
set by House 
of 
Lords/Supreme 
Court 
Yes; 
precedent set 
by lower court 
 Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
77 43 37 157 
Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division 
7 6 7 20 
High Court 5 5 4 14 
High Court of Justiciary 1 1 3 5 
Court of Session 8 4 6 18 
Northern Ireland Court 
of Appeal 
2 3 5 10 
Northern Ireland High 
Court 
2 0 0 2 
Total 102 62 62 226 
 
Table 39 demonstrates that, with the exception of the Court of Appeal (Civ), there was a great deal 
of fluctuation between the different lower courts rate of following precedent as between the 
Appellate Committee and Supreme Court sessions.104 This suggests that the sample period was too 
short to even out the natural fluctuations depending on the specific caseload in any given year and 
so again the results in this section should be treated with a degree of caution. 
Table 39. Lower Court following Precedent by Originating Court and by Final Appeal Court 
 
House of Lords or Supreme Court 
 
Total 
No 
precedent 
followed 
Yes; precedent 
set by House 
of 
Yes; 
precedent 
set by 
                                                             
104
% Precedent to No precedent Ratio for HL vs SC for each court; CA Civ (53;47 and 49;51), CA Crim (80;20 and 
20;80), EWHC (70;30 and 50;50), CoS (78; 22 and 33;67) NICA (75;25 and 100;0) and NIHC (0;100 and 0;0). 
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Lords/Supreme 
Court 
lower court 
House of 
Lords 
Which court the 
appeal originated 
from 
Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
37 22 20 79 
Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division 
3 5 7 15 
High Court 3 4 3 10 
Court of Session 2 2 5 9 
Northern Ireland 
Court of Appeal 
2 2 4 8 
Northern Ireland 
High Court 
2 0 0 2 
Total 49 35 39 123 
Supreme 
Court 
Which court the 
appeal originated 
from 
Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
40 21 17 78 
Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division 
4 1 0 5 
High Court 2 1 1 4 
High Court of 
Justiciary 
1 1 3 5 
Court of Session 6 2 1 9 
Northern Ireland 
Court of Appeal 
0 1 1 2 
Total 53 27 23 103 
 
Overrule of precedent occurred in 12 cases in Final Appeal, although a ‘substantially different 
approach’ short of overrule was taken in over 100 appeals.105 This led to the conclusion that, ‘while 
different does not mean better, a figure of this size supports our view that the House of Lords earns 
its keep by acting as substantially more than a ‘rubber stamp.’106  Table 40 demonstrates that of all 
the cases overruled in full, 58% followed some kind of precedent.  These results were not, however, 
statistically significant.107 The results were similar when ‘reversed in part’ numbers were included in 
‘overrule’, with 60% of cases overturned following some form of precedent. This suggests that the 
final appeal court was more likely to take issue with the way that a lower court read or applied a 
precedent, or take issue with the precedent itself than with the lower court’s law-making, and seems 
                                                             
105Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p247. Note that this figure only related to appeals allowed on 
the basis that a previous authority was wrongly decided rather than all of the authorities that were overruled 
or strongly distinguished. 
106Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal, n1, p247 
107X2(4) = 4.85, p = 0.303 
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to go against the initial thoughts that the higher overrule rate in the Supreme Court could be 
because the lower court was more often deemed to be law-making in the Supreme Court period. 
Overruling a lower court that believes it is following precedent is potentially more controversial than 
overruling a lower court that is acting without precedent, as precedent following should create more 
stability in the law. Table 41 tracks through whether the final appeal court was more likely to be 
divided in its decision to overrule a lower court following precedent. Of 102 cases where no 
precedent was followed by the lower court, 50% were overruled in some way and of these 
overrules, 20% were divided. Of the 63 cases following final appeal court precedent, 60% were 
overruled and of these overrules, 18% were divided. Finally of the 63 cases where precedent was set 
by the lower court, 59% were overruled and of these only 8% were divided. These statistics reflect 
the findings above in ‘Table 23; Overrule of Lower Court, Lower Court following Precedent and Single 
Judgment,’ by showing that the final appeal court garnered the most unanimity when overruling a 
lower court that followed its own precedent (and was more likely to provide a single judgment in 
such cases), whereas division was more common either when overruling a lower court that acted in 
an unprecedented manner or a lower court that misapplied final appeal court authority. Again, these 
results appear counterintuitive but, as with single judgments, they could indicate several things. 
Firstly, that final appeal court judges are more likely to disagree over the way that the lower court 
has ‘made law’ in an area. Secondly, that institutional politics may mean that there is more 
sensitivity attached to overruling a lower court precedent than a final appeal court precedent. Thus, 
the judges seek to add weight to the decision to overrule that lower court precedent, or the way it 
has been applied, by garnering more unanimity. Again, further study is needed to look at the exact 
circumstances of each case and whether it was the precedent itself that the final appeal court 
disapproved of, its application to the context, or indeed the way that it had been applied by the 
lower courts.108 
Table 40. Lower Court following Precedent and Overrule of Lower Court 
 Whether the lower court was overruled Total 
Yes No Reversed in 
part 
Does the lower court follow 
established precedent? 
No precedent followed 44 51 7 102 
Yes; precedent set by 
House of Lords/Supreme 
Court 
28 25 10 63 
                                                             
108The Appellate Committee may decide that a precedent followed by the lower court is not in fact 
‘determinative’ in the case before them; In reP (Northern Ireland) [2008] UKHL 38 [48] (per Lord Hope). 
260 
 
Yes; precedent set by 
lower court 
32 26 6 64 
Total 104 102 23 229 
 
 
Table 41. Lower Court following Precedent, Lower Court Unanimity and Overrule of Lower Court  
Does the lower court follow established precedent? 
Overrule 
Total Yes No 
No precedent followed What the result was in the 
lower court 
Unanimous 41 43 84 
Divided 10 8 18 
Total 51 51 102 
Yes; precedent set by 
House of Lords/Supreme 
Court 
What the result was in the 
lower court 
Unanimous 31 24 55 
Divided 7 1 8 
Total 38 25 63 
Yes; precedent set by lower 
court 
What the result was in the 
lower court 
Unanimous 34 26 60 
Divided 3 0 3 
Total 37 26 63 
Total What the result was in the 
lower court 
Unanimous 106 93 199 
Divided 20 9 29 
Total 126 102 228 
 
On the whole, these results suggest that the final appeal court was more likely to assert its authority 
to either overrule precedent or ensure that existing precedent was applied correctly than to 
challenge the reasoning of the lower courts acting in an unprecedented manner. This demonstrates 
the importance that the final appeal court attaches to judiciously guarding the operation of the 
system of precedent and correcting errors where the need arises. At the same time, it evidences the 
desire to maintain relations with lower courts by not too readily overruling their independent 
reasoning unless there is good reason for doing so. That said, the doctrine of precedent is justified 
on the basis of certainty, stability and predictability and institutional communication through 
precedent was perhaps not as smooth as it should have been in the transitional period. Where the 
final appeal court has already considered a matter, the role of the lower court should be easier as it 
can follow the guidance provided by the precedent.  The results suggest a problem with system of 
precedent either in the clarity and reasoning of the precedents themselves, or in the lower courts’ 
ability to identify or apply the correct precedent to analogous circumstances. The Supreme Court 
had the slightly higher rate of overturn of the lower courts in the years studied and a way of 
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addressing this going forward, would be to improve the utility of precedent. A more focussed study 
would be required to pinpoint exactly where the failings in lower court use of precedent occurred so 
that more specific recommendations could be made on how the system of precedent could be 
improved. For instance, the Supreme Court may need to clarify the reasoning behind cases further 
to enable precedents to be applied more easily.109  What can be said is that the lower courts were 
more successful at applying precedent in the human rights field and, in Chapter 1, there was found 
to be a significantly higher number of concurring opinions and citations in such cases. As such, 
concurring opinions may aid the reasoning process and thus actually help to clarify the judgment for 
the lower court.110   
Finally, the quantitative data examined whether the involvement of precedent made decision-
making more efficient in the time period. Table 42 demonstrates that the final appeal court hearing 
was longer when the lower court followed some form of precedent, although not to a significant 
extent.111 This suggests that extra time was taken to discuss the nature of those precedents and to 
consider different perspectives on how to interpret and apply those precedents.112 That said, as far 
as judgment gap was concerned, Table 43 demonstrates that the Justices appeared to deliver 
judgment in a quicker period of time where some form of precedent was followed by the lower 
court than where no precedent was followed. These differences were again not statistically 
significant.113 Nevertheless, the results suggest that judgments were simpler to write where the 
situation had precedent and judges could draw upon the insights of their forbears. As Table 44 
demonstrates, the quicker time taken to write the judgment was not because judgments that 
followed precedent were necessarily shorter in length, with judgments following final appeal court 
authority being the longest. A statistically significant difference in judgment length was found 
between judgments where the lower court followed final appeal court authority as compared to 
judgments where the lower court followed its own authority.114 This finding, at first, seems counter-
intuitive; however, it supports the analysis above that overrule of a lower court following lower 
court authority was where the final appeal court was most likely to be unanimous and/or provide a 
single judgment, which would reduce judgment length.   The results also mirror those found in 
Chapter 3 in relation to human rights judgments. Human rights judgments considered more 
                                                             
109Duxbury found the reasoning of decisions central to the binding nature of precedent; The Nature and 
Authority of Precedent, n83 
110This is part of the ‘buttressing’ function of concurring opinions suggested by Lee; J Lee, ‘A defence of 
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authorities and as a result they took longer to hear and had lengthier judgments, however the 
guidance from these authorities or the jurisprudence of the ECtHR appeared to aid the judgment 
writing process. If these results were indicative of a wider pattern, it supports the ‘consequentialist’ 
justification for following precedent as a ‘labour saving device,’115 as following precedent appeared 
to ease the judgment writing process. 
Table 42. Lower Court following Precedent and Length of Case 
 
Does the lower court follow 
established precedent? Mean N Std. Deviation 
No precedent followed 1.93 102 .859 
Yes; precedent set by 
House of Lords/Supreme 
Court 
2.22 63 1.023 
Yes; precedent set by lower 
court 
2.16 64 .895 
Total 2.07 229 .922 
 
Table 43. Lower Court following Precedent and Judgment Gap  
 
Does the lower court follow 
established precedent? Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
No precedent followed 95.71 102 157.568 17 1331 
Yes; precedent set by 
House of Lords/Supreme 
Court 
81.58 62 40.733 15 178 
Yes; precedent set by lower 
court 
73.66 64 35.602 1 173 
Total 85.68 228 109.247 1 1331 
 
Table 44. Lower Court following Precedent and Length of Judgment 
Does the lower court follow 
established precedent? Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
No precedent followed 32.18 102 19.097 6 125 
Yes; precedent set by 
House of Lords/Supreme 
Court 
40.33 63 27.414 7 129 
                                                             
115N Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent, n83, p99 
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Yes; precedent set by lower 
court 
30.48 64 19.592 4 98 
Total 33.95 229 22.091 4 129 
 
The quantitative results in this section suggest that the lower court had a better record when it 
acted in an unprecedented manner in terms of overrule and that following precedent was not 
necessarily successful in creating stability and certainty in the time period. The next section tries to 
shed more light on this by examining the resilience of precedent in the time period and the breadth 
of each precedent. 
The Resilience of Precedent  
 
Precedents are constantly being reinterpreted.116  There is a limit to their enduring nature and ‘more 
often than not the authority of a precedent will diminish rather than ripen with age.’117 At the same 
time, however, precedents command resilience through the limited circumstances in which they can 
be completely departed from. Indeed, The Practice Statement of 1966 has seldom been used since 
its inception.118 This perhaps says less about the resilience of precedent in the system of stare decisis 
and more about the subtler methods favoured by the judiciary to avoid the effects of a precedent.  
When faced with a precedent there is ‘an almost limitless interpretative choice,’ ranging between a 
narrow or extensive interpretation and application.119 A precedent can be distinguished where the 
facts of the case differ and allows a degree of flexibility short of overrule. The ‘creative following’ of 
precedent is regarded by Calderone to provide a false impression of legal stability, however this 
practice was found to be a lot more common in the US Supreme Court than the Appellate 
Committee, with the latter choosing to distinguish and overrule cases in double the number of 
instances of the US Supreme Court.120 Calderone suggests that the system of precedent’s credibility 
can be threatened by too dogmatic an attitude to following precedent and concludes that the 
                                                             
116F Schauer, ‘Precedent’, n83, 574 
117N Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent, n83, p63 
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Lord Hope describes the 1966 Practice Statement as having only been ‘applied from time to time by the 
Appellate Committee during the 40 years or so that were to elapse until the 1st October 2009.’ Austin v Mayor 
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Appellate Committee’s favoured method of distinguishing situations is more ‘respectful’ towards the 
precedent and the degree of constraint that it commands.121   
The Appellate Committee used the Practice Statement to depart from its own precedent in the time 
period,122 however it did so infrequently. In Chartbrook Limited v Persimmon Homes Limited,123 Lord 
Hoffmann stated obiter that it will only be appropriate to depart from a precedent where the 
previous decision is ‘thought to be impeding the law or to have led to results which were unjust or 
contrary to public policy.’124 It was therefore made clear that there were still ‘strong arguments’ for 
retaining the rule in Prenn v Simmonds125 (that pre-contractual negotiations are inadmissible in 
court) and this should be considered alongside the appropriateness of departing from an established 
precedent that had existed for many years and had been approved in several cases.   
This conservative use of the Practice Statement continued in the Supreme Court. Paterson noted 
that the Practice Statement had only been raised in ‘a handful of cases by the start of 2013 and in 
none of them ha[d] the court purported to exercise it,’ with the Supreme Court preferring less 
explicit methods to ‘get round precedents of its own or the House’.126  An example was R (on the 
application of Adams) v Secretary of State for Justice,127 where the Supreme Court did not expressly 
overrule R (Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,128 however Lord Phillips and Hope 
declared it to be of not much assistance and that a ‘fresh approach was required.’129 The Supreme 
Court, by contrast, appeared to actively monitor the development of precedent in the lower courts 
and overruled lower court precedent where necessary.130   
Whilst the 1966 Practice Statement has not been overly used, the Convention has opened an 
alternative avenue by which domestic precedents may be challenged and ultimately departed from. 
Lord Hope believes that the, 
                                                             
121Calderone, ‘Precedent in Operation’, n119, 780 
122A v Hoare [2008] UKHL 6 
123[2009] UKHL 38 
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127[2011] UKSC 18 
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interests of human rights law would not be well served if the House were to regard itself as 
bound by a previous decision as to the meaning or effect of a Convention right which was 
shown to be inconsistent with a subsequent decision in Strasbourg.131 
The court will therefore depart from existing final appeal court precedent where a decision of the 
Grand Chamber requires this.132 In doing so, the 1966 Practice Statement need not be expressly 
invoked. The Convention has widened the grounds for challenging a precedent, which can now be 
destabilised by another institution’s interpretation of matters; adding a further institutional layer to 
the doctrine of stare decisis in the UK. Nevertheless, the court clearly sought to limit how far 
Strasbourg jurisprudence could result in wholesale departures from existing decisions and thus 
impact upon traditional principles of certainty. In Doherty v Birmingham City Council,133 the 
Appellate Committee declined to rely on the decision in McCann v UK,134 which appeared to support 
the minority view in Kay v Lambeth Borough Council,135 to depart from the majority view in that 
decision. Instead the majority view was developed in a manner consistent with McCann. In taking 
that route, Lord Hope appeared to have been influenced by the fact that an overrule would have 
required the case to be reconvened by a panel of nine Law Lords given that Kay was decided by a 
panel of seven. Furthermore, 
it is well settled that the power to overrule a recent decision of this House which your 
Lordships undoubtedly have ought not to be exercised unless there is some very good 
reason for doing so.136 
Lord Hope believed that the Strasbourg line required further substantiating in order to have 
objective standards that could generally be applied.137 HM Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed138 
demonstrated that the Supreme Court would also await an authoritative decision of the Strasbourg 
Court to determine whether a departure from precedent was required. The Supreme Court declined 
the invitation to depart from a relatively recent Appellate Committee authority139 that determined 
the extent to which obligations under the Charter of the United Nations 1945 take precedence to 
Convention rights until such a time as the Strasbourg Court provided definitive guidance for all states 
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to follow.140 In this sense, the final appeal court retained ultimate authority over the domestic 
system of precedent. In R (on the application of RJM) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,141 
Lord Neuberger confirmed that where a final appeal court decision appeared to conflict with 
Convention jurisprudence, it was for the final appeal court to decide whether to depart from that 
authority and the lower court was still bound by the authority until that time. The lower court was, 
however, free to depart from its own precedents where those precedents appeared to conflict with 
Strasbourg jurisprudence.142 
Finally, it should be noted that whereas ECtHR authority can leave a domestic precedent vulnerable, 
Parliament, as in institution, is able to reinforce a precedent through either negative or positive 
action.  ‘Legislative inertia’ was used by the judges to justify the resilient nature of a particular 
precedent, despite the fact that this negative form of approval does not necessarily guarantee that 
Parliament specifically approved of the decision.143 In Gallagher v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints,144 the Appellate Committee had to determine whether a Mormon church was exempt from 
business rates as ‘a place of public religious worship.’ An earlier Appellate Committee decision had 
interpreted the relevant statute and the fact that the legislature had had two opportunities to 
reconsider the authority and had not done so was determinative in declining to depart from that 
authority.145    
Overall, it appears that neither the use of the Practice Statement nor the jurisprudence of ECtHR led 
to many instances of overt departure from final appeal court precedent in the time period; however, 
there was less reticence when it came to departing from lower court precedent. In this sense, 
precedent itself was fairly resilient and the overrule of the lower courts following precedent was 
more likely owing to the way that precedent had been interpreted or applied. In an effort to 
understand a little more about how precedent has the capacity to guide the lower courts, the next 
section examines the breadth of each precedent in the time period. 
The Breadth of Precedent  
 
                                                             
140 See also R (on the application of Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] UKSC 29 [21] where Lord 
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The role of the final appeal court is to oversee the coherent development of the law.  It may, 
therefore, be tempting for the final appeal court to utilise the opportunities that individual cases 
present and to increase the breadth of precedent by going wider than the issues raised in the lower 
court and by counsel.  Practically, the arguments that can be raised are to a large extent constrained 
by the Supreme Court rules and practice directions146 which, although permitting a new argument to 
be raised in advance, ensure that the skeleton of an appeal is predetermined by the case in the 
lower court.147 New arguments were only exceptionally raised in the time period.148 Exceptions were 
also rare in the past, with 12 cases arising during the period 1952-68 allowing the rule to be 
expressly waived and only 2 appeals being allowed on the basis of that new argument.149 
Furthermore, Paterson found a ‘high degree of consensus’ amongst counsel whom he interviewed 
that it is inappropriate ‘… for the judges to decide appeals on points of law which have not been 
argued by counsel or at least put to them for comment.’150   He later referred to this as a ‘normative 
expectation’ of counsel.151 Paterson referenced several cases that arose in the time period where 
this convention may have been breached.152 However, there were also cases arising in the time 
period that could have merited a fuller review of the area owing to ‘uncertainty’ and academic 
criticism, yet the court declined to do so as they were not invited to broaden the remit of the case by 
counsel.153 Norris v Government of the USA154 was one such case. In Norris, Lord Phillips alluded to 
the controversial decision of R (Wellington) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,155 which 
determined that the desirability of extraditing a fugitive, who would otherwise completely escape 
justice, meant that circumstances ordinarily regarded as ‘inhuman and degrading’ in the domestic 
context would not necessarily be so if it prevented the extradition of the offender. Even though 
Norris was also an extradition case, albeit considering a different Convention article, and there was a 
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nine justice panel convened which would have provided an authoritative overrule, Lord Phillips still 
believed that ‘this [wa]s not an occasion on which it would be appropriate to review it.’156 In doing 
so, the Supreme Court demonstrated its unwillingness to use the authority of a larger panel to widen 
the area of review beyond the four corners of the case. 
From a doctrinal perspective, it is unclear whether a wider decision would create a lesser or greater 
constraint on lower courts. On the one hand, it would create a deeper constraint as it would provide 
a wider base with which the decision could be assimilated with future cases and thus make it harder 
to distinguish the past decision. Nevertheless, too wide a decision may obfuscate the ratio decidendi 
and make it impossible to ‘articulate a characterisation’ of the decision that can be applied to future 
cases.157  Thus, if a precedent is too wide it may constrain even further the freedom of judges to 
consider what justice requires on the facts before them. The issues of ‘breadth’ and the ‘constraining 
force’ of a decision were both evident in Lord Collins opinion in R (on the application of Smith) v 
Secretary of State for Defence.158 Lord Collins was uncertain whether Lord Bingham’s determination 
that soldiers in Iraq were not under the jurisdiction of the UK formed part of the ratio of R (Gentle) v 
Prime Minister,159 given that there was no extensive argument on the point. Collins clearly wished to 
consider the matter on its own terms and felt that ‘it would be wrong … to dispose of the matter 
simply on the basis that the issue was covered by precedent.’160 
There is academic support for a narrow approach to the precedential force that attaches to each 
case. Final Appeal favoured the rule as they did not wish to see individual cases straining under the 
weight of the jurisprudence developed from their specific facts.161  Murphy and Rawlings labelled the 
process of defining the issues in the case and answering only those issues as a ‘particularist’ 
approach to judgment writing, which in turn can assist the judges in avoiding matters of policy as 
well as the need to provide more widely applicable pronouncements on the law.162 Nicol agrees that 
this is the identity of judicial decision-making compared to executive and parliamentary decision-
making; the latter being able to make law and policy on any issue. Nevertheless, he does highlight 
the utility of obiter dicta to reach beyond the limits of the case, particularly in the Convention 
context; 
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Obiter dicta have frequently been more important than the ratio of a case, and in the 
context of the Human Rights Act, they allow courts to transmit a broader message as to the 
Convention-compatibility of certain types of measure.163 
Indeed, the overriding duty to ensure the correct development of Convention based law and the 
common law can force the final appeal court into widening the remit of the case. In Walumba 
Lumba v Secretary of State for the Home Department,164 Lord Dyson described it as ‘unfortunate’ 
that the Court of Appeal sought to determine whether there was ‘a general rule of law that policies 
must be published’ given that the issue was ‘not before them and was not, therefore, the subject of 
argument or citation of authority.’ He noted, however, that it was a ‘point of general public 
importance’ and felt compelled to state why he felt the Court of Appeal was ‘wrong on this issue 
both as a matter of common law and ECHR law.’165 Furthermore, in Mayor and Burgesses of London 
Borough of Hounslow v Powell, the court was prepared to address whether A8 proportionality 
requirements permitted the court to suspend an order for possession longer than the time period 
allotted in s89 of the Housing Act 1980, even though the question did not arise on the facts, as the 
court had heard full argument on it and it was a matter of some importance.166 
Scottish Courts  
 
The Scottish Claim of Right 1689 established the right of appeal from a Scottish civil case to the 
Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Parliament was then absorbed into the English Parliament by 
Article III Treaty of Union,167 with the right of appeal transferring to the House of Lords.168 The 
position was consolidated by the Court of Session Act 1988.169 The Government’s 2003 Consultation 
Paper advocated the benefits of retaining jurisdiction over such appeals. It stated: 
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There are benefits to the Scottish justice system in having important cases reviewed by 
judges with a different background, and indeed advantages to the larger jurisdiction also in 
drawing on resources of a different legal tradition at the highest level.170 
The Supreme Court therefore retains the jurisdiction over Scottish civil appeals however it has no 
equivalent jurisdiction over Scottish criminal appeals. The Consultation Paper confirmed that the 
Supreme Court was to act as a court for the United Kingdom and that the role of the President of the 
Court was ‘to guide the Supreme Court in the development of the law in each jurisdiction and across 
the United Kingdom.’171  The identity of the distinct legal systems in the UK was supported by s41 
CRA which confirmed that a decision of the Supreme Court in an appeal from a particular jurisdiction 
is a decision for that jurisdiction only. 
The Scottish jurisdiction exercised by the court was not insignificant in the time period, although 
perhaps proportionately less than that recorded in previous studies. In Final Appeal, the small 
number of appeals meant that the numbers fluctuated widely between years however the 
overarching statistic for the time period suggested that 21.9% of civil appeals came from Scotland.172 
The ‘Origin of Appeals’ section noted that only 7% of the Appellate Committee‘s caseload came from 
Scotland.  However, with the addition of the devolution issue jurisdiction, Scottish appeals 
amounted to 13% of the overall workload in the Supreme Court; a figure that accords with the 12% 
of appeals that Dickson suggests is in line with the population of that jurisdiction and in keeping with 
the convention of having 2 Scottish Law Lords.173 The figures confirm that the institutional 
relationship with Scotland remained important in the time period. 
The relationship with Scottish courts can be viewed through the same thematic lens as the first 
section of this chapter-overrule and precedent, with some adjustments. The overrule statistics for 
Scottish courts were outlined more generally in the overrule section above; the success rate stood at 
44.4% for Scottish civil appeals and at 40% for devolution issue appeals and showed that the final 
appeal court did not just act as a ‘rubberstamp’ to Scottish lower court decisions in the time 
period.174 This section focuses on setting precedent for the Scottish jurisdiction.  It examines the 
composition of the judicial panels and contributions made by English and Scottish judges in Scottish 
decisions, with the aim of gauging the relative Scottish and English influence on the development of 
Scots law in the time period.  The empirical data on the composition of judgments in Scottish cases is 
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also reviewed to see the extent to which Scots law appeals were kept distinct to that legal system or 
whether there was evidence of crosspollination between UK legal systems. By doing so the character 
of the institutional relationship with Scotland and the Scottish courts will be gauged through the 
communication channel of precedent and the extent to which the final appeal court sought to 
contribute to Scots law either through English specialist expertise or through access to the English 
common law resource. Finally, this section concludes with a review of the new devolution issue 
jurisdiction to see the influence that it had on institutional relations with the Scottish courts and also 
the discrete influence that Strasbourg had on institutional relations in the Scottish context.  
Scottish Precedent; the Composition and Contribution of the Panel 
 
The composition of the panel nearly always observed the convention of having at least 2 Scottish 
Law Lords on Scottish Appeals with only 3 of 23 Scottish cases (including devolution issues) not 
adhering to the convention.175 Thus 87% of Scottish appeals in the time period followed the 
convention whereas just 22% (50/223) of English and Northern Irish appeals had both Scottish 
judges on the panel. The need to maintain an axis of Scottish expertise in Scots law appeals 
appeared to be even more astutely observed than at the time of Final Appeal, where the convention 
was observed in 77% of Scottish appeals and two Scottish judges sat in 34% of English and Northern 
Irish appeals.176 Only one Scottish case in the period saw Lords Hope and Rodger disagree, as 
discussed further below, and 88% of the time when Lords Hope and Rodger sat together on non-
Scottish appeals they agreed.177 Thus the axis of Scottish judicial opinion was fairly robust. 
Nevertheless, there is a limit to Scottish judicial resource and this circa 10% increase in the 
convention observance in Scots law appeals since Final Appeal, resulted in a 10% reduction in the 
observance of the convention in English and Northern Irish appeals. Individually, however, Lord 
Hope sat on 55% (122/223) and Lord Rodger sat on 44% (99/223) of non-Scottish appeals in the time 
period. Furthermore, Scots judges sat together and made more individual appearances on non-
Scottish cases in the Supreme Court proportionately compared to in the Appellate Committee.178 In 
this sense, the Scottish influence on non-Scots cases was higher in the Supreme Court. 
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Final Appeal found that instances of Scottish judges delivering full judgments were ‘markedly more’ 
frequent in Scottish appeals.179  The Scottish judges were very active in the time period, particularly 
in Scots law appeals. Every Scottish appeal had at least one Scottish judge on the panel. Lord Rodger 
sat on all Scottish appeals bar one and gave full judgment on 15 of these 23 occasions. Lord Hope sat 
on all appeals bar 2 and gave full judgment in 19 instances. Non-Scottish judges did, nevertheless, 
have a role in Scots law appeals. At least one non-Scottish judge gave judgment on 17 of 23 
occasions, although this occurred more commonly in Scottish civil appeals than in devolution issues. 
Furthermore, a non-Scottish judge would occasionally take the lead judgment where that played to 
his or her speciality. This occurred on 7 occasions, 2 of which were single judgments.180  Historical 
statistics on judicial contribution to Scots law appeals confirm that this study’s results follow a 
general pattern of rising contribution from Scottish and English Law Lords to Scots law appeals in the 
latter years of the Appellate Committee.181 It should also be recalled that judges can contribute to a 
judgment in more subtle ways, such as to the oral argument or the first conference following the 
hearing, even if it may not be for ‘as long as the specialist Law Lords.’182 
Despite evidence of a more bold English judicial contribution to Scots law than previously, it would 
be unfair to accuse ‘non-specialist’ English judges of determining Scots law matters, given that only 
one Scottish judgment in the period was not unanimous,183 and owing to the diligence of the 
Scottish judges on Scots appeals in both sitting and judgment writing. Roberts v Gill & Co184was an 
English appeal that showed the potential for English judges to challenge a Scottish judge’s reading of 
Scots law in obiter comments. Lord Collins disputed Lord Hope’s reading of Scots law as to whether 
trustees must be joined to a beneficiary’s action. This was, however, ‘only with the greatest 
hesitation’ and with the support of Lord Rodger, the other Scottish judge.185 Lord Rodger agreed 
with Lord Collins’ reading however he was reluctant, ‘to get drawn into a discussion of a tangential 
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point of Scots law which was not argued and is not free from difficulty.’186 In a separate appeal, Lord 
Collins appeared astutely aware that where an appeal overruled the Court of Session and involved 
intricate principles of Scots law, where Scots law academic commentary was cited widely and the 
area was expressly acknowledged to be confusing, he should defer to the Scottish Justices and 
reduce the scope of his judgment.187 Overall, the data suggests that an appropriate balance seemed 
to be struck between utilising non-Scottish judges’ technical expertise, whilst maintaining Scots law 
specialist knowledge on each Scots law appeal.  
Final Appeal suggested that formal concurrences were only ‘slightly more common’ in Scottish civil 
appeals compared to English civil appeals.188 The statistics measured the average number of 
concurring opinions provided relevant to where the appeal originated from (see Table 45). Although 
the average is slightly lower for the Court of Session and the High Court of Justiciary, as compared to 
the Court of Appeal (Civ), the High Court and the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, it is still on par 
with the Northern Ireland High Court and far greater than cases originating from the Court of Appeal 
(Crim). No statistical relationship was found to exist between the figures and so all that can be 
concluded is that there is a slightly lower instance of judges being prompted to provide concurring 
opinions in Scottish civil cases compared to civil cases arising in England and Wales or Northern 
Ireland. These statistics reflect the findings above that single judgments occurred most frequently in 
Scottish and criminal appeals, and that in multi-opinion judgments, both Scottish and non-Scottish 
judges were willing to contribute. The deployment of a single judgment in such cases was potentially 
a political manoeuvre to demonstrate that the final appeal court was at one in its decision in the 
specialist area and to unite the Scottish and English Justices in the judgment delivered.  
Table 45. Originating Court and Average Number of Concurring Opinions  
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
169 2.14 1.762 
Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division 
20 1.65 1.663 
High Court 14 2.14 1.916 
High Court of Justiciary 5 2.00 1.225 
Court of Session 18 2.00 1.782 
Northern Ireland Court of 10 3.00 1.563 
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Appeal 
Northern Ireland High Court 2 2.00 2.828 
Total 238 2.12 1.749 
 
Final Appeal tried to assess the extent to which there had been an ‘anglicisation’ of Scots law partly 
through looking at Scottish appeals and recording whether the Scottish Law Lords were prepared to 
dissent against the views of their English colleagues.189 This method was one of the few ways that 
the authors could objectively assess whether the Scottish Law Lords presence in the Appellate 
Committee, ‘adequately ensured the purity of Scots law in appeals from Scotland’.190 Blom-Cooper 
and Drewry began by comparing dissent rates to rates of attendance and found that Scots Law Lords 
dissented at a similar rate to English Law Lords in English appeals and that they were no more likely 
to dissent in a Scottish appeal than an English appeal. The authors found that the overall dissent rate 
in Scottish appeals was lower than in English appeals and where there was a dissent it tended to be a 
Scottish Law Lord in the dissenting position.191 In cases that involved two dissents no evidence was 
found to support the notion that Scottish judges ‘stuck’ together.192   
Table 46. Originating Court and Average Number of Dissenting Opinions 
Which court the appeal 
originated from Mean N Std. Deviation 
Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
.46 169 .906 
Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division 
.55 20 .999 
High Court .50 14 .855 
High Court of Justiciary .40 5 .894 
Court of Session .00 18 .000 
Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal 
.80 10 1.033 
Northern Ireland High Court .50 2 .707 
Total .45 238 .883 
 
Table 46 confirms some of these results in the time period. In Scottish civil cases, the final appeal 
court did not return a dissenting opinion once in all 18 cases that arose. This provides a strong 
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indication that unanimity levels continued to be stronger in Scottish civil cases and there was a 
marked reluctance for English Justices to go against the opinion of their Scottish colleagues. Scottish 
courts had a greater chance of receiving a unanimous judgment than either the English or the 
Northern Irish courts. The High Court of Justiciary had an average dissent rate on a par with the 
other lower courts, however general conclusions cannot be drawn on the basis that only 5 
devolution issue cases arose. Martin and Miller v HM Advocate,193 was the only case that returned a 
dissenting opinion and it was from a Scottish Justice (Lord Rodger) and a Northern Irish Justice (Lord 
Kerr). Indeed, Lord Kerr may have been more comfortable dissenting with the support of a Scottish 
Justice.    
Overall, it is clear that Scottish appeals tended to be unanimous. Each appeal would have at least 
one Scottish Justice, with the convention of two Scottish judges being observed in the vast majority 
of cases. That said, English judges still regularly provided a judgment in Scottish civil appeals 
including the lead judgment, although not so much in devolution issue cases and their contribution 
was less, on average, than in English civil appeals. Interestingly, Scottish judges contributed quite 
widely to non-Scottish cases and more so in the Supreme Court. It may be that the Supreme Court is 
more actively engaging in its role as a court for the whole of the UK, with English and Scottish judges 
each reciprocally sitting and contributing more regularly to cases arising in an alternate jurisdiction. 
Caution needs to be exercised however, as Lord Hope was Deputy President of the court and it is 
more likely owing to this position and his seniority, rather than his status as a Scottish judge that he 
was so active in the time period. The next section explores a bit further the idea of setting precedent 
for the Scottish legal system and the ways that influence of an alternate legal jurisdiction could 
enhance both Scottish and non-Scottish precedent. 
Scottish Precedent; Distinction and Crosspollination between UK legal systems  
 
The formation of and reliance upon precedent in Scottish cases engages certain jurisdiction specific 
considerations. The integrity of Scots law must be protected in the court’s role as a court for the UK. 
The government believed that the ability for judges from a ‘different background’ who are able to 
‘draw on resources of a different legal tradition’ could create ‘advantages to the larger 
jurisdiction’.194  The Walker Report was more specific and recognised the advantages that came from 
the relative size and history of the English jurisdiction. Provided there was no ‘undue influence’ or 
threat to the inherent ‘integrity’ of Scots law, English law was recognised as being a jurisdiction 
‘closely aligned’ to Scots law and possessing ‘undeniably rich doctrinal resources’ in the origin of the 
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common law. The ‘quantity and quality’ of English precedent could not be matched in Scotland.195 
Walker, nevertheless, questioned whether sharing a final appeal court was a necessary means of 
achieving access to this resource. He did, however, concede that a shared court was the only means 
of allowing Scots’ appeals access to English judicial expertise acquired within a generalist court that 
covered a wide variety of subject matters and which had a proportionately higher caseload.196  As 
seen above, English judges were prepared to take the lead on Scots’ cases, where the subject matter 
lay particularly within their specialist expertise. The use of English judicial resource in Scots’ cases in 
this way demonstrates the value that English judges can add to such appeals and that their judgment 
is not always secondary to the reasoning of the Scottish judges. 
Whether sending appeals to London provides more access to English common law resource, 
depends on how much that resource is used in Scots law cases. The quantitative data in Table 47 
suggests that the final appeal court judges were much better at citing English comparative authority 
in Scottish or Northern Irish cases than they were at citing either Scottish or Northern Irish 
comparative authority in English and Welsh decisions. A case that originated in the Court of Session 
or the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal would, on average, cite between 6-7 domestic comparative 
authorities (or between 8-9 authorities when those courts were being overruled). However the final 
appeal court was only likely to cite 1 domestic comparative citation, if any, when the case originated 
in an English court. Furthermore, Court of Session judgments were found to be a lot shorter in length 
and so proportionately more of a Court of Session judgment will be devoted to domestic 
comparisons. This direction of comparison could be expected given the relative size of each 
respective legal jurisdiction. The results may also reflect the practical difficulties of gaining access to 
the authorities in the Scottish and Northern Irish jurisdictions. For instance, Baroness Hale, speaking 
in the context of the Court of Appeal, has commented that lawyers often do not have the time or the 
resources to undertake comparative research between domestic legal systems.197    
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Table 47. Originating Court, Overrule and Average Number of Domestic citations  
Overrule 
Which court the appeal 
originated from Mean N Std. Deviation 
Yes Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
.59 97 1.289 
Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division 
1.29 7 1.704 
High Court 1.20 5 1.789 
High Court of Justiciary 5.00 2 5.657 
Court of Session 8.10 10 7.866 
Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal 
8.83 6 6.145 
Total 1.70 127 3.808 
No Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
.94 62 1.524 
Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division 
.62 13 1.193 
High Court .67 9 .500 
High Court of Justiciary 2.33 3 .577 
Court of Session 4.38 8 4.069 
Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal 
4.00 4 6.055 
Northern Ireland High Court 8.00 2 11.314 
Total 1.45 101 2.700 
Total Court of Appeal Civil 
Division 
.72 159 1.391 
Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division 
.85 20 1.387 
High Court .86 14 1.099 
High Court of Justiciary 3.40 5 3.209 
Court of Session 6.44 18 6.573 
Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal 
6.90 10 6.280 
Northern Ireland High Court 8.00 2 11.314 
Total 1.59 228 3.358 
 
The statistics reveal a modest use of comparative resource in Scots’ appeals and show that Scottish 
litigants still have limited exposure to the ‘rich’ English common law heritage by taking their case to 
the final appeal court. Nevertheless, these quantitative citation figures only measure separate 
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citations and do not take into account incidences of repeat citations. Past studies have shown that 
when the final appeal court cites authorities, it tends to do so in a considered and meaningful way 
and that each citation forms part of a carefully considered reasoning process. Calderone’s 
comparison of the use of precedent (which he deemed to be any citation of a prior determined case) 
in judicial review cases in the Appellate Committee and the US Supreme Court found several notable 
trends. The latter court cited more discrete cases however the average citation rate was one citation 
higher in the Appellate Committee owing to repeat citations. Appellate Committee repeat citations 
appeared to be the result of extended debate and detailed consideration of the authorities in 
question, as opposed to just ‘passing references’ in the US Supreme Court.198 Furthermore, 
Calderone found that the Law Lords often cited more than one judicial opinion per citation to 
establish common ground in the case.199  The quantitative data, therefore, is limited in that it does 
not reveal the true extent of citation rates based on repeat citations.  
The quantitative data also does not depict how the authorities were actually used. Final Appeal’s 
‘highly subjective’ impressions were that save where the Law Lords were interpreting a mutually 
applicable statute and trying to create some form of uniformity in Scotland and England, they 
deliberately avoided adopting English approaches to issues arising in Scots law.200 Thus in 1952-68 
only three cases were found which were felt to provide examples of ‘unadultered Anglicisation’201 
and, on the whole, this concern was misplaced.  Indeed Chalmers has observed that between 1993-
2002, English judges in the Appellate Committee were only prepared to deliver a speech on certain 
areas namely statutory or contractual interpretation or the law of negligence, and aside from this 
tended to ‘defer’ to the Scottish judges.202  These are the same areas where Walker has pointed out 
the need for some level of coherence: 
there are some areas of Scots law, such as the law of negligence, aspects of contract law and 
large parts of public law, that have developed in quite close coherence with laws of other 
parts of the UK, and here the proper unit to benefit from the values of coherence and 
integrity within the relevant local sectors may be the UK rather than Scotland.203 
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The observational data in this study confirms that English authorities tended to be cited where 
English law was acknowledged to be in step with Scots law. As such, domestic comparative citations 
were made in each of the legal areas identified by Walker as being in ‘close coherence’ on both sides 
of the border. In Mitchell v Glasgow City Council,204 the English comparative citations were made in 
response to the suggestion that the test in Caparo Industies plc v Dickman205 of whether it is ‘just 
and reasonable’ to impose a duty of care may not be applicable to Scots law or to personal injury 
cases. Lord Hope, however, could ‘see no good reason why, as a general guide to what is required, it 
should not be regarded as part of Scots law.’206 He cited both historical and recent English 
authorities to trace the origins of the test and when it had been applied in a personal injury context. 
He also pointed to Scottish authorities where it had unquestioningly been applied. Lord Hope was 
guided by the fact that ‘no principle of Scots law ... contradicts it’ and that ‘the law of liability for 
negligence has developed on common lines both north and south of the border.’207  Lord Brown also 
referred to the crosspollination between the two legal systems in that ‘much of England’s negligence 
law was forged in Scottish appeals.’208 
Eba v Advocate General for Scotland209 was a public law case heard alongside two English appeals on 
the scope of judicial review of decisions of the Upper Tribunal. Unlike the usual practice in conjoined 
appeals, separate judgments were provided for England and Wales and for Scotland. In doing so, the 
Supreme Court appeared to strike the balance between pulling resources in analogous case, whilst 
recognising the distinct integrity of each legal system. The court noted that Scottish authorities 
recognised ‘no substantial difference between English and Scots law as to the grounds on which the 
process of decision-making may be open to review’ and that ‘... Scots law has been able to follow the 
developments in the English approach to judicial review since Anisminic ...’. The court concluded 
that: 
It would not ... be a very large step for the Scots approach to unappealable decisions of the 
Upper Tribunal to align itself with that which has now been decided should be taken in 
England and Wales.210  
Multi-Link Leisure Developments Limited v North Lanarkshire Council,211 was a contractual case 
where Lord Hope relied upon an English authority212 for the proposition that the ‘commercial or 
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business object’ of a provision may be relevant to interpreting a provision in a contract. He 
suggested that the English authorities in this area were ‘more clearly explained’ than ‘the 19th 
century Scottish cases referred to by the Extra Division,’213 and in doing so highlighted the clear 
benefit to Scots law from drawing on a larger jurisdiction that was more likely to have recent 
authorities on a contractual point. 
The court was also careful to recognise that not all commercial or public law matters were aligned 
between the two jurisdictions and that there remained distinct differences in the legal systems, even 
within these subject areas. This included the taking of security for shares214 and the right of access to 
judicial review.215 The English judges were also careful to adopt Scots law terminology in their 
judgments in these areas. Thus they referred to a ‘delictual’ rather than ‘tortious’ duties of care216 
and used procedural language such as ‘averments’, ‘reclaiming motions’ and ‘pursuers.’217 
Procedurally, the limits of the final appeal court jurisdiction were also made clear including not 
interfering with the discretion of the Lord Ordinary or a decision of the Court of Session on 
procedural matters.218  
The other side of the coin was whether Scots law had any influence on English appeals. Supreme 
Court decisions in Scottish cases are only of persuasive authority in English appeals219 and the 
quantitative data suggested that Scots law authorities were not often cited in English and Northern 
Irish authorities. Whether ‘English law has become ‘Scoticised’’ was ‘an afterthought’ in Final 
Appeal, given the dominance of the Scottish Law Lord, Lord Reid during their period of study.220 Lord 
Hope was one of the most active Justices in the time period in terms of sitting and providing 
judgment and has been recognised as so since his appointment.221 As such there may have been a 
more subtle Scottish influence on English appeals through Lord Hope than that revealed by volume 
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of citations.222 Furthermore, the observational data revealed that even if Scottish authorities per se 
were not often cited, other Scottish comparative resources such as statutes and Law Commission 
reports were used instead, to demonstrate Scottish practice in English decisions during the time 
period.  
Reports of the Scottish Law Commission were referred to, particularly where they seemed to clarify 
the position in England. In Agbaje v Akinnoye-Agbaje,223 the Supreme Court considered the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens and drew upon a report of the Scottish Law Commission,224 which 
explained why Scotland gave less discretion to the courts to determine where an award may be 
appropriate in foreign divorce proceedings. The Supreme Court was then able to proceed on the 
basis that ‘a more flexible approach was deliberately adopted’ in England and Wales.225 A Scottish 
Law Commission Report was again referred to in R v G226 for its discussion, and clarification, of the 
English position in relation to sexual offences involving children under 13 years of age.227   
Scots law, be it statutory or common law was also used to make sense of English statutes. Indeed, 
statutory interpretation has been recognised as an area where historically, English judges are more 
comfortable contributing to Scots’ decisions.228 In Kay v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,229 
Lord Rodger noted that s11 of the Public Order Act 1986 was ‘loosely modelled’ on s62 of the Civic 
Government (Scotland) Act 1982 and so comparisons could be made.230  In R v Rollins,231 the fact 
that the FSA had investigative powers but the Lord Advocate had the power to prosecute offences 
under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 in Scotland was used by the Committee to 
conclude that the FSA’s lack of statutory investigatory powers for crimes under the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 was not necessarily a barrier to it being able to prosecute offences under that act.232 
In R v Asfaw,233 the position in Scotland was used to establish omissions by Parliament in s31 Asylum 
and Immigration Act 1999. Lord Hope acknowledged that ‘the exact matching of statutory offences 
in England and Wales with common law crimes in Scotland is at best very difficult, and more often 
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than not it is virtually impossible’, however he went on to state that, in the context (relating to the 
immunity of refugees who commit offences whilst attempting to seek asylum), there was ‘no 
sensible reason’ for Parliament to differentiate conduct on either side of the border.234 In TRM Copy 
Centres (UK) Limited v Lanwell Services Limited,235 Lord Hope used the position in Scotland on what 
constituted a hire purchase agreement to assist in interpreting s15 Consumer Credit Act 1974 in such 
a way that gratuitous bailments were outside of its scope. By reading the statute in this way he 
noted that the position was the same for both England and Wales and Scotland.236  
There were also times where the law in Scotland was merely referred to by way of comparison. In 
the English criminal case of R v Davis,237 Lord Rodger acknowledged that his colleagues had reviewed 
the English and Convention cases on anonymity of witnesses, however he went on to consider the 
position in Scotland to provide an alternate angle.238 Similarly in R v Briggs-Price,239 Lords Rodger and 
Mance noted that evidence of a crime not charged would not have been admitted in Scotland. Lord 
Mance implied that his ‘instinctive preference’ would have been the Scottish approach, however 
criminal law and procedure may legitimately vary widely, provided it adheres to the Convention and 
proper prosecutorial conduct.240 In Fisher v Brooker,241 which involved a long period of delay in 
asserting a claim to musical copyright, Lord Hope noted that under s8 of the Prescription and 
Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, there was an arguable case that this claim would be time barred in 
Scotland, even though the point had not been tested in the courts.242 Furthermore, in Star Energy 
Weald Basin Limited v Bocardo SA,243 Lord Hope noted that the rights of ownership to airspace 
above land appeared to differ between England and Scotland.244 The point of these references 
appeared to be in acknowledgement that there could be differences in approach to that of England 
and Wales as another angle to the review of the law in England and Wales. 
Occasionally Lord Hope would discuss the position in Scotland with a reformist hat on, as a way of 
implying that procedures could be improved in England. Thus he noted that ‘the Children’s Hearing 
system provided for in Chapters 2 and 3 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 is not available in 
England and Wales’ and he wondered ‘whether sexual crimes committed by children should be dealt 
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with in the same way as sexual crimes committed by adults.’245 Also, in looking at the varying 
amounts of detail provided by the prosecution in establishing breaches of Health and Safety 
legislation in England and Wales, Lord Hope compared the ‘narrative charges’ adopted in Scotland 
which ensures sufficient amounts of detail are provided.246  Finally, he commented that the ex gratia 
compensation scheme for reversals of convictions still operated in Scotland and so, unlike in 
England, victims can still be compensated even if their case does not fall within the four walls of the 
statute, which he reveals is the ‘unfortunate’ consequence of the removal of the ex gratia scheme in 
England.247 
Devolution Issues 
 
The devolution issue jurisdiction is one of the core constitutional functions of the final appeal court. 
Devolution issues are outlined in Schedule 6, para 1 of Scotland Act 1998. They include questions 
over (i) whether an Act or provision of an Act of the Scottish Parliament is within its competence,248 
(ii) whether an Act of the Scottish Government, including the Lord Advocate, is or would be within its 
devolved competence,249 (iii) whether an action or omission to act by the Scottish Government 
would be incompatible with either EU Law or the Convention rights.250 This latter ‘devolution Issue’ 
is now classed as a ‘compatibility issue’ and is governed by the legal mechanisms under the Scotland 
Act 2012, which came into force after the conclusion of the empirical work and is discussed below. 
Compatibility issues are mentioned here as devolution issues, as this was how they were classified at 
the time of the study. Devolution issues can arise in either civil or criminal cases in three separate 
situations. Firstly in relation to the proposed exercise of a function of the executive in one of the 
devolved states, secondly, by a challenge to the legislative competence of one of the three 
legislatures or thirdly by the power to refer questions by a Law Officer or the Minister of the country 
in question.251 The Supreme Court can also be asked to scrutinise Bills arising in the Scottish 
Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly or the National Assembly for Wales.252  
The Government indicated its preference to transfer the jurisdiction to the Supreme Court as it 
would ensure a consistent approach to constitutional issues and more importantly mark a clear 
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separation between devolution issue appeals and the UK Parliament.253 The JCPC was originally 
selected over the Appellate Committee to address concerns that a parliamentary body would 
inadvertently gain jurisdiction over Scottish criminal appeals when historically criminal matters had 
been exclusively retained within the Scots law jurisdiction.254 Nevertheless, the separation of the 
Supreme Court from Westminster ensured that this was no longer an issue. 
The devolution Issue jurisdiction of the Supreme Court propagates the constitutional role and power 
of the court.  The court must police the devolution settlement by ensuring that the devolved 
parliaments and executives only act within their prescribed competencies. The Supreme Court has a 
power to strike down an Act of Scottish Parliament that is found to be out-with the Parliament’s 
competence.255  It also asserts control over the Scottish executive by reviewing any act found to be 
incompatible with the either Convention or EU Law.256 The unique statutory power to hold a UK 
subordinate parliamentary and executive body to account also means that at a central level the 
Supreme Court is being tasked with safeguarding one element of the sovereign will of Parliament.  
Even more importantly, the devolution issue jurisdiction reflects to some extent, the universality of 
human rights and ensures that the Supreme Court is the final appeal court in human rights issues 
arising in any civil or criminal case in the UK and no matter which of the three legal jurisdictions the 
case arises.257 This ensures that the Supreme Court is the sole gateway to Strasbourg, with every 
case having to be heard by the Supreme Court, before litigants can claim to have exhausted all 
domestic remedies.258 
Leave to appeal a devolution issue raised in Scottish criminal appeals is refused in the vast majority 
of cases and when it is granted, it is more commonly by the High Court of Justiciary. Between 1st 
October 2009 and 21st April 2013, 44 applications were made to the court. The High Court of 
Justiciary granted leave in 11 cases, the Supreme Court in 4 cases and 29 cases were refused 
leave.259 The statistics covering the period since devolution to 21st April 2013 reveal that either the 
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JCPC or the Supreme Court heard 36 full devolution issue appeals in Scottish criminal cases; 18 of 
which were granted leave by the High Court of Justiciary; 10 by the Supreme Court and 8 were made 
by law officer or High Court of Justiciary reference.260 Although it was less common for leave to be 
granted by the JCPC or the Supreme Court, there was a 50% success rate in such cases. This success 
rate is relatively high compared to the success rates of appeals for each court, outlined at the start 
of this chapter. Appeals where the Supreme Court granted leave have the potential to be quite 
sensitive, given that the Scottish court did not necessarily accept that there was a devolution issue 
needing consideration by the final appeal court. Indeed, two appeals where the Supreme Court 
granted leave in the time period, Cadder v HM Advocate261 and Fraser v HM Advocate262 were both 
successful and sensitive, as outlined below. The statistics, nevertheless, have put to rest predictions 
that devolution issues would dramatically increase the workload of the Appellate Committee and 
thus have an adverse effect on the whole litigation system.263 
Only 5 devolution issues arose in the time period,264 however the small number perhaps belies the 
significance and impact of some of these decisions on the Scottish jurisdiction. The first devolution 
issue case in the Supreme Court was McInnes v HM Advocate,265 pertaining to an A6 ECHR issue as a 
result of failures of the prosecution to disclose information at trial. Lord Hope took the opportunity, 
in his lead judgment, to build a relationship with the High Court of Justiciary by clearly demarcating 
what the limits of the court’s devolution issue jurisdiction were; that being to determine the test to 
be applied by the High Court of Justiciary and not to apply that test.266 Rather controversially, Lord 
Brown set out the position in English law and stated that he saw no reason for it to be any different 
under Scots law.267 Perhaps as a method of damage limitation to the relationship with the High Court 
of Justiciary, in one of the first cases the Supreme Court had heard under this jurisdiction, Lord Hope 
explicitly stated that the law of Scotland is to be applied and that Lord Brown’s comments on English 
law were only to be read in deciding whether non-disclosure in a criminal trial violated A6(1) of the 
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Convention.268 Lord Brown clearly found it useful to compare the English position in such cases and 
in Martin v HM Advocate,269 he again commented on how an English court would sentence the 
criminal conduct of driving whilst disqualified, although on this occasion he expressly acknowledged 
that it was ‘immaterial to this appeal.’270 
Martin was one of the core devolution issue cases that arose in the time period in terms of the 
significance of the constitutional issues it raised. The case related to the rise in the maximum 
sentence that Sheriffs could impose summarily for driving whilst disqualified and the relative 
competence of the Scottish Parliament to enact such a change. In particular, the judges had to 
consider what was meant by the words ‘special to a reserved matter’ in sch4 Scotland Act 1998. The 
Supreme Court split, including the two Scottish Justices, with Lord Hope in the majority and Lord 
Rodger in the dissent. The split seemed to be owing to the acknowledged difficulties that the judges 
had in discerning the statutory scheme.271 If any Scottish case merited a larger panel, this perhaps 
would have been it, given the importance of the issues. Clarity was needed as to what the statutory 
wording meant and Lord Rodger clearly felt that the majority obfuscated matters further.272 Aware 
of the political sensitivities, Lord Hope was keen to emphasise that the court was not deciding what 
should be a matter for the Scottish Parliament and what should be reserved for Westminster. That 
matter was determined by the rules in the Scotland Act and all the Supreme Court was tasked with 
was interpreting those rules.273 Lord Hope went on to find that what was being amended was not 
the rule relating to maximum sentence (a reserved matter) but rather a rule of procedure as to 
which court may impose that maximum sentence, which was a matter for Scots law. Again, Lord 
Brown revealed that the majority were alert to the political effects of the decision. As the Scottish 
Parliament was intended to regulate its own legal system, he did not wish to read schedule 4 in such 
a way that would require Westminster’s assistance whenever it needed to do this.274 This would 
clearly interfere with the apparent autonomy of the Scottish legal system. 
Cadder v HM Advocate275 was also an extremely controversial decision, where a larger panel of 
seven justices was convened.  It was one of the few decisions in which the Supreme Court itself 
granted special leave to appeal on the devolution issues and in which the decision of a unanimous 
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seven member High Court of Justiciary was overturned.276 The Supreme Court found that safeguards 
present under Scots criminal procedure were not sufficient to ignore the Grand Chamber ruling in 
Salduz v Turkey,277 that the lack of access to legal assistance in police custody breached A6 ECHR. 
The decision was to have profound consequences for the whole of the Scottish justice system as 
although the Supreme Court had the ability to limit the retrospective effect of an act of the Scottish 
Parliament, ruled to be out-with its competence,278 there was no ability under the Scotland Act 1998 
to do the same for actions of the Lord Advocate.  Lord Hope, nevertheless, used the principle of legal 
certainty to limit the effect of the decision and ensure that closed cases were not reopened.279  
Another controversial aspect of Cadder was that the Supreme Court was prepared to reject the 
Strasbourg line in Horncastle when English criminal procedure was deemed to contain satisfactory 
alternative safeguards in relation to the admissibility of hearsay evidence, but was not prepared to 
do the same where the Scottish judges felt that Scottish criminal procedure had sufficient alternative 
safeguards to guarantee a fair trial, despite the lack of legal assistance.280  Lord Hope implicitly 
addressed what could be perceived to be unfair distinctions drawn between Scots and English law by 
noting that ‘the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for the domestic legal systems …’ 
whereas the Strasbourg court had not indicated that lack of access to a lawyer could be subject to 
alternative jurisdiction specific arrangements to avoid a violation of A6.281 It was also recognised that 
nearly all Council of Europe members had acted on the Salduz ruling and that Scotland would be out 
of line if it did not do so.282 
The Cadder decision had such a profound effect on the Scottish legal system that it prompted the 
enactment of the Scotland Act 2012. The Act made several amendments to the Criminal Procedure 
(Scotland) Act 1995 and reasserted the discrete legal role that the Supreme Court has on 
compatibility questions by ensuring that the High Court of Justiciary is final decision maker in the 
case. Thus a Supreme Court finding that the Lord Advocate carried out a Convention or EU 
incompatible act is no longer a nullity283 and instead will be remitted back to the High Court of 
Justiciary for final determination.284 Furthermore, the High Court of Justiciary is provided with more 
power to control the effect on its jurisdiction of an adverse ‘compatibility issue’ finding, by making 
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the relevant order instead of the Supreme Court.285 The High Court of Justiciary is therefore able to 
smooth the transition to compatibility by making an order either suspending the effects of the 
decision until the incompatibility is remedied or to limit or remove any retrospective effects of that 
decision.286 The 2012 Act also amended Scottish criminal procedure, so that any question whether 
an Act of the Scottish Parliament is incompatible with either the Convention or EU law287 or  whether 
a public authority has acted in an incompatible manner with either the Convention or EU law288 is 
now a ‘compatibility issue’ which forms a separate statutory right of appeal.289   
The final devolution issue case to court controversy in the time period was Fraser v HM Advocate,290 
where special leave was granted by the Supreme Court despite the fact that the appeal court in 
Scotland had refused leave on the grounds that it would result in the Supreme Court determining 
the merits of the case. Indeed, the appeal revealed that it was not always possible to isolate 
devolution issues into a discrete category without any consideration of substantive Scottish criminal 
matters.  The Supreme Court had to determine whether an appeal against criminal conviction due to 
non-disclosure of evidence by the prosecution could be determined by the ‘fresh evidence test’ and 
be compatible with A6 ECHR. ‘Fresh evidence appeals’ in Scotland are not within the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court as they do not raise devolution issues, nevertheless the court had to consider the 
Fresh Evidence test to see whether it was substantially the same test as would have been applied if 
the appeal court had entertained the A6 argument.291 Lord Hope, again, sought to pacify relations 
with Scotland by emphasising the limits to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction- to only determine 
devolution issues.292 Indeed, Lord Brown specifically mentioned that Lord Hope had ‘more than 
once’ pointed this out.’293  Therefore, contrary to the findings at the start of this chapter on the 
influence of the Convention on lower courts generally, the influence of the Convention in the 
Scottish context actually resulted in considerable strain in the institutional relationship between the 
final appeal court and the Scottish lower courts. 
Conclusion 
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The Supreme Court appeared more assertive than the Appellate Committee in its relationship with 
the lower courts as seen in the 6% increase in the rate of overrule in the time period. The statistics 
also revealed that 60% of cases that were overruled in some way followed precedent. This suggests 
that, as a whole, the final appeal court took issue with the way the lower court applied precedent 
more often than it did when the lower court was law-making. An example was provided in cases that 
involved the executive. The overrule rate was 7% lower in cases that involved the executive 
compared to cases that did not involve the executive and the lower court did better in that context 
when it was not following precedent. Not only does this reflect the general overrule trend in the 
time period, it also suggests that in sensitive political cases, where there was no precedent, there 
was a slight tendency for the lower courts and final appeal court to put on a united front. 
When the institutional influence of the ECtHR was examined another interesting trend emerged. The 
lower court was overruled less in human rights cases. Only 45% of such cases were overruled 
compared to a between 50-60% rate of overrule for other subject matters.  In human rights cases, 
the lower court followed precedent in 71% of cases and in cases that were influenced by ECtHR 
jurisprudence, the lower court followed precedent in 69% of cases compared to 51% of cases that 
did not consider ECtHR jurisprudence. This difference was statistically significant. The lower court 
was clearly able to read domestic precedent better in the Convention domain, suggesting that 
precedent was more clearly articulated where individual rights were at stake and the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR could be used for guidance. As such, the institutional influence of the ECtHR appeared 
to support the domestic system of precedent and the communication between the final appeal court 
and the lower courts. At the same time, domestic precedent in the non-Convention context could do 
more to support the lower courts further going forward. In this sense it is illustrative to look at the 
judgment characteristics found in the human rights field.  
Distinguishing features of human rights cases found in Chapter 3 included the significantly longer 
judgments, the higher number of concurring opinions and the higher number of citations. Each of 
these factors could allow for a more comprehensive review of the legal implications of the judgment 
and could assist in clarifying the reasoning in those precedents. More concurring opinions may 
therefore assist the lower courts in reading domestic precedent.  Occasionally, a broader approach 
was taken to domestic Convention cases, going wider than counsel’s arguments to address 
Convention issues that did not arise on the facts. This goes against the traditional characterisation of 
UK court judgments where each case is determined based on the case in the lower court and 
counsel’s submissions. There are clearly practical and doctrinal problems attached to making cases 
too broad, not least making the ratio decidendi even more difficult to discern. Nevertheless, the 
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success of the executive and the lower courts in the Convention field suggests that a slightly broader 
approach to providing guidance- where argument has been heard and it appears appropriate to 
make some more general pronouncements on the area- may actually facilitate the institutions who 
are guided by the judgments of the court.  
The resilience of precedent in the non-Convention context was confirmed by the limited use of the 
1966 Practice Direction. However, precedent in the Convention context was more easily departed 
from.  This suggests two things. Firstly, that overrule of a lower court following precedent was more 
commonly attributable to the way that the lower court applied or distinguished the precedent than 
to the precedent itself. Secondly, that too resilient an approach to precedent creates an 
‘impenetrable maze of distinctions and qualifications which destroy certainty’294 and may explain 
why the lower court tended to perform best when it was free to decide matters away from the 
constraints of precedent or, in the Convention context, where a broader approach was taken to 
domestic precedent and precedent was less resistant to overrule. If these results were true of a 
general pattern, it would suggest that the domestic doctrine of precedent, with its particularistic and 
resilient approach may actually hinder institutional communication with the lower courts. 
In terms of the institutional relationship with the Scottish courts, the Supreme Court was also more 
assertive than the Appellate Committee. The results for the respective courts show that in 9 cases 
arising in the Appellate Committee only 2 were overruled and 1 was reversed in part. Of the 14 cases 
in the Supreme Court (including devolution issues), 8 were overruled and one was reversed in part. 
These overrule statistics confirm that in the transitional period the final appeal court was not just a 
‘rubber stamp’ on Scottish lower court decisions and added what Final Appeal would regard as value 
to the appeal.295  
The value that this study suggests that the Supreme Court can add to lower court appeals is to 
increase the quality of precedent, through further reasoning and authority citation, to help guide the 
lower courts and minimise overrule in the future. In other words a lower overrule rate would be 
more facilitative to the court’s institutional relationship with the Scottish courts. This concept of 
value was recognised in the Walker Report in its list of values used to evaluate the final appellate 
jurisdiction in Scotland. Walker used a mixture of ‘indirect’ and ‘political’ values alongside others 
that were more ‘intrinsic to the legal order’, such as ‘democracy, fair treatment, coherence and 
integrity, richness of resources, expertise, detachment, operational effectiveness and economy’.296 
All of these values were not reconcilable in one model and it was concluded that ‘no single model of 
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appellate jurisdiction … provides an optimal institutional expression of any of these values,’ with 
different solutions promoting different values.297  Nevertheless the optimal model would try to 
reconcile as many of these values as possible. 
The ‘operational effectiveness and efficiency’ value was clearly supported by the shorter and more 
expeditious delivery of judgments originating in the Court of Session.  Furthermore, the ‘coherence 
and integrity’ of the domestic UK legal systems was respected by the selective use of the ‘rich 
resources’ of the English common law.  English authorities were modestly reviewed in cases where 
the separate legal systems were recognised to align. Where UK coherence was required, Scottish 
resources (if not authorities) were cited in English cases. The ‘expertise’ value was also deployed in a 
way that would be positively regarded by Walker. This was seen in allowing specialist English judges 
to lead on Scots law cases that engaged the English judge’s specialism. Whilst these judges may lack 
‘expertise’ in Scots’ law, the convention of two Scottish judges sitting on Scottish cases was observed 
even more assiduously than in the past and where it was not observed, a Scottish judge was always 
present. Furthermore, the high levels of unanimity in Scottish cases in the time period meant that in 
only one case, Martin and Miller, could concern be raised over the expertise of the majority 
judgment, with the two Scottish judges differing in opinion.  
Chalmers has suggested that, ‘Scottish and English law lords do not approach distinctively Scottish 
issues on equal terms.’298 This accusation relates to Walker’s value of ‘fair treatment’ of Scots’ 
appeals. The data revealed that Scots cases were treated differently. As we have seen, appeals were 
more likely to be unanimous, shorter in length, delivered in a quicker period of time and often with a 
single judgment.  In addition, Scottish judges were proportionately more active on Scots law appeals 
in both sitting and providing judgment. Should the preliminary conclusions in this thesis be correct, 
that longer judgments with a greater number of opinions and citations actually serves to increase 
the quality of the reasoning and the guidance to lower courts, then the judgment style favoured in 
the Scottish context could hinder institutional guidance in the future and perhaps lead to an 
increased rate of overrule.   In this sense, Scottish appeals may not be receiving full ‘value’ from the 
Supreme Court and institutional relations may be compromised in the future as a result.  
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Institutional relationships with Scotland may already be compromised in the devolution issue 
context. Both Cadder and Fraser were not received well by Scottish nationalists299 and the adverse 
publicity could well have been damaging to the infantile institutional relationship between the 
Supreme Court and the High Court of Justiciary. Cadder was so controversial, that legislation was 
promptly enacted to address its effects. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s judgments in devolution issue 
cases were marked by an awareness of the sensitivities surrounding the jurisdiction and the 
repeated emphasis on the limits of that jurisdiction.  This sensitivity may have been the reason why 
a panel of devolution issue expertise was formed.  Lords Brown and Kerr sat on all 5 devolution issue 
appeals alongside the 2 Scottish Law Lords, with Lord Brown providing a judgment in 4 of these 
cases. Lord Walker also sat on 4 of the 5 cases.300 This suggests that not only was the Supreme Court 
keen to observe the Convention of two Scottish Justices in such cases, it also wished to keep the 
English Justices that sat on such cases consistent, perhaps in an attempt to build a level of specialist 
expertise in devolution matters amongst the English judges. Rachel Cahill O’Callaghan has profiled 
the Supreme Court judges based on the personal values they demonstrated in close call judgments 
in the first 4 years of the Supreme Court.  Interestingly, in her analysis of the Jewish Free Schools 
case, she found that Lords Walker, Hope, Rodger and Brown all espoused ‘traditionalist’ values in 
their dissenting opinion in that case.301  This may, tentatively, suggest that these English judges were 
selected to hear devolution issue cases as they shared similar personal values to the Scottish judges 
and were less likely to divide in this politically sensitive area. Whilst this may be speculation, what is 
clear is that the Supreme Court took a very assertive stance and exercised its institutional power 
fairly liberally over the Scottish lower courts in devolution issues in the time period. The success rate 
of devolution issues was around 40% in the time period and higher than reported in the past.302  
In summary, the Supreme Court overruled the Scottish courts as well as the lower courts more 
frequently than the Appellate Committee in the time period.  It has been suggested that a way of 
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reducing overrule going forward- and potentially improving institutional relations with the lower 
courts- would be to improve the functioning of the system of precedent.  In this regard, lessons 
could be taken from the domestic jurisprudence under the Convention, where the lower court 
appeared more successful at applying precedent. Devolution issue judgments are characterised by 
the fact that they involve consideration of the Convention cases as well as by their Scots’ law origin 
and it may be that as the jurisdiction develops, a more detailed body of domestic jurisprudence will 
assist in guiding the lower court in this context. Scottish precedent more generally could, 
nonetheless, do more to provide ‘value’ to that jurisdiction.
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Chapter 6; Relationship with the European Courts 
 
The integral link between the final appeal court and the ECtHR was evident in the preceding 
chapters which highlighted the significant effect that the influence of the ECtHR had in the time 
period on the administrative efficiency and judgment style adopted by the court. The Convention’s 
influence also affected the court’s domestic institutional relationships, particularly its review of 
executive decision-making and its ability to communicate with the lower courts through precedent. 
In this sense, the institutional influence of the ECtHR and a Convention matter seemed to have as 
great an effect on institutional relations as the changeover from the Appellate Committee to the 
Supreme Court. This final chapter builds upon these conclusions and concludes the evolving 
narrative by looking at the empirical data collected specific to the institutional relationship between 
the final appeal court and the European courts and the effect that this had on the administrative 
efficiency of the court as well as the institutional relationships already discussed.  
The broad structure of ‘overrule’ and ‘precedent’ was used in Chapter 5 to review the relationship 
between two legal institutions. ‘Overrule’ is, however, not a term that best describes the 
institutional relationship between the final appeal court and the European courts. Neither European 
court can legally overrule a domestic judicial decision. Nevertheless, the legal mechanisms that 
govern the court’s respective relationships with these two European courts ensure that their 
jurisprudence is implemented in domestic cases. The final appeal court is obliged to ‘take into 
account’ the jurisprudence of the ECtHR under s2 HRA and is able to refer a matter to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling under A267 Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the 
interpretation of the EU Treaties.  Even when a reference is not made, the top court has a continuing 
obligation under s3 ECA to determine the matters at hand ‘in accordance with the principles laid 
down by and any relevant decision of the European Court.’  Nicol suggests that a common feature of 
both the ECA and the HRA is that each liberalises the judges from the traditional approach to 
precedent.  Section 3 of the ECA achieves this by establishing, ‘… a rival pole of authority in the form 
of the European Court of Justice’ which has the ability to override the force of domestic precedent in 
the context of the European legal order while s2 HRA does so by requiring the Convention 
jurisprudence to be ‘taken into account’.1 In this sense, both courts can influence domestic 
precedent.   
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The themes of overrule and precedent remain useful umbrella concepts subject to a degree of 
contextual adjustment and focus to see how the relationship with the European courts specifically 
impacted upon the domestic relationships and administrative efficiency of the court.  The ‘overrule’ 
section for the CJEU reviews the CJEU reference cases in the time period, specifically with a view to 
establishing how making a reference to the CJEU affected the administrative efficiency and the style 
of judgment produced by the court. The ‘overrule’ section for the ECtHR reviews how often the 
ECtHR line of authority was followed, rejected or the judges were unclear of the correct reading of 
the Convention jurisprudence, to establish how this affected administrative efficiency and the 
relative success of the lower courts and the executive in the time period. The precedent section for 
the CJEU is relatively succinct as CJEU authorities, unlike the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, were only 
cited when a CJEU reference was considered and therefore did little to impact upon the 
administrative efficiency or institutional relationships of the final appeal court. The precedent 
section for the ECtHR uses the volume of ECtHR citations in each appeal as one measure of the 
extent of the review of ECtHR authority and attempts to gauge whether the breadth of review of 
ECtHR jurisprudence and associated reasoning was related to the success of the lower court or the 
executive in the field.   
Relationship with CJEU 
 
‘Overrule in the CJEU context’; The Reference Procedure 
 
The reference procedure is the mechanism by which the jurisdiction of the CJEU on interpretation of 
the treaties is maintained: 
Community Law requires that the Supreme Court (as the domestic court of last resort) 
should refer to the Court of Justice of the European Union any doubtful questions of 
Community law necessary to its decision.2 
The obligatory nature of the word should perhaps masks the discretion that the final appeal court 
still exercises to determine whether referring a matter is necessary to its decision. The national 
courts are viewed as being in the best position to determine whether, based on the facts of the case 
before them, they need to make a reference in order to resolve that particular matter. In deciding 
whether a reference is necessary the court takes its guidance from Case C283/81 CILFIT v Ministry of 
Health as outlined in Practice Direction 11; The Court of Justice of the European Union at paragraph 
11.1.2; 
296 
 
The CJEU … made clear that no reference need be made …: a. where the question raised is 
irrelevant. b. where the European Union law provision in question has already been 
interpreted by the CJEU; c. where the question raised is materially identical with a question 
which has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case; or d. where the 
correct application of European Union law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any 
reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question of interpretation or validity is to 
be resolved. 
The latter sentence is known as the acte clair principle and affords the final appeal court some 
discretion as to whether or not to make a reference.   
Table 1 records the references that were made to the CJEU across all four sessions. The data 
differentiates between cases that made a reference or responded to a previous reference, cases 
where it was decided not to make a reference and cases where a reference was not applicable on 
the facts. The Supreme Court had more interaction with the CJEU than the Appellate Committee by 
making a greater number of references and having more opportunity to make references. A 
reference was only made in 4 cases in the Appellate Committee, compared to 7 cases in the 
Supreme Court. By contrast, a reference was declined in 9 cases in the Appellate Committee, 
compared to 14 such cases in the Supreme Court. Both courts, therefore, declined to make a 
reference on around twice the number of occasions that it made a reference.  This empirically 
reflects the final appeal court’s ability to decline to make a reference in cases where the matter is 
not necessarily acte clair, provided the appeal can be answered without the need to resolve that 
uncertainty.3 It also reflects a judicial reluctance to cause further delay by making a reference.4 In 
this sense, the institutional relationship with the CJEU is not of such a reciprocal nature that the final 
appeal court is required to alert the CJEU to instances where the interpretation of the treaties needs 
clarification, provided that clarification is not required in order to answer the appeal at hand. If 
references were required every time the treaties required clarification, the delays in making a 
reference would be even more substantial and detrimental to the system as a whole. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
2UKSC PD 1; Jurisdiction of the Court at 1.2.26 
3
See e.g. R (on the application of Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2007] UKHL 52 [35] (per Lord 
Bingham); R (on the application of Edwards) v Environment Agency [2008] UKHL 22 [58] (per Lord Hoffman) 
and the division in the court over whether the matter was acte clair in Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National 
[2009] UKSC 6 
4
OFT, n3 [48] (per Lord Walker) 
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Table 1. Frequency of Reference to the CJEU by Court and by Session 
 
Was a reference made to the CJEU? 
Session the case was heard in  
Total 
HL 2007-
2008 
HL 2008-
2009 
SC 2009-
2010 
SC 2010-
2011 
Not 
applicable 
House of Lords or 
Supreme Court 
House of 
Lords 
69 47 0 0 116 
Supreme 
Court 
0 0 48 48 96 
Total 69 47 48 48 212 
Yes House of Lords or 
Supreme Court 
House of 
Lords 
2 2 0 0 4 
Supreme 
Court 
0 0 4 3 7 
Total 2 2 4 3 11 
No House of Lords or 
Supreme Court 
House of 
Lords 
8 1 0 0 9 
Supreme 
Court 
0 0 5 9 14 
Total 8 1 5 9 23 
Total House of Lords or 
Supreme Court 
House of 
Lords 
79 50 0 0 129 
Supreme 
Court 
0 0 57 60 117 
Total 79 50 57 60 246 
 
The substantial delay caused when making a reference was supported by the empirical data. Table 2 
demonstrates that a reference to the CJEU considerably lengthened the judgment gap and this 
difference was statistically significant.5 A degree of caution should be exercised in relation to these 
results as the ‘reference case’ sample size was small and the ‘reference made’ statistics covered 
cases where a reference was made and also cases where the court was responding to a reference 
already made. In the latter instance, the judgment gap was a lot larger and so the standard deviation 
figure was high. The results nevertheless confirm that there was significant delay associated with 
making a reference to the CJEU. The practical effects of this delay are not, however, insurmountable 
                                                             
5
F(2,242) = 16.06, p < 0.0001 
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and the court still had the option to dispose of certain parts of the appeal that were not dependent 
on the outcome of the reference.6 
Table 2. Reference to the CJEU and Average Judgment Gap 
 
Was a reference made to 
the CJEU? Mean N Std. Deviation 
Not applicable 75.51 211 43.022 
Yes 251.27 11 449.008 
No 84.87 23 36.144 
Total 84.28 245 106.288 
 
The efficiency measures, aside from judgment gap, were more negatively affected in appeals that 
declined to make a reference. Table 3 reveals that the length of the hearing increased significantly7 
in these cases and the resulting judgments were, on average, longer than those judgments that 
either made a reference or where a reference was not applicable.  By contrast, where a reference 
was or had already been made to the CJEU, the hearing was quite short.  A case making a reference 
dealt simply with the circumstances surrounding the need for a reference. Similarly, a case where a 
reference had already been made usually only required analysis of the answer provided by the CJEU 
and application to the facts, with limited scope for differing viewpoints or interpretation.  These 
judgments were therefore half the length of those judgments where a reference to the CJEU was 
declined and the difference was statistically significant.8  
Table 3. Reference to the CJEU, Average Length of Case and Average Length of Judgment  
Reference to CJEU 
N Mean Minimum Maximum 
No of days case lasts for Not applicable 212 2.03 1 6 
Yes 11 1.55 1 2 
No 23 2.61 1 6 
Total 246 2.06 1 6 
Length of case in pages Not applicable 212 32.95 4 129 
Yes 11 16.27 4 35 
No 23 43.26 14 92 
Total 246 33.17 4 129 
                                                             
6
UKSC R42 
7F(2, 239) = 5.92, p = 0.003. The post hoc tests revealed that the difference between cases which referred to 
the CJEU and those that did not were statistically significant (Mean difference = -0.909, p < 0.05, 95%CI -1.62 
to -0.20). 
8t(32) = 2.38, p = 0.004 
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The findings on length of judgment in Table 3 were supported by those relating to concurring and 
dissenting opinions. Table 4 shows that the judgments that decided not to make a reference 
included 5 times more concurring opinions than judgments where a reference was made. This result 
was statistically significant.9 It is clear that the increased judgment length in cases that decide not to 
make a reference was at least partly attributable to a greater number of judges wishing to provide 
judgment. This is in stark juxtaposition to cases that made a reference, 82% of which were issued as 
a single judgment (see Table 6). Table 5 also demonstrates that cases that decided not to refer a 
matter to the CJEU had a slightly higher dissent rate. The numbers returned, however, were too 
small for any further analysis.  
Table 4. Reference to the CJEU and Average Number of Concurring Opinions 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Yes 11 .45 1.036 
No 23 2.43 1.903 
Total 34 1.79 1.903 
 
Table 5. Reference to the CJEU and Average Number of Dissenting Opinions  
Was a reference made to 
the CJEU? Mean N Std. Deviation 
Not applicable .44 212 .882 
Yes .00 11 .000 
No .74 23 1.054 
Total .45 246 .887 
 
Table 6. Reference to the CJEU and Single Judgments 
 
Was the case a single judgment case? 
Total No 
Yes-composite 
or collective 
judgment 
Yes- Single 
judgment with 
others only 
formally 
concurring 
Was a reference made to 
the CJEU? 
Not applicable 163 32 17 212 
Yes 2 7 2 11 
                                                             
9t(32) = 3.21, p 0.003 
300 
 
No 20 1 2 23 
Total 185 40 21 246 
 
The adjustment in judgment style in reference cases provided the CJEU with a single, unanimous and 
relatively succinct opinion from the final appeal court and reflects to a large extent the civilian style 
of judgment that the CJEU is used to.  The CJEU does not issue dissenting opinions and therefore 
seeks as far as possible to provide clarity in its response to Member State references. The CJEU 
judgment- and the domestic reference to it- are not part of an evolving body of precedent and 
instead are modelled on the need for certainty i.e. a clear question and definitive answer to the 
question raised.  Lee suggests that this civilian, reflective style of reasoning where the outcome is 
determined and then ‘reasoned accordingly,’ combined with a single judgment style is likely to lead 
to a compromised judgment ‘devoid of adequate reasoning and … reduced to bald assertions of the 
law without justification.’10  Lord Neuberger also believes that CJEU compulsory unanimity has 
resulted in CJEU judgments that can be ‘incomprehensible’, ‘have internally inconsistent reasoning’ 
and/or ‘do not answer the question referred.’11  There were only two cases that responded to a CJEU 
reference in the time period, which was not enough to establish whether the more limited nature of 
the jurisprudential reasoning in CJEU cases had a detrimental effect on the ability for the lower 
courts and the executive to direct themselves accordingly. Interestingly, however, the lower court 
was overruled in both the appeals that responded to a CJEU reference in the time period and there 
was technically12 a finding against the executive in both instances.13  
Precedent in the CJEU context 
 
The civil law approach to reference cases was reflected in the level of CJEU citations across all 
appeals. Table 7 demonstrates that CJEU case citations only really occurred in cases that either made 
a reference or considered making a reference.  
 
 
 
                                                             
10J Lee, ‘A Defence of Concurring Speeches’ [2009] PL 305, 326 
11
Lord Neuberger, ‘No judgment-No Justice’ (Bailli lecture, 20 November 2012) [25] 
<www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-121120.pdf> accessed 22 February 2016 
12Stringer this was not coded as involving the Executive as it was not a public decision of HM Revenue’s that 
was the subject of the complaint but rather HM Revenue’s actions in their capacity as an employer of Mr 
Stringer. 
13Marks and Spencer plc v HM Customs & Excise [2007] UKHL 8 and HMRC v Stringer [2009] UKHL 31 
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Table 7. Reference to the CJEU and Average Number of CJEU Citations 
Was a reference made to 
the CJEU? Mean N Std. Deviation 
Not applicable .09 212 .420 
Yes 6.27 11 5.002 
No 6.61 23 7.297 
Total .98 246 3.297 
 
This could be read as the final appeal court perhaps not undertaking as comprehensive a review of 
CJEU authorities as required by s3 ECA 1972 to ensure that the principles laid down by the CJEU are 
followed at all times. The low level of CJEU citations also demonstrates, in a tangible manner, the 
difference in the legal framework that governs the institutional relationship between each of the 
European courts and the final appeal court in that the authoritative nature of the CJEU’s 
interpretation of the treaties prevents anything resembling a domestic jurisprudence of treaty 
interpretation under the ECA, as exists under the HRA.  Indeed, the level of CJEU citations in the 
reference context was low compared to the average volume of ECtHR citations recorded in human 
rights cases.14 The CJEU’s authoritative answers to the interpretation of the treaties are designed for 
direct application. This is to be contrasted with the more general pronouncements of the 
requirements of the Convention by the ECtHR, the detail of which will often require substantiating 
before application in the domestic context,15 and which affords to national authorities a margin of 
appreciation in securing the requirements of the Convention.16 Again, CJEU citations were marginally 
higher in cases that declined to make a reference, although not significantly. This slight increase 
cannot support any firm conclusions, however it may reflect the fact that domestic decisions that 
declined to make a reference, with their increased instance of concurrences and dissent, reflected a 
more common law style of judgment- which was found in chapter 3 to include higher citation 
levels.17 
Overall therefore, CJEU judgments are not characterised by their need to reason through different 
authorities and develop jurisprudence on the basis of those authorities.   Ironically, however, where 
a case declined to make a CJEU reference, the process of reasoning required to justify that a matter 
was acte clair appeared to enhance the common law characteristics and reasoning in those domestic 
                                                             
14
See tables in text at Chapter 3, n101 
15
See Doherty v Birmingham City Council (2008) UKHL 57 [20] (per Lord Hope).  Hale, ‘Argentoratium Locotum: 
Is the Supreme Court supreme?’ (Nottingham Human Rights Lecture 2011, 1 December 2011) p4 
<www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_111201.pdf> accessed 8 December 2011 
16See Handyside v UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737 [48-49] 
17See tables in text at Chapter 3, n101 
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judgments. Indeed, it is the latter style of judgment that has been seen to support institutional 
relations in this thesis, as was particularly evident in the context of the Convention and the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
Relationship with Strasbourg 
 
The Proportion of Human Rights cases 
 
Human rights appeals did not occur as often as domestic constitutional and public law appeals in the 
time period. Table 8 reveals that the Appellate Committee dealt with more human rights cases than 
the Supreme Court, accounting for 20% of the Appellate Committee caseload compared to 14.5% of 
the Supreme Court caseload.18 The other categories of case remained roughly equal as between the 
two courts. This overall decline in human rights appeals was largely attributable to a dramatic fall in 
the number of human rights cases that arose in Supreme Court session 2010-2011 (see Table 9). The 
methodological limitations of a short time period make it vulnerable to annual variations and this 
sessional drop may not be indicative of a more general downward trajectory in the number of 
human rights appeals in the Supreme Court compared to the Appellate Committee. Nevertheless 
appeals arising in this session are likely to have been granted leave by the Supreme Court rather 
than the Appellate Committee and the results may suggest a more cautious approach by the 
Supreme Court Appeals Committee to granting leave in human rights cases in the fledgling years of 
the court. 
Table 8. Subject Matter of Cases by Court 
 Case_Type 
Total HR DCAPL LOPL INT 
House of Lords or Supreme 
Court 
House of Lords 26 56 31 16 129 
Supreme Court 17 55 30 15 117 
Total 43 111 61 31 246 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
18
This is lower than previous findings that human rights cases constituted 28% of the court’s workload 
following the introduction of the HRA. See Shah and Poole, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act on the Law 
Lords’ [2009] PL 347, 364 
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Table 9. Subject Matter of Cases by Session 
 
 
Case_Type 
Total HR DCAPL LOPL INT 
Session the case was heard 
in  
HL 2007-2008 13 37 16 13 79 
HL 2008-2009 13 19 15 3 50 
SC 2009-2010 11 28 10 8 57 
SC 2010-2011 6 27 20 7 60 
Total 43 111 61 31 246 
 
Table 10 demonstrates that all human rights judgments bar one considered Convention 
jurisprudence. Interestingly, the one human rights case that did not consider any Convention 
jurisprudence was a devolution issue case.19 This unusual result lends support to the suggestion that 
devolution issue cases are a discrete category of case where the judgments are often characterised 
more by their Scots law heritage, than the fact they raise Convention issues. Table 10 also confirms 
that it is not just human rights cases that will be influenced by the indirect institutional involvement 
of the ECtHR. Domestic, constitutional and public law matters will also often consider ECtHR 
jurisprudence and, on occasion, so too will private law matters.  As such, the lower numbers of 
human rights cases in the Supreme Court did not necessarily mean that that court was less engaged 
with the ECtHR over the time period.  
Table 10. Subject Matter and following the Strasbourg Line 
 
Does the case follow Strasbourg line of authority? 
Total Not applicable Yes No 
Justices unsure 
of what 
Strasbourg line 
is 
Case_Type HR 1 30 3 9 43 
DCAPL 90 19 0 2 111 
LOPL 54 6 0 1 61 
INT 25 4 0 2 31 
Total 170 59 3 14 246 
 
‘Overrule’ in the ECtHR context 
 
                                                             
19Allison v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 6 
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The duty to ‘take into account’ ECtHR jurisprudence under s2 HRA means that the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR is not strictly binding in domestic proceedings. However, domestic courts have generally 
sought to apply ‘clear and constant’ jurisprudence of the ECtHR.20 In this sense, the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR is able to direct the substantive outcome of domestic cases. This remained largely 
demonstrable during the time period and where ECtHR authority was ‘clear’ it was generally 
followed. However, the data also evidences the not insubstantial number of occasions where the 
ECtHR jurisprudence was not ‘clear’ and the judges were uncertain over how to apply the ECtHR 
authorities in the context of the case before them.21 In these situations the court had to take a 
slightly more constructive approach to interpreting the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and where 
necessary fill in any jurisprudential gaps.  These cases were coded as ‘the judges being uncertain as 
to the Strasbourg line’.  In cases where ECtHR authority was considered, 81% followed the line taken 
by the ECtHR in the Appellate Committee compared to just 73% in the Supreme Court. The lower 
figure for the Supreme Court can be explained by the fact that in almost a quarter of occasions 
where Convention jurisprudence was considered in that court, the ECtHR authority was unclear. This 
was only noted in 14% of cases in the Appellate Committee. The differences recorded may not be so 
much down to an institutional difference, as to the differences in caseload arising in any given 
session. There was a slight drop in cases that followed the ECtHR line between sessions 2007-08 and 
2008-09 at 84% and 78% respectively and then a further decrease to 62.5% in the Supreme Court 
session 2009-2010 before increasing again to 82%. As such, the levels of clarity in the ECtHR line in 
the final year of the Supreme Court were in line with the first year in the Appellate Committee. 
Furthermore, both courts generally followed ECtHR authority where it was clear. 
Table 11. Following the Strasbourg line by Court 
 
 
Does the case follow Strasbourg line of authority? 
Total 
Not 
applicable Yes No 
Justices unsure of 
what Strasbourg 
line is 
 House of 86 35 2 6 129 
                                                             
20R (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26 [20] (per Lord Bingham) approving obiter 
comments of Lord Slynn in R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment and the 
Regions [2001] UKHL 23 [23] 
21Examples include in R (on the application of Wellington) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 
UKHL 72 where the court tried to reconcile two ECtHR authorities to determine whether an ‘absolutist’ or 
‘relativist’ approach should be taken to A3. In Austin v Commissioner of the Police [2009] UKHL 5 [20] (per Lord 
Hope) there was an acknowledged grey area as to what amounted to a deprivation of liberty under A5. In 
RB(Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10 [133] (per Lord Phillips) there was a 
lack of reported cases and ‘authoritative guidance’ as to what amounted to a flagrant breach under A6. 
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Lords 
Supreme 
Court 
84 24 1 8 117 
Total 170 59 3 14 246 
 
It therefore remained rare for the judges to reject the ECtHR line of authority and this only occurred 
in the Appellate Committee in R (on the application of Animal Defenders) v Secretary of State for 
Culture, Media and Sport,22 to a lesser extent in Doherty v Birmingham City Council23 and in the 
Supreme Court case of R v Horncastle24 during the period. No case made the bold political statement 
of declining to follow a Grand Chamber decision and in Horncastle it was made clear that it would 
only be on ‘rare occasions’ where it is not clear that ‘the Strasbourg court sufficiently appreciates or 
accommodates particular aspects of our domestic process’ that this would be appropriate.25 In 
Manchester City Council v Pinnock,26 Lord Neuberger indicated that ‘in theory’ the court could depart 
from a Grand Chamber decision, however since then Lord Mance has confirmed the very specific and 
rare circumstances where this would be considered: 
It would have then to involve some truly fundamental principle of our law or some most 
egregious oversight or misunderstanding before it could be appropriate for this court to 
contemplate an outright refusal to follow Strasbourg authority at the Grand Chamber level.27 
Laws LJ has criticised Chester as endorsing the Ullah approach which he regards as, ‘deference to 
Strasbourg … quite unwarranted by the statute.’28 Instead, Laws LJ advocates the intrinsic value in 
domestic courts putting forward their ‘own initiatives in the field,’29 both from the perspective of the 
development of Convention law and domestic constitutional law.  Laws is not alone in the view that 
the development of the domestic jurisprudence under the HRA need not ‘mirror’30 that developed 
under the Convention by the ECtHR and that s2 allows for a more ‘progressive’31 approach to 
                                                             
22
[2008] UKHL 15 
23
[2008] UKHL 57. There was a partial rejection of the Strasbourg line in this case. Even though McCann v UK 
endorsed the reasoning of the minority in Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL, the Lords refused to depart from 
the majority approach and instead tried to give effect to the ECtHR ruling through applying and developing the 
majority reasoning. This was ‘as consistent as domestic law allows us to be with … Connors and McCann.’ [19] 
(per Lord Hope) 
24
[2009] UKSC 14 
25Horncastle, n24 [11] (per Lord Phillips) 
26[2011] 2 AC 104 [48] 
27R (on the application of Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63 [27] 
28R(Chester), n27, p80 
29Laws LJ, The Common law Constitution, Hamlyn Lectures (CUP, 2014) p82 
30J Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] PL 720 
31R Masterman, ‘s2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998; binding domestic courts to Strasbourg? (2004) PL 725 
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domestic jurisprudence under the HRA.32 Nevertheless, the data appears to suggest that the 
Supreme Court has not obviously adopted this more ‘progressive’ approach in the time period. 
When the ECtHR jurisprudence was not ‘clear’ or ‘constant’, the final appeal court was provided with 
the opportunity to ‘act on its own initiatives’ by having to constructively carve a domestic 
jurisprudential path through the ECtHR citations. As outlined above, this constructive role was 
undertaken more often in the Supreme Court than the Appellate Committee in the time period. A 
lack of clarity over the ECtHR line certainly led to an increased level of judicial participation in terms 
of providing judgment. The significantly higher number of concurring opinions found in human rights 
cases in chapter 3 increased further still, although not significantly,33when the ECtHR line was 
unclear.  
Table 12. Following the Strasbourg Line and Average Concurring/ Dissenting Opinions 
Does the case follow Strasbourg line of 
authority? 
No of 
concurring 
opinions 
provided in the 
case 
No of dissenting 
opinions 
provided in the 
case 
Not applicable Mean 1.89 .43 
N 170 170 
Std. Deviation 1.687 .876 
Yes Mean 2.58 .42 
N 59 59 
Std. Deviation 1.850 .875 
No Mean 2.00 .00 
N 3 3 
Std. Deviation 1.000 .000 
Justices unsure of what 
Strasbourg line is 
Mean 3.21 .93 
N 14 14 
Std. Deviation 1.805 1.072 
Total Mean 2.13 .45 
N 246 246 
Std. Deviation 1.763 .887 
 
                                                             
32See Lord Irvine, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention rights’(Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law Lecture, 14 
December 2011) < www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-institute/files/British_Interpretation_of_Convention_Rights_-
_Irvine.pdf> accessed 22 February 2016; Masterman, The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary 
Constitution (CUP, Cambridge, 2011) 
33F(2,73) = 0.90, p = 0.41 
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The overall unanimity rate decreased from 77% to 70% in cases that considered ECtHR jurisprudence 
(Table 13).34 However, Table 12 demonstrates that the dissent rate was at its greatest, although not 
significantly,35 when the ECtHR line was unclear.  By contrast, the dissent rate for cases that followed 
the ECtHR line was almost identical to cases that did not involve consideration of ECtHR 
jurisprudence. The Justices also presented a united front to the ECtHR when they sought to reject its 
line of authority.  
Table 13. Consideration of Strasbourg Jurisprudence and Unanimity of Final Appeal Court 
 
SCHL Unanimity 
Total SC/HL Divided 
SC/HL 
Unanimous 
Strasbourg Influence No Count 40 130 170 
% within Strasbourg 
Influence 
23.5% 76.5% 100.0% 
% within SCHL Unanimity 63.5% 71.0% 69.1% 
Yes Count 23 53 76 
% within Strasbourg 
Influence 
30.3% 69.7% 100.0% 
% within SCHL Unanimity 36.5% 29.0% 30.9% 
Total Count 63 183 246 
% within Strasbourg 
Influence 
25.6% 74.4% 100.0% 
% within SCHL Unanimity 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
As well as impacting on judgment style, unclear ECtHR jurisprudence had a direct impact on the 
efficiency measures reviewed in Chapter 3. Table 14 demonstrates that the hearing length was at its 
longest where the ECtHR line was unclear, suggesting that a longer time was needed to hear 
argument on the correct approach to the ECtHR jurisprudence domestically and to consider and 
reason through the authorities. The average difference between a case that did not consider ECtHR 
jurisprudence and one where the ECtHR authority was unclear was as much as half a day.  This was 
statistically significant.36 
 
 
                                                             
34
This suggests a different result to Shah and Poole’s findings that dissent declined from 38% to 22% in human 
rights cases; The Law Lords and Human Rights (2011) 74(1) MLR 79,90 
35t(242) = 1.30, p = 0.17 
36F(3, 242) = 3.37, p = 0.019 
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Table 14. Following the Strasbourg Line and Average Length of Case 
 
Does the case follow 
Strasbourg line of authority? Mean N Std. Deviation 
Not applicable 1.94 170 .826 
Yes 2.31 59 1.118 
No 2.00 3 1.000 
Justices unsure of what 
Strasbourg line is 
2.50 14 1.160 
Total 2.06 246 .939 
 
Table 15 also demonstrates that the reduction in judgment gap in human rights cases was much 
more pronounced in cases that followed the ECtHR guidance compared to where the ECtHR line was 
unclear. This confirms earlier findings that clear precedent aids judgment writing and suggests that 
judgments where the ECtHR jurisprudence was unclear were potentially more complex to write, 
given the need to reason through the Convention jurisprudence before trying to synthesise it with 
domestic sources. The judges may also differ in how best to achieve this, as seen in the higher 
dissent rate when the ECtHR line was unclear. The longest average judgment gap in human rights 
cases was where the ECtHR line was rejected, which was even longer than in cases where human 
rights was not applicable.  Nevertheless, as this only applied to 3 cases in the time period, the 95% 
confidence interval was wide and so no statistical comparisons could be made.  
Table 15. Following the Strasbourg Line and Average Judgment Gap 
 
Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 95%CI(l) 
95%CI
(u) 
Not applicable 87.73 169 125.811 7 1331 68.76112 106.69
89 
Yes 73.31 59 34.569 1 167 64.48804 82.131
96 
No 126 3 36.097 85 153 85.15164 166.84
84 
Justices unsure of what 
Strasbourg line is 
79.93 14 28.827 36 126 64.83016 95.029
84 
Total 84.28 245 106.288 1 1331 70.9716 97.588
4 
 
Table 16 demonstrates that there were clear differences between the average judgment length 
depending on whether the ECtHR line was followed or not, with judgments that followed ECtHR 
authority being almost half the length of those that declined to follow ECtHR authority.  Indeed, the 
judgment length for cases that followed clear ECtHR jurisprudence was slightly less than the overall 
mean judgment length for the Supreme Court in the time period (35.37). An analysis of variance 
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(ANOVA) revealed a statistically significant difference between the average judgment lengths,37 with 
the post hoc Bonferroni test (see Table 17) demonstrating that there was a significant difference in 
judgment length between cases that followed clear ECtHR guidance and cases where the ECtHR line 
was unclear.38 As only 3 cases did not follow ECtHR jurisprudence, no statistically significant results 
were returned for the increased judgment length in those cases. 
Table 16. Following the Strasbourg Line and Average Length of Judgment  
Does the case follow 
Strasbourg line of authority? Mean N Std. Deviation 
Yes 34.59 59 17.183 
No 60.67 3 28.361 
Justices unsure of what 
Strasbourg line is 
55.64 14 34.234 
Total 39.50 76 23.204 
 
Table 17. Post hoc Bonferroni tests for following the Strasbourg Line and Average Length of 
Judgment 
(I) Does the case 
follow Strasbourg line 
of authority? 
(J) Does the case 
follow Strasbourg line 
of authority? 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Yes No -26.073 12.767 .134 -57.36 5.21 
Justices unsure of 
what Strasbourg line is 
-21.050
*
 6.413 .005 -36.76 -5.34 
No Yes 26.073 12.767 .134 -5.21 57.36 
Justices unsure of 
what Strasbourg line is 
5.024 13.724 1.000 -28.60 38.65 
Justices unsure of 
what Strasbourg line is 
Yes 21.050
*
 6.413 .005 5.34 36.76 
No -5.024 13.724 1.000 -38.65 28.60 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 18 reveals that the ECtHR jurisprudence was unclear in 20% of 5 justice panel cases that 
considered Convention jurisprudence, compared to just 7% of cases involving 7 justice panels and 
14% of cases involving 9 Justices. This indicates that either a larger judicial panel tended to be 
convened in cases where the ECtHR jurisprudence was clear or the effect of a larger panel- and 
perhaps more judicial minds devoted to the case- was to demystify the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
                                                             
37
F(2,73)=6.89, p = 0.002 
38Mean difference =21.05, p 0.005 
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A larger sample would be required before any firm conclusions can be drawn however it appears 
that the increased frequency of larger panels in the Supreme Court may assist in reasoning through 
the ECtHR jurisprudence going forward. That said, the greater frequency with which larger panels 
were convened in the Supreme Court did not have the net effect of reducing the instances where 
the ECtHR line was unclear in that court in the time period.  More clarity in ECtHR jurisprudence 
could allow for more single judgments in the Convention context. Of 11 single judgments that 
considered Convention jurisprudence, the ECtHR line was unclear in only 1 appeal. Single judgments, 
therefore, appeared to be more appropriate in cases where the ECtHR jurisprudence was clear.  
Three of the enlarged judicial panel cases in the Convention context (one 9 justice panel and two 7 
justice panels) were also single judgments.  
Table 18. Following the Strasbourg Line and Panel Size 
 
Does the case follow Strasbourg line of authority? 
Total Not applicable Yes No 
Justices unsure 
of what 
Strasbourg line 
is 
Panel 3 justices 2 0 0 0 2 
5 justices 148 46 2 12 208 
7 justices 13 7 1 1 22 
9 justices 6 6 0 1 13 
Total 169 59 3 14 245 
 
It is evident that when the ECtHR line was unclear, it exacerbated the impact on the administrative 
efficiency of the court of human rights cases found in Chapter 3. 
Chapters 4 and 5 respectively found that the influence of ECtHR jurisprudence had, what could be 
perceived as, a positive effect on the institutional relationship between the final appeal court and 
the executive as well as the relationship with the lower courts. The majority of cases (55%) that 
followed the ECtHR line upheld the executive. Furthermore, in human rights cases the lower court 
was overruled less (45% of appeals compared to 50-60% in other subject matters) and the final 
appeal court also appeared to approve of the lower court’s reading of precedent in this area more 
than in other categories of case.  
Table 16 in Chapter 4 demonstrated that in cases where the executive was involved, the ECtHR 
jurisprudence was clear in 27 appeals compared to only 5 appeals where the ECtHR line was unclear; 
2 of which found in favour of the executive and 3 found against. The numbers are again too low to 
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draw any concrete conclusions, however the executive was less successful where the ECtHR line was 
unclear compared to when the court was able to follow the clear authority of the ECtHR.  
Table 19, Following the Strasbourg Line and Overrule of Lower Court  
 
Whether the lower court was overruled 
Total Yes No 
Reversed in 
part 
Does the case follow 
Strasbourg line of authority? 
Yes 21 26 9 56 
No 1 2 0 3 
Justices unsure of what 
Strasbourg line is 
5 6 3 14 
Total 27 34 12 73 
 
Table 19 reveals that the success of the lower court in human rights cases was not repeated across 
all cases that considered Convention jurisprudence.  Although the lower court was still upheld more 
than it was overruled in full in these cases, if reversed in part statistics are included then the rate of 
overrule exceeded the rate of success. This may suggest that the success of the lower courts in 
human rights cases was more a result of the clarity of domestic jurisprudence in articulating whether 
there had been a breach of the individual’s rights, rather than owing to the ability to draw upon 
Convention jurisprudence per se. Taking overrule and reversed in part together, the lower court was 
overruled on 57% of occasions where the ECtHR jurisprudence was unclear compared to 53.5% of 
occasions where the ECtHR jurisprudence was clear. Given the small numbers and lack of significant 
results, further study would be needed to confirm whether these results were true of a more 
general pattern. On the face it, the results suggest that the institutions reviewed had a greater ability 
to guide their conduct in accordance with the Convention, where the ECtHR jurisprudence was clear 
and constant. These results accord with the larger picture that the ECtHR line was less clear in the 
Supreme Court and there was also found to be a higher rate of overrule of both the executive and 
the lower courts in that court.  
Precedent in the ECtHR context 
 
The ECtHR does not adhere to a system of precedent and can depart from authority at will. 
Nevertheless, the s2 HRA requirement to consider ECtHR jurisprudence renders that jurisprudence 
central to the HRA and applicable under the system of stare decisis outlined in Chapter 5. Indeed, 
the overwhelming loyalty that has been shown to ‘clear and constant’ jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
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has led to suggestions that the UK courts have an offshore element and has prompted calls for a UK 
Bill of Rights.39 
It is clear from the preceding section and Chapter 3 that the need to consider ECtHR authorities had 
administrative efficiency implications for the court. Human rights cases had a significantly longer 
hearing time which in turn translated into significantly lengthier judgments and significantly higher 
numbers of concurring opinions. These factors are presumably related to the number of ECtHR 
authorities that need to be considered alongside domestic precedent. Indeed, ‘… the amount of time 
counsel spend referring to and discussing Strasbourg case law’ in Supreme Court human rights cases 
has been specifically referred to by Lady Hale extra judicially.40  
The Supreme Court had a slightly higher average rate of ECtHR citations across all appeals, even 
though the number of human rights cases were less in that court (see Table 20). This difference was 
not, however, statistically significant41 and is attributable to a slight increase in the average number 
of ECtHR citations in the 2009-2010 session (see table 21). These results indicate that although there 
were fewer cases and fewer human rights cases in the Supreme Court in the time period, the greater 
number of ECtHR citations overall suggests a wider- if not necessarily a deeper- review of the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR in each appeal in the Supreme Court. 
Table 20. Average Number of Strasbourg Citations by Court 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
House of Lords 129 3.55 6.819 
Supreme Court 117 3.82 8.177 
Total 246 3.68 7.481 
 
Table 21. Average Number of Strasbourg Citations by Session 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
HL 2007-2008 79 3.42 6.881 
HL 2008-2009 50 3.76 6.784 
SC 2009-2010 57 4.25 9.351 
SC 2010-2011 60 3.42 6.936 
                                                             
39See ‘Tories plan to withdraw the UK from the European convention on human rights’ published in The 
Guardian, 3rd October 2014 < www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/03/tories-plan-uk-withdrawal-
european-convention-on-human-rights> accessed 26
th
 October 2015. 
40Hale, ‘Argentoratium Locotum’, n15, p4 
41
t(244) = 0.28, p = 0.78 
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Total 246 3.68 7.481 
 
The rate of ECtHR citations was at its highest in human rights cases (see table 22) and when the 
ECtHR jurisprudence was unclear (see Table 23). This latter difference, however, was not statistically 
significant.42 These results accord with the results already seen in the ‘overrule’ section in relation to 
the increased hearing time, judgment length, judgment gap and number of concurring opinions 
where the Justices were unclear of the ECtHR line and demonstrate the need to consider the ECtHR 
authorities more broadly in order to rationalise the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. 
Table 22. Average Number of Strasbourg Citations by Subject Matter 
Case_Type Mean N Std. Deviation 
HR 15.40 43 9.401 
DCAPL 1.57 111 4.560 
LOPL .57 61 1.875 
INT 1.10 31 3.208 
Total 3.68 246 7.481 
 
Table 23. Average Number of Strasbourg Citations by Following 
the Strasbourg Line 
Does the case follow 
Strasbourg line of authority? Mean N Std. Deviation 
Yes 10.34 59 8.295 
No 14.33 3 11.846 
Justices unsure of what 
Strasbourg line is 
16.57 14 11.960 
Total 11.64 76 9.376 
 
Table 24 demonstrates that the average number of ECtHR citations increased in a linear fashion as 
the panel size of the case increased and these differences were statistically significant.43 The post 
hoc Bonferroni tests in Table 25 highlight statistically significant differences in citation rates between 
panels of 5 and 9 justices, as well as between panels of 7 and 9 justices. Again, this demonstrates the 
significant impact that the decision to convene a 9 justice panel made. That said, 6 out of the 13 
cases that convened a 9 Justice panel involved a human rights matter, where there would have been 
                                                             
42
 F(2,73)=2.75, p = 0.071 
43 F(3, 241) = 7.89, p < 0.0001 
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a higher number of ECtHR citations. The results in Table 6, therefore, reflect the proportionately 
higher number of occasions that a human rights appeal called for a 9 justice panel to be convened.  
These 9 Justice panels were also accompanied by the significant adverse effects on the operational 
efficiency of the court found in chapter 3. The compromises on efficiency from a 9 Justice panel may, 
however, be offset by the greater instances of clarity in the ECtHR line when larger judicial panels 
were convened. Thus larger panels, with more judges conducting a wider review of the ECtHR 
authority, may have assisted in clarifying the ECtHR line in a Supreme Court that was found to be 
less clear of the ECtHR line than its predecessor. 
Table 24. Average Number of Strasbourg Citations and Panel Size 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
3 justices 2 .00 .000 .000 
5 justices 208 3.00 6.297 .437 
7 justices 22 5.36 9.565 2.039 
9 justices 13 12.62 13.973 3.876 
Total 245 3.69 7.493 .479 
 
Table 25. Post hoc Bonferroni tests for Strasbourg Citations and Panel Size 
 (I) new_panel (J) new_panel 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
3 justices 5 justices -2.995 5.111 1.000 -16.59 10.60 
7 justices -5.364 5.313 1.000 -19.50 8.77 
9 justices -12.615 5.464 .131 -27.15 1.92 
5 justices 3 justices 2.995 5.111 1.000 -10.60 16.59 
7 justices -2.368 1.613 .860 -6.66 1.92 
9 justices -9.620
*
 2.057 .000 -15.09 -4.15 
7 justices 3 justices 5.364 5.313 1.000 -8.77 19.50 
5 justices 2.368 1.613 .860 -1.92 6.66 
9 justices -7.252
*
 2.517 .026 -13.95 -.56 
9 justices 3 justices 12.615 5.464 .131 -1.92 27.15 
5 justices 9.620
*
 2.057 .000 4.15 15.09 
7 justices 7.252
*
 2.517 .026 .56 13.95 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
From an institutional relations perspective, Table 26 confirms that there was more than double the 
number of ECtHR citations in cases where the executive was involved. This result was statistically 
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significant44 and empirically reflects the large degree of overlap between cases that involved the 
executive and were influenced by the Convention. The results also lend further support to the idea 
of a three-way institutional relational dynamic in the time period. Table 27 nevertheless shows that 
there were only slightly more ECtHR citations, on average, in cases that upheld the executive and 
this difference was not statistically significant.45 As such a wider review of ECtHR appeared to slightly 
benefit the executive; however, the difference was not substantial enough to draw any firm 
conclusions.  
Table 26. Average Number of Strasbourg Citations and Executive Involvement 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
No Executive involvement 163 2.40 5.825 
Executive involvement 75 5.53 8.197 
Total 238 3.39 6.804 
 
Table 27. Average Number of Strasbourg Citations and Executive Success 
 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Not Applicable 163 2.40 5.825 
Yes 37 5.11 8.051 
No 38 5.95 8.424 
Total 238 3.39 6.804 
 
In terms of the institutional relationship with the ‘lower courts’, Table 28 confirms that ECtHR 
citations were higher when the lower court was upheld, although the highest number of citations 
was when the lower court was reversed in part. None of these differences were statistically 
significant.46 Table 29 then tested whether overruling either a unanimous or a divided lower court 
made a difference to the volume of ECtHR citations. The results confirmed that decisions to uphold 
the lower court, whether unanimous or divided, had among the highest volume of ECtHR citations. 
This was not found to be statistically significant.47 Again, these results suggest that a wider review of 
ECtHR authority was more likely to find in favour of the lower court reasoning, or at least part of it, 
however the data was not strong enough to provide any firm conclusions. 
                                                             
44t(236) = 3.37, p = 0.001 
45t(73) =  -0.84, p = 1.00 
46F(2,229) = 2.87, p = 0.059 
47t(228) = 0.5, p = 0.48 
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Table 28. Average Number of Strasbourg Citations and Overrule of Lower Court 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Yes 106 2.88 6.400 
No 102 4.19 7.538 
Reversed in part 24 6.88 11.723 
Total 232 3.87 7.654 
 
Table 29. Average Number of Strasbourg citations, Overrule of Lower Court and Unanimity of 
Lower Court 
What the result was in the 
lower court Overrule Mean N Std. Deviation 
Unanimous Yes 3.93 108 8.231 
No 4.02 93 7.540 
Total 3.97 201 7.899 
Divided Yes 1.55 20 3.886 
No 5.89 9 7.753 
Total 2.90 29 5.621 
Total Yes 3.55 128 7.752 
No 4.19 102 7.538 
Total 3.83 230 7.648 
 
Conclusion 
 
The findings in this chapter substantiate and refine the preliminary conclusions reached in the 
preceding chapters on the institutional influence of the ECtHR in the time period. 
In Chapter 5, the lower court was found to have been upheld more and to have applied precedent 
more successfully in the human rights field. These findings could be linked to the lower courts’ ability 
to refer to the guidance provided by the ECtHR jurisprudence or could have been attributable to the 
clarity of domestic precedent in the human rights field. This chapter, however, reveals that the lower 
court’s success was not repeated where Convention jurisprudence was considered in non-human 
rights cases. This suggests that the relative success of the lower courts recorded in the human rights 
field, was more attributable to the clarity of the reasoning in domestic human rights precedents, 
rather than the ability to draw upon the ECtHR jurisprudence. The ECtHR’s broad approach to 
Convention issues ensures that the final appeal court is required to substantiate and reason through 
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the jurisprudence in the domestic context and in the time period this appears to have strengthened 
the clarity of domestic precedent and institutional communication. This may also explain why the 
executive was able to administer itself in accordance with the requirements of the Convention in the 
majority of cases.  
It was also clear that the executive and lower courts were more successful in cases where the ECtHR 
line was clear and constant.  The academic and judicial voices that call for a more critical view of 
ECtHR jurisprudence and a more proactive role in the establishment of a domestic jurisprudence of 
human rights no doubt have merit. However, this study suggests that, at least in the short-term, 
such an approach would weaken the predictability that is created by directly mirroring the clear and 
constant jurisprudence of the ECtHR and could create the impression of a more assertive court that 
overrules the lower court and executive more often. Thus, an approach which deviates from the 
Convention would make it more difficult for the domestic institutions that are engaged with the final 
appeal court to conduct themselves in accordance with the domestic requirements of the 
Convention, until such a time as the domestic jurisprudence was properly established.  
Furthermore, applying the clear and constant ECtHR line had less of a negative effect on the 
administrative efficiency of the court compared to when the ECtHR line was unclear and the judges 
were required to undertake a more constructive role.  The higher number of concurring opinions, 
the longer judgments, the longer hearing length, the greater instance of dissent all appeared to be 
more associated with a lack of clarity in the ECtHR line of authority. Thus the preliminary conclusions 
which advocated more concurring opinions, longer judgements and wider citation of authority to 
assist in developing the reasoning of judgments and the subsequent ability of institutions to 
interpret the judgment requires some refinement. This chapter has shown that these factors were 
not always a reason for clarity but sometimes a symptom of a lack of clarity in the ECtHR 
jurisprudence.  Instead, where the ECtHR line was clear, the instances of concurrence and dissent 
were less elevated, the judgment length was in line with the average for the time period, the 
increased hearing time was less pronounced and the judgment gap was shorter than when the 
ECtHR line was unclear. Thus, although it is still true that a slightly higher number of concurring 
opinions in the human rights field and a wider citation of authority appeared to assist the lower 
court, the lower court’s ability to read precedent clearly in the human rights context appeared to be 
primarily owing to the clearer articulation by the judges of what the requirements of the Convention 
were in human rights cases, based upon clear ECtHR guidance. 
It was clear from the time period that in order for the court’s institutional relationship with the 
ECtHR to support the court’s domestic institutional relationships and not adversely affect the 
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administrative efficiency of the court, the instances where ECtHR jurisprudence is unclear need to be 
minimised.  Although this is the institutional responsibility of the ECtHR, there are ways that the 
Supreme Court could assist. For instance, there was tentative evidence to suggest that the Supreme 
Court was better able to reason through the ECtHR authorities with more judges on the case. Thus a 
greater instance of 7 Justice panels where the ECtHR line is unclear, would (as seen in chapter 3) not 
be as administratively burdensome on the court as convening a 9 justice panel and may prove an 
extremely constructive way of enhancing the dialogue between the Supreme Court, the ECtHR and 
clarifying the communication channels for each of the court’s domestic institutional relationships 
going forward.  
In contrast to the relationship with the ECtHR, the succinct nature of institutional communication 
between the final appeal court and the CJEU characterised that institutional relationship. The final 
appeal court took its lead from the CJEU, referring matters to it in short, unanimous and mostly 
single judgments. Nevertheless, this study also revealed that when a reference was considered and 
declined, the effect on judgment style was to enhance the common law characteristics of the final 
appeal court judgment. The statistically significant increase in length of hearing, the longer length of 
judgment, the significant increase in the number of concurring opinions, the higher level of dissent 
and the slightly higher number of CJEU citations means that these cases bore all the traditional 
hallmarks of common law judgments and the associated impact on the administrative efficiency of 
the court as outlined in Chapter 3.  In sum, the reference procedure itself is designed to promote 
clear, succinct, institutional communication between the CJEU and the final appeal court, so that the 
latter can duly implement the former court’s interpretation of the EU Treaties. However, the 
domestic impact on institutional relations in cases that declined to make a reference - be it because 
the matter was acte clair or it was not necessary to determine the appeal before the court- was 
more reasoned individual opinions.48   
Anderson advocated a repeal of the reference procedure, owing to the adverse effect on the 
efficiency of the Appellate Committee when a reference was made and because reference cases 
rarely, ‘invest the time and effort necessary to arrive at and express … a conclusion in circumstances 
where that conclusion will not be determinative and risks being contradicted by the ECJ.’49 He 
therefore felt that the obligation to refer would prevent the Supreme Court from realising its full 
                                                             
48There were certainly more academic citations in cases that declined to make a reference (5.35 mean) 
compared to those that made a reference (0.91 mean) or where a reference was not applicable (4.17 mean). 
49D Anderson, ‘The Law Lords and the European Courts’ in A Le Sueur (eds), Building the UK’s New Supreme 
Court, National and Comparative Perspectives (OUP, 2004) 
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potential to contribute to the development of EU Law.50 The reference procedure did delay 
judgments significantly and affected the ability of the court to deliver a judgment in a reasonable 
time. Only two cases responded to a CJEU reference in the time period and so no clear conclusions 
can be reached on how those cases impacted upon domestic institutional relations.  Given the 
conclusions reached in relation to the ECtHR, it may be no small coincidence that the lack of a 
sustained domestic jurisprudence in the EU context is potentially damaging to domestic institutional 
communication in that context. A wider study confirming this trend may therefore support 
Anderson’s repeal of the reference procedure. However, the empirical data also revealed that a by-
product of the reference procedure- and perhaps the wish to avoid the delay associated with making 
a reference- was for the judges to actively participate in decisions that declined to make a reference 
by contributing their own analysis of whether a matter was acte clair. In this sense, the reference 
procedure may inadvertently result in a more sustained domestic review of EU authorities and allow 
the domestic court to contribute more to the development of EU law. 
In summary, the institutional relationships with the European courts each had a- often statistically 
significant- bearing on the administrative efficiency, the judgment style and ultimately the domestic 
institutional relationships of the final appeal court. Any future adjustments- be they constitutional or 
informal- to the court’s institutional relationship with the European courts is likely to have a 
significant impact on the operation of the Supreme Court going forward.
                                                             
50Anderson, ‘The Law Lords and the European Courts’,n49, p216 
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Chapter 7; Conclusion 
 
At the conception of this project, the research objective was to measure whether the transition from 
Appellate Committee to Supreme Court resulted in any statistically significant changes in the 
administrative efficiency and the institutional relationships of the final appeal court. Both significant 
and non-significant changes have been uncovered in this study and some recommendations have 
been made to improve the administrative efficiency and institutional relations of the Supreme Court.  
Broadly, these include convening 7 justice panels wherever possible in place of 9 justice panels to 
lessen the impact on the efficiency of the court, opting for a judgment style that includes one or two 
concurring opinions to strengthen the reasoning in the judgment and guidance provided to other 
institutions and including an agreed statement of facts and legal issues, to reduce judgment length 
and provide more synchronisation between concurring opinions.   
The Supreme Court appeared to be marginally more assertive than the Appellate Committee, with 
the executive being less successful and the lower courts, including the Scottish courts, being more 
frequently overruled in 2009-2011. This could indicate the beginning of a more forceful court 
following its institutional separation and greater level of independence. Indeed, any rise in power of 
the court could be legitimised through it having more visibility and more democratic accountability 
following the implementation of the CRA.1 Nevertheless, what was evident in every chapter of the 
thesis was the significant effect that the institutional influence of the ECtHR appeared to have on 
both domestic institutional relationships and the administrative efficiency of the court. Indeed the 
executive was more successful and the lower courts were upheld more in the human rights cases 
and it may be more than coincidental that these institutions were less successful in the Supreme 
Court, where fewer human rights cases arose in the time period.  If this analysis is correct, then the 
constitutional change that could have as great an effect as the CRA on the administrative efficiency 
and institutional relations of the Supreme Court is the repeal of the HRA and the introduction of a 
domestically-focussed British Bill of Rights.   
The extent to which a repeal of the HRA would impact upon the final appeal court would very much 
depend on the exact legal arrangements.  For instance, if the UK remained a signatory to the 
Convention, the court would still have to consider the ECtHR jurisprudence in ensuring that the UK 
complied with its international obligations and thus it may be that no discernible difference in 
judicial practice would occur. The study also revealed that the subtle effects of the Convention on 
321 
 
judicial-executive relations go beyond the Convention context and could not necessarily be altered 
by the repeal of the HRA. This included the willingness to review independent executive action to 
ensure proper institutional decision-making processes when the rights of an individual were 
adversely affected, the power of judicial review under the rule of law, the willingness to isolate the 
legal from the political and find matters more justiciable and the impact of proportionality-based 
review in characterising the relationship between the executive and judiciary. These more subtle 
changes in judicial attitude and the characterisations of the judicial-executive relationship cannot be 
reversed simply by repealing the HRA. 
A Bill of Rights would require a domestic body of jurisprudence to be built under that instrument, 
which would in no doubt be influenced by the position that courts had already established on rights 
under the Convention. In the event of a repeal of the HRA, Malleson has stated that ‘it is hard to 
imagine that the Supreme Court Justices would simply put aside the case law and the human rights 
legal culture which the courts have developed over the last decade’ and instead suggests that there 
would be a ‘considerable degree of constitutional fudging so as to retain the principles and decision-
making processes, if not the form, of the HRA.’2 Clearly, the lower courts and to some extent the 
executive, were able to use the ECtHR jurisprudence and domestic jurisprudence under the HRA to 
successfully guide their conduct in the Convention context and there would be benefits to 
institutional relations if the new domestic jurisprudence did not deviate markedly from the existing 
body of jurisprudence under the HRA. 
From an administrative efficiency perspective, the removal of the need to consider the ECtHR 
jurisprudence may assist in improving the efficiency of the court. Chapters 3 and 6 demonstrated the 
significant adverse effects on the efficiency of the court where the ECtHR line of authority was 
unclear and there was a need to rationalise the different strands of ECtHR jurisprudence. By 
removing the need for the Supreme Court to act as a hub between the ECtHR and the lower courts it 
may improve the efficiency of the court. Nevertheless, the rationalisation of ECtHR jurisprudence 
into domestic law- at least where ECtHR jurisprudence was clear- appeared to have a positive effect 
on the clarity of domestic precedent. Thus the removal of the need to consider ECtHR jurisprudence 
may adversely affect the clarity of domestic precedent in the rights context. 
A two year time period is too short to make any firm conclusions as the court needs time to adjust to 
its institutional separation and to evolve with its developing caseload. Furthermore, Shah and Poole 
have acknowledged, ‘statistical analyses, revealing though they can be, often work best as platforms 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
1R Hazell, ‘Judicial Independence and Accountability in the UK have both emerged stronger as a result of the 
CRA 2005’ [2015] PL 198 
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from which other studies can build.’3 This study revealed several areas where a larger time period 
was required as the statistics were affected by fluctuations in caseload or too low numbers were 
returned in the time period to conduct further analysis.4 There were also areas where significant 
differences were found and there was a need for deeper qualitative analysis to discover the reason 
for those results.5  
The study further revealed how the focus on institutions was occasionally too blunt and failed to 
take into account the fact that institutions are characterised by the individuals within those 
institutions.  This was particularly apparent when the observational data in the Parliament section 
appeared to suggest that certain judges were more predisposed to adopting purposive 
interpretative techniques, with others favouring a more literal approach to statutory language.  
These judicial predispositions were then reflected in the Convention context in terms of how those 
judges navigated the infrastructure in the HRA. Individual judicial styles therefore clearly influenced 
judicial-parliamentary relations in the time period.  The differences between Lord Bingham’s and 
Lord Phillip’s style of presiding over the court may also have been responsible for certain 
administrative efficiency changes identified, such as the longer time taken to produce judgments in 
the Supreme Court. In this sense, it is acknowledged that the retirement and appointment of certain 
judges can also have an impact on both the administrative efficiency and the institutional 
relationships of the court. A wider time period and a more tailored study could perhaps account for 
the effect of individuals on the court. 
This study has provided a systematic, empirically-informed snapshot of the evolving power of the 
Supreme Court, its efficiency, its style and the interconnection between the institutions which either 
have a relationship with or influence the court.  It is very early days in the court’s life and the 
constitutional framework that gives the court its structure is also changing. This is part of the fluidity 
of the UK constitution. Nevertheless, the relative power of the court and the significant effects of 
the institutional influence of the ECtHR found here form firm foundations on which to build further 
studies. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
2
K Malleson, ‘The evolving role of the Supreme Court’ [2011] PL 754, 763-764 
3Shah and Poole, ‘The impact of the Human Rights Act on the House of Lords’ [2009] PL 347, 369 
4See CJEU reference cases and Northern Irish appeals. 
5
See e.g. the interrelationship between different categories of citation, the individual judicial preference for 
either a literal or a purposive approach to statutory interpretation or the reasons why overrule was higher 
where the lower court followed precedent. 
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Annex 1: Dataset 
 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords Session 2007-2008 
Case 
No. 
Party Names. Citation. 
1. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) v AH (Sudan) 
and others (FC) (Respondents) 
[2007] UKHL 49 
 
2. Ward (AP) (Appellant) v Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(Respondents) (Northern Ireland) 
[2007] UKHL 50 
 
3. Watt (formerly Carter) (sued on his behalf of the other members of 
the Labour Party) (Respondent) v Ahsan (Appellant) 
[2007] UKHL 51 
 
4. R (on the application of Countryside Alliance and others and others 
(Appellants) v Her Majesty's Attorney General and another 
(Respondents) 
[2007] UKHL 52  
 
5. Whaley and another (Appellant) v Lord Advocate (Respondent) 
(Scotland) 
[2007] UKHL 53 
 
6. Kola (FC) and another (FC) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions (Respondent) 
[2007] UKHL 54 
7. In re M (FC) and another (FC) (Children) (FC) [2007] UKHL 55 
 
8. Clarke (Appellant) v Fennoscandia Limited and others (Respondents) 
(Scotland) 
[2007] UKHL 56 
9. Saber (AP) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Respondent) 
[2007] UKHL 57 
 
10. R (on the application of AL-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State 
for Defence (Respondent) 
[2007] UKHL 58 
 
11. Phillips and another (suing as administrators of the estate of Christo 
Michailidis) (Appellants) v Symes and others (Respondents) and 
others 
[2008] UKHL 1 
12. Fleming (t/a Bodycraft) and Conde Nast Publications Limited 
(Respondents) v Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (Appellants) 
[2008] UKHL 2 
 
13. In re Hilali (Respondent) (application for a writ of Habeas Corpus) [2008] UKHL 3 
 
14. In re Duffy (FC) (Appellant) (Northern Ireland) [2008] UKHL 4 
 
15. Boss Holdings Limited (Appellants) v Grosvenor West End Properties 
and others (Respondents) 
[2008] UKHL 5 
 
16. A v Hoare [2008] UKHL 6 
 
17. Pilecki (Appellant) v Circuit Court of Legnica, Poland  
 
[2008] UKHL 7 
18. R v Clarke (Appellant); R v McDaid (Appellant) 
 
[2008] UKHL 8 
19. In re Maye (AP) (Appellant) (Northern Ireland)  [2008] UKHL 9 
 
20. Majorstake Limited (Respondents) v Curtis (Appellant)  [2008] UKHL 10 
21. Scottish & Newcastle International Limited (Respondents) v Othon 
Ghalanos Limited (Appellants)  
[2008] UKHL 11 
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22. Reinwood Limited (Respondents) v L Brown & Sons Limited 
(Appellants)  
 
[2008] UKHL 12 
23. Corr (administratix of estate of Thomas Corr (deceased) (Respondent) 
v IBC Vehicles Limited (Appellants)  
[2008] UKHL 13 
 
24. R (on application of M) (FC) (Appellant) v London Borough of 
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231. E (Children) (FC)  
 
[2011] UKSC 27 
232. R (on the application of Cart) (Appellant) v The Upper Tribunal 
(Respondent); R (on the application of MR (Pakistan) (FC) (Appellant) 
v The Upper Tribunal and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department  
 
[2011] UKSC 28 
233. Eba (Respondent) v Advocate General for Scotland (Appellant) 
(Scotland)  
 
[2011] UKSC 29 
234. R (on the application of G) (Respondent) v The Governors of X School 
(Appellant)  
 
[2011] UKSC 30 
235. NML Capital Limited (Appellant) v Republic of Argentina (Respondent)  [2011] UKSC 31 
236. Scottish Widows plc (Appellant) v Commissioners for Her Majesty's 
Revenue and Customs (Respondent) (Scotland)  
 
[2011] UKSC 32 
237. R (on the application of McDonald) (Appellant) v Royal Borough of 
Kensington and Chelsea (Respondent)  
 
[2011] UKSC 33 
238. Al-Rawi and others (Respondents) v The Security Services and others 
(Appellants)  
 
[2011] UKSC 34 
239. Home Office (Appellant) v Tariq (Respondent); Home Office 
(Respondent) v Tariq (Appellant)  
 
[2011] UKSC 35 
240. Duncombe and others (Respondents) v Secretary of State for 
Children, Schools and Families (Appellant) (No.2)  
 
[2011] UKSC 36 
241. R v Smith (Appellant)  
 
[2011] UKSC 37 
242. Belmont Park Investments PTY Limited (Respondent) v BNY Corporate 
Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc 
(Appellant)  
 
[2011] UKSC 38 
243. Lucasfilm Limited and others (Appellants) v Ainsworth and another 
(Respondents)  
 
[2011] UKSC 39 
244. Jivraj (Respondent) v Hashwani (Appellant); Jivraj (Appellant) v 
Hashwani (Respondent)  
 
[2011] UKSC 40 
245. Autoclenz Limited (Appellant) v Belcher and others (Respondents)  
 
[2011] UKSC 41 
246. Houldsworth and another (Respondents) v Bridge Trustees Limited 
and another (Respondents) and Secretary of State for Work and 
[2011] UKSC 42 
337 
 
Pensions (Appellant)  
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Annex 2: Coding 
 
Functional Variables 
 
Name of Case 
(a) Name of case 
House of Lords/ Supreme Court 
(a) House of Lords (1) 
(b) Supreme Court (2) 
Year/Session of Decision 
 
(a) HL; 2007-2008 (1) 
(b) HL; 2008-2009 (2) 
(c) SC; 2009-2010 (3) 
(d) SC; 2010-2011 (4) 
Case Category  
Human Rights 
(a) Article 1-Jurisdiction (78) 
(b) Article 2 - Right to Life (1) 
(c) Article 3- Prohibition of Torture (2) 
(d) Article 4- Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour (3) 
(e) Article 5- Right to Liberty and Security (4) 
(f) Article 6- Right to a Fair Trial (5) 
(g) Article 7- No Punishment without Law (6) 
(h) Article 8- Right to Respect for Private and Family Life (7) 
(i) Article 9- Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (8) 
(j) Article 10- Freedom of Expression (9) 
(k) Article 11- Freedom of Assembly and Association (10)  
(l) Article 12- Right to Marry (11) 
(m) Article 13- Effective Remedy (12) 
(n) Article 14- Prohibition of Discrimination (13) 
(o) Article 15- Derogation from the Convention (14) 
(p) Article 16- Restrictions on Political Activity of Aliens (15)  
(q) Article 17- Prohibition of abuse of Rights (16) 
(r) Article 18- Limitation of Restrictions on Rights (17) 
(s) Article 1 Part II First Protocol- Protection of Property (18)  
(t) Article 2 Part II First Protocol- Right to Education (19) 
(u) Article 3 Part II First Protocol- Right to free elections (20) 
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(v)  Part 3 Article 1 of The Thirteenth Protocol - Abolition of the death penalty (21) 
 
Domestic Constitutional, Administrative or Public Law matters 
(a) Immigration (22) 
(b) Family Law (23) 
(c) Racial Discrimination (75) 
(d) Disability Discrimination (76) 
(e) Data Protection (77) 
(f) Local government (24) 
(g) Administrative law (25) 
(h) Social Security/ Welfare (26)  
(i) Police (27) 
(j) Tax (28) 
(k) Sentencing (29) 
(l) Administration of Justice (30) 
(m) Housing (31) 
(n) Constitutional Law (32) 
(o) Planning (33) 
(p) Civil Procedure/ Evidence (34) 
(q) Armed Forces (35) 
(r) Education (36)  
(s) Media and Entertainment (public parties) (37) 
(t) Health (public parties) (38) 
(u) Terrorism (39) 
(v) Devolution Issue raised in a Scottish decision (40) 
(w) Criminal Procedure/ Evidence (41) 
(x) Criminal Law (42) 
 
Private Party/ Law of Obligations  
(a) Landlord and Tenant (43) 
(b) Real Property (44) 
(c) Contracts (45) 
(d) Tort (46) 
(e) Media and Entertainment (private parties) (47) 
(f) Personal injury (48) 
(g) Health and safety (49) 
(h) Intellectual Property (50)  
(i) Employment (51) 
(j) Construction (52) 
(k) Consumer law (53)  
(l) Damages (54) 
(m) Mental Health (55) 
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(n) Equity (56) 
(o) Health (private parties) (57) 
(p) Insurance (58) 
(q) Shipping (59) 
(r) Succession (60) 
(s) Accountancy (61) 
(t) Animals (62) 
(u) Commercial Law (63) 
(v) Company Law (64) 
(w) Energy (65) 
(x) Environment (66) 
(y) Insolvency (67) 
(z) Rates  (68) 
(aa) Restitution (69) 
(bb) Pensions (79) 
 
International (other than Human Rights) 
(a) Extradition (70) 
(b) European Union (71) 
(c) International Law  (72) 
(d) Competition Law (73) 
(e) Conflict of Laws (74) 
Administrative Efficiency Variables 
Length of Case 
(a) 1 day (1) 
(b) 2 days (2) 
(c) 3 days (3)  
(d) 4 days (4) 
(e) 5 days (5) 
(f) Longer than 5 days (6) 
 
Judgment Gap 
(a) No of days between hearing case and handing down judgment. 
Length of judgment 
(a) No of pages of judgment 
 
Panel Size 
(a) 5 Justices (1) 
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(b) 7 Justices (2) 
(c) 9 Justices (3) 
(d) 3 Justices (4) 
Single Judgment 
(a) No (1) 
(b) Yes-composite or collective judgment  (2) 
(c) Yes- single judgment with formal concurrences (3) 
Decision Splits 
Combinations on the way a judgment can be split 
(a) Unanimous 
(b) 4/1 
(c) 3/2 
(d) 6/1 
(e) 5/2 
(f) 4/3 
(g) 8/1 
(h) 7/2 
(i) 6/3 
(j) 5/4 
 
For each Combination above, the coding below will indicate whether any of the issues in the case 
were decided in that combination;  
(a) This combination was not present on any issue (0) 
(b) 1 issue and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations) on that issue (1) 
(c) 2 issues and unanimous (or any other the above combinations) in both issues (2) 
(d) 2 issues and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations) in 1 issue(3) 
(e) 3 issues and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations) in all 3 issues (4) 
(f) 3 issues and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations) in 1 issue (5) 
(g) 3 issues and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations) in 2 issues (6) 
(h) 4 issues and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations) in 1 issue (7) 
(i) 4 issues and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations)in 2 issues (8) 
(j) 4 issues and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations) in 3 issues (9) 
(k) 4 issues and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations) in all 4 issues (10) 
(l) 5 issues and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations) in 1 issue (11) 
(m) 5 issues and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations)on 2 issues (12) 
(n) 5 issues and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations) on 3 issues (13) 
(o) 5 issues and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations)on 4 issues (14) 
(p) 5 issues and unanimous (or any other of the above combinations) on all 5 issues (15) 
 
Concurring opinions 
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(a) None (0) 
(b) One (1) 
(c) Two (2) 
(d) Three (3) 
(e) Four (4) 
 
Dissenting opinions 
(a) None (0) 
(b) One (1) 
(c) Two (2) 
(d) Three (3) 
(e) Four (4) 
Relations with other Branches of State Variables 
Finding against the Executive? 
(a) Not applicable (0) 
(b) Yes (1) 
(c) No (2) 
Relations with Lower Courts variables 
Originating Court 
(a) Court of Appeal Civil Division (1) 
(b) Court of Appeal Criminal Division (2) 
(c) High Court (3) 
(d) High Court of Justiciary (4) 
(e) Court of Session (5) 
(f) Northern Ireland Court of Appeal (6) 
(g) Northern Ireland High Court (7) 
 
Result of Lower Court 
(a) Unanimous (1) 
(b) Divided (2) 
 
Over-rule Lower Court 
(a) Yes (1) 
(b) No (2) 
(c) Reversed in part (3) 
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Does the lower court follow established precedent? 
(a) No precedent followed (1) 
(b) Yes- precedent set by House of Lords/Supreme Court? (2) 
(c) Yes- precedent set by lower court? (3) 
 
Domestic Citations 
(a) No of different Domestic Courts cited from a separate legal jurisdiction (2 different cases 
from one court will be counted as 2). 
 
Relations with overseas courts variables 
Relationship with Strasbourg 
Strasbourg citations 
(a) The number of Strasbourg authorities cited in any case. 
Is the decision in line with Strasbourg? 
(a) Not applicable (0) 
(b) Yes(1) 
(c) No (2) 
(d) Justices unsure of what Strasbourg line of authority is (3) 
Relationship with CJEU 
CJEU Reference 
(a) Not applicable (0) 
(b) Yes (1) 
(c) No (2) 
CJEU citations 
(a) the number of ECJ cases mentioned in each case. 
Variables Measured for Post Thesis Study 
Voting Pattern Variables 
For each of the following Justices;  
UK Supreme Court 
(a) Lord Phillips 
(b) Lord Hope 
(c) Lord Walker 
(d) Lady Hale 
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(e) Lord Brown 
(f) Lord Mance 
(g) Lord Kerr 
(h) Lord Clarke 
(i) Lord Dyson 
(j) Lord Wilson 
(k) Lord Rodger 
(l) Lord Collins 
(m) Lord Saville 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (Law Lords who did not also sit in the Supreme Court) 
(a) Lord Scott 
(b) Lord Neuberger 
(c) Lord Bingham 
(d) Lord Hoffmann 
(e) Lord Carswell 
(f) Lord Mance 
(g) Lord Cullen 
Extra Judges who can be called upon to sit 
(a) Lord Judge 
Decision making patterns as follows; 
(a) Not present (0) 
(b) 1 issue present in the majority (1) 
(c) 1 issue present in the dissent (2) 
(d) 2 issues- present in majority on both (3) 
(e) 2 issues- dissent in both (4) 
(f) 2 issues-majority in 1; dissent in 1 (5) 
(g) 3 issues present in majority in all 3 (6) 
(h) 3 issues-dissent in all 3 (7) 
(i) 3 issues-majority in 2; dissent in 1 (8) 
(j) 3 issues-majority in 1; dissent in 2 (9) 
(k) 4 issues-dissent in all 4 (10) 
(l) 4 issues-majority in 3; dissent in 1 (11) 
(m) 4 issues-majority in 2; dissent in 2 (12) 
(n) 4 issues-majority in 1; dissent in 3 (13) 
(o) 4 issues-present in majority in all 4 (14) 
(p) 5 issues- dissent in all 5 (15) 
(q) 5 issues-majority in 4; dissent in 1 (16) 
(r) 5 issues-majority in 3; dissent in 2 (17) 
(s) 5 issues majority in 2; dissent in 3 (18) 
(t) 5 issues-majority in 1; dissent in 4 (19) 
(u) 5 issues-majority in all 5 (20) 
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Academic citations 
(a) No of different academic resources cited. 
The break-out table is designed to find out more about the scholarly resources that the judges most 
often refer to in their judgments.  The above numbers were coded into SPSS, with further detail as to 
the specific journal or book provided in a break out table; 
• Academic Journal 
• Book (including textbooks and monograph)  
• Extra judicial authority (Government Report, Law Commission Report, Lecture, 
Contribution to Government Report, Hansard etc) 
International Citations 
(a) No of different International Courts cited (2 different cases from one court will be counted 
as 2) 
European Citations 
(a) No of different European Courts cited (2 different cases from one court will be counted as 2). 
 Intervener present? 
(a) Yes (1) 
(b) No (0) 
Plus a break out table to establish which organisation intervenes the most often. 
Intervention Citations 
(a) Not applicable (0) 
(b) One (1) 
(c) Two (2)  
(d) Three (3) 
(e) Four (4) 
(f) Five (5) 
(g) Greater than five (6) 
(h) Not mentioned (7) 
Annex 3: Data Analysis Questions by Variable 
 
(1) Length of case Average no of days to hear the case for each session and for each court, including 
mean, range etc.  Any significant difference?  Any outliers and why?   
 
346 
 
(i) Lower Court factors 
 Does the length of the hearing increase if the CA is overturned and does it make a 
difference to length if the CA is overturned and the CA believed that they were following 
precedent? 
 Does the length of hearing increase if the CA is divided? 
 Does the length of the hearing increase depending on which court the appeal originated 
from? 
  Does the length of the hearing increase depending on whether the CA were or were not 
following any precedent? 
(ii) External Court Factors 
 Does the length of the hearing increase if there are a larger number of Strasbourg or 
International or European or Domestic citations included in the judgment (suggesting 
that these cases were cited to and considered by the court in the actual hearing)? 
 Does the no of days taken to hear the case increase or decrease if a reference is made to 
the ECJ? 
 Does the no of days taken to hear a case increase if Strasbourg guidance is not being 
followed? 
 
(iii) Volume of academic commentary included in case 
 Does the length of the hearing increase if there is a larger amount of academic 
commentary included in the judgment which is finally handed down?  
 
(iv) Whether or not there is an intervention  
 
 Does the length of the hearing increase if an intervener intervenes on the case? 
 
(v) Judge related factors 
 Does the average length of hearing increase when the number of judges on the panel 
increases? 
 Is there a correlation between a particular judge sitting on a case and the average length 
of case increasing/ decreasing?  
 Is the length of the hearing less where only a single judgment is delivered? 
 Does the length of the hearing increase the more concurring judgments and/or 
dissenting judgments that are provided in the judgment? 
 Does the length of the hearing increase if the judges are not unanimous on all issues? 
 
(vi) Type of case/ Issues to be heard 
 Is there a correlation between the length of the hearing and any particular subject 
matter? 
 
(vii) Executive related matters 
 Does the length of hearing increase if the case involves the Executive and/ or overturns 
the Executive? 
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(2) Judgment Gap The average no of days for each session and for each court, including mean, 
range etc.  Any significant difference?  Any outliers and why?   
 
(i) Size of case factors (Volume of material/ Difficulty of Case/ Importance of case) 
 Is there a correlation between length of case and judgment gap i.e. do the shorter cases 
to hear take a shorter time period to produce a judgment?  
 Is there a correlation between the length of the judgment in pages and the time taken to 
hand down the judgment? 
 
(ii) Lower Court Factors 
 Does the Judgment Gap increase if the CA is overturned? 
 Does the Judgment Gap increase if the CA is divided? 
 Does the Judgment Gap appear to increase depending on whether the CA was or was 
not following any precedent? 
 Does the Judgment Gap increase depending on which court the appeal originated from? 
 
(iii) External Court Factors 
 Is the Judgment Gap affected by a reference to the ECJ? 
 Does the Judgment Gap increase if there are more Strasbourg/European/ International/ 
Domestic citations? 
 Does the Judgment Gap increase if the Strasbourg guidance is not being followed? 
 
(iv) Volume of academic commentary included in case  
 Does the Judgment Gap increase the more academic citations are included in the case? 
(v) Whether or not there is an intervention? 
 Does the Judgment Gap increase if an intervener intervenes on the case? 
(vi) Judge Related factors 
 Is there a correlation between a particular judge sitting on a case and the judgment gap 
increasing/ decreasing?  
 Is the Judgment Gap affected if the size of panel of judges increases? 
 Does the judgment gap increase or decrease where only a single judgment is produced 
in the case? 
 Does the judgment gap increase the more concurring judgments and/or dissenting 
judgments that are provided? 
 Does the Judgment gap increase if the judges are not unanimous on all issues? 
 
(vii) Type of Case/ Issues to be heard 
 Is the Judgment Gap greater for any particular subject matter? 
 
(viii) Executive related matters 
 Does the judgment gap increase if the case involves the Executive and/ or overturns the 
Executive? 
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(3) No of pages for each session and for each court, including mean, range etc.  Any significant 
difference?  Any outliers and why?   
In determining ‘why’ the no of pages in the judgment may be increasing/ decreasing the 
following answers would be useful: 
(i) Lower Court factors 
 Do the no of pages increase if the CA is overturned? 
 Do the no of pages increase if the CA is divided? 
 Do the no of pages appear to increase depending on whether the CA was or was not 
following any precedent? 
 Does the length of case increase or decrease depending on which court the appeal 
originated from? 
 
(ii) External Court factors 
 Do the no of pages increase if there are more Strasbourg/European/ International/ 
Domestic citations? 
 Do the number of pages in the judgment decrease where there is a reference to the ECJ? 
 
(iii) Volume of academic commentary included in case 
 Do the no of pages increase the more academic citations are included in the case? 
 
(iv) Whether or not there is an intervention  
 Do the no of pages increase if an intervener intervenes on the case? 
 
(v) Judge Related factors  
 Is the no of pages less where a single judgment is delivered? 
 Is there a correlation between a particular judge sitting on a case and the average no of 
pages increasing/ decreasing?  
 Do the no of pages increase when the number of judges on the panel increases? 
 Do the no of pages increase the more concurring judgments and/or dissenting 
judgments that are provided? 
 Do the no of pages increase if the judges are not unanimous on all issues? 
 
(vi) Subject matter/ Issues under Appeal related matters 
 Is there a correlation between the no of pages  and any particular subject matter? 
 
(vii) Executive related matters 
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 Do the number of pages increase if the case involves the Executive and/ or overturns the 
Executive? 
 
(4) Originating Court for each session and for each court, the differences in where the appeal 
originates from This feeds into research questions for the other variables. 
 
(5) Result of lower court- Is the rate of overturn of the lower court affected by whether the lower 
court was unanimous or divided? Is there a difference between the various originating courts in 
terms of how often they are unanimous and how often they are divided? This feeds into 
research questions for the other variables. 
 
(6) Overrule lower court- for each session and for each court what is the rate of over-rule?  Has this 
changed in any significant way? 
Factors which could be relevant to the CA being over-ruled; 
(i) Judge related factors 
 Is any particular judge present on the panel more often when the CA is over-ruled? 
 Does the SC/HL tend to be unanimous when it over-rules the CA? 
 Are there more instances of single opinions when the CA is being over-ruled? 
 Do the Judges sit in larger panels when the CA is being over-ruled? 
 Are there more dissenting/ concurring opinions when the CA is overruled? 
 
(ii) CA related factors  
 Is there one particular lower court that gets over-ruled more often than others and is 
this the same throughout all sessions? 
 Is the CA more likely to be over-ruled where they are or are not following either HL or 
CA precedent. 
 Is the CA more likely to be over-ruled where it is divided? 
 
(iii) Subject matter/ Issues under appeal related factors 
 Is there any particular subject matter of case that causes the CA to be over-ruled? 
 
(iv) Academic citations  
 Do the SC/ HL cite more academics when the CA is being over-ruled? 
 
(v) External Court related factors 
 When the CA is overturned is there more Strasbourg, International, European or 
domestic citations made. 
 
(vi) Executive related factors 
 Is the CA more likely to be overturned in cases that involve the Executive? 
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 In cases where the CA are overturned, are there any instances of a finding against the 
Executive by the SC/HL in that case? 
 
(7) Following established precedent- for each session and each court have the rates at which the 
lower court is following precedent changed?  Is this change significant? 
 Does any particular lower court follow established precedent more than others? 
 Is it more common to follow HL precedent or CA precedent and does this vary between 
the various lower courts? 
 How does following precedent affect the rate of overturn? 
 Is there any particular subject matter of case in which the CA are more likely to follow 
precedent? 
 Are they more likely to follow precedent in cases which involve the Executive? 
 Are they more likely to follow precedent in cases that involve a Strasbourg related 
matter? 
 
(8) No of academic citations- average nos for each session and for each court, including mean, 
range etc.  Any significant change? 
 
Factors which could explain an increase/decrease in academic citations; 
(i) The particular subject matter/ issues in the case 
 Do the no of academic citations increase with any particular subject matter? 
 
(ii) Judge related factors 
 Does the no of academic citations increase when any particular judge is on the panel? 
 Do the number of academic citations increase when the judges are divided? 
 Do the number of academic citations increase when the panel of Justices increases? 
 Are there more Academic citations in single opinion cases? 
 Are there more Academic citations in cases where more concurring or more dissenting 
opinions are given? 
 
(iii) Executive related factors 
 Do the number of academic citations increase when it is a case involving the Executive 
and especially in cases where the Executive is overturned? 
 
(iv) Lower court related factors 
 Do the number of academic citations increase when the CA is overturned (and is this 
true for each of the different lower courts) and if so did the CA believe that they were 
following precedent? 
 Are there more academic citations in cases where the CA is overturned and they were 
unanimous? 
 
(v) Intervener present 
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 Do the number of academic citations increase when there is an intervener present? 
 
(vi) Efficiency of the Court matters 
 The volume of academic citations also feeds into judgment length, judgment gap and  
length of case- see above. 
 
(vii) External Courts 
 Any link between the no of International, European, Domestic and Strasbourg citations 
and the no of academic citations that are made in the case? 
 
(9) No of International citations- average nos of citations for each session and for each court, 
including mean, range etc.  Any significant change? 
 
Factors which could be relevant in an increase in International citations; 
(i) The particular subject matter/ issues in the case 
 Does the no of International citations increase with any particular subject matter? 
 
(ii) Judge related factors 
 Does the no of International citations increase when any particular judge is on the 
panel? 
 Does the no of International citations increase when the judges are divided? 
 Do the number of International citations increase when the panel of Justices increases? 
 Are there more International citations in single opinion cases? 
 Are there more International citations in cases where more concurring or more 
dissenting opinions are given? 
 
(iii) Executive related factors 
 Do the number of International citations increase when it is a case involving the Executive 
and especially in cases where the Executive is overturned? 
 
(iv) Lower court related factors 
 Do the number of International citations increase when the CA is overturned (and is this true 
for each of the different lower courts) and if so did the CA believe that they were following 
precedent? 
 Are there more International citations in cases where the CA is overturned and they were 
unanimous? 
 
(v) Intervener present 
 Do the number of International citations increase when there is an intervener present? 
 
352 
 
(vi) Efficiency of the Court matters 
 This also feeds into judgment length, judgment gap and length of case- see above. 
 
(vii) External Courts 
 Any link between the no of International, European, Domestic and Strasbourg citations and 
the no of academic citations that are made in the case? 
 
(10)  No of European citations-average nos for each session and for each court, including mean, 
range etc.  Any significant change? 
 
(i) The particular subject matter/ issues in the case 
 Does the no of European citations increase with any particular subject matter? 
 
(ii) Judge related factors 
 Do the no of European Citations increase when any particular judge is on the panel? 
 Do the no of European Citations increase when the judges are divided? 
 Do the no of European Citations increase when the panel of Justices increases? 
  Are there more or less European  citations in single opinion cases? 
 Are there more European citations in cases where more concurring or more dissenting 
opinions are given? 
(iii) Executive related factors 
 Do the number of European Citations increase when it is a case involving the Executive and 
especially in cases where the Executive is overturned? 
(iv) Lower court related factors 
 Do the number of European citations increase when the CA is overturned (and is this true for 
each of the different lower courts) and if so did the CA believe that they were following 
precedent? 
 Are there more European citations in cases where the CA is overturned and they were 
unanimous? 
 
(v) Intervener present 
 Do the number of European citations increase when there is an intervener present? 
(vi) Efficiency of the Court matters 
 This variable also feeds into judgment length, judgment gap and length of case- see above. 
(vii) External Courts 
353 
 
 Any link between the no of International, European, Domestic and Strasbourg citations and 
the no of academic citations that are made in the case? 
(11) No of domestic citations- average nos for each session and for each court, including mean, 
range etc.  Any significant change? 
 
(i) The particular subject matter/ issues in the case 
 Does the no of Domestic citations increase with any particular subject matter? 
(ii) Judge related factors 
 Do the no of Domestic Citations increase when any particular judge is on the panel? 
 Do the no of Domestic Citations increase when the judges are divided? 
 Do the no of Domestic Citations increase when the panel of Justices increases? 
 Are there more Domestic citations in single opinion cases? 
 Are there more Domestic citations in cases where more concurring or more dissenting 
opinions are given? 
 
(iii) Executive related factors 
 Do the number of Domestic Citations increase when it is a case involving the Executive and 
especially in cases where the Executive is overturned? 
(iv) Lower court related factors 
 Do the number of Domestic citations increase when the CA is overturned (and is this true for 
each of the different lower courts) and if so did the CA believe that they were following 
precedent? 
 Do the number of Domestic citations increase when the appeal originates from any 
particular lower court? 
 Are there more domestic citations in cases where the CA is overturned and they were 
unanimous? 
 
(v) Intervener present 
 Do the number of Domestic citations increase when there is an intervener present? 
 
(vi) Efficiency of the Court matters 
 This also feeds into judgment length, judgment gap and length of case- see above. 
(viii) External Courts 
 Any link between the no of International, European, Domestic and Strasbourg citations and 
the no of academic citations that are made in the case? 
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(12) Case categories- As well as feeding into the analysis on the other variables, it would be useful to 
see whether any case categories have reduced or increased significantly between the years and 
the courts. 
 
(13) Finding against the Executive- Has there been any significant change in the no of cases that 
involve the executive and also the rate of finding against the Executive between the sessions and 
between the courts? 
 
(i) Lower Court related matters 
 Do the cases involving the Executive tend to originate from one particular lower court? 
 Does the lower court tend to be unanimous on these Executive related decisions? 
 What is the rate of overturn of the lower court in cases that involve the Executive and in 
which of those overturned cases does the CA feel that it was following precedent? 
 
(ii) The particular subject matter/ issues on the case 
 Do the cases involving the Executive correlate to any particular subject matter? 
 
(iii) Judge related matters 
 Do the cases involving the Executive tend to have a higher than average instance of larger 
panels of judges sitting on the case? 
 Does one particular judge have a higher than average presence on cases involving the 
Executive? 
 Do cases involving the Executive tend to be unanimous decisions or is there division? 
 Do cases involving the Executive tend to have a higher occurrence of single judgments? 
 Do cases involving the Executive have a higher number of concurring or dissenting opinions? 
 
(iv) Intervener presence 
 Do interveners intervene more frequently on cases that involve the Executive? 
 
(v) External Courts 
 Is there a higher instance of Strasbourg citations, EC citations, International or European 
citations in cases that involve the Executive? 
 
(vi) Academic citations 
 Is there a higher instance of academic citations in cases that involve the Executive? 
 
(vii) Efficiency of the Courts matters 
 Does the involvement of the Executive on the case increase the judgment gap judgment 
length or no of days taken to hear the case. 
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(14) Concurring judgments- how many concurring judgments are there on average and has this 
increased or decreased for each session and for each court in any significant way? 
 
Factors which may affect this 
(i) Judge related matters 
 Do the number of concurring opinions given increase when the no of judges sitting on the 
case increases? 
 Do the number of concurring opinions decrease when the SC/HL is unanimous on all issues? 
 Do the number of concurring opinions increase when the SC/HL is divided on at least one 
issue? 
 Does the number of concurring opinions increase when there is also dissenting opinions on 
the case? 
 
(ii) Lower court matters 
 Does the number of concurring opinions increase when the CA is being overturned and does 
it make a difference whether the SC/HL is overturning a unanimous or a divided CA? 
 Are there more instances of concurring opinions when the case originates from a particular 
lower court? 
 Do the no of concurring opinions increase where the SC/HL is overturning a CA that believes 
it is following precedent and does it make a difference whether it is HL or CA precedent? 
 
(iii) Executive related matters 
 Does the number of concurring opinions increase when the case involves the Executive and 
in particular when the Executive is being overturned? 
 
(iv) Administrative matters 
 Does the number of concurring opinions provided increase the length of the judgment and 
the length of the judgment gap? 
 
(v) Subject matter/ issues in case  
 Does the number of concurring opinions increase when a particular subject matter is 
involved? 
 
(vi) External Court related matters 
 Do the number of concurring opinions increase where the Strasbourg line of authority is 
rejected? 
 Do the number of concurring opinions increase where a reference is or is not being made to 
the ECJ? 
 As the no of concurring opinions increases does this result in an increase in Domestic/ 
European/ International/ Strasbourg or EC citations? 
 
(vii) Academic related matters 
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 As the no of concurring opinions increases does this result in an increase in academic 
citations? 
 
(15) Dissenting opinions- how many dissenting judgments are there on average and has this 
increased or decreased for each session and for each court in any significant way? 
 
(i) Judge related matters 
 Does the number of dissenting opinions given increase when the no of judges sitting on the 
case increases? 
 
(ii) Lower Court matters 
 Do the number of dissenting opinions increase when the CA is being overturned and is this 
still true where the CA is being overturned and is unanimous or being overturned believes it 
is following firstly  HL and secondly CA precedent? 
 Is there more instances of dissenting opinions when the case originates from a particular 
lower court? 
 
(iii) Executive related matters 
 Does the number of dissenting opinions increase when the case involves the Executive 
and/or where the Executive is being overturned? 
 
(iv) Administrative matters  
 Does the number of dissenting opinions provided increase the length of the judgment and 
the length of the judgment gap? 
 
(v) Subject matter/ Issues in case 
 Does the number of dissenting opinions increase when a particular subject matter is 
involved? 
 
(vi) External Court related matters 
 Do the number of dissenting opinions increase where the Strasbourg line of authority is 
rejected? 
 Do the number of dissenting opinions increase where a reference is or is not being made to 
the ECJ? 
 Does a higher no of dissents result in a corresponding increase in International/ Domestic/ 
European, Strasbourg or EC Citations? 
(viii) Academic matters 
 Does a higher no of dissents result in a corresponding increase in Academic Citations? 
 
(16) Single Judgment- how many single judgments are there on average and has this increased or 
decreased for each session and for each court in any significant manner? 
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(i) Efficiency 
 Has the most common type of single judgment given changed between sessions and years? 
 Does the single judgment reduce average judgment length, judgment gap and length of 
hearing? 
 
(ii) Subject matter/ Issues in case 
 Do single judgments occur more often for any particular subject matter of case? 
 
(iii) Lower Court related matters  
 Do single judgments occur more often when the case originates from any particular court? 
 Do single judgments occur more often when the CA is being overturned and does it matter if 
the CA is being overturned and unanimous or overturned and believes that it is following 
firstly HL or secondly CA precedent? 
 
(iv) Judge related matters 
 Do single judgments only occur where there are 5 Justices on the panel? 
 Is there one particular judge who is present most often when single judgments are handed 
down? 
 
(v) Executive related matters 
 Do single judgments ever occur where the case involves the Executive and do they ever 
occur where the Executive is being overturned? 
 
(vi) External Court related matters  
 Does the average no of Strasbourg, EC, European, International and Domestic comparative 
citations decrease in cases where a single judgment is delivered? 
 
(vii) Academic related matters 
 Does the average no of academic citations decrease in cases where a single judgment is 
delivered? 
 
(17) No of Strasbourg authorities- how many Strasbourg authorities are cited on average and has 
this increased or decreased for each session and for each court? [Adam- The stats will need to 
be worked out on the basis of all the cases in the sample and then again just including the 
cases that involved consideration of Strasbourg jurisprudence i.e. those that either followed or 
rejected the Strasbourg line of authority and did not have a ‘not applicable’ marked in that 
column.) 
(i) The particular subject matter/ issues in the case 
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 Does the no of Strasbourg citations increase with any particular subject matter? 
(ii) Judge related factors 
 Do the no of Strasbourg Citations increase when any particular judge is on the panel? 
 Do the no of Strasbourg Citations increase when the judges are divided? 
 Do the no of Strasbourg Citations increase when the panel of Justices increases? 
 Are there more or less Strasbourg citations in single opinion cases? 
 Are there more Strasbourg citations in cases where more concurring or more dissenting 
opinions are given? 
(iii) Executive related factors 
 Do the number of Strasbourg Citations increase when it is a case involving the Executive and 
especially in cases where the Executive is overturned. 
(iv) Lower court related factors 
 Do the number of Strasbourg citations increase when the CA is overturned (and is this true 
for each of the different lower courts) and if so did the CA believe that they were following 
either HL or CA precedent? 
 Do the number of Strasbourg citations increase when the appeal originates from any 
particular lower court? 
 Do the number of Strasbourg citations increase where the CA is overturning a unanimous CA 
(v) Intervener present 
 Do the number of Strasbourg citations increase when there is an intervener present? 
(vi) Efficiency of the Court matters 
 This also feeds into judgment length, judgment gap and length of case- see above. 
(vii) External Courts 
 Any link between the no of International, European, Domestic and Strasbourg citations and 
the no of academic citations that are made in the case? 
(18) Case in line with Strasbourg- how many instances has there been for each session which 
involves a Strasbourg line of authority and has this increased or decreased for each session and 
for each court? How many instances are there of the judges rejecting the Strasbourg line of 
authority and has this increased or decreased for each session and for each court in any 
significant way? 
 
(i) Subject matter/ Issue related matters 
 Does any particular subject matter result in a greater instance of rejecting the Strasbourg 
line? 
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(ii) Judge related matters 
 Does any particular judge sit most often on Strasbourg cases? 
 Is any particular judge present most often when the Strasbourg line of authority is rejected 
or where it is unclear what the Strasbourg line of authority is? 
 When the Strasbourg line is rejected or unclear does that result in an increase in Justices 
sitting on the panel? 
 When Strasbourg jurisprudence is under consideration does this result in a greater or lesser 
no of concurring and dissenting judgments and does it make a difference whether the 
Strasbourg line of authority is being accepted or rejected. 
 
(iii) Efficiency of Court matters 
 When the Strasbourg line is rejected or unclear does that result in a longer judgment or a 
wider judgment gap or a longer hearing? 
 When the case involves consideration of Strasbourg jurisprudence does that result in a 
longer judgment or a wider judgment gap or a longer hearing? 
 
(iv) Executive related matters  
 When the Strasbourg line is rejected or unclear, how often is that also a case which involves 
the Executive and where it is rejected, is that a finding for or against the Executive? 
 
(v) External Court related matters 
 When a case involves Strasbourg jurisprudence is there a greater or lesser than average no 
of International Citations, European Citations or Domestic citations? Does this change if the 
Strasbourg line of authority is rejected? 
 
(vi) Academic related matters 
 When a case involves Strasbourg jurisprudence is there a greater or lesser than average no 
of Academic citations? Does this change if the Strasbourg line of authority is rejected? 
 
(19) Was reference made to the ECJ- How many times for each court and also for each session has 
the case involved a reference to the ECJ and as a proportion of those cases how many times has 
the court made a reference and declined to make a reference? Is there any significant 
difference? 
 
(i) External Court related matters 
 Are there more EC authorities cited in cases that involve a reference either being made or 
not being made to the ECJ than where a reference is not considered? 
 Are there instances of cases where Strasbourg citations are made in cases that involve a 
reference being considered? 
 Are European Comparative Citations cited in cases where a reference to the ECJ is being 
considered? 
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(ii) Efficiency of the Court 
 Does the decision to make a ECJ reference increase the judgment gap? 
 Does the decision to make a  ECJ reference increase the judgment length? 
 
(iii) Judge related matters 
 Does a decision to make an ECJ reference tend to involve single judgments of the court? 
 Are the judges ever divided on a case where a ECJ reference is being considered? 
 Is there any one particular judge who sits on a case more often where a ECJ reference is 
being considered? 
 
(iv) Academic related matters 
 Does the average no of academic citations increase or decrease where a reference is made 
to the ECJ? 
 
(20) No of EC Authorities- Has the average no of EC citations as between sessions and courts 
increased or decreased? What is the range? Are there any significant difference between the 
years? 
(i) The particular subject matter/ issues in the case 
 Do the no of EC citations increase with any particular subject matter? 
(ii) Judge related factors 
 Do the no of EC Citations increase when any particular judge is on the panel? 
 Do the no of EC Citations increase when the judges are divided? 
 Do the no of EC Citations increase when the panel of Justices increases? 
 Are there more or less EC citations in single opinion cases? 
 Are there more EC citations in cases where more concurring opinions are given? 
 Are there more EC citations in cases where more dissenting opinions are given? 
(iii) Executive related factors 
 Do the number of EC Citations increase when it is a case involving the Executive and 
especially in cases where the Executive is overturned? 
(iv) Lower court related factors 
 Do the number of EC citations increase when the CA is overturned (and is this true for each 
of the different lower courts) and if so did the CA believe that they were following 
precedent? 
 Do the number of EC citations increase when the appeal originates from any particular lower 
court? 
 Do the number of EC Citations increase where the CA is being overturned and is unanimous? 
(v) Intervener present 
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 Do the number of EC citations increase when there is an intervener present? 
(vi) Efficiency of the Court matters 
 This also feeds into judgment length, judgment gap and length of case- see above. 
(vii) External Courts 
 Any link between the no of International, European, Domestic and Strasbourg citations and 
the no of academic citations that are made in the case? 
(21) Judges’ voting patterns- As discussed, if there is any way that you can work out which 
combination of judges sits the most often and how they vote.  Cross-tabs displaying each of the 
stats for each judge for each session though would also be useful, to see the biggest dissenter. 
This feeds into other variables in terms of levels of unanimity and how that has a bearing on 
other matters. 
 
(22) Panel Size- Pie charts would be useful in order to demonstrate any change between the sessions 
and also between the two courts in terms of the proportion of cases heard by a particular size of 
panel.  Panel Size has fed into the other variables above. 
 
(23) Decision Splits- What is the frequency of each combination of decision split as between each of 
the sessions and each of the courts and is there any significant difference? 
 
(i) Judge related matters 
 Is there less unanimity when there is a larger panel size i.e. what is the relationship between 
panel size and decision splits? 
 Is there less unanimity when any particular judge sits on the case? 
 
(ii) Executive related matters 
 Is there less unanimity where the Executive is involved in the case and indeed when the 
Executive is overturned? 
 
(iii) Lower Court related matters 
 Is there less unanimity where the CA is being overturned? Does it make a difference whether 
the overturned CA were unanimous or divided or felt that they were following precedent? 
 Is there less unanimity on cases from any particular lower court? 
 
(iv) External Court related matters 
 Is there less unanimity in cases which involve Strasbourg and indeed where the Strasbourg 
line is not being followed? 
 Is there less unanimity where an EC reference is made? 
 Is there a correlation between, no of International Court citations, No of European Citations, 
No of Strasbourg citations and No of EC citations and the level of unanimity in the case i.e. 
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the less unanimity that there is in the court, the more the judges feel the need to cite from 
these other resources. 
 
(v) Efficiency of Court matters 
 Is it true that as unanimity levels are lower, there is an increase in hearing length, judgment 
length and judgment gap? 
 
(vi) Intervener present 
 Are levels of unanimity affected by the presence of an intervener? 
 
(vii) Academic matters 
 Do the numbers of academic citations increase as the level of unanimity in the court 
decreases? 
 
(viii) Intervener Present- Has the number of interventions increased or decreased as between 
the different sessions and the different courts and is this significant? 
 
(ix) No of references to Intervener- Have the no of references to the intervention increased 
or decreased on average as between the different sessions and also between the 
different courts? 
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